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ABSTRACT

Using a comparative-cultural perspective, this collection of essays examines the co-constructivist nature of human development in culturally organized environments. The contributions also cover a large age span--infancy to adulthood. Chapters in part 1 cover two different directions in the study of early adult-infant interaction from a comparative cultural perspective. Chapters in part 2 are devoted to child socialization in the cultural-ecological contexts of Southern Italy and India. Chapters in part 3 examine the co-construction of self in adolescence. Chapters in part 4 provide a cross-cultural analysis of the meaning of intelligence or "intellectual competence." Following an introduction to the comparative-cultural perspective (Valsiner), the chapter titles are: (1) "The Study of Early Interaction in a Contextual Perspective: Culture, Communication, and Eye Contact" (Scholmerich and others); (2) "Transformation and Construction in Social Interaction: A New Perspective on Analysis of the Mother-Infant Dyad" (Lyra and Rossetti-Ferreira); (3) "'Amoral Familism' and Child Development: Edward Banfield and the Understanding of Child Socialization in Southern Italy" (Benigni and Valsiner); (4) "Childrearing Practices Relevant for the Growth of Dependency and Competence in Children" (Sinha); (5) "Transformation of Women's Social Roles in India" (Verma); (6) "A Co-Constructivist Perspective of Life-Course Changes among Havik Brahmins in a South India Village (Ullrich); (7) "Culture and Self-Concept among Adolescents with Bicultural Parentage: A Social Constructionist Approach" (Minoura); (8) "Persons' Conception of Human Nature: A Cross-Cultural Comparison" (Oerter); (9) "The Meaning of Intellectual Competence: Views from a 'Favela'" (Oliveira); and (10) "Cultural and Environmental Influences in the Acquisition of Concepts of Intellectual Competence" (Keats). An epilogue, "Comparative-Cultural Co-Constructionism and its Discontents (Valsiner) examines some of the difficulties inherent in the comparative-cultural co-constructionist perspective. Each section begins with an editorial introduction, and each chapter includes references. (HTH)

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CHILD DEVELOPMENT WITHIN CULTURALLY STRUCTURED ENVIRONMENTS

Comparative–Cultural and Constructivist Perspectives

Volume 3

Edited by

Jaan Valsiner
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

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INTRODUCTION

Social Co-Construction of Psychological Development from a Comparative-Cultural Perspective

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Psychologists these days have become increasingly talkative about child development and its ties with the social world. The nature of these ties remains difficult to make sense of; hence or increasing interest in the integration of the "personal" and social" aspects of self-development. This interest has had its positive role to play in the field of investigation that the present volume represents. When the first two volumes of *Child Development within Culturally Structured Environments* were published by Ablex in 1988, it did not seem that the *collective constructionist* (alternatively also labeled as *co-constructivist* or *co-constructionist*) perspective that emerged from a number of the contributions would lead into further development of a full research orientation. Now, some years later, it becomes clear that the first efforts in that direction are in need of a follow-up—hence, the appearance of the present book as Volume 3 under the same general title.

Over these past few years, developmental psychologists have intensified their discourse, using the themes of "sociogenetic", "constructivist," and "co-constructivist" nature of children's development. Of course different authors have very variable ways of explaining development in these terms. The co-constructivist framework remains a heterogeneous (and therefore—open to further development) set of general ideas and methodological pursuits. This heterogeneity will be evident in the present volume, as much as it was part and parcel of its two previously published counterparts.

FROM CROSS-CULTURAL CONTRASTS TO A COMPARATIVE-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE ON CHILD DEVELOPMENT

The present book introduces a new theme to our series of volumes on child development within culturally structured environments—the comparative-cultural perspective. When contemporary psychologists hear of the *comparative-cultural* perspective, they find it usually easiest to equate it with *cross-cultural* empirical research. Whereas the tradition of cross-cultural investigation is quite widespread in psychology at large and in developmental psychology in some of its domains, I would like to separate the cross-cultural perspective from a comparative-cultural one, for reasons that should become obvious from the present volume (see also the Epilogue).

Where is "Culture" in Cross-Cultural Psychology?

Cross-cultural psychology is largely built on the basis of the projection of traditional psychological methodology onto comparisons of samples of subjects (contrasted by their "belonging" to different ethnic groups as "cultures") on the basis of some psychological "measurement instruments." It remains merely a comparison of samples—very much as is the case in the unicultural psychology—only with the nuance that the samples are "drawn" from different populations which are labeled *cultures*. This has been the main direction of methodological thought in the nondevelopmental populations-oriented mindset in psychology (see Valsiner, 1984a, 1986). A similar traditionalist habit can be seen to dominate child psychology, where different samples belonging to different age groups are endlessly being compared—without much explanation of the reasons for any age-group differences that might be found. Or, rather, the blanket term *development* is often used to provide a trivial explanation for these differences. For instance, any explanation of differences between two age groups of children can as easily be attributed to "development" having had taken place, as similar differences between two samples from different countries can be explained by "cultural influences." In both cases, the general terms used in explanation create no clarity about the causal systems that might have brought about these differences. As will be shown below, the use of both terms (culture, development) in this context entails neither a culture-oriented nor a developmental perspective in psychology.

Aside from a mere general attribution for differences between subjects to *culture*, further specific attributions about the "effects" of culture can be seen in the literature. Thus, the substantive role ascribed to culture in cross-cultural psychology is often that of "shaper" of "human behavior" (see Segall, 1979, p. 5). As such, culture in psychology has de facto been reduced to a general undefined complex of *variables* (psychologists' pet term for unexplainable complexity) that is posited to have "effects" on human beings that are well known from psychology's unicultural construction of explanatory principles. *Cultural* has become used as an umbrella term to denote a complex black box explanatory mechanism. It is therefore not surprising that cross-cultural psychology has not elaborated the notion of culture beyond an explanatory and descriptive general label (see discussions of this issue in Cole, 1985, 1989a, b; Johoda, 1984; LCHC, 1983; Rohner, 1984; Valsiner, 1989b). When necessary, cross-cultural psychologists would of course try to define *culture* in relatively all-inclusive terms, as could be evidenced from the following effort at a definition from a recent textbook on cross-culture psychology:

> Culture, by almost any definition, includes the *products of the behavior of others*, especially others who preceded us. It connotes a set social stimuli that to a very great extent have existence prior to us. Put very simply, *culture is already there for all of us as we begin life*. It contains values that will be expressed and a language in which to express them. It contains a way of life that will be followed by most of us, who through most of our lifetimes *will unquestionably assume* that there is no better.
>
> ...culture also includes language, music, and art forms. It includes preferences, appetites and aversions. It includes rules, norms, and standards. It includes hopes and fears, beliefs and attitudes, convictions and doubts, *at least to the extent that such are shared, inculcated, and transmitted from people to people*. To be considered a part of culture, anything, material or symbolic, need only be of human origin. (Segall, Dasen, Berry & Poortinga, 1990, p. 27; emphases added)

The notion of culture in contemporary cross-cultural psychology is set up as an all-inclusive human *product* that is being *exchanged* between persons and *inculcated into* the offspring. It is given the role of an external agent that interferes with psychological functions. Furthermore, in an ironic twist, on multiple occasions cross-culturally oriented psychologists have made efforts to eliminate the concept of culture (as a poorly defined entity) from cross-cultural psychology altogether, in favor of universal dimensions of psychological functioning (see Lonner, 1980; Segall, 1984; Triandis, 1977, 1978, 1989) or by way of empirical data-analytic techniques (Poortinga, 1986, 1989; Poortinga, van der Vijver, Joe, & van de Koppel, 1987; Poortinga & van de Vijver, 1978, 1988). Even when cultural relativity of psychological phenomena is emphasized together with biological and social universals in ecological contexts (Berry, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1983), the goal of the psychologists is seen in the arrival at a universal psychology that somehow integrates knowledge across topics and cultures. Culture here remains a variability-generating obstacle that needs to be transcended if our psychology can claim the status of pertaining to our species at large. The alternative—that culture (and all the psychological variability that it entails) might somehow itself be the core of human psychological functions—is left unexplored by cross-cultural psychology.

There is a continuing ambivalence in the relation to the concept of culture among psychologists who dedicate themselves to "cross-cultural research," as Keats has candidly remarked:

> A question of much interest to cross-cultural psychologists is whether there can be a "universal" of behaviour. Alternatively, are all behaviours so influenced by our cultural environment that in the logical extreme they are not really comparable? Most of us would probably wish to adopt an intermediate position on this issue, but we are then left with the intriguing problem of trying to decide in what way, and to what extent, the influence of culture is exerted upon an underlying psychological process. (1987, p. 144).

This ambivalence about cultural influences among psychologists seems to be inevitable (see also Pepitone & Triandis, 1988), given the history of cross-cultural psychology as branching off from general experimental psychology. Cross-cultural psychology started from an emphasis on generality of psychological perspectives, despite the possible evidence of variability across subgroups of human beings loosely classified into homogeneous groups under the label of culture. Since contemporary psychology has not demonstrated much insight into its own inferential logics, the flip-flopping between deductive argumentation (for desired generality of psychology's accounts) and inductively obtained knowledge (empirical investigations the demonstrate differences between cultures, not to speak of the nonapplicability of culture-based methods in other ethnic groups) leads psychologists necessarily to the "intermediate position," as indicated by Keats. By extending their trained psychological methodological inclinations to groups of subjects with backgrounds different from the investigator's, the psychologists have tried to fit the psychological phenomena into their uniculturally created categorization systems that make sense of those in terms of "variables," "standardized measurement instruments," "control," "random sampling," and other mental constructions that are so usual for any laboratory researcher. Of course, the theoretical constructions of psychologists remain usually based on their own cultural meaning systems, therefore creating self-fulfilling prophecies that lead to a rigid belief in the (selectively derived) "empirical data" as guaranteeing objectivity (see an analysis by Jahoda, 1979). Similarly to the history of development of some highly universalistic subfields of psychology (e.g., the invention of the "g-factor" and "s-factors" in the tests-based research on intelligence), cross-cultural psychology ends up creating a conceptual contrast between universal psychological functions and culture-specific adaptations of persons' psychologies to social-ecological contexts (see also Hui & Triandis, 1985). This amounts to assimilation of the information about variability of individuals' adaptational forms of psychological structures to the preexisting scheme of general psychology, without accommodation of the latter.

"Folk Models" Used by Cross-cultural Psychologists

Most of the theoretical reasoning of scientists is channeled by their (usually implicit)metatheoretical backgrounds. This background is shared by scientists and laypersons in a given culture, and guides the construction of specific theoretical systems. The "folk models" (analogous to those of laypersons—see Holland & Quinn, 1987) that guide the thinking of psychologists have had their impact on cross-cultural psychology.

Often we can find that the implicit folk models that psychologists use lead them to leave relevant questions unasked (and hence unanswered). The more general question of cross-cultural psychology that often remains unaddressed—*how* is it possible to conceptualize the mutual relations between the culture and person? LeVine (1973) has outlined four different mental models that have been used by psychologists to think of linkages between culture and personality. The first two can be described as "reductionist" positions—either culture is viewed as a construction of intrapsychological maturational processes, or all of personality is equated to a "product of culture". These simple reductionist positions parallel the "nature" versus "nurture" dispute that psychology at large had been living through, on and off, over all its history. LeVine's third mental model—"personality mediational view" (culture and person are linked via the mediational role of "modal personality") seems to be parallel with the neobehavioristic "intervening variables" notion of the 1940s and 50s. Finally, the fourth model (personality and culture interact, while each of them has its own systemic organization) seems to be a cousin to the interactionist perspective in the rest of psychology of the recent decades. Thus, the last two (nonreductionist) mental models that preserve culture in their theoretical constructions use limited repertoires of concepts to depict how the person and culture are mutually linked. The modal personality perspective emphasizes traditional psychological concepts denoting *acquisition* of personality traits from culture ("learning") as well as assuming some molding by the culture ("shaping," "socialization," "teaching"—all implying unidirectional culture transmission from the carriers of culture—adults—to children). The interactionist perspective declares the notion of *interaction* to explain the mutual linkage of the person and culture—without further specification of the ways in which this interaction takes place and how it results in the development of personality.

Furthermore, what is the *adequate level of generalizations* that cross-cultural psychology creates? As in much of the thinking of psychologists at large (see Valsiner, 1986), in the reasoning of cross-cultural psychologists the levels of analysis of individual persons and social units that subsume individuals as their parts are constantly confused. Cultural "influences" are traced both within persons and in social organizations, and the person thus becomes fused with the culture and a carrier of the latter. Of course, in the latter role the person becomes viewed as a representative of some general class features (culture), while encounters with individual carriers of culture reveal high interindividual (hence intracultural) variability in the supposedly "general characteristics." It is here that cross-cultural psychology's general assumptions about the role of culture (e.g., that of shaper of minds) and the variability within and between those minds enter an ambivalent coexistence. The usual traditional heuristic that is used to overcome that ambivalence is the use of the notion of modal (see D'Andrade, 1990, p. 118) specimens (averages or prototypes) that supposedly represent all (or at least the majority) of cases in the given class. This trick of homogenization of heterogeneity has been widely used in psychology at large (see Valsiner, 1984a), and its use in cross-cultural comparisons for homogenization of the depiction of culture is not a great innovation. It is interesting to note that the reversal of that trick—proving that heterogenity within cultures is at least as high than that between cultures (i.e., pointing to the actual heterogeneity of culture) has been used to argue in favor of *absence* of demonstrable cross-cultural differences in some areas of child psychology that entail the need to reinstate the notion of pan-human universality of the psychological issues studied (e.g., Van IJzendoorn & Kroonenberg, 1988).

Nevertheless, in some versions the focus of cross-culturally oriented psychologists reaches a position that is close to the co-constructivist perspective that is being emphasized in the present volume. thus, discussing the ways in which culture and cognition could be fitted together, Pepitone reached the understanding of how intragroup (interpersonal) variability can be a relevant resource for constructive processes:

> The proposition that culture is the ultimate determinant of social cognition clearly does not mean that culture is a maker of uniform minds. For in the first place, the prevalent meanings of social stimuli, with perhaps the exception of statutory law, are not usually fixed, unequivocal, and explicit. We have to be very careful to recognize that when we refer to shared "codes" of meaning we are being somewhat metaphorical. For good social science reasons . . . cultural meanings tend to be abstract and imprecise. It is also the case that, with respect to a given social stimulus situation, there may not exist any normative meaning at all. When this is so, the variance of cognitions contributed by individual abilities, personality, and experience would presumably be large. But individual variation is seldom fully unconstrained in the real social world. Group dynamics research shows that when strangers interact concerning stimulus material that is relatively novel to them, they soon develop standard meanings; in other words *they construct a normative "situational" culture*. (Pepitone, 1986, p. 254; emphasis added)

Indeed, the classic contributions to social psychology in the area of construction of social norms (Sherif, 1936) or the construction and reconstruction of intra- (and inter-) group relations (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) provide us with ample evidence to create a constructivist understanding of the systemic relationships between person and culture.

Cultural and Social Anthropology and the Issues of Psychology

Anthropology, similarly to psychology, has tried to conceptualize cultures as homogeneous classes where all persons "share" the culture that consists of strictly defined and relatively stable "rule," "beliefs," or "folk models" (see critical analyses of this point in Sapir, 1934; Oliver 1965). According to D'Andrade (1984, pp l. 115–116), in the present time there exist three major kinds of views on culture in anthropology. First, culture is seen as knowledge—the accumulation of information (irrespective of the extent to which that information is shared between "members of the culture"). Secondly, culture is seen as consisting of core "conceptual structures" that provide basis for intersubjectively shared representations of the world in which the persons live. This perspective does not emphasize the moment of accumulation (of information), but is rather a set of rules that makes it possible for persons to arrive at shared understandings. Finally, the third kind of views on culture treat it as construction of conceptual structures by the activities of persons.

If we carefully examine these three kinds of views of culture, we can reach an understanding that much of anthropology tries to study culture *through persons* (individual members of the culture) without taking the persons *as persons* into account. It is at the level of individual persons' reports upon their own intrapsychological (thoughts, emotions, beliefs) and interpsychological (social roles, relations, habits, rituals, .practices) phenomena that anthropology and psychology could meet in their epistemological efforts—but usually fail to do so. In an effort to protect the boundary of the discipline of anthropology, the individual persons whom the anthropologists usually study become viewed as "helpful informants" about the culture (rather than persons who have their particular goals in interaction with the anthropologists). In other terms, anthropologists are likely to make an *external attribution* of the phenomena reported by the informant to belong to the culture, and assume that the informant merely accurately reports those. In psychology, a similar "boundary defense" mechanism can be seen in selective self-blinding of the investigator in the opposite direction—whatever the subject may report to the investigator can easily become viewed as the person's own psychological phenomenon, rather than an externalization of a culturally organized and internally reconstructed understanding of the world. The psychologist may be in the habit of making an *internal attribution* for the phenomena reported by the subject, locating them exclusively "in" the "mind" of the person. Thus, stating from similarly complex phenomena, psychologists and anthropologists can derive completely different data and use those for their preconceived theoretical purposes.

However, the two disciplines have been quite closely linked in their conceptual backgrounds. In cultural anthropology from its beginnings there has been a substantial effort to look for the universals in human psychological functions (Boas, 1911), in contrast with the separation of psychological functions into qualitatively different levels (Levy-Bruhl, 1985). Even in classic descriptions of the difference of other cultures from the investigator's own (Mead, 1928), the relevance of the universality emerges through suggestions for one's own society to reorganize itself.

The associationist/holistic contrast that has haunted the history of psychology in this century has had its parallel in cultural/social anthropology (see LeVine, 1984; pp. 71–76; Silverman, 1983. pp. 14–15). On the one hand, culture happens to be defined as a "mass" of "learned and transmitted motor reactions, habits, techniques, ideas, and values—and the behavior they induce" (Kroeber, 1948, p. 8). On the other hand, culture in social anthropology has been presented as an integrated whole in which systemic interconnections between physiological drives and their transformations through social institutions were the core of the concept (Malinowski, 1944). Within that organizational perspective

> Culture is an integral composed of partly autonomous, partly coordinated institutions. It is integrated on a series of principles such as the community of blood through procreation; the contiguity in space related to cooperation; the specialization in activities; and last but not least, the use of power in political organization. Each culture owes its completeness and self-sufficiency to the fact that it satisfies the whole range of basic, instrumental and integrative needs. (p. 40)

It is at the level of culture's organization of basic human needs where the interests of anthropology and psychology come together. If culture is a means to the organization of these needs, then no serious psychological theory of human cognitive and affective processes can overlook culture as a relevant aspect of psychological functions. The fundamentality of culture in this respect leads to the question of its sharing between persons in a given society who are all considered to be carriers of the given culture. In anthropology, culture is conceptualized as either fully shared by all successfully socialized members of the culture (thus treating cultures as homogeneous groups), or as shared differentially by different persons who occupy different positions in their status, role, and social relationships with one another (see Linton, 1936; Swartz, 1982; Wallace, 1970).

Anthropologists' efforts to define culture in terms of person-linked characteristics (habits, ideas, etc.) underline the historical parallel and occasional cross-fertilization between psychology and anthropology (see Bartlett, 1937; Hallowell, 1955; Jahoda, 1982; LCHC, 1983, pp. 296–299; Serpell, 1976). Of course, in parallel with the psychology-oriented tendency in anthropology it is possible to find its opposite—a tendency towards separating culture from the phenomena that pertain to individual human beings. Still, the psychology-linked part of anthropology has created some unity in the basic concepts that the two disciplines have used to explain the linkage between culture and individual human beings. The notions of molding and shaping as describing the cultural transmission processes from generation to generation (Cohen, 1971) are used in ways parallel with psychologists' terminologies of the time. Similarly, folk models widely used in genetic transmission in biology have been transferred to culture transmission issues (Cavalli-Sforza, Feldman, Chen, & Dornbusch, 1982). The prevailing tendency in anthropological accounts of culture transmission has been to view it as a unidirectional "transmission" from the "experts" (adult carriers of culture) to the "novices" (children). The latter are usually viewed as passive (or at least obedient) recipients of whatever (cultural "traits"!) is being "transmitted." As has been pointed out elsewhere (Valsiner, 1989a, chap. 3), the adoption of the unidirectional perspective in conceptualizing culture transmission process creates a theoretical *impasse* for anthropology for reasons similar to its complication of the study of child development in psychology.

Furthermore, the concepts of *socialization* and *enculturation*, as those have been introduced in anthropology, translate the issue of culture transmission into psychological terminology—again in terms that assume an unidirectional process. Thus, *enculturation*

> is in essence of a process of *conscious or unconscious conditioning*, exercised within the limits sanctioned by a given body of custom. From this process not only is all adjustment to social living achieved, but also all those *satisfactions* that, though they are of course a part of social experience, *derive from individual expression* rather than association with others in the group. (Herskovits, 1948, p. 39; emphasis added)

The terminology used here to explain enculturation in its wide sense is explicitly psychological in its nature. Margaret Mead's separation of the terms *enculturation* (the process of *learning* a culture in all its uniqueness and particularity") and *socialization* (species-wide *requirements upon* the developing children) did not alter the dependency of anthropological terminology on its sister discipline of psychology (see Mead, 1963). Likewise, in our contemporary cognitive anthropology the notions of folk models (or *cultural models*—see Holland & Quinn, 1987) constitute a theoretical construction that is close to cognitive psychologists' reliance on "mental representations" (or "social representations"—see Farr & Moscovici, 1984). Last (but not least), in cultural anthropology an ambivalence similar to that in cross-cultural psychology exists in the domain of handling differences between cultures (see Geertz, 1973, pp. 43–44), as well as within them (between individuals—see Keesing, 1987) Cultures become "texts" that can be interpreted by active persons (rather than passive carriers of culture) in the process of making sense of everyday life events. These events are social occasions, whereas the process of interpretation by persons entails a meaning construction process.

Shared Universalistic Orientation of Anthropologists and Psychologists

As I have shown above, both psychology and anthropology have shared the dualistic emphasis in conceptualizing culture and person. Obviously, in its uses of the concept of culture the maturationist/environmentalist dualism of Western psychological thought remains in its full force. This dualistic ethos of psychology shows through this veil of cross-cultural interests (e.g., Kagan & Klein, 1973)—the person's psychological setup is maturational in its core, while different cultural-environmental conditions *force* specific modifications upon that basically similar fundamental core. The person is an occasional "victim" of the cultural environment (which may make him or her relatively "retarded" in comparison with others from other environments); hence, the coincidence in time of much of the upsurge of interest in cross-cultural psychology (at least in North American psychology) with the "discovery" of the "learning difficulties" of the "disadvantaged" child (see Cole, 1975, pp. 157–158). For educationalist this parallel opened up the domain of interest in educational intervention so as to help the "disadvantaged" to reach the level of the "advantaged"—be this within a culture, or between (see Cole & Bruner, 1971, pp. 874–875). Of course, the orientation towards educational intervention is predicated upon some version of belief in modifiability of the processes of development.

In contrast with this educationally optimistic ideology applied to cross-cultural research, the very same discovered cross-cultural differences can be interpreted in a framework of an ideology that is by far less open to development and leads to possible discrimination of one culture by another. The complete maturationist interpretation of cross-cultural differences in psychological characteristics can lead to the interpretation that some cultures are "better" than others. The possibility that psychological data can be put in the service of ideological extrascientific uses to substantiate discrimination has been recurrent in this century (ranging from British eugenicists' efforts of selection of "best stock" for future society, to the use of "Aryan personality" characteristics in Nazi practices in the 1930s). The interpretation of the very same investigation of psychological functions in a non-Western culture can change as the social framing of it changes. Luria's empirical work in Central Asia in early 1930s (see Luria, 1976; Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991) was intended (by Luria) to demonstrate the remarkable developmental potential of the "backward culture" once the new educational opportunities become available. However, Luria's critics interpreted his result as demonstrating inherent "backwardness" of the people who were building socialism in USSR.

Given the two contrasting interpretations of cross-cultural differences (and their social implications), it is not surprising that most cross-cultural psychologists have been careful either to concentrate on the search for universality across cultures, or (in case of cross-cultural differences) view those as particular adaptations to the particular environments (rather than inherent psychological characteristics of persons). Cultural anthropologists, as shown above, have equally actively avoided the dangers of direct evaluative comparison of cultures. As a result, a major epistemological paradox of cross-cultural comparisons emerges—if we find differences between cultures, then we are likely to interpret those as "local artifacts" of the "effects" of cultural environment on persons; and if we discover no differences, then that becomes easily interpretable as proof of universals. in other terms—our metatheoretical axiomatic system guarantees that whatever we find in cross-cultural research supports one of the two (environmentalist or maturationist) "world views" that unicultural (occidental) psychology carried with it well before psychologists started to take interest in studying persons from (or in) other cultures. Cross-cultural comparisons merely verify preexisting metatheories rather than help to modify those. Thus, the function cross-cultural comparisons play in psychology has little to do with different cultures at all—a paradoxical outcome in itself!

The Comparative-Cultural Approach: Comparison of Cultures-in-Persons

In contrast, if evidence from persons whose life courses have been set in cultures different from us can be of use in conceptual renovation of psychology in general, then the notion of culture may become useful in psychology. Following the emphasis that has been consistently used by Cole (1991), culture becomes a mediating vehicle in persons' relationships with one another, and with one's own self. This conceptual renovation needs to overcome the external oppositional nature of the *culture* and *person* relationship, and to replace it by one that concentrates on viewing culture within the psychological structure of a person as a systemic organizer of psychological functions. In this case, comparisons of cultures take place through comparing different forms that have emerged in case of persons' psychological processes by way of participation of the cultures in human development (as opposed to the molding or shaping notions that anthropology and cross-cultural psychology habitually use). In this way, the psychologist's comparison of different persons entails an investigation of their cultures that have guided their development. Conversely—anthropologists' comparison of cultures is possible only through recognition of the personal variability of different forms—that is, the study of culture is not separable from the persons whom we consider our "informants."

This comparative-cultural perspective is built on assumptions of construction of culturally guided forms of psychological processes in the course of development. It is therefore not surprising that a consistently developmental orientation in psychology has found it relevant to integrate cultural phenomena into its theoretical texture (Vygotsky, 1929; Werner, 1957; Werner & Kaplan, 1963). The main issue involved in development is the creation of novelty by the human beings in their individual ontongenies as well as in the history of their collective units. This function of generativity is theoretically assumable for different cultures in their semiotic representation of their external and internal (psychological) worlds:

> I can demonstrate that the conventional cross-cultural method and cross-cultural tests of causal hypotheses pertaining to symbols are for the most part meaningless. Thus, the hypothesis that if you have X, a certain motive, you would also have Y, a certain cultural symbol causally associated with it, is impossible to test on a random sample for the simple fact that Y may show degrees of symbolic elaboration ranging from the absence of Y in some societies to its fullest symbolic elaboration in others. Furthermore, the notion of substitutionability of symbols implies that where X is related to Y in one society, X would be related to a substitute symbol Z in another society, rendering predictions either dubious or outright impossible. Third, the notion of disconnection implies that a postulated correlation between X and Y may not be a true causal relation insofar as Y has become disconnected from X. . . . Finally, while X may exist, Y may not since the motive may not have its symbolic counterpart in the society simply because Y may occur as a symptom on the individual level rather than as a symbol on the cultural level. The assumptions underlying conventional tests of hypotheses in psychological anthropology are that symbolic capacity is equivalent in all human societies and that this capacity must be uniformly manifest in cultural symbol systems everywhere. (Obeyesekere, 1990, p. 62)

Obeyesekere's point is of wider relevance than the context of personal symptoms and cultural symbols in anthropology. It can be argued that psychologists' efforts to construct "culture-fair" (or "culture-free") tests constitute a case of construction of a symbolic device that becomes the basis of communication in the community of psychologists. The basic assumption behind the construction of these tests is very similar—the construct (X) is *assumed to be present in a different degree* in each person (or cultural group) to whom the test is administered, and in *the* (usually unspecified) way in which it is assumed to be manifested in the test responses (Y). The possibility that X may not be expressed in Y for some persons (or cultures), or that X may be manifested in Y differently from the way presumed by the test constructor (e.g., the possibility that *intelligence* may be expressed in the process of failing to solve a highly complex item on the test, rather than in the sum of successfully passed "easy" items) is ruled out metatheoretically. The developing person (or culture) may at any time modify the specific ways in which X and Y are connected, including a substitutional construction of a novel expression (Z) in place of Y. All this indicates that the subjects who participate in the research of psychologists (cross-cultural or unicultural alike) are constantly active in modifying their connections between the intropsychological (or intracultural) functions (X) and their externalizations (Y or Z). The theoretical relevance of this characteristic of generaltivity leads us to the need to explicate the "co-constructivist" perspective in conjunction with comparative-cultural approach in developmental psychology.

Where is "Development" in Developmental Psychology?

Similarly to questioning the whereabouts of culture on the mindscape of cross-cultural psychology, it is perfectly appropriate to ask a similar question about the meaning of the notion *development* in developmental psychology (see Benigni &

Valsiner, 1985). As was pointed out above, much of research under the label of *developmental psychology* in our present time is devoted to comparison of different age (or educational level) groups of children that reveals the superiority of some groups over others in the results of performance measures used. Attribution to development as an unspecified causal agent of these differences is rampant in developmental psychology—in ways similar to the use of culture effects in cross-cultural psychology. In general, developmental psychology has worked out a very limited set of concepts to explain developmental transformations (see Van Geert, 1988, for an analysis). Furthermore, the actual phenomena of development (i.e., the processes of transformation of the present form of psychological functions into a novel state) are easily lost in the uncritical use of data-analytic fashions in contemporary psychology (see Cairns, 1986). Hence it is not surprising that contemporary developmental psychology turns increasingly to look for inspiration in it own history, becoming fascinated by the work of such scholars of the 1920s as Lev Vygotsky or Mikhail Bakhtin (Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991; Wertsch, 1985). Indeed, the emphasis on explaining developmental phenomena (in contrast to our contemporary pastime of explaining age-group differences through the use of the concept *development*) was by far further advanced in the developmental psychology of the past than it was in the 1970s or 1980s.

Developmental psychology (narrowly defined) is aimed at revealing the laws and conditions of transformation of psychological forms into their novel states. As such, the core of all developmental science is the notion of *transformation of form* into *novel* states, where the maintenance of the previous form, in conjunction with emergence of novelty, is merely a background condition for the latter. Developmental psychology thus addresses the issue of novelty construction in ontogeny, concentrating on the holistic (structured) rather than atomistic (quantitatively accumulated) phenomena. If there were a counterpart to this perspective in cultural anthropology, it ("developmental anthropology") would address the issue of historical transformation of culture under the conditions of clinging ecological and economic conditions, on the one hand, and of activities and mental constructions of persons on the other. In both cases, developmental phenomena need to be explained by systemic causal mechanisms that link culture and person in ways that elaborate the mutually interdependent transformation of both. It is clear that the unidirectional culture transmission folk model that has been present in both anthropology and in the psychological learning theories is a major obstacle on the way towards such co-constructivist perspective. Still, even in the history of joint efforts of the "culture and personality" tradition linking psychology and anthropology, we can find ideas that come close to that perspective. Thus, Lawrence Frank's brief commentaries to a "round table" discussion in 1938 demonstrate this quite well. By suggesting an emphasis upon "how culture operates and how personality develops," Frank argued:

> culture is not some mysterious entity or mystic force floating around in the universe; culture approached operationally is the sum total of the *ways people*

> *pattern their functions and behavior into conduct* and more specifically *transmit* those patterns to their children. Culture then is a process, an activity, not an entity or a thing. It is to be studied as operating within human organisms where it has been established in their very organic structure, functioning and behavior...
>
> What we call personality then may be looked upon as that unique constellation *which the individual child develops under the impact of culture* upon his developing organism and conduct.... Thus each individual child receives a highly idiomatic or idiosyncratic version of the official culture which, *imposed upon* his unique hereditary constitution and disposition, gives rise to what we call personality. But this conception of personality is inadequate if it does not also recognize that the individual organism, while undergoing this cultural patterning, with all of its variations and peculiarities of the family situation, also develops, along with each of these cultural patterns, a persistent affective reaction to the world of people and things around him to which he *must make these required responses*. This brings us then to a realization that the individual is engaged not only in the overt conduct *demanded by* by the culture but he is also *feeling, at each moment, acceptance or rejection* of the cultural world in which he lives, *acquiescence or resistence* to its demands, and other affective disturbances as he *is forced to accept* deprivations, repressions or finds indulgences or releases.
>
> ...Personality emerges...as the unique individual organic manifestation of that culture as seen in an individual who, as a member of that group, utilized the *prescribed* cultural patterns, but *always idiomatically and with affective reactions* that are peculiarly his own. (Frank, 1938, pp. 624–625; emphasis added)

Frank's statement about the interdependence of culture and personality was certainly in line with similar perspectives of his contemporaries (Vygotsky, Sherif, G. Allport. Malinowski), and it also comes very close to a co-constructivist perspective as it has been outlined in some contributions to the first two volumes (Hill & Valsiner, 1988; Robinson, 1988; Stratton, 1988; Verdonik, 1988; Winegar, 1988), and as some contributions to the present volume undertake. It is interesting to notice the combination of terminology stemming from the unidirectional model of culture transmission (culture is *transmitted* to children; child develops *under the impact* of culture; culture is *imposed upon* the child, who *must make required responses* and is *forced* to accept *prescribed cultural patterns*) with the terminology that recognizes the active role of the *recipient* child in the construction of his or her own personality. Thus, the developing child at each moment "feels acceptance or rejection" and can accept or reject himself or herself the demands of the heterogeneous and often inconsistent cultural inputs. This active handling of the cultural messages by the developing child leads the developmental process to the construction of idiographic (idiomatic) personality of the child. While it remains true that Frank failed to conceptualize how these idiographic forms of personality are constructed by the person in his or her interaction with the culture, he came to the threshold of formulating a co-constructivist perspective in cultural development of human personality.

THE CO-CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIRROR OF COMPARATIVE-CULTURAL APPROACH

As I have demonstrated above, both cross-cultural psychology and cultural (or social) anthropology have been built on the basic assumption of duality of the person and the environment. In their different ways these disciplines (at times borrowing from each other) have tried to explain human psychological phenomena in opposite ways. Psychology has attempted to reinstate the primacy of the individual in the middle of the life-space filled with culturally meaningful objects. Or, alternatively, the person's psychological world has been presented as a result of environmental molding or shaping. In the latter focus, anthropological perspectives on human psychology have often coincided with psychologist's fallacies. If both the person and the (cultural) environment have been taken into account, the model involved has usually be the distribution of the extent of causal influences between the two (see Valsiner, 1984b), or viewing the two sides as being in competition or conflict (e.g., the usual question of nature versus nurture).

Surely a number of psychologists have tried to overcome this dualistic view on human psychology and its development by putting together some version of an "interactionist" or "transactionist" perspective (see Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Cairns, 1979; Magnusson, 1985; Sameroff, 1983, 1987), The "co-constructivist" perspective in developmental psychology grows on that basis, as the first efforts towards the advancement of that perspective indicate (Winegar, 1989; Wozniak, 1986; Youniss, 1987). Rob Wozniak outlined the interactional construction of psychological functions, emphasizing the parallel and interdependent construction process:

> experience, symbolic discourse and action are co-constructions that arise (in the here and now) in the interaction of mental structures and mental acts with physical/social objects and events and (ontogenetically) from the interaction of mind with physical/social reality. (Wozniak, 1986, p. 41)

A similar orientation towards treating culture as an inherent component in the causal interactive system of development has been advanced separately in the context of cross-cultural psychology over the recent decade (Cole, 1991; Eckensberger, 1979; Krewer & Eckensberger, 1990). Culture here ceases to be an "external agent" relative to the developing person but becomes intricately linked with every aspect of action and symbol construction in a person's life. In anthropology, the above mentioned focus on culture as text (that is to be interpreted by persons whose lives are embedded in that text) leads to a similar focus on co-construction. Culture as text appears in the context of everyday actions (including rituals). However,

> the *meanings*, or at least many of the deeper meanings a symbolist would want to uncover, are not there *as part of the text*. Many of these meanings need not be shared in public, need not be understood by those who *live* [the given] culture, follow its guidelines and procedures, stay within its boundaries. Meanings, we might better say, are not in the cultural texts, not inherent in cultural symbols, but *evoked by* them. (Keesing, 1987, p. 164)

It remains true that the subdiscipline of symbolic anthropology has only rarely so far taken a co-constructivist perspective on context and meaning in everyday life (see also Obeyesekere, 1990). The unity of co-constructivist perspectives in developmental psychology and the comparative-cultural perspective (as outlined above) becomes evident in the aspirations of investigators who at the present time make an effort to establish a discipline called *cultural psychology* (see D'Andrade, 1986; Stigler, Shweder, & Herdt, 1990; Vervaeck, 1984). Likewise, the idiosyncratic personal contributions and context-bound self-constructions that anthropologists encounter working in the field are persistently mentioned in anthropology (Ewing, 1990; Knudsen, 1990). Thus, the ground for another effort to unite culture and psychological functions seems ready to take off from the ground.

This new effort may immediately lead to the construction of a symbol to denote itself. Along these lines, one of the persistent advocates of uniting culture and psychology, Richard Shweder (see also Shweder, 1977, 1979, 1980) outlines the focus of that new discipline in the following terms:

> The aim for cultural psychology is to imaginatively conceive of subject-dependent objects (intentional worlds) and object-dependent subjects (intentional persons) interpenetrating each other's identities or setting the conditions for each other's existence and development, while jointly undergoing change through social interaction. . . . That aim is to bridge the gap between psyche and culture by talking about them in new (or is it very old) ways. (Shweder, 1990, p. 25; emphasis added)

The comparative-cultural perspective linked with the co-constructivist approach to human development takes the processes that "set the conditions" for a person's psychological development within the culturally organized environments as their targets of explanation. It is not merely sufficient to declare (and prove) *that* the person and culturally organized environments are "interdependent," but rather it is necessary to explain the general processes through which development (in interaction) takes place.

Contemporary developmental psychology is certainly far from providing satisfactory theoretical analyses of that co-construction process. However, the goals and interests of many contemporary developmentalists are set up in that direction (see Cole, 1989a, b, 1991; Ivić, 1978; Rogoff, 1990; Tulviste, 1988; Wertsch, 1985). Different bases for construction of co-constructivist theories can lead to vastly different results. For example, the extreme constructionist perspective that has led to substantive criticism of psychology's traditional theory and methodology can easily arrive at the reduction of psychological phenomena to the status of subjective constructs by way of language use (Gergen, 1982, 1985, 1989; Shotter, 1990; see also criticism by Jahoda, 1986). While this constructionist perspective has made it possible for psychology to overcome its methodological dogmatism by gradual acceptance of the assumption of the active goal-setting and goal-oriented subject whose life course (history) is of relevance (Gergen & Morawski, 1980; Gergen & Gergen, 1984), it reminds us of all the difficulties of solving dualistic problems of our discipline by considering persons (or cultures) as texts (Gergen, 1988; Keesing, 1987) or as immersed in "situated activity contexts" (Lave, 1988; Rogoff, 1990). Surely the constructionist movement in contemporary social psychology has provided a fruitful methodological starting point for conceptualization of different forms of the temporal processes that we use in the construction of our accounts in science and everyday life (Gergen & Gergen, 1986). However, the reality of the life-worlds of the active subjects who symbolically construct their self-narratives (and active psychologists who equally busily construct accounts to explain psychological phenomena) have remained underemphasized in the constructionist tradition.

The constructivist perspective in social psychology can be viewed as a special version of the general co-constructivist perspective in developmental psychology. Its emphasis on the historicism and its process orientation unite with the quest of the developmentalists. It is this kind of process-oriented theoretical, methodological, and empirical search that is characteristic of the comparative-cultural angle of the co-constructivist perspective in developmental psychology. Let us turn to the compositional structure of the present volume and see how it represents the heterogeneity of ideas in the co-constructivist framework.

A PREVIEW OF THE CONTENTS OF THE VOLUME

The various contributions to the present volume reflect different approaches to the issue of development of human beings in culturally organized environments. The contributions also cover a large age span—infancy to adulthood. Furthermore, the contributions range from issues of social interaction (Part I) and cultural patterning of adolescents' and adults' lives in Southern Italy and India (Part II) to the intrapsychological reconstruction of cultural meanings in the domain of reasoning about self and general concept of person (Part III). Last (but not least)—the ecological approach to culturally provided meaning systems (Valsiner & Benigni, 1986) is constantly in the focus of consideration by different contributors (to Part II and Part IV). It is clear that different authors of the contributions are interested in different aspects of the culture person co-constructive process, and hence the variety of methodological approaches they take ranges from relatively conventional group-aggregation of data (e.g., Chapters 1 and 4) to reinterpretation of complex self-presentational texts (Chapters 3, 5, and 7) or reasoning problem-solving transcripts (Chapter 8). The culturally organized environments where the co-construction process takes place are described in great detail in some of the chapters (3, 6, and 9) and very little in others (1, 4, and 10). This heterogeneity of foci of analyses is natural within the present state of co-constructionist perspectives, where methodological innovations are only beginning (see Epilogue for a more elaborate discussion of these issues). However, all in all, the reader is welcome to another series of performances along the co-constructivist lines, with different genres in operation both in succession and simultaneously in this polyphonic (hopefully not cacophonic!) operetta of scientific relationships that may occasionally lead to the discovery of Cinderella-type issues in the domain of relevant culture-linked empirical phenomena of human development.

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PART I

Cultural Organization of Social Interaction in Early Ontogeny

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Social interaction in early infancy and childhood has been a major domain of interest among child psychologists in the 1970s and 1980s. This interest has largely been fueled by the folk idea that infants are by far more organized psychologically than had been previously thought by child psychologists. William James's description of the world of infants as being that of "booming, buzzing confusion became the "straw man" for infant psychologists of the recent decades. Furthermore, the notion that infants are equal partners in their interaction with adults that became fashionable in Euro-American middle-class childrearing ideologies led to viewing the interaction process between babies and adults as if it were a harmonious "behavioral exchange" between "equal partners" as contributors to the interactional process (e.g., Condon & Sander, 1974). Of course, the obvious fact that the adult partner always remained the dominant organizer of the conditions of interaction with the infant could not (and was not) denied in general terms but the empirical analyses of behavior interaction sequences between the two often de facto equalized the "behaviors" of the partners

Thus, in the very large empirical research where "infant vocalizations" are given an equal status to "mother's vocalizations" (thus eliminating the mother's *speech* content from the analysis of the dyadic interaction, translating it into merely quantitative measures of her verbal behavior). The models used for making sense of the dyadic adult–infant interaction process were often of the kind that assumed cyclical dynamics (e.g., Markov chain models, time series or lag-sequential analyses) and thus ruled out any possibility of capturing the development of novel interaction process structures. Surely an accumulation of "conditional probabilities" (read: "frequencies transformed into probabilities") over an observable sequence of mother–infant dyad in terms of behavioral codes (which equalize adult and infant "behaviors" by making both content- and context-free) can not lead to discovery of the particular moment in interaction where either the adult or the infant starts to try out novel ways of interacting with the other. The latter moments may have become recorded in the Markovian transition frequency tables in those cells that demonstrated low-frequency phenomena.

Since low-frequency phenomena are habitually overlooked in contemporary psychology's inductive generalization schemes, the data analyses of adult–infant interaction operated with highly recurrent "interactive behaviors" that had been freed from their concomitant other behaviors, as well as from the meaningful context. In other terms— both the *process structure* and *meaningful organization* of early adult–infant interaction were habitually eliminated from the empirical investigation. The prevailing notion of interaction tended towards viewing it as taking place between two "behavioral machines" that would "input" their particular "behaviors" to the other, and receive feedback from the other in similar terms. It was the goal of describing the work of a harmonious (albeit "probalistic") interactive "machine" that the investigators were aiming towards, not the development of either that "machine" or—by it—of the individual partners.

Paradoxically, introducing "dyadic approaches" to the study of infancy, psychology did not come closer to understanding development. Instead, it extended the nondevelopmental approach from having the focus on individuals to having it on the interaction of individuals. This focus on interaction was linked with the return to understanding of the active role of the child in its relations with adults (see Bell & Harper, 1977) but left the development of novel forms of interaction out of consideration. For example, on the side of the infant the "dyadic perspective" entailed the postulation of a well-organized, preadapted behavioral system to handle social encounters. Surely that meant that the investigators now began to notice that infants' behavioral dynamics was organized in *some* (nonrandom) way, but in their general discourse that way became described as *well organized*. The developmental question—that of process mechanisms of transition from semiorganized to differently organized (novel) forms—remained unaddressed. Rather, a stance for looking for harmonious complementary between the interaction partners was often assumed. For instance, the adult's role in interaction was to "*fit* her behaviour in with an *already existing* organization" of the infant, rather than "create order out of chaos" (Schaffer, 1977, p. 5; emphasis added).

Although the existing literature on infant–adult interaction of the last two decades also provides remarkable efforts to develop systemic views of the interaction process (see Als, Tronick, & Brazelton, 1980; Kaye, 1982; Papoušek & Papoušek, 1982; see also a few contributions to Schaffer, 1977; Tronick, 1982; Uzgiris, 1979), the prevailing habitual tendency in research remained atomistic, context insensitive, and unmeaningful. These efforts, paired in later 1980s by importing of the theoretical framework of nonequilibrium thermodynamics to developmental psychology, have led recently to the recognition that interaction indeed participates in creating new forms by way of disequilibration of previous ones (Butterworth & Bryant, 1990: Thelen & Fogel, 1989). More basically, the limitations of the dyadic framework in research on child development have been pointed out (Kreppner, Paulsen, & Schutze, 1982), and the role of crises in development suggested as the central moment of development (Kreppner, 1985).

The empirical orientation of researchers in the field of adult–infant interaction led them to efforts of cross-cultural analysis of evidence. It became quite clear that the ways in which infant–adult interaction is organized in non-Western cultures differ remarkably from the prevalent Euro-American middle class habit of "face-to-face" placement of the infant by the adult (Callaghan, 1981; Martini & Kirkpatrick, 1981; Sostek, Vietze, Zaslow, Kreiss, van der Waals, & Rubinstein, 1981). In most social contexts in which infants are included together with other persons, the self-centered emphasis on keeping the full attention of the infant by the single caregiver is a rather egocentric strategy by the adult, while letting the child be a participant in a wider social setting is a highly appropriate way of making the child a participant observer in that context. Of course, the immediate social-ecological "niche" (see Super & Harkness, 1982) where the infant's life activities take place varies greatly across cultures. Infants can spend much of their time in close tactile contact with the mother or caregiver (Agiobu-Kemmer, 1984; Konner, 1978) or in a swaddled condition, as well as attached to a cradleboard (Chisholm, 1983; Dennis & Dennis, 1940). these background structures of conditions set the stage for episodes and goals of adult–infant interaction that can take many different forms beyond the Western middle-class emphasis on "enjoying the interaction with the baby" (Stern, 1974).

The two chapters included in Part 1 of the present volume cover two vastly different directions in the study of early adult–infant interaction from a comparative-cultural perspective. Chapter 1 (by Axel Schölmerich, Heidi Keller, and Birgit Leyendecker) is a representative of the cross-cultural research tradition that aggregates data over individual adult–infant dyads to arrive at "cultural modal types" that are then compared with one another (see also Keller, Schölmerick, & Eibl-Eibesfedt, 1988). However, the authors of Chapter 1 are clearly not satisfied by the possibility of staying at the mere descriptive level of cross-cultural comparisons, and offer a systemic model that accounts for both the "shared" and "idiosyncratic" aspects of cross-cultural and cross-individual differences. The central focus of the authors is on the combination of a large number of "index variables" at the intersection of which each individual adult–infant dyad creates it won behavioral interaction structure. Through the use of multiple "variables" (including those of physical environment, values, meanings, family conditions, etc.) the authors hope to solve the problem of cross-cultural differences by inserting "culture" into a complex combination of a structure of aspects that guide development. This approach comes close to the basic assumptions of the co-constructionist perspective, stopping at it entrance.

Chapter 2 (by Maria da Conceição Lyra and Clotilde Rossetti-Ferreira) comes from the opposite end of the field of research on adult–infant interaction. The reader will not encounter any aggregation of data over adult–infant dyads in this chapter. In fact, all the analyses of the data are based on one dyad that was followed longitudinally. This database is perfectly sufficient for demonstrating a number of relevant aspects of the theoretical perspective of the authors, which is at the forefront of contemporary developmental research in Brazil.

It should not be a surprise to an European or North—American developmental psychologist that he or she has rather limited knowledge about the progress of developmental psychology on other continents. This ignorance is certainly a good reason for concern about the intellectual quality of the so-called "mainstream" research in North America or Europe. If one makes an effort to transcend geographic (and, to large extent, linguistic) boundaries, the present state of Brazilian developmental psychology shows itself as an intellectually active and creative scientific undertaking (see Rossetti Ferreira, 1985, for an overview). It is highly developed in a number of areas (literacy research, issues of social development and early education, cognitive development), and is closely in touch with the phenomena it investigates (see also Chapter 9). Theoretically, investigations in adult–child interaction have further advanced different European theoretical traditions, with a special indebtedness to the work of Henri Wallon. Wallon's work has been paid very little attention in the English-language psychological literature (see Voyat, 1984, for a single exception), despite the important role that Wallon has had in French-speaking developmental psychology (his relevance can be compared to that of Jean Piaget) and beyond. For example, Wallon's influence on the development of the ideas of Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 1933/1984; Wallon, 1931) is undoubtedly a relevant one, albeit so far left without careful study. The readers of psychological literature in the Portuguese language are by far more fortunate to have access to Wallon's ideas than those limited to the use of English— over the recent two decades a number of Wallon's books have appeared in Portuguese translation (Wallon, 1978, 1979; Werebe & Nadel-Brulfert, 1986).

The particular theoretical approach represented in Chapter 2 transcends the emphasis of infant–adult researchers of the 1970s to demonstrate that the dyad works in a harmonious and mutually complementary way, on the basis of existing behaviors. Instead, the structure of the interaction process is seen by Lyra and Rossetti-Ferreira as emerging from the fusion between the semiformed (and episodic) integration of the conduct structure of the infant, on the one hand, and of the adult's meaning-based actions that complement and extend the infant's perceived conduct, on the other. The adult segments and highlights the semistructured "flow" of the infant's total behavior, with or without explicit linkage of the latter to the world of objects in the environment. The emphasis in this approach is on the detection of the process of emergence of novel conduct in the course of the interactive process, in which the whole range of behavioral and semantic phenomena is dynamically organized into "in-focus" parts of "figure" that are contrasted to the "ground." The work by Lyra and Rossetti-Ferreira serves as a valuable entrance point into the issues of creating methodology for the co-constructionist perspective.

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CHAPTER 1

The Study of Early Interaction in a Contextual Perspective: Culture, Communication, and Eye Contact

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INTRODUCTION

All over the world human infants engage in social interactions with adults. These interactions play an important role in the development of a young infant. The infant's contributions to these interactions like smiling, vocalizing, mimical, and gestural cues promote parental investment and thereby increase the child's chances of survival. By crying, the infant can express negative affective states and call for the help and attention of the caregivers. Parental interactional behaviors offer emotional shelter, security, and information, and provide the fundamental first experience of cognitive and social development by consistent and expectable patterns of exchange of signals.

The interaction between infant and caregiver can be described as a specific form of human communication, which is promoting attachment and thereby providing the necessary security for the child. This constitutes a developmental task (Havighurst, 1972) and therefore acts as an organizer of children's ecologies (Kindermann & Skinner, 1988). The universal aspects of social interaction, in combination with the specifics within a given culture that form and structure interactional situations, provide the frame for socialization of infants.

Any theoretical conception of universality has to include reflections on potential reasons for similarities between cultures as well as sources of differences (cf. Jahoda, 1980) and additionally the proximate and ultimate goals of behavioral concepts should be considered (cf. MacDonald, 1988; see also Van de Vijver & Poortinga, 1982; Vogel & Eckensberger, 1988). Early parent–child interaction is an "etic" concept (see Berry, 1969), but observations of adult–infant interactions have to include aspects that might be unique to a specific culture.

In this chapter, we will present our approach for the study of early interactions. Some points will be illustrated with data from recent studies; others will be developed along the lines of a theoretical model, which will be discussed conclusively in the last section.

CULTURE AND INTERACTION

Areas of Cultural Comparisons

The socialization of infants and children is influenced by a number of factors originating in different domains. For the variation in structuring socialization environments for infants, we have to consider the following sources:

- biological adaptions, e.g., intuitive behavioral programs,
- general living conditions; and
- symbolic systems and social cognitive constructions.

Intuitive Parenting: The Biological Basis

The interactions between adults and infants appear to be regulated by the intuitive parenting programs (Papoušek & Papoušek, 1987), which include a variety of specific behaviors that adults use more or less exclusively while interacting with infants.

Such programs are conceptualized as being a result of evolutionary processes, which lead to biologically functional mutual regulations between adult and infant. The intuitive parenting programs regulate social interchanges; the eye-to-eye distance, for example, is intuitively adjusted to be in the optimal looking range of infants, approximately 20 to 25 cms (Schoetzau & Papoušek, 1977); parents provide ample visual stimulation to children, although they believe that the infants cannot yet see (Papoušek & Papoušek, 1984; Grossmann, 1978); and parents use specific forms of vocal-verbal interchange with the infants. The slowdown in tempo, the increased use of rhythmic elements, and the specific prosodic contour of parental talk to infants has been observed in different cultures. Parents reflect the infants' behavior as a biological mirror and thereby enhance the development of a sense of self in the infant (Keller, 1990; Papoušek & Papoušek, 1987). It seems also very likely that social referencing (Campos & Sternberg, 1981; Klinnert, Campos, Score, Eurde, & Svejda, 1983) is part of an intuitive, inborn program that works between infants and adults.

The contents of intuitive behavioral programs appear without learning or training in the human, shortly after basic social skills like empathy have been developed (Bischof-Köhler, 1989), so they are observable, not only with adults, but also with children from about 3 years of age on. There is evidence for the universal existence of intuitive parenting programs across ages, sexes, and cultures (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984; Keller & Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1990; Papoušek & Papoušek, 1987). On the other hand, there is large variation in the use of intuitive interactional behaviors between different individuals (Keller, Gauda, Miranda, & Schölmerich, 1985).

General Living Conditions

There is a tremendous variation among different cultures in this world in general living conditions and the physical environment (Farver & Howes, 1988; LeVine, 1980). In regions of high child mortality and dangerous environments, childrearing practices may be concerned with the promotion of infant survival (like carrying the child on the back while working to protect him or her from dangerous physical situations) rather than direct parental efforts toward the development of early competences (LeVine, 1977). Such living conditions would be of obvious relevance for the assessment of interactional situations. Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1984) reported that Trobriand Islanders expose their babies during waking hours to the public village life. Karplus and Karplus (1989) have noted that the Negev bedouins keep their infants in dark areas of the tents to protect them from the sand and the wind of the desert, thereby also avoiding almost all social contact with other persons. Whiting and Whiting (1975; Whiting, 1980) conclude that the types of interactions are mainly determined by the ecological subsistence variables that determine group sizes and the composition of daily activities. Housing factors like the availability and utilization of space (cf. Parke, 1978) have been identified as determinants of social interactions.

On a more specific level with respect to interaction, variables like temperature, humidity, and necessity of clothing also determine the possibilities for social interactions between adult and infant. The potential effects of putting babies in reclining chairs or transporting them in prams, as opposed to jointly relaxing in a hammock or carrying the infants on the back, has of course considerable influence on the amount of tactile and vestibular stimulation an infant might receive. Sitting on mother's lap might be the predominant mode of close bodily contact in specific environments, but can be unusual in others.

The home environment has been regarded as a source of variability in childrens' cognitive functioning (cf. Caldwell, Elardo, & Elardo, 1972). The utilization of space ("floor-freedom") determines motor development as well as social behaviors (Parke & Sawin, 1979). Density has been studied intensively as a psychological variable in the recent years, but not so much in relation to the development of children. Wohlwill (1985) has pointed out that this kind of research has "been carried out more from an interest in the problem of crowding than in child behavior and its development" (p. 18).

Besides the physical aspects of the living conditions, the personal aspects of the general living conditions are of interest as well. Infants are generally cared for by their parents, mostly the mothers (Barry & Paxton, 1971; Minturn & Lambert, 1964; Rogoff, Sellers, Pirotta, Fox, & White, 1974). In the Whiting and Whiting (1975) study 80% of children's interactions were with their parents in all six cultures. Seventy percent to 80% of the social interaction of !Kung babies were with their parents (Konner, 1977); and Eibl-Eibesfeldt (1983) reported more than 50% of all physical contacts were made with the mother of two observed !Ko bushmen babies in their first year of life.

Family organization affects the daily experiences of interactional partners (Chisholm, 1981; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). From the infants' perspective, the availability of potential caretakers and interacting others is directly linked to the type of family organization, which ranges from the extended to the nuclear, two-generation family, where the parents are almost exclusively the interactional partners. An extended family implies that more than two generations live together, and genetically remote relatives might live in the same house or housing area. Polygamic families (cf. Valsiner, 1989) present another type of family, the most prominent form is the "one husband–several wives" constellation. The existence of polygamic families is restricted to specific religious orientations. Of course, the surrounding community system also affects the family organization. In village communities the members of different families spend most of the day together. With respect to early interaction, it appears that the likelihood of any social interchange with persons other than the parents depends on the type of family organization.

But substitute caregivers like relatives or nonrelated group members can play an important role in the everyday social interactions of children (French, 1984; Hartup, 1982) as well. The importance of permanent caretakers other than parents has been documented recently in a study by Oppenheim, Sagi, and Lamb (1988). The attachment relationship between children and their *metaplot* (Kibbuzim caretakers) was more predictive for various aspects of social emotional development than the quality of attachment with the mother. The number of other persons that are present and available for interaction affects the preferred body position (face-to-face versus facing out), as Munroe and Munroe (1971) have documented.

The Symbolic Systems and Social-Cognitive Constructions

Handwerker (1989, p. 324) notes that "cultural systems are unique to each individual because no two people take precisely the same path through life. Cultural systems can be shared by two or more people only to the extend that those people experience intersecting sets of material stimuli and selective pressure." With emphasis on development, Valsiner (1988) has suggested conceptualizing culture as "a result of internalization of experiences first provided in the sphere of social transacation" within "the psychological domains of individual persons" (p. 287) instead of using it as an index-variable in cross-cultural comparisons. The symbolic systems are individual representations of the meaning of certain environments. Adults follow culturally predefined socialization scripts that they have acquired during their own socialization, and thereby regulate the type and patterning of information in different contexts (Greenbaum & Landau, 1977; Rogoff, Gawvaiw, & Ellis, 1984; Dasen, 1980; Jahoda, 1986).

Mothers' educational level appears to be a representation of symbolic systems that influences the interactive behavior more than ethnic differences, as Laosa (1980) and Laosa and Sigel (1982) have shown. Differences in maternal behavior between Latino and Anglo-American mothers disappeared when maternal education level was held constant in that study. Podmore and St. George (1986) also noted an influence of parental educational level on interaction both with New Zealand Maori and Pakeha mothers. Parents' ideas about the capabilities and abilities of an infant are of great significance for the interaction that is likely to occur (Keller et al., 1985; Ninio, 1979). This knowledge component of belief systems (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1976) has been identified as influential on adult–infant interactions, for example, in the work of Brooks-Gunn and Furstenberg (1986) with teenage mothers in the United States. The lack of knowledge of norms for infant development may be a contributing factor to less adequate parenting skills when compared within the same culture. This of course might be meaningless in other samples or cultural contexts.

Unrealistic expectations about developmental time tables, as a normative aspect of development, can influence the interaction between mothers with their preterm infants (Field, 1987). The parental beliefs have been described as a characteristic of the infants' caregiving environment (Parke & Tinsley, 1987), and they are considered to be part of the subjective culture (Triandis, 1972). The parental belief systems are a focus of recent research on parent–child interaction trying to bridge the gap between culture and behavior with the help of the concept of beliefs and attitudes (see also Miller, 1988; Goodnow, 1988; Bril, Zack, & Nkounkou-Hombessa, 1989; Bril, 1989).

The religious or ideological assumptions about human infants or human beings in general are also a source of potential influence on social interaction. Field and Widmayer (1981) speak of the "hidden agendas," and Glick (1985) uses the term "*hidden* rules and laws." Certain taboos, rules for the selection of appropriate foods, and appropriate places for social interaction are outlined in those sets of culturally specific assumptions.

Combination of Different Perspectives

Research on child development in a cultural context has to deal with the problem of combining data from different sources within one theoretical line of arguments. Valsiner (1988, p. 283) has suggested that "child development takes place within environments that are physically structured in accordance with the cultural meaning systems of the people who inhabit theses environments." At first glance, this statement gives rise to the hope of correspondence between the different domains. Of course this hope is not really warranted by the argument; the correspondence is a loose one, as the word *accordance* indicates. The relationship between the structuring of an environment by its inhabitants, and the influence of the physical environment on the ideas of the inhabitants about how the environment should be structured, is not a simple one, and it appears to be almost impossible to "measure" concepts like that in the near future.

Furthermore, the high level of individualization in representing cultural values is a result of the theoretical analysis of the way in which a set of cultural values is internalized during individual development. This excludes "culture" as an indexing variable and directs attention to the problem of measuring the individuals' representation of the shared meaning system of the surrounding culture.

For further research on the role of early interaction, it is necessary to develop a system of categorization for the different socialization environments, based on knowledge about the developmental significance of early experiences of infants. The ethogram approach seems most promising for contributing to the inventory of potentially relevant behaviors and settings that structure adult–infant interactions. In combination with microlevel analysis of the quality of interaction, it will be possible to address the question of the correspondence between quality of interaction and everyday experience of the infant.

The following study addresses the question of identifying potentially relevant interactive behaviors.

EARLY INTERACTION AS COMMUNICATION BETWEEN ADULT AND INFANT

Adult–infant interaction is a form of human communication between infant and caregiver. The affective state of the infant is expressed in different communicative channels, via vocal/verbal or visual signals. The appropriateness of parental reactions can only be seen in the change of expressive behaviors in the infant's face and body. Fogel, Toda, and Kawai (1988) demonstrated with Japanese and American mothers of 3-month-old babies that they reacted contingent on infants' changes in facial expressions, vocalizations, and gaze directions (see also Fogel, 1977). The prompt and consistent reaction is an integral part of functional parenting, which has been described as responsivity (cf. Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Nall, 1978; Bornstein, 1989), sensitivity (Lamb & Easterbrooks, 1981), adequacy of parental behaviors (Keller & Gauda, 1987), and latency (Keller, Chasiotis, & Boigs, 1989).

In order to make sure not to miss potentially relevant behaviors, we describe this communication in terms of stimulations of the sensory systems that are involved. There are four types of stimulations of the partner: visual, tactile, vestibular, and vocal/verbal. The last consists of three types of vocalizations (positive, negative, and neutral). Each individual, in our case infant or caregiver, might use one or more of the communicative elements at any given time. The partner will respond with an answer to the preceding action.

If early behavioral interchange between infant and caregiver really is a communicative act, then the occurrence of some of the actions should evoke an increased probability of occurrence of specific other actions. While the affective state of the infant preselects certain behaviors as more or less likely in a given situation, the bundle of environmental factors or general living conditions also determines what kind of behavior parents think is appropriate to deal with the infant's perceived needs.

In a recent study, we used the categories listed in Table 1 to code videotaped and filmed material from two Western and two non-Western cultures. The West German and Greek samples were produced under direction of the authors with the help of the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft and Technische Hochschule Darmstadt; the material on the Trobriand Islanders and the Yanomami Indians was taken from published filmed material that was produced by Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt at the Max-Planck-Institut für Verhaltensphysiologie and was made

Table 1. Categories Used to Code Communicative Behaviors

Infant code numbers

No	Name	Description
121	visual stimulation	changes in facial expression or gesture, visible for partner
122	tactile stimulation	change in any form of body contact, with every part of body
123	vestibular stimulation	self-stimulating behaviors like hopping (not communicative)
124	positive vocalization	low to moderate intensity, gently exhaling, a-sounds, r-strings, etc.
125	negative vocalization	cessation of respiration, higher intensity, high frequencies
126	neutral vocalization	neither positive nor negative
127	interest outside	looks intensively to external objects or persons

Adult code numbers

No	Name	Description
221	visual stimulation	change in facial expression or gesture, visible for partner
222	tactile stimulation	change in any form of body contact, with every part of body
223	vestibular stimulation	moves the child in space, full support of weight, mostly rhythmical
224	positive vocalization	low to moderate intensity, "baby talk," repetition, prosodic contour, slow speech
225	negative vocalization	aggressive undertone, very fast speaking, sighs
226	neutral vocalization	adult way of talking, fast, long utterances, little contour
227	interest outside	looks intensively to external objects of persons

available to the Institut für wissenschaftlichen Film Köln.wissenschaftlichen Film Köln.

The available material was analyzed if it met the following requirements:

- infants' estimated age between 2 and 6 months,
- length of the scene more than 30 sec,
- interaction with only one adult in one scene,
- infant and parent visible during the whole scene,
- complete soundtrack on film or tape.

Coding of material was done by experienced observers trained to reach reliabilities of above 90% using a specifically designed keyboard connected to a personal computer. The coding procedure results in realtime transcripts of the observed behaviors for both infants and adults. Table 2 shows frequencies for the coded behaviors for infants and adults. The number of coded actions in the total sample was 1,950 (including vocal/verbal, visual, tactile, and vestibular stimulations), of which 547 were infant actions and 1,403 were adult actions. This results in a mean action rate of 13.87 actions per minute for the infants, and 35.57 actions for the adults. The action rates are comparatively stable for the infants across the four cultures, ranging from 12.29 to 18.45 actions per minute. There is much more variation in the adults' action rate, ranging from 21.87 to 54.05 actions per minute. Table 3 shows the frequencies of Table 2 in percentages, to make it easier to compare the occurrence of single behaviors. Each individual infant behavior is expressed as a percentage in relation to the total number of infant behaviors, and the same is done for the adults.

Table 2. Frequencies of Interactional Behaviors

Type of stimulation	Yanomami	Trobriand	Greek	German	Total
Total time of interaction (sec)	491.12	541.77	592.78	740.69	2,66.36
Infant visual stimulation	51	14	17	14	96
Adult visual stimulation	43	50	59	78	230
Infant tactile stimulation	47	61	22	11	141
Adult tactile stimulation	37	67	108	139	351
Infant vestibular stimulation	5	6	0	0	11
Adult vestibular stimulation	35	31	69	18	153
Infant positive vocalization	9	5	19	16	49
Adult positive vocalization	43	56	197	172	468
Infant negative vocalization	38	22	45	70	175
Adult negative vocalization	3	5	29	12	49
Infant neutral vocalization	1	3	20	51	75
Adult neutral vocalization	18	20	72	42	152



Figure 1.



Figure 2.

Table 3. Percentages of Interactional Behaviors

Type of stimulation	Yanomami	Trobriand	Greek	German	Total
Infant visual stimulation	49.51	17.28	43.59	56.00	38.71
Adult visual stimulation	37.39	33.78	25.00	33.19	31.34
Infant tactile stimulation	45.63	75.31	56.41	44.00	56.85
Adult tactile stimulation	32.17	45.27	45.76	59.15	47.82
Infant vestibular stimulation	4.85	7.41	0.00	0.00	4.44
Adult vestibular stimulation	30.43	20.95	29.24	7.66	20.84
Infant positive vocalization	18.75	16.67	22.62	11.68	16.39
Adult positive vocalization	67.19	69.14	66.11	76.11	69.96
Infant negative vocalization	79.17	73.33	53.57	51.09	58.53
Adult negative vocalization	4.69	6.17	9.73	5.31	7.32
Infant neutral vocalization	2.08	10.00	23.81	37.23	25.08
Adult neutral vocalization	28.13	24.69	24.16	18.58	22.72

Although the overall action rates for infants are comparatively stable across the four studied cultures, it appears that the use of vocal/verbal mode is rather different between the non-Western and Western samples. The lower use of vocal/verbal signals in the non-Western samples is also found in the adults, as Figures 1 and 2 indicate. But the lower use of vocal/verbal signals is at least compensated by the use of other communicative behaviors.

The infants' use of the different modes of communication appears to reflect the parents' use of these modes, as well as the culturally defined importance of certain modes. This does not indicate that this lower use of vocal/verbal modes in the adults "causes" the infant to produce comparatively few vocalizations. The important point is to use care when comparing quantities of single behaviors, and to look for potentially relevant compensators or functionally equivalent communicative behaviors.

The sequential features of the communication process are reflected by the frequency with which a specific action is responded to by another action by the interactional partner. Due to the small sample sizes within the cultures, and only for the purpose of illustrating the method, we aggregated all data for all subsamples, resulting in Table 4. The rows in this table indicate the preceding action, and the columns indicate the first following action of the partner (so to speak, the "answer"). If the partner does not respond within 3 seconds, then the next action is processed, and the unresponded action is not included in the table. In the total sample, there were 213 unresponded actions, resulting in 1,737 sequential action patterns. On the 90 infants' visual stimulation (code no. 121), the adults answer in 31 cases with another visual stimulation, and in 25 cases with a positive vocalization (code no. 224). Please note that we count the "answers" on an exclusive basis, so that, if an interactional partner shows a smile and starts to vocalize subsequently, only the smile would be counted. We are aware of the fact that there is much redundancy in human communication,

Table 4. Response Patterns in Adult–Child Interaction

Code	121	122	123	124	125	126	221	222	223	224	225	226	Sum
121							31	11	12	25	2	9	90
122							31	42	19	34	2	11	139
123							2	1	6	2	0	0	11
124							10	8	1	29	0	0	48
125							25	48	30	40	6	22	171
126							13	18	5	28	2	9	75
221	33	50	3	19	54	40							199
222	31	59	0	35	101	68							294
223	30	34	6	2	44	9							125
224	53	79	1	63	136	82							414
225	3	9	0	5	11	4							32
226	15	32	4	12	52	24							139
Sum	165	263	14	136	398	227	112	128	73	158	12	51	1737

which would make it necessary to allow more than one response for every action, but this leads to calculational problems that we will not comment on here.

The cells in Table 4, which correspond to theoretically expected meaningful sequences of communicative actions like dialogic vocalizations or patterned vestibular stimulation upon negative vocalization of the infant, appear rather frequently within this set of data.

As we have seen before, there is considerable variation in the quantity of single behaviors. Some of the links between specific behaviors appear to be more likely in some cultures than in others. This means that there is a patterning of dyadic interchange that might be culturally specific, but, on the universal level, we can expect adults to react with whatever might be the culturally appropriate behavior to any given stimulation the infant has provided. This might also be true the other way around, although we see the infant as being less perfectly adapted to the cultural relevance of this specific behavior. This is reflected in the general similarity of action rates, including vocal/verbal and other stimulations of the infants. In this study there was no estimation of the intensity of behaviors, and we also did not try to measure the adequacy of parental reactions with respect to the infants' affective state. We were also not able to assess the quality of interactions, because that would have to be done against certain standards or norms within the culture.

The Specific Significance of Eye Contact

The looking system plays a very important part in nonverbal human communication. Seeing and looking have attracted the imagination of people through the centuries, for which evidence can be found in numerous myths and superstitions all over the world. Infants' ability to look and see from birth on is part of their inborn behavioral repertoire to explore their surroundings (Keller & Boigs, 1989). Parents show a special interest in watching their infants' faces and try to catch the infants' eyes (Keller et al., 1985; Keller & Gauda, 1987). The behavioral intention to attract an infant's visual attention has been documented in parents as well as nonparents and children (Papoušek & Papoušek, 1982; Rheingold & Adams, 1980; Fernald & Simon, 1984).

During the first 2 to 4 months of life, parents and infants communicate primarily affective information without the mediation of objects. This has been shown in a cross-cultural analysis between the United States and Japan by Fogel et al. (1988). Eye contact with infants operates as a releaser for caregiving and nurturing activities and reinforces parents in experiencing feelings of competence while interacting with infants.

Evidence for the developmental significance of eye contact between human infants and their caregivers also emerges from a few studies that deal with the avoidance of eye contact. Having excluded difficult birth conditions and cognitive immaturity as possible reasons for low looking behavior (Miranda & Fantz, 1974; Field, 1987), most authors explain gaze aversion in terms of the baby's reaction to generally overstimulating (Field, 1979), intrusive controlling (Stern, 1977), or unresponsive and insensitive (Keller & Gauda, 1987) caretakers. Most researchers interpret the cutoff function of gaze aversion as modulating arousal or reducing tension; this interpretation is supported by the association between gaze aversion and elevated tonic heart rate in babies (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1984; Field, Sostek, Vietze, & Leiderman, 1981). In a German longitudinal study, eye contact at the age of about 10 weeks was the best predictor for the development of problem behaviors.

The occurrence of dyadic eye-to-eye contact is integrated into the general developmental context in early infancy. The infants' looking and gazing at the caregiving person increases after birth due to the maturation of physiological and neurological systems (like postural control) up until the age of 3 to 4 months, when this behavioral system is mastered. It constitutes a developmental task for this age span (cf. Havighurst, 1972; Keller, 1989a,b). Thereafter, it decreases as a major interactional topic (see Keller et al., 1985; Beebe, Zelner, Feldstein, & Jaffe, 1984). The general developmental course of infants' gazing at their mothers during this period is similar across a variety of cultures with only minor variations in the age of onset and peak-time (Super & Harkness, 1982). After that time, infants develop sensorimotor coordination for reaching, grasping, and manipulation which enormously extends the range of controllable activities. Orientation to objects outside the dyad becomes possible (Trevarthen, 1979, 1982) and occurs frequently in free-play situations.

Eye contact between infant and caregiver during the first year of life is mainly limited by infant looking behavior, since the parents show extended looking at their infants' faces, thereby providing a frame for the interaction (Messer & Vietze, 1984; Stern; 1974; Stevenson, Ver Hoeve, Roach, & Lewitt, 1986). Figure 3 shows the general developmental course of parental looking, infant's looking, and eye contact during the first year of infant's life. The data on which Figure 3 is based are from a longitudinal study in West Germany on the development of exploratory behaviors and infant–caregiver interaction in which 30 families with their first-born infants participated. The study was funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

In a recent cross-cultural analysis (see Keller & Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1990), we could confirm the occurrence of similar eye contact patterns in cultures as different as West German, Greek, Yanomami Indian, and Trobirand Islander. In all those samples, the adults look almost twice as much at the infants as the infants look at the adults, the adults continue looking after the infant has terminated eye contact, and the eye contact episode is initiated by the infant because the adults already look.

However, there are large differences in quantity of eye contact, for example, in the mean duration of a single eye contact episode, as shown in Figure 4.

Such differences in quantity have been interpreted in relationship to interactional parameters (see, e.g., Field & Widmayer, 1981) as well as by social contextual variables, especially the availability and identity (in age and/or sex) of potential caretakers (cf. Chisholm, 1981; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). While, for the German sample, the quantity of eye contact was a useful indicator of the quality of interaction with predictive power, it might not be possible to extend this into different cultural settings.



Figure 3.



Figure 4.

Reviewing the data on early eye contact, two aspects are of significance for interpretation in a cultural context. First, most of these findings originate from Western cultural backgrounds, favoring one permanent caretaker for the infant, usually the mother. Here eye contact appears to be a developmental task with direct relevance for the infants' development (a basic "mechanism" of development) and can therefore be used as a window on the quality of interaction in a given age range.

Second, all of these data are produced on a basis of short-term (5 to 30 minutes) observations of free play situations. Exact analysis of eye contact is mostly based on observation intervals of 2 to 2½ minutes (Berger & Cunningham, 1981; Dixon, Tronick, Keefer, & Brazelton, 1981; Lasky & Klein, 1979; some use 4 to 6 minutes (Field & Pawlby, 1980; Field & Widmayer, 1981; Kaye & Fogel, 1980; Keller et al., 1985).

Future research on the role of eye contact for infant development has to extend in two directions. The occurrence of eye contact between caregiver and child needs to be studied in diverse cultures, including a description of the culturally structured environments. Additionally, long-term observations of early caregiver–infant interactions covering all the waking hours and possible interactional partners of the infant are necessary.

This approach will be outlined in the final part of this chapter.

OUTLOOK; CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGN OF STUDIES ON EARLY INTERACTION IN A CULTURAL CONTEXT

The study of early interactions in a cross-cultural context offers unique insights with strong implications for the theoretical conceptualizations of the significance of early interaction for development. It can be meaningful to transport concepts derived from general developmental theories into different contexts, and to look for their functionally equivalent substitutes. Given the biological basis of early interaction, and the wide variation of interactional situations, one can sketch the potential relationships between the different aspects as in Figure 5.

The figure represents a set of assumptions. The developmental outcome, like an individual's personality, is determined by its past experience. The everyday experience is a result of intuitive parenting programs filtered through the selection of situations where infants can interact with caregivers. The selection of situations is done on the basis of social-cognitive constructions, which are influenced by the general living conditions, upon which the former also have some impact.

Considering this system, it becomes quite clear that we cannot expect stable relationships between behavioral intentions formed by the intuitive parenting programs and the developmental outcome, or to expect the general living conditions to have a clear deterministic effect upon the personality that develops within a culture. The variations in individual symbolic systems, like beliefs and goals that are considered important, modify the impact of the general living conditions upon the selection of situations for interaction with infants. This is necessary, since different individuals within one cultural background will have different opinions about the appropriateness of certain behaviors in the presence of infants.

In order to be useful in developing observational designs for the study of early interaction, the presented model of theoretical relationships between different influences on interaction and infant developmental needs to be completed by a consideration of the potential differences within a cultural system. This leads to the distinction of empirical relationships for comparison from theoretically influencing relationships.

General living conditions and social-cognitive constructions/cultural values have to be differentiated further. This set of influencing factors can be divided into two main parts: (a) the set of shared aspects of culture, which are common to all members or families within a given culture; and (b) the individual aspects, with high personal intervariability.

The variability between different individuals or families depends on many factors, some of which are unique to one family (like the genealogy); others are partially shared by other members of the same cultural system (like language, educational background, or religious orientation) or might even be common


G L C
General living conditions
I P P
Intuitive parenting program
S S C V
Symbolic systems and cultural values,
Goals for development
S S I
Selection of situations for interaction
E E I
Everyday experience of infants
Interactions
Other influences on development
D O
Developmental outcome

Figure 5. Theoretical Model: Determinants of Developmental Outcome

among a variety of cultural systems (like age of the mother, family size, or the health risk status of an infant).

Shared aspects of culture (SAC) refers to a general level of symbolic systems and cultural values, as well as goals for development, that are common to all members of a cultural system, e.g., a country. The basic level in Figure 6, *individual aspects of culture* (IAC), refers to an individual or a small group of individuals, for example, a mother–infant dyad or a family, that share some aspect of the cultural system. *Multiple contrast groups* (MCG) are homogeneous on one or more index variables. The selection of indexing variables has to be done on the basis of theoretical assumptions about their impact on the set of variables one is interested in. This intermediate level is also the level of empirical comparison.

The MCGs are formed by combinations of index variables, which might include:

- demographic variables (age, socioeconomic status (SES), type of subsistence);
- social environment (family size, number of caregiving persons, occupational orientation of mother);



Figure 6. Multiple Contrast Groups: Design for cross—cultural studies

S.A.C: shared aspects of culture, common to all individuals or families
M.CG: one of the multiple contrast groups
IAC: individual aspects of culture, unique to one individual or common to a family

⤻ empirical comparison (within/between)

__________ determining relationships (theoretical)

- physical environment (urban/rural, type and size of housing, ambient background stimulation);
- cultural values (ethnic background, religious orientation, distinct ideals for life orientation).

Theoretically, members of one of the multiple contrast groups might simultaneously belong to another group as well, depending on the selection of index *variables*.

This design allows the comparison within a cultural system as well as across cultures, it gives estimates of the variability within a given culture, and it offers potential identification of factors influencing the observed phenomena. We see the main advantage of this type of design in the dissolution of the concept of culture in psychologically meaningful variables identifying the factors, and possible combinations of factors, that provide the frame for each individual in which development takes place.

This is an essential precondition to avoid the flaws of traditional cross-cultural psychology, which tried to compare cultures as single, independent units. For developmental psychology, it is necessary to identify the factors, or combinations of factors, which structure the environment in which the individual develops.

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CHAPTER 2

Transformation and Construction in Social Interaction: A New Perspective on Analysis of the Mother–Infant Dyad*

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The investigation of the development of the baby in the context of social interaction has been the subject of a great number of studies. The majority of these studies aim to relate the domain of characteristics of the social interaction to the mastering of preverbal aspects of communication by the baby, attempting to explain the acquisition of language. However, the task of making explicit how social interaction participates in the transformations and constructions of the baby as subject seems not well established in the literature. We still have little understanding of how the child-as-subject emerges from the sensorimotor functioning of infancy and reaches the domain of construction and use of symbols that is characteristic of language.

In this chapter we propose to analyze and comprehend the development of the baby as part of an interdependent process of transformation-construction of the partners in the dyad. This process of change, which happens in and through social interaction, includes both of the partners as subjects, and their interaction. We would like to point out the need to investigate the possible continuity relating

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the sensorimotor domain of actions to the domain of symbolic functioning through the comprehension of a processual continuity. This approach has previously been suggested by Camaioni, De Castro Campos, and De Lemos (1984). Instead of focusing on specific characteristics of the interactions that would be related to structural, pragmatic, or semantic aspects of adult language competence, we aim to analyze the dynamics of the process of exchanges that occur between the interactional partners.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Our rationale to approach the phenomenon of transformation-construction in and through the social interaction has its roots in the work of Mead (1934), Vygotsky (1962, 1978), and Wallon (1942, 1946, 1949, 1954), and in a contemporary perspective which is being developed by De Lemos (1981, 1985, 1986) and collaborators (De Castro Campos, 1985; Figueira, 1985; Lier, 1983; Maia, 1981, 1982, 1985; Perroni, 1983; Scarpa, 1984) as a new way to analyze and comprehend the process of language acquisition by the child. The main aspect of convergence of the ideas of these autors is the theoretical and epistemological position that conceives social interaction as the "locus" of the emergence and constititon of a species-specific human subject. Thus, the investigation of human functioning must be accomplished through the comprehension of the process of changes created through social interaction. We view that social process of change as happening through typical ways of exchanges which cannot be approached through a linear model of causal analysis (Lyra, 1989).

The bidirectionality of the interdependent transformations of the subjects inside social interaction does not allow us to conceive of the development of the baby as a linear causal result of the partner's actions, or as an unfolding of his or her maturational capacities. At the same time, the baby is a subject and an object of the partner's actions. Therefore, he or she is a co-participant in the interactions which emerge and a co-participant in his or her individual development. The baby is conceived as an emerging subject who constructs the earliest aspects of an intersubject mediational function in social interaction. We propose that this intersubject function duplicates reality through the unfolding and amplification of the initial sensorimotor adaptation, creating co-participated meanings to complement the partners' actions in the interactional process. We suggest that this process can be in the origin of human-specific symbolic functioning.

The nature of the process of the subject's construction, and the recognition of the social embeddedness of human intellectual constructions, differentiates this socioconstructivist perspective from Piagetian constructivist ideas. The Piagetian subject starts to be constructed in a process of interaction with a world, basically a physical world, which is not co-transformed in the same way as the social world is (Piaget, 1936, 1937). The socioconstructivist perspective proposes that the social partners are both co-transformed in a mutual process of change, from the beginning of the baby's life.

Furthermore, Piaget's constructivist perspective does not assume the social relativity of the human symbolic intellectual functioning and its resulting construction of the subject (Piaget, 1973, 1975). His constructivist perspective proposes that the baby is constructed through the interaction of the baby with his environment, from the beginning of baby's life. Also, this process of construction explains the early coordinations of the baby's actions conceiving them as the beginning of the later universal structures of adult's symbolic intellectual functioning (Piaget, 1936, 1946). The contemporary literature on infant capacities points to a baby who starts life with pregiven sensorimotor coordination capacities (Schaffer, 1984). Therefore the demonstration of existant coordinations in the newborn challenges the Piagetian constructivistic assumptions about human symbolic functioning.

However, if we assume the social nature of the construction of the human subject through the co-participated character of his or her symbolic intellectual functioning, we can argue that it was Piagetian forgetting of this very specific nature of the human subject's construction that challenged his constructivist position. The investigation of the transformation and construction of the baby in the process of social interaction does not argue that all coordinations and capacities of the baby are the result of a constructivist process. What is constructed in and through this process is the human dimension as subject—a subject who is characterized by symbolic intellectual functioning.

We need to make clear the ways in which we conceptualize symbolic functioning in the context of this study. Our analysis and comprehension of the construction of the baby in the first months of life in the social interaction process do not attribute to him or her a capacity to represent reality. Partner's actions and baby's actions are not conceived as represented in the sense of an internal reproduction of the reality at the cognitive level.

Instead, our intention is to follow up, in the history of the dyad, the transformations of its process characteristics that suggest the emergence of co-participated meanings in complement to the partners' actions. These meanings are constructed through the process of negotiated transactions. This process of creation of meanings attached to the partner's actions, which continuously recreate the previously existing meanings through successive reconstructions, seems to elucidate the earliest steps of a mediational intersubjective function that reconstructs reality through re-presentation. It is in this sense which we talk about the investigation of the genesis of the symbolic functioning. If the human capacity to duplicate reality through symbolic functioning emerges through the social embeddeness of persons, then the genesis of this human symbolic functioning must be investigated through the analysis of the specific characteristics of that social process.

Henri Wallon's Perspective

The ideas above expressed are based on Henri Wallon's conception of the initial development of the human subject. Wallon (1942, 1949) presented a perspective which proposes that the baby has a biological organization that is social. This perspective is coherent with contemporary viewpoints about the baby's social preadaptations (Schaffer, 1984). The social environment is, according to Wallon (1946, 1954), the characteristic environment of our species. The subject who possesses symbolic functioning is just the typical subject who emerges from this characteristic environment. Biological endowment and social environment are indivisibly linked through a process of exchange that takes place between the organism and its characteristic environment. The construction of human symbolic functioning emerges from this interactional process, which has its roots in the biological and social characteristics of our species.

Wallon (1949) proposed that the sensorimotor organization of the newborn is full of latent capacities that emerge in the context of social interactions. The emergence of tensions, which result from conflicts and oppositions between the infant and his or her partner in interaction, constitutes a fundamental feature of the process of social transformation and construction of the human subject (Wallon, 1942, 1949). Wallon emphasized that the interactional dynamics between partners can be described as a phenomenon of oppositions between two inseparable poles: the one of fusion between partners, and the other of differentiation between partners. This dynamic of oppositions creates tensions, giving rise to the differentiation of the subjects. The emergence of symbolic capacity is the fundamental construction that springs from this dynamic of fusions and differentiations between human partners.

The human infant's characteristic long-lasting dependence on the other members of his or her own species, on whom his or her own survival depends, contributes for the strong bonding and communicative value of emotions and postures early in life. To Wallon (1949) the organization of the baby at birth relies on a postural or tonic system from which the system of emotions emerges. This is the first organizational and expressive system of the newborn. This system allows the establishment of the fusional link between the baby and his or her social environment, making the occurrence of the first interactions possible. The initial fusional link creates the first psychological reality between the partners. The organizational level of emotions allows the partners to reach a new organizational and expressive level, the one of mental realizations. However, this new level cannot be reduced, in terms of causal explanations, to the preceding one, because each new level of the organization of the subject carries new possibilities of interactions also responsible for the emergence of new subject's functionings.

The Sociointeractionist Constructivist Approach

The sociointeractionist constructivist approach (De Castro Campos, 1985; De Lemos, 1981, 1985, 1986; Figueira, 1985; Lier, 1983; Maia, 1981, 1982, 1985; Perroni, 1983; Scarpa, 1984) investigates the interactional processes which can be responsible for the child's acquisition of language. The core of this perspective is its conception of dialogue, which implies that all the interactional activities are conceived as a process of negotiated transactions between partners. These dialogical negotiated transactions bring about transformations in the partners' actions that construct the interactional subjects, their own interaction, and the object of knowledge—the language—which emerges from the dialogue. Therefore, the dialogical processes are the main interest of this perspective.

De Lemos (1981, 1985) presents the role played by the interactional formats as dialogical processes. By segmenting the flow of dyadic interchanges, these processes can explain various aspects of language acquisition. It is proposed that three dialogical processes—*specularity, complementarity*, and *reciprocity* (Camaioni & De Lemos, 1985; De Lemos, 1981, 1985) constitute the core of dyadic interaction processes. De Lemos (1981, 1985) demonstrated that, in the domain of acquisition of language, we can recognize units that are differentiated through an analysis of the interturn-negotiated transactions between partners. Subsequently these units appear in the child's own production through the analysis of the intraturn exchanges.

This theoretical and methodological perspective has been used by Lier (1983), who studied a baby from 6 to 17 months of age. The construction of the co-participating activities related to vocal interchanges was analyzed. Lier shows that the vocal interchanges emerge and are differentiated at the same time that the baby is constituted as a vocal partner, in the context of the dialogical negotiated transactions. The theoretical and methodological concepts adopted in this study are based on this sociointeractionist constructivist approach and on the Wallon's ideas about the process of fusion and differentiation and the dynamics of oppositions, which the social interaction gives rise to (Lyra, 1988).

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CONCEPTS: DEFINITIONS

Dialogue and Dialogical Processes

We use the concept of dialogue to characterize the observed phenomenon in our study (Lyra & Rossetti-Ferreira, 1987). It refers to social interaction conceived as a sequence of intersubjective actions. These can be characterized as bidirectional and interdependent negotiated transactions that happen between partners through time. These dialogical negotiated transactions perform an indissociable task of transformation-construction that is applied simultaneously to the interactional partners, the interaction itself, and the objects of knowledge that emerge from this dynamics of transformations during the history of the dyad. Therefore, the concept of negotiated transaction, or negotiation, needs the comparative analysis of the interactions through time, which means that the identification of a negotiation can only be done through the historical analysis of the partner's mutual transformations. We cannot analyze only one moment of dyadic interaction isolated from the history of the dyad as a negotiated transaction. For instance, an interaction with a computer is not a dialogical negotiated transaction, because we cannot identify interdependent and bidirectional transformations in the history of this "dyad." This "dyad" does not change through time; even so, we continue to interact with the computer ad infinitum. In contrast, the analysis of the dynamics of transformation-construction means that we must concentrate in the dialogical processes. Thus, the focus of analysis must be the dyad.

The dialogical processes are qualitative aspects of the partners' actions that are highlighted by the observer to describe and comprehend the dynamics of the dialogical negotiated transactions. In the study described here, we consider two interrelated levels of analysis of the dialogical processes.

Level A.1. The general process of fusion-differentiation creates a dyadic psychological reality through the fusional link. At the same time, this process segments the flow of dyadic interchanges through time. This process makes the differentiation and construction of the dialogical formats possible. Through these formats the work of segmentation of the flow of dyadic actions becomes increasingly clearcut.

The dominance of the pole of fusion exhibits a dyadic psychological reality characterized by the identification of emotional global interchanges. The process of negotiated transactions does not delimit which particular actions are negotiated between the partners. Therefore, the partners' role in the dialogue is mixed. The pole of fusion constructs a first unity of dyadic psychological reality, from which differentiation of the partners' actions and roles can start and continue. The segmentation cannot be analyzed if we only consider the differentiation as an isolated process.

Example 1 (infant's age 1 month, 16 days):

(1) The mother is nursing the baby. For a moment she stops nursing him.	We can observe in this example that the mother and the baby share a general moment of well-being.
(2) The baby is in his mother's lap and makes some movements. He seems to look at his mother's face.	The mother, even as she talks about baby's hunger, by the end smiles and looks at the baby.

(3) The mother smiles and looks at the baby for some time.
(4) The baby has a vague look.
(5) The mother, smiling, says: "I'm hungry, Mammy!
I'm very hungry, Mammy!"
(6) The mother starts nursing him again.

The baby seems to participate in this moment in a global way, basically "through his "well-being-alert" state.
However, the baby's vague look to his mother seems to be a beginning of differentiation of the baby's actions.

The dominance of differentiation becomes evident in the partners' actions, which entail dynamic segmenting–highlighting of the flow of interaction, which becomes observable through a kind of "figure–background dynamics." The segmenting–highlighting dynamics delimits selected aspects of the partner flow of actions that are being currently negotiated. The "figure-background" shows a segmenting–highlighting dynamics that takes into consideration the relationship between the segmented (delineated) and other actions of the partner. Some of these actions become considered as "background," on the basis of which others become definable as the "figure."

Example II: (infant's age 2 months, 24 days):

(1) The baby is looking at a toy hanging upon the baby.
He touches it sometimes, vocalizing, smiling, and moving arms now and then.
(2) The mother is moving the toy.
(3) At a moment, one of the baby's hands comes close to the string attached to the toy.
(4) The mother puts the string into the baby's hand.
(5) The baby holds the string, bouncing and looking at it.

Here (1–5) we can observe that the process of "segmenting–highlighting" is taking place. The mother's action raises the baby's imprecise hand movement to the simile of action of holding. Thus, this behavior (baby's holding) becomes the "figure" (on the "ground" of other motility), and the interaction is built further both through and around it.

Level A.2. At the level of the interactional format assumed by the dialogical negotiated transactions, we consider three dialogical processes—specularity, complementarity, and reciprocity—which have been proposed by De Lemos (1981, 1985; see also Camaioni & De Lemos, 1985). These processes have the power of maintaining the interaction as well as transforming the quality of the flow of dyadic negotiated transactions through the process of fusion-differentiation.

Sublevel A.2.1. The process of specularity is the interactional format assumed by, at least, one of the partners, who incorporates part of the other's action by repetition, thus allowing continuity of the negotiated transactions to take place.

Example III (infant's age 2 months, 17 days):

(1) The baby smiles and vocalizes.
(2) The mother repeats the baby's vocal production in an approximate way.
(3) The baby, while looking at the mother's face, moves, smiles, and vocalizes.
(4) The mother again repeats the baby's vocal production.
(5) The baby, while looking at the mother's face, vocalizes, [this kind of turn-taking interaction continues for some time]

We can observe that the interaction is maintained through the repetition by the mother of the infant's vocalizations.

The infant begins to repeat his own vocalizations after the mother's imitations.

The partners start to use each other's actions as the basis for maintaining their interaction.

Sublevel A.2.2. The process of complementarity is the interactional format in which at least one element is added by one partner to the other's action, thus establishing a complementary role of the partner and making it possible for the interaction to continue.

Example IV (infant's age 2 months, 24 days):

(1) The mother shows a toy to the baby.
(2) The baby, after a while, directs his open hands to the toy.
(3) The mother puts the toy in one of the hands of the baby, helping him to grasp it.
(4) The toy falls down.
(5) The mother starts again showing the baby the same toy.

This example starts to demonstrate a sketch of baby's complementarity to the mother's action. The baby moves his hand towards the toy offered by the mother. The mother introduces a complement to the infant's action (3) and helps him to grasp it. When the joint action fails, the complementary action on mother's behalf recurs.

[This interaction is repeated. Further on in this process of joint construction, the baby presents an already established complementary action by catching the toy offered by the mother.]

Sublevel A.2.3. The process of reciprocity, only used by the mother, implies that the baby comprehends the meaning of the adult's complex symbolic action, that is accessible to the child mainly through the verbal channel of communication. Therefore, the mother does not specifically negotiate parts of baby's antecedent action—by repeating or complementing it—in order to continue the interaction process. Instead, the mother negotiates *the whole meaning* attributed by her to the antecedent actions of the baby. This way the adult assumes that the baby performs the role of a partner, through interacting with the baby "as if" he were really participating at this level of the dialogue.

Example V (infant's age 1 month, 16 days):

(1) The baby looks at his sister.
(2) The mother asks him if he recognizes his sister and answers in the place of the baby, "I am becoming an old boy. I am recognizing my sister."

In this example the mother takes infant's looking at his sister as interpretable in terms of recognition, enters that meaning into the ongoing interaction, and moves on to play the role of the infant in terms of giving an answer that uses the same introduced meaning.

Co-participated Negotiated Transactions

By *co-participated negotiated transactions* we mean dyadic interactions which can be described as characterized by symmetrical interactional exchanges, in whatever dimension of partner's actions. These moments are always preceeded and succeeded by asymmetrical negotiated transactions (Lier, 1983).

This description of co-participated negotiated transactions is not meant to imply that the goal of the development carries a tendency towards harmony and equilibrium. These transactions function as anchor periods for mutual understanding. The description of co-participated negotiated transactions, through the history of the dyad, allows us to grasp the emergence of different qualitative moments of organization of dyadic exchanges. As Lier (1983) pointed out, these emerging organizational forms exhibit the presently existing characteristics of the partners at the same time as they construct mutual knowledge. We think that this process of construction of mutual knowledge can be understood as the process of creation of meaning based upon the partners' actions. These created meanings have an intersubjective nature, the primary function of which is to mediate the process of dyadic relationships.

EMPIRICAL STUDY: EARLY ONTOGENY OF INTERSUBJECTIVE MEANING CONSTRUCTION

The theoretical and methodological concepts that we have described above were applied to the analysis of a mother–infant dyad in the first 5 months of the baby's life. The core of this analysis was to describe and comprehend the process of transformation-construction of the dyad during early infancy.

The data analyzed in this chapter come from weekly video records (30–40 mins each) of the natural routine of a Brazilian middle-class dyad. The infant, a male baby, was considered to belong to the class of a "normally developing" babies, according to pediatric examinations. The videotaped observations started at 1 month and 16 days of age and ended at 5 months and 6 days.

Transcriptions and Analysis

Our methodology of transcription and analysis of the video records assumes that empirical data and theoretical approach are indissociable. Data are thus constructed by the investigator, who selects some events to be recorded and who analyzes them according to his or her theoretical perspective. Thus, we constantly set up hypotheses aiming to capture the process of transformation-construction of the dyad through the longitudinal data recorded. These hypotheses were tested through returning to the records and investigating the dialogical processes during different moments of transformation-construction of the dyadic negotiated transactions.

The data were transcribed and analyzed in three steps:

1. The records were completely transcribed by two observers (including the first author) specifying (a) the place were the baby was, the mother's activity in relation to the baby, the postural aspects of the baby and the mother; (b) the verbal production of the mother; and (c) the actions executed by the baby, including his vocal production. The three separated columns of descriptions followed the temporal sequence of occurrence of the partners' actions. These transcriptions were checked by reviewing the records until an agreement was reached.
2. After the first step, the data were examined in terms of finding "moments of change of the dyadic interactions" (interactions which exhibit qualitatively different negotiated transactions from the precedent ones); and looking for moments which exhibit co-participated negotiated transactions. During this stage of analysis both the video recordings and the transcriptions were used.
3. The subsequent step, using both the records and the transcription, was aimed at the search for antecedent and subsequent interactional moments which exhibit a history of the transformations before and after the

"moments of change of the dyadic interactions" that were previously identified.

Three observers took part in the two last steps of analysis (including both authors). The focus was the dialogical process of fusion–differentiation and the dialogical processes that describe the interactional formats related to the "moments of change of dyadic interactions" and to the moments identified as co-participated negotiated transactions detected in the dyad. From this analysis come small histories of the transformations-constructions of the dyadic organization that could be observed during the whole period of dyadic interactions. By carefully returning to the records and transcriptions, the three observers established an agreement in relation to: (a) the "moments of change of the dyadic interactions," (b) the co-participated negotiated transactions identified, and (c) the dialogical processes exhibit in the history of transformations-constructions of the dyadic negotiated transactions.

For instance, we can observe that the face-to-face dyadic interactions exhibited in Example 1 (see above) are qualitatively different from the ones exhibited in Example 3. In Example 1 we can observe the dominance of the fusion between the partners. Therefore, the partners' roles are not clearly separable from each other, and it is complicated to differentiate the actions that are "exchanged" between the partners. In Example 3 we can observe how the process of specularity is used by the mother (and begins to be used by the infant) in the domain of vocal exchanges. We could also distinguish the infant's smiles toward the mother that occur on the "background" of co-participated eye contact. This new organization of the face-to-face interaction demonstrates the emergence and differentiation of the specularity process. This process seems to constitute an aspect of differentiation: By repeating each other, the partners' vocalizations and smiles become differentiated as negotiated transactions and are in the process of being transformed and constructed as co-participated negotiated transactions. At the same time, this process also establishes a fusional link between the partners—the partners' global sharing of well-being that is evident in Example 1 is also evident in Example 3. In relation to the mother–object–infant dyadic exchange, qualitative differences of exchanges can be found comparing Example 2 and Example 4.

Analysis of dyad's transformations-constructions

The analysis and discussion of the data concentrates on the transformation-construction of two co-participated negotiated transactions identified, which are coherent with the literature on early social development (for instance, see Schaffer, 1985): *"face to face" negotiated transactions* and the dyadic negotiated transactions which construct the object as a third element of the exchanges. The latter are called in this study *"mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions.*

The process of transformation-construction of these two kinds of shared negotiated transactions is an interrelated and integrated process. Therefore, we consider both as two sides of the same constructive process, which creates co-participated interactional meanings that mediate the subjects' actions. In our data, we can find the beginning of organization of the "face-to-face" and "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions at the baby's moments identified by the mother as "well-being-alert" state, as opposed to state of "discomfort."

We can distinguish three moments corresponding to the dyadic organization of the "face to face" negotiated transactions. These moments can be outlined: (a) the dominance of the pole of fusion and the beginning of the mother's segmenting highlighting dynamics process, which differentiates baby's gaze direction to her in order to establish eye contact; (b) the establishment of the "face-to-face" negotiated as co-participated exchanges; and (c) the "abbreviation" of the co-participated "face-to-face" negotiated transactions.

In relation to the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions, we can differentiate five months: (a) the mother does not identify the direction of baby's looking; (b) the mother "discovers" "where" or "what" the baby is "looking at" and uses a segmenting highlighting dynamics process applied to baby's gaze direction to the object; (c) the mother uses the same segmenting process to differentiate baby's movements toward the object; (d) the "mother-object-infant" negotiated transactions are established as co-participated exchanges; and (e) the co-participated "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions are abbreviated.

We start by analyzing two examples that exhibit the moments of establishment of co-participated negotiated transactions related to "face-to-face" and to "mother–object–infant" exchanges. First, let us consider the moment (b) of the "face-to-face" negotiated transaction:

Example VI (infant's age 2 months, 17 days):

(1) The baby lies supine on mother's bed, while the mother steps back.
(2) The baby looks forward and moves his arms and legs.
(3) The mother steps close, taking hold of the baby's clothes, cleaning him, while she keeps speaking to the baby.
(4) The baby looks at his mother's face, smiles and vocalizes something like: "Eh, eh"
(5) The mother talks, while cleaning him: "Eh, eh! Such nonsense.

Such nonsense wasn't baby? Lots of nonsense wasn't, eh? Wasn't? Such nonsense Mammy!? Eh!"	
(6) The baby continues looking at his mother and makes some movements with his arms and legs.	
(7) The mother stops cleaning the baby and looks at his face.	Here the eye contact is co-participated.
(8) The baby vocalizes and smiles for a while.	From this point onwards until the end of this example, shared eye contact is maintained, while movements, smiles, and vocal exchanges happen as co-participated actions in this totality of "face-to-face" organization.
(9) The mother (smiling) says: "What a laughter, mammy! What a laughter, mammy! What's this baby?"	
(10)) The baby vocalizes something like: "Umm"	
(11)).The mother says: "Umm, what is this, eh? Eh?"	

[A long period follows in which eye contact is maintained. The baby vocalizes, and the mother repeats many times the baby's vocal production or comments about it. Baby's smiles and mother's smiles occur; also baby's arms and legs movements, and some movements of baby's mouth. To this last movement the mother answers verbally, saying that he is humming like a bee.]

Let us also look at a description of moment (d) in the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transaction:

Example VII (infant's age 3 months, 14 days):

(1) The baby lies supine on mother's bed. The baby holds and then immediately loses a toy that his sister has put into one of his hands.	The infant starts the episode from the action of holding.
(2) The mother catches the toy and shows it to the baby at a short distance, so that he can catch it. The mother makes noise with the toy.	Co-participated exchange that involves display of object at a short distance while the infant is attentive.
(3) The baby looks at the toy, directs his arms/hands toward the toy, touches, and catches it. He succeeds in holding the toy, losing it a little later.	Co-participated exchange is completed, as the child gets hold of the toy that the mother brought to his grasping vicinity.

[This kind of interaction is repeated for some time.]

We can find in these examples that the infant and the mother exhibit a degree of symmetrical exchange between the partners in the dyad. In Example VI the co-participated aspect of interactions is related to eye contact that is maintained during a period when movements, smiles, and vocal exchanges seem to function as interactional operators. This use of nonverbal behaviors in a dyad is analogous of the use of "why"-questions, which, having only the function of maintaining the dialogue between verbal partners, is considered to function as a discourse operator (De Lemos, 1975). These interactional operators are elements inside a global first organization of "face-to-face" exchanges and have the function of granting the continuation of the interaction. On the eye contact "background" on which these elements act as "figures" functioning as interactional operators, the "face-to-face" exchanges exhibit a partner's mutual dependence of actions, organized as a co-participated totality. The process of specularity dominates the "face-to-face" exchanges (the interaction continues mainly through mutual repetion).

In Example VII the early beginning of the co-participated interactions involving the object happens through the mother's actions of capturing the baby's gaze to the object that she is offering to the baby, and by the infant's arms/hand movements toward the object. These movements come to touch the object, and, finally, catching and holding the object is performed by the baby. Also with the object we can find a mutual dependence of partners' actions through the complementary role of these shared dyadic interactions. Therefore, the process of complementarity is the process that dominates the dyadic exchanges with the object.

We propose that the shared nature of the dyadic exchanges, which exhibit a degree of mutual knowledge that mediates each partner's actions, can be understood as a historical process of transformation-construction of dyadic negotiated transactions. For that purpose, longitudinal analysis of the data from times prior to the abovementioned moments is in order.

Moment (a) (fusion and the beginning of segmenting by adult) of the "face-to-face" interaction could be found at age 1 month, 16 days:

Example VIII:

(1) The baby has nursed and is being burped. He is on the mother's lap and in the nursing position.	The infant is in an "alert, well-being" state.
(2) The mother turns him so that she can see his face. While turning the baby the mother says:	The mother tries to establish eye contact and talks to the infant.

"Good, you burped, eh!
Eh little boy, eh!
Where's Mammy's baby!
Where is he, eh!

Baby still hungry!? Aren't hungry eh!?	
(3) The baby is quiet and seems to look at his mother.	It is not certain that the infant clearly looks at mother.
(4) Later on the mother holds the baby's hand, turning him so that she can see his face, and says: "I'm getting to be a big boy. I'm growing a lot."	Another effort to establish eye contact, linked with talking.
(5) The baby is quiet and seems to have a vague look, perhaps directed to his sister (nearby).	The direction of the infant's gaze is not clearly defined.

In our data, this first moment shows the mother trying to establish a "face-to-face" interaction when, in the baby's awake period, she identifies a state of "well-being-alert" as opposed to "discomfort." The baby is placed by the mother in a position that permits eye contact. However, the baby does not seem to look at his mother's face, giving the impression of having a diffuse exploratory gaze. Still, the mother's actions can be characterized as considering the baby a dialogue partner through the utilization of an "as if" dialogue. We can see that this dialogue consists of mother's actions that are based on baby's actions *as those are interpreted by the mother.* Moreover, we can relate dyadic exchanges in this moment to the dyadic "face-to-face" constructions identified in moment (b), described above. Therefore we analyze this moment as an instance of negotiations related to the transformations-constructions of the "face-to-face" negotiated transactions that were later established.

Following the present direction we can observe that the mother establishes an "as if" dialogue in which the verbalizations reflect mixed features of the process of complementarity and specularity, not clearly separable processes. Specularity can be observed in the place where the mother reflects upon the baby's behavior (burping). Reciprocity can be seen when she speaks taking the role of the baby (e.g., saying "I'm getting to be a big boy, Mammy").

These processes are used to establish a fusional link between the partners (the pole of fusion) that maintains the dialogue. At the same time, through this maintainence of the dialogue, the mother negotiates the baby's gaze direction to her as a kind of "minimum baby's action" that would continue the dialogue. In order to accomplish that, the mother changes baby's position and turns him towards herself. In this way the mother introduces a segmenting highlighting dynamics process (the pole of differentiation) that differentiates baby's gaze direction to her, as a negotiated "figure" against a "background" of baby's other characteristics or actions. For instance, the baby's peacefulness becomes a "background" against which the baby's gaze direction to the mother can become a negotiated "figure."

From moment (a) until the moment (b) the eye contact is progressively established as co-participated negotiated transaction in the dyad. This can be evaluated through: (a) prompt establishment of eye contact; (b) the baby's capacity of initiating it; and (c) the maintainance of this negotiated transaction in the dyad. This shared action, which is initially a "figure," becomes a "background" against which the baby's vocalizations (which are becoming differentiated from the sounds of discomfort), smiles, and movements are segmented as negotiated "figures" in the interaction. However, eye contact is maintained as a negotiated "figure" that punctuates the beginning and the end of the "face-to-face" episodes. As a final limit, the breaking of eye contact is initially not clearly separated from discomfort indicators, progressively becoming differentiated from them.

Let us now consider evidence for moment (a) in the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions (at the same age—1 month, 16 days). The work with objects starts in our data when, being the baby in a "well-being-alert" state, the mother interrogates to where or what the baby is "looking at" and try to follow baby's gaze direction:

Example IX:

(1) The baby, after nursing, is on mother's shoulder with his head turned backwards over it.	The infant is in an "alert well-being" state
(2) The mother says: "You're not, baby? Are you still hungry? Umm, you aren't hungry? Umm, umm? What do you see, eh? What are you looking at, eh? What are you looking at, eh?"	The mother asks about the object of infant's gaze orientation
(3) The baby seems to look at the window. The mother takes him off her shoulder to make it possible for her to observe the baby's look, turning her head a little in the direction of the window.	The mother's effort does not allow to specify the object of the gaze direction

Later, the mother's monitoring of the infant's eye gaze becomes oriented towards specifiable objects. At 2 months, 17 days, the following episode illustrates moment (b) of the "mother–object–infant" interchange:

Example X:

(1) The baby is on mother's shoulder.	
(2) The mother turns her head back, observing where the baby is looking, and says: "Look at Tobby (the dog), look! Look at Tobby! Can you see Tobby?"	Here the mother not only tries to find out the infant's gaze direction, but also guides it towards an object that she herself specifies

Example XI (2 months, 3 days):

(1) The mother places the baby on a chair which has some toys hanging in front of him.	The mother sets up the situation to direct child's gaze to the toys
(2) The mother tries to catch the baby's look at the toys, moving and making noise with them.	
(3) The baby looks at the toys.	

[Further on, the mother's verbal theme aims at the baby's looking at the toys]

Example XII (2 months, 11 days):

(1) The baby is in the chair as in the previous example. The mother is beside him.	
(2) The baby looks at the toys and makes small movements with his hands towards the toys.	
(3) The mother, moving and making noises with the toys, continues talking about where the baby could be looking.	The mother continues highlighting infant's gaze to become oriented towards toys, even as the child shows motor orientation towards them.

A developmental change can be seen to occur between Example IX and Example X—concerning the mother's capacity to specify where or what the baby is "looking at." This change seems to be parallel to the beginning of the first negotiated transaction about the object as a third element in the dyadic interaction, evident in Examples XI and XII. Similarly to "face-to-face" interactions, the "mother–object–infant" exchanges can be considered as dialogical from their beginning. The mother's negotiation of baby's gaze direction to the object is based on baby's actual actions, and this moment of interactions can be related to the successive moments of construction until moment (d) earlier described.

However, the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transaction shows different characteristics from its "face-to-face" counterpart. Instead of mixed features of the dialogical processes that describe the interactional formats, as happens in the beginning of "face-to-face" negotiated transactions, we can observe in both Examples XI and XII the dominance of the process of complementarity. This process seems to be emerging as the main interactional format through which the dyad negotiates the object. This way the mother realizes a segmenting highlighting dynamics process that differentiates, as an initial condition for the exchanges with the object, the baby's gaze direction to them. Until this moment the mother does not try to complement baby's hand movements towards the toys. This aspect suggests that the gaze direction to the object must be established first.

The mother complemented the baby's gaze direction to the object by moving and making noise with them. These mother's actions capture and maintain the baby's gaze directed to the object. Let us now look at moment (c) in the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions:

Example XIII (infant's age 2 months, 24 days):

(1) The baby lies supine in his crib.	The baby is in a "well-being-alert" state.
(2) The crib has a little toy bird hanging over the baby with a string attached to it (the toys can go up and down when the string is pulled).	
(3) The mother is sitting next to the crib.	
(4) The baby looks at the little bird and nonsystematically touches it with his half-opened hand. The bird bounces.	
(5) The mother gets closer to the baby and says, smiling, while pulling the toy's string. "Where's mother's little baby?"	The mother moves the toy to maintain the baby's gaze towards the object and does not highlight the baby's hand movement towards the object.
(6) The baby looks at his mother for a while, then back at the toy.	Visual, vocal, and smiling-based exchanges are taking place here, as well as infant's motor activity.
(7) The mother continues talking, smiling, and laughing.	

(8) The baby smiles, make movements with his arms and legs, and does not follow the bird's movements, although he continues looking in the bird's direction.	Infant maintains gaze orientation. The mother verbally highlights the infant's looking.
(9) The mother stops moving the toy, looks at the baby, and says: "What are you looking at, eh? Eh? You're looking?"	
(10) The baby continues looking at the toy, touching it sometimes, vocalizing, smiling, and moving arms now and then.	
(11) The mother continues moving the toy. At a given moment, one of baby's hands becomes closer to the toy's string.	
(12) The mother puts the string in the baby's hand.	Here the mother goes one step further as she answers the infant's hand movement towards the object.
(13) The baby holds the string, bouncing and looking at it.	

This example shows the transition, through the process of complementarity, from mother's segmenting highlighting dynamics applied at first to the gaze, and subsequently to the baby's hand movement towards the object. Similarly to the case of "face-to-face" negotiated transactions, the baby's direction of gaze, in this case towards the object, is becoming a "background" against which the baby's movements directed to the object are emerging as the negotiated "figure" between the dyadic partners.

This example also exhibits another relationship between the "face-to-face" and "mother–object–infant" constructions. We can observe that this episode involves fast eye contact (followed by gaze back to the object), vocal and smiling exchanges, as well as general movements by the baby. These elements, at this age (2 months, 24 days), have been generated in "face-to-face" negotiated transactions as we can observe in Example VI. They are shared knowledge that mediates these dyadic exchanges. In "mother–object–infant" exchanges we consider them as having the function of interactional operators. These actions maintain the dyadic interaction with the object through representing, to the mother, the continuity of the baby's "interest" toward the object and to the baby, because the mother persists, complementing his interest through her actions towards him and the object. Therefore, at this moment, these exchanges also mediate the dyadic interactions with the object, beside the specific complementary negotiation that highlights the baby's hand movements towards the object. In ontogeny, from moment (c) to moment (d) we can observe progressive establishment of the co-participated negotiated transactions through the complementary partners' actions of capturing the baby's gaze to the object (mother's offering it to the baby) and catching and holding the object (by the baby).

Having discussed the process of transformation-construction of the dyadic negotiated transactions ontogenetically before the episodes which exhibit co-participated exchanges, we now present what kinds of dyadic interaction forms were observed after these moments of constructions in ontogeny.

Example XIV (3 months, 14 days; Moment (c) "face-to-face"):

(1) The baby lies supine on his mother's bed, looks at his mother's face, and vocalizes. (2) The mother says: "Eh?" (3) The baby continues looking at mother's face and puts his hand in his mouth.	
(4) Eye contact is established. (5) The mother takes the baby's hand from his mouth and, drying the baby's face and humming like a bee, says: "Where's the bee humming, eh? Where the bee humming?" (6) The mother turns the baby sideways to dry him and immediately after returns him to supine position.	Here the mutual maintaining of exchanges in the dyad is framed by the eye contact background
(7) The baby immediately establishes eye contact again. (8) The mother talks and smiles. (9) The baby smiles. (10) The mother repeats the action of turning and overturning the baby. (11) Eye contact is immediately established, and the baby moves his legs, touching the mother's body with them.	Eye contact, smiling, movements, and vocalizations are established co-participated exchanges. This facility of fast restablishment of eye contact is part of the "face-to-face" exchanges (smiles, movements, vocal exchanges) that occur despite the interruptions of the eye contact. Over time, these "face-to-face" exchanges are

(12) The mother holds the baby's legs and goes on talking and making noises.

(13) The baby continues smiling and moving his arms and legs

easily reestablished.

[In another moment of the same record, these "face-to-face" interactions between eye contact interruptions also include baby's vocalizations.]

These easily established "face-to-face" negotiated transactions, which happen between interruptions of eye contact, become "abbreviated" in their form in the sense that they occur with smaller intervals of temporal unfolding: first, establishment of eye contact, which is then followed by vocal exchanges, smiles, and movements. This characteristic suggests a greater mastering, by the dyad, of the capacity of establishing "face-to-face" negotiated transactions. Therefore, a degree of greater shared knowledge can be shown through this "abbreviated" form assumed by "face-to-face" negotiated transactions.

This "abbreviated" form of "face-to-face" negotiated transactions emerges gradually from the initial "face-to-face" co-participated totality (as Example VI showed—see above) mainly through the application of the specularity process, but also through some feature of the complementary process when the mother holds the baby's legs, after those had touched her. The specularity process, at first assumed by the mother and later on by the baby, is becoming a co-participated way of negotiation which is mainly applied to the vocal and smile exchanges, but also to some baby's movements (such as mouth movements—as we could see in another example not transcribed here, when the baby was 2 months, 24 days of age). By mutual repetition the dyad differentiates the elements (actions) inside the first "face-to-face" co-participated totality and then negotiates some of these actions in these fast and abbreviated exchanges (which we call *abbreviated face-to-face negotiated transactions*). In this way the dyad constructs shared knowledge applied to these differentiated negotiated actions—mainly vocalizations and smiles—which we suggest are being built as objects of mutual knowledge.

The abbreviated face-to-face negotiated transaction is also illustrated in Example XV, which follows.

Example XV (5 months, 6 days—moment (c) of "face-to-face" type:

(1) The baby just had his bath.

(2) The mother puts the baby on her bed in supine position, with his face covered by the towel and says:

"Good! Where is he? Where's this boy?"	
(3) The mother takes the towel away from baby's face. Eye contact is immediately established.	This "abbreviated" form of "face-to-face" interactions includes interruptions of eye contact due to both partners.
(4) The baby smiles, vocalizes, and moves his arms and legs.	
(5) The mother smiles and says: "Where is he? Where's this little boy?"	
(6) The baby turns around, staying in prone position. Then he starts making movements which interrupt eye contact.	Infant's movements interrupt eye contact, and the mother moves to restore it, which is followed by abbreviated face-to-face exchange.
(7) The mother returns the baby to the supine position. "Face-to-face" exchanges are immediately reestablished.	

[The kinds of exchanges in which the mother covers and uncovers the baby's face (peek-a-boo), or where the baby turns around to prone position and the mother returns him to supine position, each time followed by "face-to-face" exchanges, repeatedly appeared in this recording session].

Example XV, besides showing "face-to-face" negotiated transactions in a "abbreviated" form, presents them as part of a repeated kind of exchange that seems to constitute two variations in the emerging play routines. This kind of play entails interruption of eye contact, which is followed by reestablishment of the abbreviated face-to-face negotiated transactions. This abbreviation of the exchanges will become obvious in further examples.

Example XVI (age 4 months, 17 days—moment (e) "mother–object–infant":

(1) The baby lies supine on the mother's bed and whimpers.	
(2) The mother shows a rattle-brush, bouncing and making noise with it.	It is the mother who introduces this object into the dyadic context
(3) The baby stops whimpering, looks at the toy, and immediately catches and holds it, while he vocalizes something like: "Eh, eh, eh."	Immediate active entrance by the infant into the exchange episode.

(4) The mother says: "Eh, eh. eh. eh. It's baby brush Yes, eh! eh!"	The mother complements the child's actions by vocal means.

Example XVII (age 4 months, 27 days):

(1) The baby lies supine on the mother's bed and has a rattle-brush in his hand. He bounces it and alternates his looking between the toy and his mother.	
(2) The baby lets the rattle-brush fall.	
(3) The mother catches and gives it to the baby.	Quick movement of offering and accepting on behalf of both partners.
(4) The baby immediately catches and holds the toy.	

We can observe in Example XVI, and particularly in Example XVII, that the "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions are performed in an "abbreviated" form, as happens in "face-to-face" negotiated transactions, exhibiting a greater dyadic mastery of these kinds of exchanges. In these observations we have the offering an object by the mother and catching and holding it by the baby, instead of the unfolding of the actions monitored by the mother, as happens in Example IV (the capture the baby's gaze toward the object, arms/hands movements to the object, touching, and finally catching and holding the object). Vocalizations, some smiles, and alternations of eye contact between the object and the mother can occur.

This abbreviated form of "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions shows the process of complementarity as the dominant interactional format assumed by the dyad. The complementary role of partners' actions, firstly assumed by the mother, is progressively assumed by the baby, emerging as a shared interactional format. As this process is constituted, the object is also constructed through the partners' complementary actions, as a shared third element of the dyadic negotiated transactions. We suggest that, this way, the object emerges as an object of mutual knowledge.

Emergence of Novel Dyadic Organization: Gestures

Finally, the negotiated transactions related to the catching and holding of objects and other motor actions, which are intercalated by abbreviated "face-to-face" negotiated transactions, seem to emerge as gestures. This new quality of the dyadic exchanges is only outlined in our data in the following examples:

Example XVIII (age 5 months, 6 days):

(1) The baby is carried by his sister. The mother stretches out her arms to him while smiling and says: "Come, come Xando." (2) The baby looks at the mother and streches out his arms to her. The mother continues calling him.	The mother here starts a game using verbal and motor actions as gesture. The infant accepts and continues the game with the same gesture.
(3) The baby stretches out his arms toward his mother and, looking at her face, vocalizes and smiles. (4) The mother continues calling him and stretching her arms toward the baby. (5) The baby touches his mother's hand. The mother continues doing the above described actions. (6) For a moment, the baby looks to his mother, vocalizes and moves his arms and legs. This kind of interaction continues until the baby starts a variation of the game:	Here the abbreviated "face-to-face exchanges" occur.
(7) The baby turns his face away. (8) The mother calls him. (9) The baby turns his face to his mother and then again turns away.	The baby uses his movements as a kind of another gesture that continues the same game in a novel way.

[This kind of play interaction is repeated a couple of times. Eye contact, smiles, and vocalizations occur each time.]

These dyadic exchanges, which have the emergent motor gestures as a new element negotiated between the partners as a kind of shared game, suggest a new organization of the dyad of which our data can only get a cursory glimpse.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The investigation reported in this chapter illustrates how a dialogical perspective (which takes the social interaction as an intersubjective system as its starting point) can be used to analyze and comprehend the transformational nature of the interactions which take place in a mother–infant dyad. We claim that this perspective can explain, at least partially, the process of transformation-construction of the dyad (subjects, interactions and object of knowledge) from early ontogeny onwards. From this dynamics of exchanges co-participated negotiated transactions emerge (conceived as shared interactional meanings), which mediate the partners actions. We suggest that this process, which creates intersubjective meanings, is of relevance in the beginning of human symbolic functioning.

Taking this perspective, we propose that the very specific function of social interaction, from the early beginning of dyadic exchanges, is the creation of *meaning. At the same time it assumes an intersubjective mediational function.* Moreover, these intersubjective meanings are progressively developing as the object of the subject's knowledge. This amplification of baby's sensorimotor actions, by the partners' exchanges, duplicates the baby's actions through this creation of intersubjective meanings. It is this intersubject processual dynamics that, we think, can lie at the origins of the symbolic functioning and language acquisition later on.

Our data show the first steps of differentiation and construction of the co-participated negotiated-transactions, both in "face-to-face" and in "mother–object–infant" interactions. Through the dominance of the fusional links which make possible the first "face-to-face" exchanges and, at almost the same time, the "segmenting highlighting dynamics" process applied by the mother to the baby's gaze direction, both "face-to-face" and "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions come into being. Following this first differentiation, "face-to-face" negotiated transactions are the first negotiated transactions that show shared eye contact. This shared eye contact becomes "background" against which smiles, vocalizations, and baby's movements emerge as negotiated "figures." These first co-participated "face-to-face" exchanges have the characteristic of a shared totality not analyzable into its specific action elements. Nevertheless, they function as interactional operators that maintain the interaction. In these conditions the specularity process emerges as a kind of shared interactional format that differentiates, at the same time, the actions to which it is applied—basically smiles and vocal exchanges.

The degree of mutual knowledge in "face-to-face" interactions evolves, assuming an "abbreviated" form of shared negotiated transactions. In this new form, the "face-to-face" exchanges are reduced in time, occurring between interruptions of eye contact. "Mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions are constructed through the mother's application of a "segmenting highlighting dynamics" process on baby's gaze direction to the object. Similarly to the "face-to-face" negotiations, the baby's gaze to the object is becoming a "background." Against this "background" smiles, vocal exchanges, and baby's movements (not necessarily toward the object) become "figures" that function as interactional operators that maintain the "mother–object–infant" interaction. Almost concurrently with that organizational form, the mother starts using a "segmenting highlighting dynamics" process applied to the baby's movements toward the object, by complementing them. The complementarity process emerges as the main interactional format through which the dyadic motor exchanges with the object happen. The process of complementarity begins to be shared within the dyad as a specially constructed interactional format.

A greater improvement of partners' mutual knowledge, related to the exchanges with the object, is exhibited later in ontogeny. This is shown by the partner's negotiated transactions assuming an "abbreviated" form: the mother offers the object, and the baby immediately catches and holds it. The "abbreviation" of the "mother–object–infant" exchanges seems analogous to the "abbreviation" of "face-to-face" exchanges that happened earlier. A new organization of the dyadic exchanges, mainly related to the motor gestures, is glimpsed by the end of the investigated period.

Two aspects must be highlighted as a final comment. The analysis and comprehension of the social exchanges as a dialogical process of transformation-construction of the dyad, an nonlinear process of mutual transformation of the partners, leads to an integrated knowledge of the development of baby in the course of social interaction. From this perspective we can comprehend both "face-to-face" and "mother–object–infant" negotiated transactions as belonging to the same process of change and construction (Lyra, 1989). The aspect of "abbreviation" exhibited in our data lends support to our proposal that the process of negotiated transactions that creates intersubjective meanings from the beginning of dyadic exchanges can be functional in originating the human symbolic functioning in ontogeny. We can say that one of the main functions of symbols is to "abbreviate" reality. Therefore, "abbreviation" seems to be characteristic of the functioning of the symbolic capacity. Mead (1934) has already pointed out the "abbreviation" as related to the social construction of human symbolic functioning. This process of "abbreviation" also includes gestures, which were also used by Mead as examples of this social constitutive process. The gesture "abbreviation" was identified by Pereira and De Lemos (1987), who studied the development of communication of deaf children. The processual emphasis applied to the analysis and comprehension of the human symbolic construction within (and by way of) social interactions goes in the direction of Mc Neill's idea (1985) of a same communicative matrix relating both gesture and language. Our work is aimed at contributing a new conceptual way to explore the first human social interactions. Eventually we hope to find processual continuities in ontogeny that can be related to the symbolic functioning characteristic of language.

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PART II

Cultural Organization of the Life Course: Insights into the Process of Socialization

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Contemporary developmental psychologists are increasingly reaching the understanding that to limit their discipline only to child development would artificially separate one aspect of developmental phenomena from its equally relevant counterparts. Thus, we can increasingly observe an emphasis on "life-span" developmental research, as well as a focus on life-course analyses. Of course, a mere extension of the approach of developmental psychologists to cover the whole range of human life is not sufficient for solving the theoretical problems that research on infant or childhood development has proven unable to cope with. In other terms—extension of the empirical focus to cover human development from birth to death does not solve any theoretical problems. The latter requires conceptual innovation, which may be assisted by the focus on the full life-course.

It is within the life-course-oriented perspective that the issue of coordination of historical transformation of the "collective culture" (see Valsiner, 1989, pp. 47-51), and that of ontogenetic cultural construction of a person, become a relevant theme of investigation. The society is constantly undergoing developmental transformation, and so is every person in parallel developing on one's life course. These courses of development are not merely parallel but interdependent with one another. A given society at large may be undergoing a social upheaval, and the "collective culture" is rapidly being transformed to construct new meanings, values, rituals, and other collective conduct practices. In that process, individual persons of different generations participate in different ways, often channeled by others (for instance, see Chan, 1985). The developing children necessarily become a part of social reorganization of the society and of the "collective culture." Their parents may encounter that historical transformation in the middle of their life courses. Likewise, the persons of the grandparental generation have to face social transformation from the perspective of their wisdom that was created over their lives. Each of the three age (and vertical kin relation) cohorts is interdependent with the others: The children's curiosity about the changes in society may encounter resistance from their parents, which may lead to a wide range of forms in children's understanding of these changes. Likewise, the input from children's self-construction of conduct (e.g., in adolescence) can play a role in guidance for the parents in changing their established forms of acting and thinking under conditions of changes in the society. Likewise, parents would consider the advice of their parents in some way in their thinking and acting. Most of this intergenerational negotiation involves co-construction of meanings and particular action schemes. Hence it is through analyses of reasoning of persons from different generations about relevant everyday issues (like child-related problems: punishment, socialization, education) that the "ecological approach" (see Valsiner & Benigni, 1986) can be taken to analyze the developmental processes of socialization.

All four chapters in Part II are devoted to child socialization issues in their cultural-ecological contexts—of Southern Italy and India. Methodologically, these contributions vary vastly, ranging from a rather tradition sample-level correlational analyses (Chapter 4) to a literary-narrative presentation of a three-generational life course study (Chapter 5), as well as to anthropological fieldwork descriptions over the interval of two decades (Chapter 6). Last (but not least) an ecological reanalysis of data gathered for other purposes, and their reinterpretation, are included in this part (Chapter 3). All of these contributions lead us to the same general notion—that all manifest "behavior," which we can observe in the field, is subtly organized by the context of collective-cultural and personal-cultural meanings. For any adequate investigation of human development, both the observable actions and their (unobservable) meanings need to be studied in unison.

Chapter 3 (by Laura Benigni and Jaan Valsiner) takes the reader to the impressions that a well-known American investigator in post-World War II political science—Edward Banfield—lived through in a little Southern Italian village. Banfield's ideas, and his analysis of the psychological underpinnings of the small Italian community, have become prominent in the discourse of sociologists and political scientists, who often tend to accept psychological explanations at their face value. Our reanalysis of Banfield's underlying (culture-bound) assumptions, and of his empirical data, leads to conclusions quite different from his (and of his critics in the field of rural sociology). Namely, the psychologically phrased concept of "amoral familism," to which Banfield attributed causality for the vast difference of the thinking of Southern Italian villagers, is shown to be inadequate. Instead, the conduct of the Italian villagers is shown to be built upon their use of general collective cultural concepts (i.e., their meanings of "charity," "love" of parents towards children, children's motivation to succeed in life) as well as upon the structure of social role relationships. Criticism of the general methodological goals of contemporary interpretive anthropology—that of the investigator becoming an (at best) marginal member of the target society—leads to metamethodological implications about the subject–object relationship in any field research.

Chapter 4 (by Sudha Rani Sinha) constitutes a psychological cross-subcultural comparison that uses a rather traditional psychological methodology. In her chapter the relevant aspect for the perspective of co-constructionist understanding of human development is her success in studying lower income families in Patna (Bihar State). As is usual all over the world, psychologists have easier access to subjects who come from their own social stratum (middle class). Hence there exists an imminent danger that developmental psychologists' empirical research on middle-class children merely verifies some middle-class, child-oriented background folk beliefs that the active social interaction partners of these children use in their socialization efforts.

Chapter 5 (by Jyoty Verma) comes also from the same location in India (Patna) but belongs to the extreme opposite to Sinha's chapter in terms of its methodological orientation. The historically set and changing social role expectations for women are carefully described and subsequently illustrated by an intergenerational comparison of particular women's ways of assembling their personal cultures on the basis of their generation's collective culture channeling that process from the background.

FInally, Chapter 6 (by Helen Ullrich) is written from an explicit co-constructivist perspective as that was applied to the author's ethnopsychiatric fieldwork in a South Indian village (see also Khan, 1980, for a sociological description of childhood in rural Karnataka). Ullrich's reported cases indicate an intricate negotiation process between parents and children—about the meanings of social roles of gender, education, etc.—that leads to transformation of the collective culture, and at the same time guarantees both continuity and discontinuity from generation to generation in the personal cultures.

In general, contemporary developmental psychology could become better informed about the processes involved in human development in the variety of societies that inhabit the Indian subcontinent. Indian developmental psychology is undergoing progress that still remains little known to the international scientific community. It is mostly the psychoanalytically oriented direction that has gained international recognition (Kakar, 1978), but by no means is that direction the only valuable contribution from India to comparative-cultural developmental psychology (see Saraswathi & Dutta, 1987; Sinha, 1981). Anthropological and sociological research in India on human development issues is likewise well developed. In terms of its cultural heterogeneity, India provides developmental psychologists potential access to a wide range of culturally structured environments for human psychological development. So far, only a few of these opportunities have been frutifully used in ways that force the culture-bound psychology of the "First World" to rethink its basic assumptions (see Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; Shweder & Much, 1987). Further investigations into the co-construction of self in the manifold of cultural contexts in India would be truly valuable.

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CHAPTER 3

"Amoral Familism" and Child Development: Edward Banfield and the Understanding of Child Socialization in Southern Italy

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It is trivial to state that children develop in the web of social relationships. Nevertheless, developmental psychology has usually not analyzed the organization of these relationships in explicit ways. Even less frequent are efforts made to connect an understanding of these relationships with the sociocultural context of life of the persons who form these relationships. In contrast, sociology provides numerous examples of how social contexts have been analyzed. Sociological (or ethnographic) analyses of social contexts have oftentimes been vulnerable to the investigator's projection of his (or her) belief systems into the object of study. One of such cases is the target of our investigation. In this chapter, we reanalyze one particular case that has become a "classic" work in political sociology—the account by Edward Banfield of the social context of a Southern Italian village (Banfield, 1958)—from the viewpoint of child development.

It must be noted that Banfield's study was not devoted to understanding of child development per se. Rather, some information about that issue became integrated into his treatise of political sociology because of his field observations. Two issues will be addressed in particular. First, the cultural relativity of anthropological (sociological) accounts is made explicit in the ways in which Banfield interpreted his research materials. That relativity—dependence of the understanding of the object phenomenon on the cultural basis of the investigator—is a major tenet in the social sciences (see Devereux, 1967). Secondly, we will reanalyze the web of interpersonal relationships, and individuals' reflections upon these relationships, on the basis of the data that Banfield presented in his work. We will concentrate on the connection between Banfield's implicit acceptance of the American cultural conditions as the norm, and his analysis of the Southern Italian village community. Finally, we will try to address the issue of how child development is guided by *constantly changing* cultural conditions—a focus that has largely remained outside the intense and extensive discussions of Banfield's findings.

BANFIELD'S ANALYSIS OF THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF A SOUTH ITALIAN VILLAGE

As a result of his field work in a very poor village in the South of Italy (labeled *Montegrano*), American urbanologist Edward Banfield found an explanation for the extreme poverty and backwardness of the place in:

> the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good or, indeed, for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family. This inability to concert activity beyond the immediate family arises from an ethos [defined as: the some of the characteristic usages, ideas, standards, and codes by which a group is differentiated and individualized in character from other groups]—that of "amoral familism", which has been produced by three factors acting in combination: a high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the extended family. (Banfield, 1958, p. 10).

Banfield recognized the "somewhat awkward and imprecise" nature of the term *amoral familist*—a person who *follows the rule is without morality only in relation to persons outside the family.* In relation to family members, the amoral familist applies "standards of right and wrong" (Banfield, 1958, p. 85). Banfield's emphasis on the *applicability* of moral standards to conduct within a social group is of crucial interest here. In one case—that of amoral familists, the larger social group is subdivided into family groups. Banfield equated family with the notion of "household," which led him to perceive the Southern Italian village he worked in as consisting mainly of nuclear families. The rules of transaction *between* those family groups are observed as lacking "morality" (interest in, and promotion of, "common good"), while *within* each of those groups the shared interests are strongly promoted. This case was contrasted by Banfield with his preferred social organization—that of American small-town community, in which *both* the within-family and extrafamilial social relations were characterized as oriented towards "common good." Banfield's nostalgic description of the community of St. George, Utah, gives us a good glimpse of his ideal society:

> Americans are used to a buzz of activities having as its purpose, at least in part, the advancement of community welfare. For example, a single issue of the weekly newspaper published in St. George…reports a variety of public-spirited undertakings. The Red Cross is conducting a membership drive. The Business and Professional Women's Club is raising funds to build an additional dormitory for the local junior college by putting on a circus in which the members will be both clowns and "animals". The Future Farmers of America (whose purpose is "to develop agricultural leadership") are holding a father-son banquet. A local business firm has given an encyclopedia to the school district. The Chamber of Commerce is discussing the feasibility of building an all-weather road between nearby towns. "Skywatch" volunteers are being signed up. A local church has collected $1,393.11 in pennies for a children's hospital 350 miles away. The County Farm Bureau is flying one of its members to Washington, 2,000 miles away, to participate in discussions of farm policy. Meetings of the Parent Teachers Associations are held in the schools. "As a responsible citizen of our community", the notice says, "you belong in the PTA." (Banfield, 1958, p. 15)

The picture of community activities that emerges from this little account of the small Utah town served as the normative model against which Banfield compared the South Italian community of Montegrano. In all of his analysis, that model of booming and buzzing across-families' social activities in the American rural community constitutes the comparison base. Two basic themes reemerge in Banfield's treatment of Montegrano: Why is it not possible for community members to be involved in joint work for "common good," and why are individual community members not charitable for "good causes?" In Montegrano, none of the enthusiastic community work that Banfield was used to existed. On the contrary, Banfield's informants reported high distrust of the organizers of such activities, suspecting goals of personal gain as motives for such actions; would consider it inconsequential and a waste of energy to take upon themselves any leadership role; and were not interested in the possibility that a local newspaper replace the traditional social interaction network as a means of distribution of knowledge about happenings in the town. The lack of local newspaper seemed to have been a major sign of 'backwardness' of Montegrano, as he returned to the issue when he proceeded to give advice on how to bring about cultural change (Banfield, 1958, p. 173).

Banfield's contrast between St. George and Montegrano is indeed valid and requires a psychological explanation. In *both* communities the same psychological principles can be seen to create these vastly different outcomes. The difference in these outcomes follows from the *functional social unit* that operates in those communities as the determiner of the *ingroup* (as contrasted with *outgroup*) demarcation. In Montegrano, the family boundaries may define the ingroup, contrasting the given family with other families (outgroup) in the village. In St. George, the ingroup consisted of the confederation of households/families in the community, while the role of the outgroup was designated to opponents who were located beyond the boundaries of the community (e.g., the Indians, with whom the people of St. George had historically been in less than amiable relationships). Both within a Montegrano family and the St. George community, the ingroup organization of these social units integrates the actions and reasoning of individual members of the units. That ingroup status of the community facilitates the booming and buzzing activity of people in St. George "for common good," while In Montegrano the smaller (i.e., family) units are similarly active working towards *their* particular goals of what is beneficial to the family.

However, the universal social-psychological mechanism of ingroup/outgroup distinction is not singularly sufficient for the explanation of the contrast between the two social contexts that Banfield so vividly described. The American small community, in contrast with Montegrano, has a different cultural-historical background. That background extends in history to the formative role that Reformation in Europe played in reorganizing the social contexts of human lives, and to the history of emigration of certain subgroups of reformed people to the New World. Perhaps the major psychological aspect that was introduced as a result of the split between Reformation and orthodox Catholicism in Europe can be found in the attributional styles propagated to individuals, as well as in the realm of beliefs about the person's control (or lack of it) over significant life events.

Attributional Styles and Social Ecology

Human beings are always interdependent with their environments. The latter are structured by cultural means—by way of meanings, social rules and beliefs, and superstitions, all of which are constructed by the persons. Human beings make attributions for causality of events that have taken place, predict future happenings, and try to control their present lives. Different social-ecological contexts give rise to different types of causal attribution (Valsiner, 1984). Furthermore, the same context allows different individuals to devise diverse attributional constructions. These attributional constructions are linked with personal beliefs about the role of the self and external forces in controlling one's fate. Banfield captured some of the complexity of attributions and control beliefs of the Montegrano peasants:

> Many of the Montegranesi are not religious. God exists, no doubt, and it would be unseemly not to pay Him respect. But there is no use trying to gain His protection or favor by right behavior or even by worship. God is like luck, and if luck could be managed by intention, it would not be luck.
>
> Great success, then, is obtained by the favor of the saints or by luck, certainly not by thrift, work, and enterprise. These may be important if one is already lucky, but not otherwise, and few would invest large amounts of effort—any more than they would invest large amounts of fertilizer—on the rather remote possibility of good fortune. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 113–114)

This description of the beliefs of the peasants seems to provide substance for the dual-process model of control beliefs that has emerged in psychology in recent years (Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). Rothbaum et al. integrate two processes of personal control into the model. First, the *primary* control process refers to the person's efforts to change the world (either in practice, or in personal perception) so that it fits the self's needs. Second, the *secondary* control process refers to psychological phenomena by way of which the person attempts to gain control by fitting in with the world ("flow with the current"—cf. Rothbaum et al., 1982, p. 8). The American farmers in St. George demonstrate the prevalence of primary control processes in their transaction with the environment. Hence their vigorous acting out for the sake of the good of the community and themselves. In contrast, the Montegrano peasants were described by Banfield in terms that closely fit the description of the dominance of secondary control mechanisms—they align themselves with the external conditions and powerful others (upper classes), and do not belief in active efforts towards improvement of social conditions. The Rothbaum et al. (1982) dual-process control-belief model views the two processes as mutually interdependent, although possibly imbalanced related to each other (similarly to Piaget's view on the link between assimilation and accommodation). Thus, under the social ecology of life in Montegrano, the secondary control processes were overshadowing the primary control (although that process was not absent!). In the conditions of an American small community, it is the primary control ethos that overshadows the secondary control phenomena, although the latter remain important. From the perspective of the dual-process model of perceived control, Montegrano and St. George constitute opposite examples that are based on the same basic underlying processes. Banfield's overlook of that underlying similarity of the Southern Italian and American communities is obviously related to his own cultural background—his identification with the American communities as the ideal for social organization.

Cultural relativism in understanding Montegrano

Banfield started his book quoting Alexis De Tocqueville:

> In democratic countries the science of association is the mother of science; the progress at all the rest depends upon the progress it has made. (Banfield, 1958, p. 7)

This quotation leaves a rather complimentary impression of De Tocqueville's fascination with democracy he saw in the United States of the 1830s. However, more careful reading of *Democracy in America* may leave a very different impression. For a young aristocratic traveller like De Tocqueville, many aspects of the 'American democracy,' as he saw those in 1830s, were as foreign as Montegrano peasants' thinking was for Banfield in the 1950s. In both cases, the observers relied heavily on respective cultural backgrounds that flavored their analyses. Theirs are good examples of culture-bound accounts, in which the author's own background emerges as a normative ideal. Banfield's account of Montegrano is full of his own *ethnocentrism*, which is defined as

> the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it. Folkways correspond to it to cover both the inner and the outer relation. . . . Each group thinks its own folkways the only right ones, and if it observes that other groups have other folkways, these excite its scorns. (Sumner, 1906, p. 13)

In contrast with that perspective, contemporary social sciences have developed a commitment to cultural relativism. The claim that any comparative research has to be focused on a nonnormative, nonevaluative comparison is based on an egalitarian ideology that tries to avoid prejudices in the direction of the values habitually labelled as "progressive, modern, or positive, all of which may be (self-) attributed to the economically more advanced or politically more powerful society, in comparison with other societies. This view is also posited by the evolutionary approach to the study of societies and cultures, according to which each society shows degree of adaptation and survival values in its customs and institutions.

The relativist approach can be applied to cultures in the synchronic or diachronic dimensions. In the synchronic mode, anthropologists have in the last two decades pondered the extent to which different cultures are comparable. Following the lines of radical and interpretive anthropology, we could compare cultures if and only if we share or accept part of the culture of the 'others,' to the extent that practices, motives, and goals of the unknown culture became meaningful to us. That perspective on comparing cultures constitutes a dead-end street for anthropological and cross-cultural research, since it assumes fusion of the investigator of the culture with the culture he or she studies. In the same idea is transposed to another discipline (say, astronomy), no knowledge about celestial objects other than the few to which human beings have traveled (the Earth, and the Moon) is possible. A radical anthropologist who tries to understand a culture by pretending to become one of its members is likely to end up a marginal member of the culture at best, with no guarantee that new knowledge about that culture is generated.

The diachronic perspective on cultural relativism allows us to transcend the limits of radical anthropology and cross-cultural psychology. That perspective treats cultures as organized systems that have arrived in their present state by way of transformation of their organization over time. Cultures, like human individuals, are constantly changing and developing systems whose interaction with their environments plays the leading role in their transformation. From the diachronic viewpoint, direct comparisons between rural Southern Italy and the United States are unlikely to provide any definitive information about the organization of culture (neither that of rural Utah nor of Montegrano). Instead, the historical processes that have led the two communities into their present organizational forms can be reconstructed as an explanation of the culture.

An example of diachronic approach to the explanation of the difference between Montegrano and St. George (that is, of Banfield's main synchronic axis of comparison) is the *history of charity*. The cases of Montegrano and St. George belong to different 'branches' in the historical process of development of charitable attitude towards other members of the community. The Montegrano case follows the historical tradition of Catholic-dominated culture areas in Europe, where charitable activities were organized in a hierarchical fashion: Individuals were supposed (required) to give alms to the church, which then would channel some of the proceeds "down" to the needy through another part of its institutional structure. The requirement to give alms to the church was fortified through the internalized understanding of the positive function of the alms given by the individual, for returns to that individual in the complicated future interaction with the deity. In contrast, the St. George case follows the historical tradition (started with Reformation) that has 'democratized' the realm of charitable actions. Acts of charity in this case are built on individuals' *volunteering* of *direct* charitable actions, targeted on the persons who are perceived to need those. From that historical background, it is not surprising at all that the people in St. George are involved in compulsive community activities for the benefit of others, while the Montegranesi display none of such conduct, and are suspicious of its very idea. The *horizontal* (individuals → individuals) and *vertical* (individuals → institutions → individuals) historical forms of organization of charity provide a context for the phenomenological differences that Banfield described in detail. Furthermore, the historical course of cultural development has produced the basic difference between Banfield and the Montegranesi in the urge for missionary activities oriented towards promoting change in a culture. In his "vision for the future" (Banfield, 1958, pp. 163–175), an emphasis on the leading role of psychological transformation from amoral familism to some form of *community moralism* can be traced. The moral reeducation emphasis, rather than transformation of the economic basis of Montegrano, can be traced from Banfield's suggestions. His personal attachment to the idea of local newspaper seems to reflect it well:

> Public television might be used to advantage adult education, as it has been in Puerto Rico, but in the long run establishment of independent weekly newspapers serving districts of two or three villages would probably be more valuable. *A local newspaper would give the peasants an incentive to learn to read* (why should one learn to read if he lives where there is nothing to read?), but it would do much more besides. *It would create a sense of community, a conception of common good, and an agenda for public-spirited action.* (Banfield, 1958, p. 174; emphases added)

Banfield also advocated the integration of the educational system in Montegrano to a wider (national) network, encouragement of local action, promotion of simple cooperative ventures, and establishing a village soccer team. Whereas many of his suggestions followed the know-how of basic social-psychological principles of promoting cooperation, the emphasis on the *conversion* of people into a new faith seemed to have dominated Banfield's understanding of how to transform the Montegrano social structure as a whole.

CRITICISM OF BANFIELD'S WORK IN SOCIOLOGY

Most of the criticisms, revisions, and suggestions that relate to the issues of amoral familism pertain to different disciplines (anthropology, sociology, history, and social politics), but interestingly enough, social and developmental psychologists have never considered Banfield's work as a provocative arena for commenting upon. The situation is the reverse in sociology. De Masi (1976), editor of the last revised Italian translation of Banfield's book, stresses how it is probably the most widely discussed sociological investigation in recent decades and surely the most well-known description of the Italian reality.

The large number of Banfield's reviewers and commentators can be divided along two main axes:

1. those who are in agreement with Banfield about the existence of amoral familism but who disagree with his effort to present it as the causal explanation of the extreme poverty and backwardness of the peasants in Montegrano (e.g., Cancian, 1961; Galtung, 1971; Silverman, 1968; Wichers, 1964); and
2. those who both disagree with the hypothesis of the existence of amoral familism as well as deny the entire causal chain suggested by Banfield, as it is contradicting different possible structural, economic, and political explanations (e.g., Colombis, 1975; Davis, 1970; De Masi, 1976; Dolci, 1974; Marselli, 1963; Peabody, 1970; Pizzorno, 1967).

Following Banfield's book, his model of amoral familism is used as an explanatory tool of the failure of a community with an agricultural survival system to cope with the requirements of an industrial society.

Many of the most radical criticisms of the Banfield's conclusions (Colombis, 1975; Marselli, 1963; Pizzorno, 1966) stress his refusal to consider structural-ecological factors as the most relevant explanations of the social life in the village.

Despite the disciplinary background of Banfield as a politologist and sociologist, the fortune of his report can be attributed mainly to the psychosocial explanation of the cultural differences between Americans and South Italian morality posited on a judgmental value he attributed to an ideal or real social situation, and the ideal or real reactions of the Southern Italian peasants he interviewed. In other words, it was his contribution as a naive social psychologist that was especially appreciated (or attacked) by researchers in political and social sciences.

The attempt of finding a psychological explanation of the backwardness of a Western countries has the consequence of avoiding political and social explanations, as if the social nature of a given population per se that can give an account of the condition of their survival and of their customs.

This positivistic, social-darwinistic heuristic is also very close to the layman's prejudice every time a more "modern" culture is compared to a more backward. This again can explain the wide popularity of Banfield's book.

If we look at the structure of the ethnic prejudice in two countries, for example, we will find inside the same countries North vs. South distinctions that more or less overlap the differentiation between American and South Italians that was pointed out by Banfield. The existing sociological and anthropological criticism of Banfield's work has largely overlooked the issue of child socialization and its psychological context—the thoughts and actions of child caregivers. As was shown above, the Montegrano peasants also performed the role of parents to their children, to the best of their abilities under the given conditions. It is interesting to analyze Banfield's examples of the reasoning of the peasants, as that pertains to issues of childrearing.

BANFIELD'S DESCRIPTION OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT IN MONTEGRANO

Banfields main goal was to analyze the sociopolitical organization of Montegrano, rather than child development. Therefore, his accounts of child development are relatively fragmentary. Nevertheless, he reports a number of observed practices that child psychologists of his time considered relevant: the swaddling of infants, no rigid emphasis on toilet training (nor any effort to promote it early), sex-differential promotion of modesty, and parental permissiveness towards children (Banfield, 1958, pp. 154–155).

For an observer who starts from the American cultural background, issues of child punishment were obviously of interest. Banfield observed an organizational form of punishment that seemed to contrast with his own background:

> Children are punished when they are naughty... and sometimes even when they are not. Parents and teachers believe that an occasional blow helps a child grow up to be more "refined" and to "find itself better off in life"...
>
> As a rule, the parent exercises influence over his children by punishing or threatening to punish rather than by offering rewards or appealing either to the child's desire to please or (in the case of older children) to its willingness to cooperate on grounds of mutual respect...
>
> Punishment, although freely given, does not entail any suggestion of withdrawal

> of love by the parent, and it *often has no connection with a principle of right and wrong*. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 155–156, 157; emphasis added)

Here Banfield touches upon three major issues in child development in Montegrano that are of relevance. First, the physical punishment, once it occurs, need not be based on any rational "general principle" of "bad" versus "good" conduct. Second, the child who is punished is shown affection at times other than those of punishment, and (more importantly) *punishment is not related to the display of parental love-withdrawal*. The noted absence of that latter parenting strategy in Montegrano is essential, since it (more than any other aspect of child treatment) deemphasizes children's beliefs that, by misbehavior, they may lose their parents' love for them. Likewise, the use of positive rewards for children's good conduct was not observed. *Montegrano children could neither "increase" nor "decrease" parental affection, no matter what they did*. The basic parental feelings towards the child remained the psychological context within which the children developed—as they were punished at times, not paid much attention to at others, and carefully guarded in their conduct when that was necessary.

However, Banfield's cultural background leads him to interpret this picture of child socialization in Montegrano from a perspective that overlooks the complexity of Montegrano childhood. He declared two aspects of childhood in Montegrano to be of "special importance." First, he attributed developmental causality to what he perceived to be "parental indulgence":

> The indulgence of parents toward children and their willingness to allow children to be selfish and irresponsible—"carefree"—until all at once at the time of marriage the grown child must assume the burden of looking after a family of its own. Perhaps it is not too much to say that the Montegranesi act like selfish children because they are brought up as selfish children. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 160–161)

Here Banfield follows the assumption of isomorphism between childrearing conditions in childhood and adult personality. Psychology has on many occasions accepted that assumption at face value. From the perspective of common sense, that assumption indeed might fit the role of the simplest (most parsimonious) model of child development. However, it is exactly that model of development that is the least likely candidate for an adequate theory of development. In the case of individual psychological development, it is impossible to posit that all individuals conform to a unilinear model of development. Instead, different children develop along different lines, only one of which may be the model of childrearing—adult personality isomorphism.

Furthermore, Banfield's use of the label *parental indulgence* is itself misleading, since his own observations speak of the *coordination* of unconditional parental love (displayed under many circumstances), and punishment:

> Punishment . . . is unrelated to any principle of "oughtness"; at one moment that parent kisses at the next he cuffs. If gratification and deprivation—"good" and "bad"—depend upon the caprice of one who has power, *no general principles can be internalized as conscience*. The individual may try to propitiate the power holder, but he will not be surprised if his efforts fail and *he receives ill when he deserves good*. To receive ill will be "bad fortune" and to receive good will be "good fortune". Neither, of course, will have any relation to principle. *Having no internalized principles to guide him, the individual will depend upon the promise of rewards and punishments to tell him how to act.* The punishment he receives will serve the function of the *guilt he would feel if he had a conscience*. (Banfield, 1958, p. 161; emphases added)

The *separation* of punishment and expression of positive affection is important here. Banfield, like almost all of Western (particularly American) child psychologists, has assumed that love and displeasure that parents direct at children are *separate* and *opposite* ways of handling children. This separation follows from breaking the parent–child interaction phenomena, observable over time, into elements each of which can have only a single emotional valence attached to it. Thus, an episode of the parent's kissing the child in public is assumed to be positive in the emotional valence, while hitting the child assumes a negative valence. Notice that Banfield refers to the "capricious" nature in which positive and negative parent–child interaction episodes may follow one another. From Banfield's point of view, then, the "capricious" (= disorganized, to governed by a master plan based on "principles") child handling in Montegrano is one of the presumed reasons for the attributional inclinations that the child would have as an adult.

An alternative view on the child handling in Montegrano would be based on the *conjunctive* nature of emotions in any act of parenting. When a parent punishes the child, the context of that punishment is an expression of parental love towards the child. Children are socialized so that the understanding of that unconditional parental love is internalized as the cognitive basis of accepting *any* parental act towards them. From that perspective, the Montegranesi handling of children can no longer be viewed as "capricious" or "unprincipled." Instead, parental display of love and displeasure *only strengthens the child's emotional ties to the parents*, precisely because it is episodic and unpredictable and not a necessary response to the child's actions.

Finally, Banfield assumes that no internalized general principles guide the action of Montegrano peasants. This misperception of reality has been widespread in psychology in multiple contexts (see Edwards, 1982). Its basis lies in the separation of the internalized psychological processes from externally evident support contexts that set up social demands on the individuals. According to Banfield, human beings *either* function on the basis of "internalized general principles" *or* are guided by external conditions that determine their behavior. This belief in either personal or environmental causation has hampered Western psychology on a wide scale (see Valsiner, 1984). As an alternative, a developmental perspective on internalization implies that the development of internalized principles proceeds in coordination with external social support systems. Thus, neither in Montegrano nor in St. George are individuals guided *only* by external or internal causes, but all internalized psychological processes are supported by the external life conditions in which the person lives. Likewise, the internalized psychological phenomena support (and modify) the external support conditions for the life of human beings. The internalized belief in the "inherent good" of "community action" that may guide the conduct of Americans in St. George may be as influential in arranging their social lives as the (equally strongly internalized) belief in uselessness of public action in Montegrano was in leading the villagers away from such actions in their life context. Child socialization in *any* cultural context works through coordination of the internalization and externalization processes: The child's social environment promotes the internalization of relevant values, and tests the results of that by way of observing the externalized outcomes of these values in the child's conduct, which leads to further promotion of internalization.

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT IN ITALIAN VILLAGES

Despite widespread acquaintance with Banfield's report, there exist alternatives to his ethnography of Southern Italian villages. At least two studies deserve comparable attention—the studies of Milocca and Bonagente.

The Study in Milocca

In 1928 Charlotte Gower Chapman went to Milocca, a tiny village in the southwest corner of Sicily. She wrote her report in 1935, but that report was lost until a copy was found in 1970 at the University of Chicago and was finally published in 1971 (Chapman, 1971).

Chapman's account provides rich data about Milocca also touching upon child development. The context of child punishment that Banfield noted three decades later in Montegrano is also found in Milocca:

> Popular sayings refer to the correction of the children as the parents' duty, but discipline seems to follow no definite pattern. Scolding, accompanied by the most violent threats, is common, "I'll kill you!" is not at all unusual. The only threat that is ever carried out is the reporting of the offense to the father when he returns from work. Corporal punishments are given immediately, and it would be safe to say that a Sicilian child is never struck except in anger. Nothing is said about the punishment hurting the parent more than it does the child, although a proverb exists which indicates a certain reluctance on the part of parents to correct their children:

> "He who has no children is quick to beat them." In actual life those who have children beat them as often as they prove sufficiently exasperating, and the mood of the parent has as much to do with the punishment as the gravity of the offense. But it would be quite erroneous to infer that the punishment of children in Sicily is extremely severe or frequent. For one thing, small children are by definition "innocents," and real evil is foreign to their natures. Much is forgiven them, and it is only when they have driven their parents to desperation that the hand of justice, or wrath, falls. When they begin to go to confession, the most common sin that they admit is driving their mother or father to desparation. Their conduct is considered evil, apparently, only as it produces an unfavorable reaction in other people. (Chapman, 1971, pp. 74–75)

The theme of the *emotional* and *largely unpredictable* social context of child punishment is evident in this quote. Differently from the conditional (contractual) basis for child discipline in cultural contexts tied to Puritanical backgrounds, the description of punishment in Milocca seems to lead us to the track of an emotion-based child socialization system.

The Study in Bonagente

In 1957 Feliks Gross went to Bonagente, a village in South Lazio in Central Italy, and lived there for a year. At the main focus of the study was the social change from a rural to an industrial economy in the community. Gross returned in the same village in 1969. The report on the first study and on the follow-up appeared few years later (Gross, 1973). While Banfield overlooked the relevance of kinship ties between households in Montegrano, Gross perceived the extended nature of Italian families in its full extent (Gross, 1973, p. 69).

Issues of child discipline were of relevance for Gross's observations. He noted:

> The father and the mother have no doubt as to what is right and what is wrong; this is not a world of relativistic values. The evaluation is not left to the child, there is no hesitancy in this respect, no argument or different opinion...
>
> If the child misbehaves, he is spanked and he is spanked hard enough to feel the physical pain. I have seen children as young as a year and half or two being spanked for what was regarded as misbehavior, and I spoke to a mature man who admitted he was beaten by his father at the age of twenty. Physical punishment is given until the child reaches maturity, but is given infrequently...
>
> The child is continuously given evidence of the parents' attachment and love, especially in the early period, it is caressed and loved in the presence of the others, praised while parents speak to the neighbors. This contributes perhaps to the face that once the child grows up he usually obeys the order of the father promptly, without questioning. The younger children will also obey an older child once the power is "delegated" by the father or the mother. (Gross, 1973, pp. 70–71)

A context similar to that described by Banfield emerges in Bonagente: The punishment of the child is embedded in the framework of unconditional parental love and (publicly demonstrated) affection of the *delegated version* of the role of the punisher, as is obvious from the following excerpt:

> Father tells an older brother, "Tell Giovanni he should come down from the hills with the sheep immediately." The brother calls Giovanni, and if he doesn't come promptly with his animals, punishes him in a way similar to the one the father uses. And so the older brother educates the younger, and they use the same mechanism of harsh punishment. The younger children accept this authority as legitimate without visible opposition although they may rebel emotionally and intellectually. (Gross, 1973 p. 71)

Delegation of child-care functions by parents to older siblings is a culturally universal practice (Weisner & Gallimore, 1977). However, here we can trace the contextual nature of this delegation—it becomes possible if the older siblings have internalized their understanding of contributing to the "common good" of their family.

MAJOR THEMES IN PEASANTS' MINDS: A RETURN TO BANFIELD'S FINDINGS

Banfield's report can be considered an ethnographic report and as such is based on a rather eclectic bunch of methods. His methods included spot observations, informal conversations and interviews, written notes from the informants, case descriptions of everyday happenings, excerpts from personal correspondence, and psychologists' projective tests (the TAT—Thematic Apperception Test). Since our main goal is to elucidate the aspects in Banfield's work that are relevant from the perspective of developmental psychology, we will focus our attention on the transcripts of the Thematic Apperception Test. TAT, when administered to adults, triggers the construction of stories that express some major themes relevant for the lives of the subjects. Since storytelling by adults is a pervasive source of cultural input for children, especially in the case of a semiliterate society (which Montegrano was in the 1950s), the *kinds* of stories that prevail among adults constitute an important part of children's environment.

The Thematic Apperception Test was devised by Murray in the 1930s with the explicit aim of studying personal fantasies (Morgan & Murray, 1935). It was originally one of the many techniques that Murray planned for the use of the study of fantasies (see Murray, 1936). The procedure of TAT consists of the presentation of a series of pictures (each depicting a dramatic event) to the subject in the context of an individual experimental session. The subject is told that the session is a test of creative imagination, and that the experimenter wants the subject to make up a plot or story for which it might be used as an illustration. The TAT technique was made up on the basis of an understanding that, in the construction of literary plots that subjects provide on the basis of thematic pictures, both the subjects' life experiences and unconscious phenomena are integrated in an intricate way. Murray found that

> there were four chief sources from which the plots and the items of the plots were drawn: (1) books and moving pictures, (2) actual events in which a friend or a member of the family participated, (3) experiences (subjective or objective) in the subject's own life, and (4) the subject's conscious and unconscious fantasies. (Morgan & Murray, 1935, p. 291)

The use of the TAT in psychology has been rather widespread, transcending the original personological application of the method that Murray envisaged (Murray, 1951). By the 1950s, TAT was indeed one of the clearly potent psychological techniques to borrow for cross-cultural applications. The pictures of TAT, although created in Western cultural framework, still trigger storytelling in other cultures. Furthermore, creation of stories is one of the basic human activities, in which people in many cultures (*especially* those in which literacy was not yet widespread) have actively been involved. Therefore it was for good reason that Banfield's research in Montegrano included the TAT. For him, of course, the goal of its application was *not* that of elucidating *personal* fantasies (as it was for Murray). Instead, Banfield made use of the stories, generated by villagers in response to TAT pictures, for proof of his comparison of the subculture of Southern Italy (Montegrano) with that of Northern Italy and the rural United States.

Banfield's Conclusions from TAT

Banfield's interest was, first of all, in the domain of social stability and change. Therefore, his interest in the TAT results from Montegrano was related to the *resistance to change* in the peasants' minds:

> In only two of 320 stories told by 16 Montegrano peasants who were given Thematic Apperception Tests did a family *prosper by thrift or enterprise*, and even in these cases *the success was not great enough to raise it out of the peasant class*. In the TAT stories, dramatic success came only as a gift or fortune: a rich gentleman gave a poor boy a violin, a rich gentlewoman adopted an abandoned child, and so on. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 65–66; emphasis added)

The absence of the theme of success-by-action, so close to Banfield's ideal of the Protestant work ethic, is not surprising in the cultural-historical context of Montegrano. Given the hierarchical cultural model of charity, the Montegranesi can expect changes to be introduced by way of the goodwill of an agent who is above them in the social hierarchy, *not* at the same level. Furthermore, Banfield found that themes of calamity and misfortune to be present in Montegrano peasants' stories more often than in his comparison groups (see Table 1).

Table 1. Distribution of T.A.T. stories dealing with calamity and misfortune

	Samples of subjects		
Description of the theme in T.A.T. responses	**Montegrano %**	**N-Italy %**	**rural Kansas %**
Calamity: the story ends in death, insanity, or blighting of all hope.	44	13	9
Calamity or misfortune averted or mitigated: story deals with an escape, fears that prove unfounded, tribulation followed by eventual success or alleviation	26	38	26
Misfortune: story ends with injury of the 'hero,' loss of money, death of livestock, etc.	20	11	7
Safety: the story is not necessarily happy but there is no theme of peril	7	29	50
Unclassifiable	3	9	8
TOTAL PERCENT	100	100	100
TOTAL number of stories	320	200	386
TOTAL number of subjects	16	10	30
(of whom married)	(14)	(10)	(30
Subsistance activity	peasants	peasants	farmers

Source: *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, by E. Banfield, 1958, Table 3, p. 110. Copyright 1958 by The Free Press. Reprinted by permission.

As can be seen from Table 1, 64% of all TAT stories produced by Montegrano peasants belonged to the categories of "calamity" and "misfortune." Among the peasants from Northern Italy, these two categories were represented in 24% of the stories, and in rural Kansas in 16% of the stories. The opposite case—theme of *no* mention of calamity or misfortune—were present in 7% of the Montegrano TAT stories, as contrasted with 50% of the stories from Kansas.

Banfield tied the emphasis on calamity and misfortune in Montegrano with the attributional system of the peasants:

> The idea that one's welfare depends crucially upon conditions beyond one's control—upon luck or the caprice of a saint—and that one can *at best only improve upon good fortune, not create it*—this idea must certainly be a check on initiative. Its influence on economic life is obvious: one who lives in so capricious a world is not likely to save and invest in the expectation of ultimate gain. In politics, too, it must have an effect. *Where everything depends upon luck or Divine intervention, there is no point in community action.* The community, like the individual, may hope or pray, but it is not likely to take its destiny into its own hands. (Banfield, 1958, p. 114; emphasis added)

Again, as we pointed out above, the Montegranesi were observed to demonstrate the primacy of the secondary control beliefs over the primary ones.

The conditions of life in Montegrano obviously created a context in which the prevalence of secondary control beliefs was a reasonable adaptation strategy.

"The Boy and the Violin": An Analysis of Banfield's TAT Transcripts

Let us investigate the particular inferences that Banfield made, on the basis of the responses to one particular TAT card (depicting a boy gazing pensively at a violin that is resting on a table before him). This reanalysis of Banfield's use of TAT data is possible since the stories given in response to the "boy and violin" picture are reported in full in his book (Banfield, 1958, pp. 191–199). Banfield also administered other TAT cards to the Montegrano peasants and made use of their interpretations.

In summarizing the data for this "boy and violin" picture, Banfield remarked:

> Eleven of the 16 Montegranesi saw the boy as an orphan; of these, eight saw him as a beggar, one as dying of hunger, one as mistreated by a miserly uncle, and one as a neglected bastard. The boy was not an orphan or a beggar for any of the northern Italians; most of them thought he was an ambitious lad highly motivated to become a violinist. Of the 30 Kansans, none thought he was an orphan or a beggar (although five called him "poor"); 13 said he was being forced against his will to practice. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 147–148)

In due credit to Banfield, he understood the relevant aspects of the post-War Southern Italian conditions as one of the sources for the presence of the theme of poverty, loss of a parent, and difficulty in making ends meet. However, he linked the presence of these themes in the responses of Montegranesi with the combination of high death rates *and* the absence of the extended family (Banfield, 1958, p. 151). As a critical comparison condition, Banfield demonstrated that the TAT responses from peasants living in extended family networks in Northern Italy lacked these themes.

The interpretations of Montegrano peasants of the "boy and the violin" picture is noteworthy also in the context of *shared misperception of the violin as a guitar.* In all of the stories of the Montegrano peasants where the name of the instrument in the picture was mentioned, it was labelled a 'guitar' (an instrument that was well known in the Southern Italian popular culture, as opposed to violin).

Actually, the theme of the need for development (beyond the present conditions) emerges in some of the Montegrano TAT transcripts. Consider the following example (Banfield's Subject No. 4, man aged 32):

> Two parents had an only son and so they were willing to undergo all kinds of sacrifices in order to see that their son learned a profession better than theirs. But the son did not appreciate their sacrifices. In fact he would not study and liked

> instead to go to play and gain bad companions. His parents tried in every way. They punished him many times, but it did no good because he was very lazy. Many times they would close him in his room, but instead of studying he would go to sleep. Years passed and the boy grew up. Then he became aware of the evil he had done and wished to make amends, but then it was too late. His parents had grown quite old, and thus he had to go to work in order to live. He was very, very sorry that he wasn't able to do anything but go hoe the ground. (Banfield, 1958, p. 191)

If we interpret this TAT story as a part of Montegrano village folklore, its potential role as a socialization narrative becomes quite obvious. The theme of parents' desire *that their son go beyond their status* is strongly communicated in the story. That desire is counteracted by the son's opposition to that desire, which, as it succeeds, leads to consequences that are given as undesirable. The morale—listen to your parents' advice (or draw conclusions from punishment) and work towards a better status in society—is obvious. A similar emphasis on individual working towards better future, if conditions afford, is reflected in another transcript (No. 5, man aged 30):

> There was a poor boy who had been left as an orphan and he had nothing to live on but charity. One day someone gave him a guitar. It was a little old. The boy thought that if he could only succeed in learning to play it well he might very well make his fortune, and so from morning until night he would try to learn something about it, never ceasing and never tiring. One day a gentleman saw him who was much moved with compassion by him. The gentleman took the boy home and let him study. The boy knew very well how to profit by his good fortune and indeed became a very fine maestro. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 191–192)

Here, too, the *theme of study to become better* emerges, only in this case initiated by the boy (rather than parents). The success of the boy's motivation to improve, however, is presented, as it depends on the "luck" of coming across the gentleman who would provide him an opportunity, which is made use by the boy in the way of working to improve himself. As is obvious, the themes of *individual effort towards improvement* and *conditions that make that effort possible* are intricately intertwined in the thinking of the subject.

Similar themes of connectedness of individual effort and (usually restrictive) conditions emerge in other TAT responses:

> 6. *Woman, age 37.* There was a boy who cried continuously because he couldn't succeed in learning to play, and he was constantly unhappy about it. But he continued with his intention and finally after many struggles and much effort he ended up well and succeeded in becoming a very good artist.
>
> 8. *Man, age 40.* There was a boy who from the time he was little made little instruments out of paper, so much enamored was he of music. But he was not able to go to school because his family had not the means. However he was not

> discouraged and continued by him to learn something. How many times he would cry because he wasn't able to make happen what he wanted to happen. But then finally he was able to become a member of a small orchestra, and from then on his ability became in a short while excellent. He became a fine player and a musician of great fame. (Banfield, 1958, p. 192)

The emphasis on *individual struggle* with (unfavorable) circumstances, towards reaching a goal, surfaces in these stories. Although not every story of the 16 by Montegrano peasants revealed an emphasis on individual effort to achieve a goal, some generalizations about Banfield's findings can be made. Although the TAT stories of the Montegranesi indeed gave a rather pessimistic and fatalistic picture of their psychological sphere, behind the "fatalistic" general impression seems to lie a realistic understanding that human beings set themselves goals and try to attain these, often having to confront serious obstacles on their way. The TAT stories of Montegrano peasants, when looked upon in more depth, tell us the story of *coordination of primary and secondary control beliefs* (Rothbaum et al., 1982) rather than of "hopeless uncontrollability" of poor life conditions, as a cursory interpretation of Banfield's work may lead us to believe.

If this reinterpretation of TAT transcripts is valid, then would Banfield's contrast of Montegrano and rural United States be altered in any way? The possibility of testing this exists, thanks to the inclusion of five TAT stories (of the "boy and violin" card) from the rural Kansas sample in Banfield's book. Indeed, these five stories provide no evidence of calamity, death, and orphan themes. However, a closer look at them reveals some similarity to the individual effort theme that was present in the Montegrano transcripts:

> 2. *Woman, age about 30.* In a little village in Germany there lived a large family. There was not much opportunity for the children to go to school because there was a big family. This little boy had his head set on being a great musician. There was not much of a way to make any money, but he saved every penny he could get to later go to school and buy a violin. His brother and sisters all laughed at him for having a great ambition, but he said, "I'll show you." So he worked and slaved day after day. He studied at night. When he was old enough, he went away to college. It was not easy. But his family can all truthfully say they are proud; for today he is one of the nation's leading conductors. (Banfield, 1958, p. 198)

However, the other four transcripts from rural Kansas reveal a combination of themes that was interestingly absent in Montegrano. That combination is interesting in its own, since the theme of *child's individual wishes* and others' (authority figures') *restrictions upon these* give rise to negative feelings about playing the violin (e.g., "feeling bored," "dreaming of kids outside," "can't... make up his mind." Let us examine these transcripts:

> 1. *Man, age about 30.* It looks to me like a little kid's got to take violin lessons, and he seems pretty bored. It looks to me as though he's dreaming about some other kids outside—maybe there's a good ball game going on, I don't know. His mother probably wants him to be a great concert violinist someday, but he seems pretty bored. His mother probably gets her way; the little boy has to stay in and practice his violin lessons. (But in the end) he turns out to be a big league ball player.
>
> 3. *Man, age 35–40.* There's a young boy looking at his violin. He's probably been told he should practice his violin. He's thinking it over, trying to decide if he really wants to or not. I believe he would enjoy his violin if he would just pick it up and play it—but he can't quite make up his mind whether he wants to or not. He's thinking also that if he'd practice and play real well, maybe some day he would become great and go out before large audiences and entertain the people, and get very rich. Pretty soon he's going to make up his mind to play the violin and become a great violinist.
>
> 4. *Woman, age 35–40.* This little boy has grown tired of practicing his violin lesson. He is thinking about doing something outside. While he is thinking about it, his mother probably tells him to get back to practicing so he probably does. As the time goes on, he learns to play real well—perhaps gets so he enjoys it. He has a pet dog that always howls when he practices. As he grows older, he becomes quite accomplished, and plays in an orchestra.
>
> 5. *Man, age 35–40.* There's a boy thinking about his violin. He's probably disgusted because maybe he's supposed to practice with it. It looks like he's got a bad eye. I donno much about that picture. (What happens?) I donno. He just ain't playing his violin. (Banfield, 1958, pp. 198–199)

The way in which achievement orientation of the child is viewed in these transcripts is different from Montegrano's. Children are depicted as being persons 'in themselves' who are to make up their own decisions about playing or not playing the violin. However, actually these decisions were not their "own," since they are made under *strong demands* on behalf of the authority figures. The perception of a child's activities in rural Kansas is not at all as "free" and nonfatalistic as Banfield's analysis has led us to believe.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Our reanalysis of the work of Edward Banfield from the standpoint of developmental psychology has led to a few surprising conclusions. First, the contrast between a small rural community in Southern Italy and similar American communities need not be in the direction that Banfield implied (and his critics were reacting to). The seeming *lack* of "internalized principles" of child discipline that Banfield claimed to have found in Montegrano is largely an illusion of misperceiving the nature of human relationships. In Montegrano, as well as in most of the world developing children experienced the *full immersion* of their selves in the social context of the family, which made it unnecessary to expect separate principles of disciplining to be formulated. In contrast, in comparable American communities, the child is treated as a *separate* individual *who is being molded into a socialized human being*, on the basis of fixed principles of "right" and "wrong" as seen from the point of view of the community. In a context where the child is embedded in an environment filled with unconditional parental love (shown on many occasions), and punished at times in that environment, *no "general" principles are necessary* to organize the parenting of the child. In contrast, once the child is treated as a separate individual, and parental demonstrations of love made conditional upon the "right" actions of the child, general principles need to be *necessarily devised* as a metalevel organizing scheme of parenting. When viewed from that angle, the emergence of "general principles" of childrearing and moral conduct is a *result* of cultural history, rather than its basis.

Second, our reanalysis of Banfield's reported TAT transcripts demonstrated that the attributional patterns in Montegrano and rural America demonstrate *both* similarities and differences. The dominance of the themes of calamity that Banfield emphasized in the case of Montegrano is different from that in America only at first approximation (see also Morgan & Murray, 1935). When we analyzed the narrative contents of the TAT stories, similar emphasis on the individual effort of the impoverished to work towards improving their situation emerges in both cultures. The American cases, however, provide additional evidence for personal conflict phenomena that emerge at the intersection of individual's will and its external restrictions. These phenomena illustrate further the adaptation of human personality to the conditions where the culture simultaneously promotes individual activity and its restriction of nonsupportive external constraints. Edward Banfield, while trying to make a poor community in Southern Italy better understandable to us, has revealed some basic aspects of organization of child development in his own culture. In a spectacular way, Montegrano has served as a "cultural inkblot" that has been of use in understanding the implicit emphases that have dominated American social sciences over the decades.

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CHAPTER 4

Childrearing Practices Relevant for the Growth of Dependency and Competence in Children

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INTRODUCTION

The Modal Indian Personality

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in the culture-specific patterns of modal social behavior in India. J.B.P. Sinha (1970), Chattopadhyay (1975) and Pareek (1968) found that Indians have excessive dependency. Similarly, Sinha (1979) and Kothari (1970) reported that Indians have a tendency to arrange all interpersonal relationships into a hierarchical order, which then determines the subsequent interactions and other social and political behavior.

It is also by and large accepted that such culture-specific modal characteristics of a group of people maintain a consonant relationship with the ethos of a culture. In other words the sociocultural realities generate certain expectations, norms, values, constraints, and so on, that shape the behavior of the people residing in the cultural milieu. There also exists a consensus that the two are related through childrearing practices that a society adopts for the socialization of its members. It is, therefore, natural that investigators such as Carstairs (1971), Kakar (1978), Nandy and Kakar (1976), Murphy (1953), Spratt (1966), Taylor (1948), and others, while delineating the modal component in the Indian character, also tend to trace the roots of these characteristics to childrearing practices.

There is, however, a basic difference in the approach of these investigators as compared to their counterparts in the West. A large number of investigators have maintained sustained interest in research on childrearing practices in the Western countries. Broadly speaking, three different approaches can be identified: the psychoanalytic, the cognitive, and the social-learning approach.

Psychodynamic theory emphasizes the importance of early experiences and the possibility that traumatic socialization practices may have life-long and possibly irreversible consequences. Freud's theory is based on the assumption that maturational changes in the organism dictate personality dynamics, which in turn produce the developmental problems that must be resolved in each stage of development. But in addition to his maturational orientation, Freud acknowledged the important role of environment, and social influences were given even more attention by the neo-Freudians (Erikson, 1963).

The cognitive developmental perspective provides a dynamic view of the cognitive processes involved in social development. Piaget's central concepts of accommodation and assimilation refer explicitly to continuous interaction between the organism and the environment. Piaget's developmental stages describe individual potentiality. Basically, his theory clearly demonstrates that these are regular patterns in cognitive development experienced by everyone. In turn, such understanding allows us to predict, for an individual, his or her mode and range of comprehension all along on the course of his or her development.

A third explanation of how developing individuals acquire their capabilities and preferred modes of dealing with other people is offered in social learning theory (Bandura, 1971). The social-learning theorists are engaged in empirical investigation of those sources of social influence that directly affect development. Social conditions dictate the existence of developmental phases, regardless of variations present in individual life circumstances where they are based on independent fact. Social-learning theory shares a concern for the present instead of seeking remote antecedent explanation for behavior.

In the Indian context, however, investigators have been predominantly influenced by the psychoanalytic tradition only in researching human development (D. Sinha, 1983). Carstairs (1971) and Spratt (1966) set the ball rolling, and others tended to elaborate upon the basic conclusions outlined by them. Let us sample some of their observations. According to Taylor (1948), the basic personality in orthodox Hindu culture is characterized by low aspiration, passivity and conformity. The family, he writes, "develops the acute sense of dependency by its extreme emphasis on subjecting to parental authority, its minimizing the opportunities for personal initiation in socially significant field of action, its inculcation of a clear sense of subordination to social and religious sanctions which transcends even parental authority" (pp. 3–12). Carstairs (1971) described Hindu personality as permeated by paranoid reactions of mutual distrust, emotional insecurity, ambivalence, and indecision. These results from what Carstairs calls "betrayal by the mother" of the child after initial indulgence. According to Spratt (1966), the father is an unimportant figure in

Indian childrearing practices. He is identified by his son more due to the narcissistic orientation. Narain (1957) described the Hindu character as mild, passive, dependent, other-worldly, nonmaterialistic, and dominated by values of renunciation. Minturn and Hitchcock (1963) have also reported a lack of self-reliance, dependency, and disinclination to take initiative and responsibilities in Indian children because of lack of encouragement of adults in independent behavior. Murphy (1953) has also supported this contention.

The Indian family structure requires that a child must submit to the authority unconditionally. Carstairs (1971) argues that this is the reason for the unquestioning obedience to authority of Indians. This contention is substantiated by the scholars such as Ramanujam (1978), who finds "almost a nostalgic desire for approval and sanction of the father at every step" (p. 51). Kakar (1978) provides a detailed view of how a family structure determines a part of the Indian personality. He contends that an Indian views every relationship in terms of superior and subordinate.

> His sense of relative familial and later social position, superior to one and subordinate to other become so internalized that he qualifies in Dumount's phrase as an original *homo-hierarchicus*. The principle of hierarchical ordering of social dependencies extend beyond its home base in the extended families to every other institution in Indian life. From jajmani system to corporate business, from Guru-Chela relationship in religious education to department staffing in Indian universities, from village Panchayat politics to the highest reaches of government bureaucracy." (pp. 117–119)

On the basis of the abovementioned observations by different scholars, some characteristics which seem to be more pronounced and less controverted in Indian character are dependency, incompetence, lack of motivation, and a hierarchically oriented outlook. These characteristics of dependency, passivity, and ambivalance, which handicap initiation, competence, and decision making, result from unique Indian childhood experiences and influences of joint families.

CHILDHOOD REALITIES: INDIAN AND WESTERN

As stated above, the roots of these patterns of behavior have been traced into childhood. Kakar (1978) goes into the details of the childhood experiences of an Indian and how such experiences shape his or her adult personality. A child in an Indian family is treated with extreme indulgence. There is total indulgence on the part of the mother for her infant's wishes and demands, whether these be related to feeding, cleaning, sleeping, or being kept company. Moreover, she tends to extend this kind of mothering well beyond the time when the infant is ready for independent functioning in many areas. There is no forcing of pace regarding cleanliness, walking, talking, or weaning. By and large, minimal demands are placed on Indian infants to master the world around them and to learn to function independently of the mother. Given the experiences of mother's immediacy and utter responsiveness, an Indian generally emerges from infancy into childhood with a staunch belief that the world is benign and that others could be counted on to act in his or her behalf (Kakar, 1978, p. 82). As soon as the infancy is over, say around the age of 5, the mother's indulgence is abruptly withdrawn (Asthana, 1956). In a psychosocial sense, the world of Indian childhood widens suddenly from the intimate cocoon of maternal protection to the unfamiliar masculine network woven by the demands and tensions of the men in the family (Kakar, 1979, 35). Such a reversal of a previously indulgent relationship has a profound effect on the child's later development. His or her image of a good mother turns into the image of a "fickle mother" who mysteriously withholds her caresses and attention from time to time. His or her confidence is shattered, and he or she starts mistrusting every body. This is the reason, according to Nandy and Kakar (1976), for the strong "mother complex" in an Indian child. Mother is like Goddess "Kali," who nurtures as well as destroys the child. Father is a distant onlooker and is a "co-victim" of the whimsical mother. This leads to a positive "we-feeling" between a child and his or her father, which persists until adulthood in the form of Oedipal alliance rather than Oedipal complex (Nandy & Kakar, 1976).

Roland (1978) provides a psychoanalytic perspective of personality development in India and discusses differences between Indian and Western childrearing practices and family structure as they affect personality development in each culture. According to this thesis, in contrast to the Western emphasis on individuality and personal autonomy, Indian culture stresses symbiotic modes of relating. Roland sees the Indian indulgence of childhood symbiotic striving and abrupt curtailment of assertiveness during the period where separation, individualism, is normally accomplished in the west, as contributing to the symbiotic emphasis in Indian social structure.

Neki (1976) emphasized the significance of childrearing practices in the development of dependency in the Indian context. He compared the prevalent attitudes of Western and Indian culture towards dependence. His central thesis is that dependence has acquired a negative connotation in Western psychological and psychoanalytic literature and in Western culture as a whole, however, it lacks such connotation in Indian culture. Western childrearing encourages early independence. Indian childrearing, on the other hand, fosters dependence. In the Indian family the mother and the infant have a virtually uninterrupted, close physical contact, and the infant receives prolonged and indulgent attention from both the biological mother and several mother surrogates in the extended family.

UNIVERSAL AND CULTURE-SPECIFIC PARENTAL GOALS

Talking about childrearing practices and their impact on child development brings us right to the problems of sociocultural relativism. Childrearing practices differ from one culture to another, which, in turn, are due to differentially valued cultural goals. For example, LeVine (1977) argues that there are universal and cultural variations in parental goals.

Universal parental goals are (LeVine, 1977, p. 20):

1. The physical survival and health of the child.
2. The development of the child's behavioral capacity for economic self-maintenance in maturity.
3. The development of the child's behavioral capacities for maximizing other cultural values, i.e., moralities, prestige, wealth, religious piety, intellectual achievement, personal satisfaction, and self-realization as formulated and elaborated in culturally distinct beliefs, norms, and ideologies.

On the other hand *cultural variations of parental goals*, according to Levine, can be found, for instance, in populations with high mortality rates where childrearing customs reflect the priority of physical survival and health of the child. For example, in rural Africa, children are usually not weaned until they are 2 years old, and sometimes older than that. However, in areas where the postweaning diet is very low in protein, prolonged breast feeding has been observed, thus providing better protection for the child against diseases of all kinds.

These cultural variations may be seen in a confrontation of global goals of personality development in the Western vs. the Eastern part of the world. Kagan, Kearsley, and Zelazo (1978) maintained that there are three dimensions of developmental goals: (a) autonomy vs. sociability, (b) sensual excitement vs. serenity, and (c) patent action vs. passive contemplation. Among these three goals, the West prefers autonomy, sensuality, and action, and the East interdependence, serenity, and contemplation.

Despite these cross-cultural differences, nearly all families share common purpose, that is, the well-being of their children, even though they may not know how to achieve it. They want their children to succeed in school, to be popular among classmates, to take pride in their heritage, to be respectful toward their elders, and to live happy and healthy lives, mentally and physically. It needs, however, to be emphasized that technologically advanced countries like the United States and Germany emphasize autonomy and individuality; developing countries like those in Africa, Mexico, Thailand, and India, as well as China and Japan (countries which developed after World War II) emphasize social interdependence and obedience in the socialization process.

DEPENDENCY: A STRATEGIC VARIABLE

Dependency, broadly speaking, can be inferred as the modal personality characteristic of Indian culture and, therefore, is being focused on here.

Dependency generally refers to the seeking of nurturance, affection, and protection. Heathers (1955) defined dependency as a need for reassurance, love, approval, and aid from others. Khan and Sinha (1971) defined *dependence proneness* as a motivational habit to depend on others in situations where such dependence is neither required nor functional.

Beller (1957), in his study, used *five* measures of dependency, that is, seeking help, seeking recognition, seeking attention, seeking physical contact, and seeking to be near others. Each of these dimensions was highly intercorrelated. Defined as the behavior of dependence proneness in progeny is, it still arouses curiosity as to how such behavior develops in a particular culture or an individual predominantly as a sequel to mother–child interactions.

CHILDREARING PRACTICES AND DEVELOPMENT OF DEPENDENCY

Many studies have been conducted to investigate the effects of childrearing practices and the mother–child interaction on the development of dependency. Mothers who impose restrictions and encourage continued connection with their children develop dependency in their children. Abelew (1974) found that mother's strictness was associated with field-dependence.

Parental nurturance, withdrawal, or intermittent reward or punishment for dependent behavior, are the most crucial factors in developing dependency in children. A warm, nurturant parent who permits or rewards dependency has a highly dependent child. Levy (1973) investigated the effect of overprotection on children as defined in terms of:

1. *Excessive contact,* manifested in the form of holding, kissing, and touching the child, and rarely leaving the child alone;
2. *Infantilization,* by assuming care-taking functions such as dressing or feeding the child inappropriate for the age; and
3. *Prevention of independent behavior,* like encouraging the child not to leave the mother or interact with peers.

Hartup (1975) found that, if a previously nurturant mother withdraws her nurturance by ceasing to talk and to respond to a child, the child produces a more dependent response than does a child who has been consistently rewarded. This finding indicates that children who are highly dependent are more responsive to the withdrawal of nurturance. Sears, Maccoby, and Levine (1957) similarly found that maternal rejection led to increased dependency only when the dependent responses were occasionally rewarded. Frustrations and punishment in infancy and preschool years are associated with dependency (Bandura, 1960; Sears, et al., 1957).

CULTURAL FACTORS IN DEPENDENCE-INDEPENDENCE

Parental practices and mother–child interaction can account for many of the behavior and developmental differences seen among children of different cultures. Ainsworth (1974) has examined some of these differences by studying mother–child attachment in Ganda in East Africa. She found that Ganda children respond to their mothers by crying, whereas infants in United States usually respond to their mothers by smiling (Bhogle, 1982). Kriger and Kores (1972) compared Jewish and Chinese mothers and found that Chinese mothers were more restrictive and yet encouraged independent behavior. Sinha (1978) found that nomadic Birhors in North India were significantly more independent than the sedentary Oraons. Bhogle (1978) reported that backward Hindu children showed greater dependence than the high caste Hindu children.

Dyk and Witkin (1965) and Witkin, Dyk, Feterson, Goodenough, and Karp (1962, 1974), in their studies of the childrearing practices of mothers of relatively field-dependent and -independent boys, found that mothers of field-dependent boys encouraged continued connections with her, emphasized conformity, discouraged aggressive behavior, and used severe training methods. Field-dependent boys were not allowed to set their own standards and were pressed towards standards and goals set by their parents; were punished for assertive behavior, also according to their parents' whims and moods; and were generally disciplined in authoritarian manner (Berry, 1966; Dawson, 1967). In another study Berry compared the Temne (Africa) children with Eskimo children and found that Temne children, who were physically punished and severely disciplined, were more field dependent than the Eskimo children, who were given much freedom, were rarely punished, and were encouraged to assume responsibility early in life (cf. D. Sinha, 1981).

COMPETENCE: ANOTHER STRATEGIC VARIABLE

In every individual there are some qualities and capabilities that provide an advantage over others in coping with the social and physical environment, and in obtaining whatever privileges and commodities are valued in the culture.

At the present time there seems to be no widely agreed-upon view of just what capabilities and habits contribute to the effectiveness with which one deals with environment. Neither is there any single unifying theory providing a comprehensive explanation of how these competencies are developed, or what conditions determine whether an individual will utilize those skills of which he or she is capable.

The topic of competence has been of sufficient recent concern and hence lacks a clear-cut definition. White (1959) has defined *competence* as an organism's capacity to interact effectively with its environment. According to him competence refers to the exercise of behaviors which lead to a feeling of efficacy, and thus to a source of gratification that is universally and spontaneously sought by all members of our species. Erikson specified trust, autonomy, and initiative as the successful or healthy outcome of his early stages of psychosocial development.

One criterion of competence which seems to be most agreed upon is that competence is an ability, capacity, or skill to perform a specific task. These tasks may range from a particular role in a given society (Anandlaxmi, 1975; Inkeles, 1968) to the mastery of the overall environment or, to use Anisworth and Bell's (1974) term, "to influence the environment."

Child research focusing on competence broadly defined began with Murphy's (1962) study of children's coping effectively with stress. More recently Baumrind (1973) investigated instrumental competence in preschool children and the role of parental warmth and discipline in its development. Bowlby (1973) considered the growth of self-reliance as originating from infancy-based, secure, parental–child attachment. White (1975) described factors of a child's competence and their expression in children from 6 months to 6 years old (cf. Tyler, 1978).

Connolly and Bruner (1974), Coulter and Morrow (1978), and Smith and Greenberg (1979) considered competence as an ability to adapt effectively to the surrounding environment. It is argued that every society demands a set of skills for coping with its existing realities, and how an individual functions in that society depends largely on the acquisition of the competencies (i.e., skills) required by those realities (Mishra, 1987). These skills are divided into two parts, the specific skills and the general skills, and the latter are considered to have the "capacity for combining information in a fashion that permits one to use flexibility, to go beyond the information given, to draw inferences about things yet to be encouraged and to connect and probe for connection" (Connolly & Bruner, 1974, p. 4).

Connolly and Bruner treated competence as intelligence in the broadest sense. In fact they used the term *operative intelligence* to refer the general skills component of competence. Different criteria have been proposed to mark a behavior as competent. Some theorists have used adjustment and effectiveness of behavior as the criteria of competence. A competent person is one who perceives himself or herself as socially adjustable, emotionally mature, capable, self-confident, successful, satisfied, decisive, optimistic, independent, self-reliant, self-assured, and having leadership qualities and constructive self-feeling (Allport, 1963; Comb & Snygg, 1959; Rogers, 1951).

Behaviors such as achieving positive relationship with others, and psychosocial adjustment, have been considered by psychiatrists as characteristic of a competent person (cf. Wine, 1981).

CHILDREARING PRACTICES AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETENCE

Competence and dependency are processes that, to a great extent, are rooted in the early experiences of infants. The two terms, dependency and competence, seem to have an inverse relationship with each other. They may share the same set of determinants, although their effects may be diametrically opposed on dependency and competence.

Studies have shown that mothers who are responsive to their children instill in them a feeling of self-confidence, and that this sense of confidence influences the development of increased competence in other realms. Sensitive maternal responsiveness to an infant's signals, especially when combined with giving a baby freedom to explore his or her physical environment, facilitates overall competence as measured by the general intelligence quotient (Stayton, Hogan, & Ainsworth, 1971).

Cognitive and perceptual stimulation most often occur within the context of an interpersonal interaction. Mothers provide stimulation for their babies when they are feeding, diapering, bathing, and dressing them. They sing to their babies, talk to them, and play games with them. Responsiveness of a mother figure to an infants' signals promotes the development of infant communication and hence the development of social competence (Ainsworth & Bell, 1974).

Every child has autonomy needs to master his environment and feel competent and successful. But often his or her needs are not fulfilled because of the restrictive nature of the parents. Several studies have indicated that children whose needs are blocked fail to develop an active, exploratory, self-confident approach to learning of competence.

Parent–child interaction is perhaps most important in the preschool years, when the foundation is first developed before being carried over to the school years. Thus Schiff (1968) commented that Ganda children seemed to be lacking in curiosity, and active exploration of the environment, as a result of the childrearing practices employed there. At Ibadan, in Western Nigeria, Durojaiye (1970) found a significant correlation between the frequency of responses of mothers to their children's questions and the same children's intelligence quotients. This is due to the fact that, in African families, children are expected to be seen and not heard. The verbal interaction between the parent and child is minimal.

Baumrind (1967) investigated childrearing practices of preschool children and found that mature and competent children had parents who were rated highly on maturity demands, parent–child communication, and parental nurturance. These parents tended to communicate clearly their attitudes about appropriate behavior to their children, while also respecting children's opinions. The parents of moderately self-reliant children tended to be rather low in warmth and compassion, and unable or unwilling to communicate their attitudes effectively or to consider the feeling and opinions of their children. The parents of immature and dependent children showed warmth and compassion toward their children, but they tended to exert less pressure on them to perform at their level of ability, and they spent less time communicating with them.

Many other factors can produce competence and dependence in children. One such devious route to producing dependence and inhibiting competence is through maintaining a tight family circle. The family does everything together, and if the children initiate their own activities, they are made to feel disloyal. Parents may discourage their children's growing independence, for any number of reasons. A mother may welcome a child's submission as tribute of love. A father may gain a feeling of power when his children depend heavily on him. In other cases the parents may find the independent child too self-assertive and a threat to their authority (Rogers, 1977, p. 363).

INDIAN FAMILY STRUCTURE: EXTENDED AND JOINT VERSUS NUCLEAR

To understand the subtleties and complexities of the inner psychological makeup of the Indian personality, it is essential to elucidate the soil and climate in which it grows and functions, the Indian extended family and the richly complex hierarchical relationship that constitute it. When we mention Indian family structure, the image that comes into mind is that of a joint and/or extended family characterized by shared bodily substance with an inherent code of conduct and further sharing of residence, property, income, etc. The Indian joint family is hierarchical in nature, and the eldest male member, usually the grandfather, is the head of the family. He has control over the rest of the family. Thus a man may have grown-up children to whom he is the hierarchical superior, but if his father is still alive, the latter will be the hierarchical superior in the family who may well make the major decisions for his grandchildren (Roland, 1988). The children, who are at the lowest order in this hierarchy, do not participate in family decision making. They are supposed to be obedient, respectful, and rarely rebellious (D. Sinha, 1981).

In the joint family system great stress is laid on submission, resignation, and obedience. A great premium is placed on conformity at the expense of personal initiative. Individuals are supposed to achieve stability in their lives by adhering to the patterns of their enveloping society rather than by asserting their own initiative, and they are always ready to sacrifice self for the family. The individual functions as a member of a group rather than in his or her own capacity. Competitiveness, and need for competence, are less rewarding in the joint family system.

Because of the presence of a large number of relatives, the child, in the joint family system, has many adult figures for identification who act as parent surrogates, thereby having multiple models before him or her. This leads a child to have a more diffused identity (Clausen, 1966) as compared to the Western children.

The father–child relationship is very restraining in a joint family set-up. According to Gore (1978) father's effective role is considerably circumscribed by social and cultural norms. He is to assume an authoritative rather than an effective role toward his children. Because of the father's psychological absence, the mother makes the children more dependent on her.

But in the modern age, values have changed considerably. The concept of the extended family has almost disappeared for all practical purposes and been replaced by the nuclear, although the joint family system still continues in a broad sense (R.P. Sinha, 1977). Childrearing patterns have also changed. The father, who was a mere onlooker in the joint family system, plays as equally important a role presently in childrearing as the mother. Children have a better chance of having clear identification with their fathers. As a sequel, a greater premium is presently put on competitiveness, individualism, and assertiveness in modern Indian families.

SOCIAL CLASS

Although the basic nature of child care is uniform, there is diversity in different subcultures. Children in privileged class families enjoy better facilities and a better atmosphere to grow and to develop in than those from less privileged families.

Mothers in lower class families are compelled to work outside the home due to economic pressure (S.R. Sinha, 1979). They give very little time and attention to their children, compared to middle or upper class mothers. Nevertheless, the children are more exposed to the external environment in lower class families. Therefore, there seems to be a clear-cut difference in the personality development of upper class and lower class people.

A number of studies conducted in India have demonstrated the importance of cultural and ecoomic deprivation on cognitive and perceptual growth. Das, Jachuck, and Panda (1970) have observed that, on intelligence tests, poor

Harijan children obtained the lowest score, and rich Brahmin children the highest. On the basis of a series of studies Das (1973) has reported that, in India, high caste and economic prosperity independently enhance cognitive competence.

Chakrawarti and Kundu (1986), in their study of language development in lower SES children, found that interpersonal communication is at a minimum in the backward family, at least in so far as parent–child communication is concerned. The vocabulary level of parents is usually low, and this is transmitted to their children.

Mass media are still far away from the lower class communities, and they do not have any chance to improve their language through mass media.

Thus, socioeconomic class structure may differentially determine the childrearing practices, and thereby the growth of competence and or dependence.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Although the studies mentioned above provide a fascinating story of how an Indian child grows up, they yet lead us to many unanswered questions and many loose ends, which need to be tied up for a full understanding of the relationship between childrearing practices, on the one hand, and the modal patterns of Indian parental behavior, on the other. A serious objection to the above observations on Indian culture and its personality is their speculative nature. Most of these authors base their conclusions on a narrowly drawn sample of clinical cases. By and large, the sample represents the middle-class-caste Hindu only.

In the present study an effort has been made to minimize some of the limitations of earlier studies. This is an observational study of mother–child interaction conducted on a wider universe. To further widen the area of observation, the samples were taken from two social classes, i.e., the upper middle and lower classes, and two family structures, joint vs. nuclear families.

As stated earlier, family structure is an important consideration in child development. Jointness of family is supposed to be a unique characteristic of Indian culture. About 80% of Indians still live in villages where families are predominantly joint in their structure. However, recent evidence (cf. Mukherjee, 1971) indicates that Indian families in villages are not necessarily always joint. They move in cyclic order from joint to nuclear and back to joint, but, either unitary or joint, both structures are maintained.

Another important factor is social class. To understand the concept of competence and dependency, we have to go beyond the family and into the economic realities in which the child and family find themselves.

Therefore, the purpose of the study is to investigate (a) the childrearing practices of Indian mothers coming from two social classes (upper and lower) and two family structures (joint/nuclear), and (b) how these maternal childrearing practices are related to the development of competence and dependency in their children.

The quality of mother–child interaction is supposed to be of primary significance in the personality development of the child. A sensitive mother–child interaction affects the development of competence in children. Therefore, it was proposed to observe the mother–child interaction in the context of family.

METHODOLOGY

The Sample

The mother–child interaction pattern, and its effect on the development of children's competence and dependency, was observed in the context of family and socioeconomic class structures.

The sample consisted of 75 mother–child dyads recruited from 45 upper class and 30 lower class families. Among the 45 upper class families, 23 were nuclear and 22 joint. In the lower class group out of 30 families 20 were nuclear and 10 joint.

The families were differentiated on the basis of their income, educational, and occupational status. A family in which the parents had a monthly income of Rs.4000[1] and above, with high educational and professional degrees (above graduation) and holding class I or II jobs, were selected as upper middle class families. They also belonged to upper castes. They lived in posh colonies. The low-SES families were those in which parents had a monthly income of Rs.400 or less. A few of them had either primary or middle school education; otherwise, the majority were illiterate. They were working in lower posts as peons, sweepers, and so on. Some of them had independent occupations, such as vender, rickshaw puller, maid-servant, daily wage earner, construction worker, and washerman. They belonged to backward or schedule castes and lived in slum areas.

One reason for selecting an unequal number of families (45 in upper class, 30 in lower class) was that, in the lower class community, independent and separate houses were difficult to find, and therefore, observation of a family interaction was difficult to make. They lived in groups, and at the time of observation they used to gather together. If the investigator wanted to know something about a particular family, she could not get the answer from that parent; others would start answering the questions and would not let them speak.

A second reason was that these subjects lived in small houses made of clay or bamboo sticks, or in a low tent cover with a few lame supports holding up pieces of polyurethene or sheets of tin and other materials. It was common to see a family of six crawling under it after nightfall. Therefore, they spent most of their time in the open field, along with other families. To observe any unique characteristic of a single family seemed to be difficult in most of these cases.

Finally, the joint family structure in lower class families seems to be diminishing. The basis of living jointly is usually predicated on a certain amount of land or wealth. The absence of landed property in people of a lower socioeconomic class forces them to live in nuclear families. Therefore, it was difficult to get joint families in proportion to nuclear families.

The families were contacted through Principals of nursery schools and through neighbors, on a voluntary basis.

The children selected were in the age range of 2 years and 6 months to 5 years, such as preschool children. The assumption behind selecting the children of this age group was drawn from the views of many psychologists who assume that the child's striving for mastery and control often reaches a peak between the ages 2 and 3 years (Erikson, 1965). The age deemed appropriate for terminating what Ausubel and Sullivan (1970) call the "stage of volitional independence and executive dependence" (viz. infancy) varies between 2 and 4 years of age in different culture (Piaget, 1970; White, 1979).

Both boys (47) and girls (25) participated in the study. The average age of mothers was 30 years. In all families, husbands and wives were alive and living together. The families were, caste-wise, heterogenous, but all of them belonged to the Hindu community.

The investigators had to face many problems in family observation. First of all, it was a difficult job to ask permission to get into the houses and observe family interactions. Some of them suggested that their neighbors also had children in the age group of 2 to 5 years, so why didn't we go there. Some of them thought that we had come from one of the government agencies to assess their income or give relief. In fact in many families the male members became suspicious and refused to give permission to observe their families. Only a few families from the upper class willingly participated in the study. This behavior seemed to be very natural in a culture like India, where the boundaries of ingroups are drawn rather narrowly. Only the family members, close relatives, friends, neighbors are inside the group and loved, cared for, and respected. Those who are outside the boundary are suspected, disliked, rejected, and exploited (J.B.P. Sinha, 1985). No one wants to expose and share his or her private life with an outsider.

On the whole, mothers were more cooperative and had no objection, but the fathers and other members of the family, such as grandparents, showed more annoyance.

The Observational Procedure

Naturalistic observations were made in homes, using a time-sampling technique for understanding socialization processes and mother–child interactions (Barker & Wright, 1955; Williams, 1965).

The observations were made in each home on 10 consecutive days. After a brief period of getting acquainted, the mother and other family members were asked to go about their normal daily routine while the observers observed the mother's and child's behavior and their interaction patterns. In general, the observations were made in the morning and in the afternoon, because these were the hours when the children were home and mother–child interactions were quite frequent. The observations lasted about 1 to 1½ hours each day.

Before beginning the final data collection, three investigators were trained for 3 months in the observational method used in this study. A pilot study was made to get acquainted with the process of observational method. The observed data were content analyzed and placed in different categories. Five categories for mother's behavior, and three for children's behavior, were developed. On the basis of these categories for mother's and children's behavior, the final observations were made. Each session was subsequently coded for children's behavior and maternal behavior.

Mother's Behavior: Coding Categories

The behavior of mothers was set under six broad categories: (1) Nurturant, (b) Overprotective, (c) Responsive, (d) Giving freedom to explore, (e) Encouraging and guiding, and (f) Controlling.

Nurturant. A nurturant mother is one who is warm, affectionate, supportive, and caring. *Nurturance* means the willingness or eagerness to promote the well-being and development of the loved one. It is a demonstration of sympathy and liking as expressed verbally, facially, and physically. Examples of nurturant behavior are fondling the child, caressing, giving approving glances, kissing the child, smiling, saying nice things, singing songs or telling stories to the child, etc.

Overprotective. An overprotective mother is one who shows excessive contact with her child manifested in the form of holding, kissing, and touching, and in rarely leaving the child alone. In infantilization a mother assumes care-taking functions, such as dressing or feeding the child in inappropriate ways for its age, and thereby prevents the development of independent behavior.

Examples of overprotective behavior include hugging the child and keeping it in close proximity. Overprotective mothers tended to fondle their children excessively, watch over them constantly, and prevent them from taking risks. They would fuss a lot about their children's health by over medicating and over dressing them. They would happily help them from performing their daily chores and would not let them do anything without asking them.

Responsive. *Responsiveness* means giving prompt, consistent, and adequately elaborated feedback on the child's behavior. Examples of responsiveness include being near the child, singing, listening, answering calls for help promptly, or being attentive to the child's needs.

Giving freedom to explore. This means allowing the child freedom to move around, to try new things, to learn things by trial and error method.

Encouraging and Guiding. An *encouraging* mother is one who demonstrates warmth and approval to the child when he or she is successful. She encourages the initiative shown by the child to do a job and guides him or her in taking the right decision.

Controlling. A *controlling* mother is one who exercises control over the child's behavior, who keeps a strict vigilance over the child's activities and does not allow any freedom. She often punishes the child for behavior that, according to her rule book, is not appropriate.

CHILD'S BEHAVIOR: CODING CATEGORIES

Child's behaviors were clustered under two broad categories: dependency and competence.

Dependency. Under dependency, the behaviors rated were the following: (a) seeking help, (b) seeking physical contact, (c) seeking proximity, and (d) seeking attention and recognition.

Competence. Competent behaviors shown by children were grouped under the following dimensions: (a) Development of age-appropriate skills. The observation of this dimension was based on the norms for Indian children from 2½ to 5 years developed by Dr. Murlidharan (1971). (b) Self-sufficiency and independence. These mean being able to manage one's own affairs, the fitness of a child to interact effectively with the environment, independent of adults. (c) Responsibility. The willing performance of task, duties or routines: if a child is assigned a task, does he or she finish it without any pressure? (d) Coping ability. An active, planful, invested coping style including high initiative, goal setting, and a capacity to build both from success and failure.

On the basis of frequency of occurrence, the behaviors were scored for each day. Each individual score of 10 observations was added. The maximum score for each person on each category was 10.

Intercoder Reliability

Three raters rated all the behaviors. Intercoder reliability was checked. The correlations are presented in Table 1.

As the intercoder reliability coefficients were only marginally significant, the scores of all three raters on each category were combined for statistical analysis.

RESULTS

Nature of behavior observed of Parents

The mean scores and SDs of the six maternal categories and two child's categories are presented in Table 2, in order of occurrence.

Table 1. Intercorrelations® Among Three Raters on Eight Variables

	Nurturance			Responsiveness			Giving Freedom			Controlling Q		
Raters	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
1	–	.58*	.55*	–	.40*	.58*	–	.50*	.68*	–	.68*	.65%
2		–	.73*		–	.72*		–	.75*		–	.68*
3			–			–			–			–

	Overprotection			Encouraging			Depending			Competence		
Raters	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
1	–	.70*	.52*	–	.70*	.52*	–	.81*	.73*	–	.75*	.69%
2		–	.53*		–	.63*		–	.74*		–	.69*
3			–			–			–			–

Note. N = 75, $^{*}p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

The results shown in Table 2 are illustrative of the preferred mode of childrearing practices of Indian mothers. The majority of mothers, irrespective of social class and family structure, aggregated over the category of nurturance. This finding reflects a culture-specific trait of Indian mothers also substantiated by Ghei (1966), who found that Indian men and women both share a need for nurturance and a need for abasement. According to him, nurturance is the most dominant need of Indians.

The next most frequent behavior seemed to be providing the child freedom to explore. This behavior was more frequent in lower class than in upper class families.

Being responsive to the child's needs was the third characteristic behavior of Indian mothers. The upper class mothers were more responsive to their children's signals in both joint ($t = 5.37$, $p < .01$) and nuclear ($t = 4.04$, $p < .01$) family structures than the lower class families in either structure (See Table 3).

Table 2. Mean Scores and SDs of Six Maternal Variables

Maternal Variables	Mean	SD
Nurturance	10.083	4.354
GivingFreedom	10.067	4.398
Responsive	8.773	4.005
Encouraging	5.467	4.881
Controlling	3.133	4.325
Overprotection	1.827	3.727
Children's Variables		
Competence	6.933	4.812
Dependency	3.72	4.162

Table 3. Comparison between Mean and S.D. Scores of Upper Class and Lower Class Joint and Nuclear Families.

Variables	Joint			Nuclear		
	Mean	S.D.	t-ratio	Mean	S.D.	t-ratio
1. Nurturance Upper Class	11.009	3.175	2.387	11.826	4.669	3.287**
Lower Class	7.900	3.833		6.400	3.072	
2. Responsiveness UC	11.318	3.349	5.369*	10.435	3.281	4.045**
LC	4.600	2.764		6.400	3.072	
3. Giving freedom UC	8.818	3.892	1.964	8.957	4.448	2.113*
LC	11.600	2.833		11.950	4.610	
4. Encouraging UC	7.000	4.824	2.079*	7.000	5.733	2.738**
LC	3.500	2.693		3.000	3.000	
5. Over Protective UC	3.045	4.527	1.420	2.174	4.400	1.530
LC	.900	1.375		.550	1.564	
6. Controlling UC	2.636	4.192	0.545	3.391	4.136	0.201
UC	3.600	5.083		3.150	3.439	

Giving the child encouragement and guidance was the fourth preferred mode of child rearing of Indian mothers, although it was preferred more by upper class than the lower class mothers. Overprotective behavior also was a characteristic of upper class parents in both family structures, although the presence of this behavior was negligible. Overprotectiveness, supposed to be a common characteristic of Indian childrearing practices, did not emerge as a prominent practice. The data also suggest high variability, as indicated by enormous SDS in this category.

The absence of this behavior may be due to changing family patterns. With the joint family on the way to being more or less abolished, the system of support and interdependence, a common feature of Indian families, seems to be diminishing. In the nuclear family structure mothers have to perform much work. The male members are generally the breadwinners. They are not generally responsible for childrearing or other activities of household chores. Therefore, mothers, who were, in the near past, only responsible for rearing their children, have presently to perform the household work. There is a shift in the role of women in the family, and this change is being triggered from within the family, through changing intergenerational interactions, and from the environment as well. Access to higher education has substantially contributed to alternative roles of motherhood. Now a mother shares the responsibilities for her child's education, health, and other outdoor activities that were previously borne only by the male members of the family. If she is a working woman, she has to bear a double burden. So the ultimate consequence is a paucity of time for children.

Mothers who exercised control over their children's behavior were very few. This trend is in accordance with earlier findings that Indian mothers are more permissive and persuading, in their behavior in disciplining their children, than controlling and punishing (S.R. Sinha, 1985).

Nature of behavior observed of Children

Children's behavior was grouped under two main categories—dependency and competence. The mean scores and SDS of the two variables are illustrated in Table 2 (see above).

The scores of five dimensions of dependency and four dimensions of competence were combined, and a composite score of dependency and competence was used for further analysis.

It is evident from Table 2 that the degree of overall competence was higher as compared with overall dependency (t = 4.344, $p < .01$) in the total sample, irrespective of social class and family structure.

Intercorrelations among mother's and children's variables

The correlational matrix in Table 4 displays the analysis of the relationship between six maternal variables and two children's variables for the total sample of mothers and children.

First let us examine the patterns of childrearing and interrelationships among variables. Some of the maternal variables were significantly and meaningfully interrelated with one another. The variable of nurturance was positively related with mothers' responsiveness (r = .48, $p < .01$) and encouragement (r = .24, p

Table 4. Intercorrelations Among Six Categories of Mothers Behavior and Two Categories of Child's Behavior

	Nurturance	Over protection	Responsive	Giving freedom	Controlling	Encouraging	Dependence (ch)	Competent (ch)
Nurturance	–	03	49**	−02	08	24	12	07
Overprotection		–	−05	−45**	01	−08	40**	−23
Responsive			–	−04	08	38**	00	12
Giving Freedom				04	04	−08**	−30**	30
Controlling					–	08	24**	−02
Encouraging						–	00	37**
Dependency (ch)								60**
Competence (ch)								–

Note. Decimal points are omitted. *$p < .01$, *$p < .05$
N = 75

$<.05$). These three variables taken together constitute a pattern of mothering which is nurturant, such as, giving warmth, affection, care, and protection to the children with prompt responsiveness to the children's signals, as well as giving verbal encouragement and positive guidance to them. The positive correlation between responsiveness and encouragement ($r = .38$, $p <.01$) reflects the trend that mothers who were sensitive to their children's signals were also familiar with their children's needs, abilities, difficulties and problems. These mothers tried to help overcome their children's problems by giving them appropriate guidance and encouragement from time to time. They gave them prompt response, help, and attention without forcing or dominating, and yet encouraged the children toward independent efforts.

The variable of overprotection had significant negative correlation with freedom to explore ($r = -.45$, $p <.01$). The finding substantiated the hypothesis that mothers who were overprotective restricted children's freedom to move, work, and make decisions independently.

These six maternal variables were correlated with their children's competence and dependency. Out of six maternal variables only two (giving freedom to explore and encouraging) were positively and significantly related with competence ($r = .20$, $p <.01$; $r = .37$, $p <.01$ respectively). Maternal nurturance and responsiveness, which were clustered together with encouragement, did not show any direct significant relationship with the children's competence dimension. Giving accurate guidance and providing encouragement in the form of verbal approval, compliments, and so on, from time to time seemed to facilitate the development of overall competence.

The contribution of maternal responsiveness and nurturance is perhaps less immediately apparent in the growth of competence. But it suggests that the behavior characteristics of a sensitive mothers has, as Piaget (1936) proposed, a facilitating effect on the development of the child's ability to deal with the environment. It also reflects that a child whose signals are responded to promptly and accurately builds up a sense of competence, a confidence that he or she can, through his or her own behavior, control what happens to him or her, and that this confidence carries over into the transaction with the physical environment (Ainsworth & Bell, 1974).

Giving child freedom to explore was significantly related with competence ($r = .30$, $p <.01$), meaning that providing the child freedom to explore helped to facilitate the overall development of competence. A regression analysis, computed to determine the effect of floor freedom on the development of competence in children, was not significant ($t = 1.39$, $p <.10$). It explained only 2.5% of variance.

A weak negative correlation was found between the factors of competence and overprotection ($p <.05$). This showed a trend towards partial support of the hypotheses that maternal overprotection has a debilitating effect on the development of competence.

The variable of dependency had the reverse trend. Maternal overprotection had a strong positive correlation with dependency (r = .40, p <.001).

Another factor which was positively correlated with dependency was controlling behavior of mothers (r = .24, p <.05). Mothers who exercised excessive control and restrictions over their children's behavior had children who were highly dependent.

This finding was also confirmed by computing a regression analysis between the two factors that showed a marked influence of maternal controlling behavior on children's dependency (p <.01). It explained 10% variance. Giving freedom was negatively correlated with dependency (p <.01).

The dimensions of dependency and competence were inversely related (r = .60, p <.01), substantiating the hypotheses that highly dependent children were less competent, and vice versa.

Influence of Social Class and Family Structure

Childrearing practices of mothers were also influenced by the social class and the family structure. Behavior of mothers from upper class and lower class, and joint versus nuclear, families were intercorrelated. The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6.

The data obtained reflected an interesting pattern emerging out of four categories, which differentiates them significantly.

Table 5. Intercorrelations Among Mother's and Children's Behavior in Upper Class Nuclear Families

	Nurturance	Over protection	Responsive	Giving freedom	Controlling	Encouraging	Dependence (ch)	Competent (ch)
Nurturance	–	−22	45**	27	−13	11	17	19
Overprotection		–	−56**	−54**	14	−29	63**	−46**
Responsive			–	49**	23	06	−34*	09
Giving Freedom				–	−18	38**	−57**	45*
Controlling					–	−24	12	−06
Encouraging						–	−15	50**
Dependency (ch)							–	−76**
Competence (ch)								–

Note. Decimal points omitted. *p <.05, **p<.01
N = 23

Table 6. Intercorrelations Among Mother's and Children's Behavior in Upper Class Joint Family System

	Nurturance	Over protection	Responsive	Giving freedom	Controlling	Encouraging	Dependence (ch)	Competent
Nurturance		−04	76**	00	−35	17	−33	20
Overprotection		–	−11	−36*	−06	−27	12	−08
Responsive				12	−11	54**	−29	42*
Giving Freedom					15	29	10	06
Controlling						14	57**	−19
Encouraging							−07	−52**
Dependency								−66**
Competence								–

Note. Decimal points omitted. **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$. N = 22

The Upper Class Joint vs. Nuclear Families

Mothers of upper class families, irrespective of family structure, had higher mean scores on nurturance ($p < .05$ for joint, and $p < .01$ for nuclear family), responsiveness ($p < .01$ for both), giving freedom to explore ($p < .10$ and $p < .01$ for joint and nuclear, respectively), and encouragement ($p < .05$, for both), as compared with the lower class families.

On the other hand, in the lower class families, giving freedom was ranked higher; then came nurturance and responsiveness, respectively (see Table 3).

The intercorrelational matrics presented in Table 5 and 6 show the data of the upper class joint and nuclear families. The trend of relationship is almost similar in both family structures. Some of the behavior categories of mothers were clustered together to give a clear picture of specific childrearing patterns in upper class families. Mothers who were nurturant were also responsive to their children's needs. They encouraged their children to learn new things, and provided positive guidance when they needed it. They did not restrict their children's movements, gave them freedom to explore the world, but all the time were vigilant and did not neglect the children.

This concern for the well-being of their children, being always vigilant and responsive to their signals and giving them encouragement, led to the development of overall competence in children.

Overprotection in the upper class nuclear family was negatively and significantly related with responsiveness of mothers and giving freedom to the children (r = $-.56$, $p <.01$; r = $-.54$, $p <.01$, respectively). In the joint family, the trend is the same, but the correlations between overprotection and responsiveness are not significant. Giving freedom to explore was significantly and negatively related with overprotectiveness (r = $-.36$, $p <.05$) in the joint family, substantiating the earlier findings.

A possible explanation for overprotection relating negatively to responsiveness seems to be that the mothers are not responsive to their children's needs as required by the children's wish. They themselves decide what is good or bad for their children, what should be their needs, and to that they are responsive. Therefore, a child is not attended to when he or she cries for food; rather, the mother decides when he or she should be given food or go to sleep. The overprotectiveness is a mixture of authority, on the one hand, and warmth, affection, and persuasion on the other. Therefore, children are allowed to do things independently but only under the close supervision of the mother. Mothers are always involved in considering the well-being of their children.

As far as dependency of children in upper class families is concerned, the data provide an interesting picture. The overall dependency score of children in the upper class nuclear family was positively and significantly related with the overprotective behavior of their mothers. Mothers who were more anxious about their children, who were overprotective and indulgant, instilled in their children a sense of dependency. Dependency in the nuclear family was negatively related with responsiveness (r = $-.34$, $p <.05$) and giving freedom to explore (r = $.57$, $p <.01$), meaning that positive responsiveness of mothers to children's signals, and their granting them autonomy, generates a feeling of self-confidence and independence in children, thus inhibiting the growth of dependency.

In the upper class joint family only those mothers had highly dependent children who exercised excessive control on them. Restrictiveness of parents, combined with lack of warmth and affection, prompted dependency in children (Bhogle, 1982).

The joint and nuclear families of the upper middle class showed different trends on the dimensions of their children's competence. In the nuclear families, giving children freedom to explore led to the development of overall competence (r = $.45$, $p <.01$) in children. Maternal encouragement was also positively and significantly related with competence (r = $.50$, $p <.01$).

In the joint families, it was mother's responsiveness, rather than giving freedom, which was responsible for inculcating a sense of competence in children. Encouragement of mother was positively related with competence in joint families also (r = $.57$, $p <.01$).

The findings here reflect the picture of upper class joint and nuclear family styles. In the joint family, there are a number of family members other than father and mother who look after the child. Therefore, the child has more freedom to move about here and there—from one person to another. This freedom of movement carries the essence of carelessness and an easy style of childrearing.

In the nuclear families, due to lack of a number of family members, the parents try to change the environment into a constructive one. They don't have time to look after their children all the time; thus they provide access to toys, play materials, books, music equipments, TV, etc. They create an environment which is more secure and inventive and leave the child free to explore. This freedom is combined with mother's vigilance and attentiveness. She is also attentive and responsive to her child's needs for help. This freedom and prompt responsiveness lead to the growth of competence in children.

The Lower Class Joint/Nuclear Family

In the lower class families, the picture is somewhat diffused. There did not emerge any clear-cut pattern of childrearing either in joint or nuclear families. The reasons may be (a) the effect of urbanization, or (b) living in close contact with middle class people. Except for the sweeper class, the people of other occupations, like peons, maid-servants, rickshaw pullers, and so on, live in close contact with middle class people. They try to imitate their childrearing values. They also send their children to missionary schools, try not to punish them physically, give them more nutritional food, and try to fulfill their demands. They aspire to make their children educated and to join some service.

The correlational matrixes of lower class families are presented in Tables 7 and 8.

The childrearing practices prevalent in joint families differed from the nuclear families. In the nuclear families, the factor of nurturance had an inclination to combine with overprotectiveness (although not significantly) leading to dependency (r = .37, $p < .05$). Overprotection had a high positive correlation with encouraging (r = .65, $p < .01$). Giving freedom to explore was the only behavior which had a significant positive relationship with competence in children (r = .55, $p < .01$). This finding is in accordance with the trend found in the upper class nuclear family discussed earlier.

The picture was just the reverse in the joint family structure. Here nurturance of mother was related with the high degree of overall competence in children (r = .59, $p < .01$). Overprotection did not show any meaningful relationship with any other categories. Another maternal factor that was associated with the development of competence was controlling. The trend was just opposite in the nuclear family structure, where giving freedom was more effective in the development of competence in children.

In the joint family, mothers who imposed restrictions and controlled the behavior of their children had children who were high on competence.

In the course of close observation of the families, it was evident that among

Table 7. Intercorrelations Among Mother's and Children's Categories in Lower Class Nuclear Families

	Nurturance	Over protection	Responsive	Giving freedom	Controlling	Encouraging	Dependence (ch)	Competent
Nurturance	–	24	– 37*	04	09	– 01	37*	16
Overprotection		–	– 23	– 45*	– 11	65*	– 05	– 13
Responsive				06	– 20	– 01	19	– 09
Giving Freedom				–	– 20	– 09	06	55*
Controlling						– 04	03	28
Encouraging						–	02	– 20
Dependency							–	– 33
Competence								–

Note. Decimal points omitted. *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$. N = 20

Table 8. Intercorrelations Among Mother's and Children's Categories in Lower Class Joint Families

	Nurturance	Over protection	Responsive	Giving freedom	Controlling	Encouraging	Dependence	Competence
Nurturance	–	.02	.34	.31	.34	– .07	– .16	.59
Overprotection		–	.17	– .09	– .29	– .01	.30	.01
Responsive			–	– .08	– .40	– .26	– .02	.03
Giving Freedom				–	.40	.31	– .78*	.25
Controlling					–	– .28	– .07	.71*
Encouraging						–	.41	.27
Dependency							–	– .33
Competence								–

N = 10

the lower class subjects, giving freedom was associated with carelessness. Because there was no one to look after them in the absence of parents, they had much time on their own. Children living in slums have a tendency to roam around uncared for, directionless, and without any goal.

Parents exercising control in this environment put a restriction on the child from going astray. Control here means to give them direction, to keep them on the right path, to get them to work. It also shows the concern of the parents. The freedom that is allowed in the lower class families is not conducive to a healthy development of the child. It is a kind of carelessness on the part of the parents.

Therefore, it seems quite natural that, in this environment of freedom and carelessness, mothers' control leads to the development of competence in their children by providing them appropriate guidance and clear direction.

Many studies have shown parental control (strictness–permissiveness) to be major dimensions of parental behavior. In a recent study Rohner and Pettingill (1985) found that, in East Asian society, parental strictness was perceived as a sign of parental warmth and low neglect. Baumrind (1972), in a sample of Black families, found that Black girls whose mothers used highly hostile and restrictive disciplinary practices were self-assertive and independent in their behavior, as contrasted with White girls and their mothers. It was concluded that authoritarian childrearing practices with black girls are explicitly intended to develop toughness and self-sufficiency. Thus the girls perceived their mother's behavior as an act of loving care rather than an expression of rejection.

Giving freedom had strong negative correlation with dependency, substantiating the earlier findings.

Social Class and Family Structure as Factors of Dependency and Competence

Chi-square tests were applied to see the effects of social class, and joint and nuclear families, on the development of dependency in children.

Extreme group comparisons were made to examine the effects of social class and family structure in high- and low-dependent and high- and low-competent

Table 9. Chi-square to Assess the Difference Between Upper and Lower Class Joint vs. Nuclear Families Having High- and Low-Dependent Children

Dependency	Upper Class		Lower Class		
	Joint	Nuclear	Joint	Nuclear	
High	12	7	4	4	27
Low	7	10	2	10	29
Total	19	17	6	14	56

$\chi^2 = 5.018$. DF = 2. $^*p < .10$

Table 10. Chi-square to Asess the Difference Between Upper and Lower Class Joint vs. Nuclear Families Having High- and Low-Competent Children

Dependency	Upper Class		Lower Class		
	Joint	Nuclear	Joint	Nuclear	
High	11	12	4	8	35
Low	6	6	2	4	18
Total	17	18	6	12	53

DF = 2. χ^2 = n.s.

children. The extreme groups were selected by taking 25% children scoring above the 75th percentile, and 25% children scoring below the 25th percentile. Table 9 illustrates the difference between upper class and lower class joint vs. nuclear families on the dimensions of competence.

The results suggested that there was no significant difference between the upper and lower class, or between joint and nuclear families, as far as the competence of children was concerned.

As far as the relationship with social class, family structure, and dependency was concerned, the chi-square only approached significance ($\chi^2 = 4.405$, $p < .10$) although showing a clear-cut trend that, irrespective of social class, children of joint families were more dependent as compared with the children of nuclear families (see Table 10).

Child's Variables: Age and Sex

An attempt was made to see the relationship between children's age and sex and the degree of competence and dependency in them. The results are illustrated in Tables 11 and 12.

It is evident from Tables 11 and 12 that age and sex of children were not associated with the degree of dependence or with competence.

Table 11. Chi-square Table for High- and Low-Competent Children of Different Age Groups

Age Groups (in years)	Competence		
	High	Low	
4–5	13	20	33
3–4	16	16	32
2–3	6	4	10
Total	35	40	75

Df = 2. χ^2 = 1.56. n.s.

Table 12. Chi-square Table for High- and Low-Dependent Children of Different Ages

Age Groups	Dependency		
	High	Low	
4–5	14	20	34
3–4	17	16	33
2–3	4	4	8
Total	35	40	75

Df = 2, χ^2 = .76, n.s.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The purpose of the present study was to investigate the patterns of childrearing practices of Indian mothers and to know how these different patterns affected the growth of competence and dependency in their children. Effects of social class and family structures were also investigated.

Style of Mothering

The results suggested that the most prominent styles of childrearing of Indian mothers were being nurturant, responsive, providing their children freedom to explore, and giving encouragement and guidance. Nurturance and responsiveness is a typical style of Indian mothers, which is also evident from the literature review given below. In India, children are born in a warm, affectionate, and welcoming culture where they are completely accepted. Their needs are well cared for. During the first 4 to 5 years, a child remains mostly in the bosom of the family. Mothers mostly give in to whatever their children want. Singh and Kapoor (1986), in a comparative study, found that Indian parents seem to be more sensitive to their children's needs and spend more time near the children than Chinese parents. Chinese children are less likely to be picked up when they cry, especially at night, than Indian infants.

Providing the child freedom to explore seemed to be a factor consequent on mother's lack of time, as it was more evident in lower class families. Lower class parents are occupied in working outside the home and could not spend much time with their children. Their children are reared by the older siblings or by the community.

Giving children encouragement emerged as a somewhat new style of maternal childrearing practice because, in Indian culture, praising children in front of them is supposed to spoil them, although giving appropriate guidance to children is a common behavior of Indian parents, since, throughout life, a person is guided by elders in every major decision—from education to marriage—and is not accorded full autonomy of choice and evolving identity (Roland, 1988). Encouraging behavior of mothers may be influenced by exposure to Western culture or to education and the mass media.

So far as the influence of these maternal childrearing practices on children's behavior was concerned, the findings suggested that only two styles of mothering were related to the development of competence in children. They were giving children freedom to explore, and encouraging and guiding them. This result is in accordance with other findings illustrated in the introduction chapter.

Dependency behavior in children was highly correlated with maternal overprotective and controlling behavior. This finding was also in support of the hypotheses and substantiated by other findings mentioned earlier (Berry, 1960; Dawson, 1967; Dyk & Witkin, 1965; Witkin et al., 1974).

Comparison of Maternal Behavior Between Upper Class and Lower Class Joint vs. Nuclear Families

Some clear-cut differences were found between upper class and lower class mother's childrearing styles. First of all, upper class joint families were compared with lower class families and then upper class nuclear families were compared with lower class nuclear families. There was a clear-cut difference between the joint families of the two socioeconomic classes on the variables of nurturance ($t = 2.39$, $p < .05$), responsiveness ($t = 5.37$, $p < .01$), encouraging ($t = 2.08$, $p < .05$), and giving freedom to explore ($t = 2.00$, $p < .05$). Among these varaibles, high-status mothers used *nurturance, responsiveness,* and *encouragement* in their childrearing practices more often, and lower class mothers provided more *freedom to explore* to their children. These differences were also quite obvious at the time of observation. The upper class mothers had more time to spend with their children. They were affectionate caretakers, listeners, teachers, and guides to their children. The value of children also differed in the two socioeconomic class, as observed by the investigators. In the upper class families, children were treated as a precious thing (specially the male child), were better cared for, and were more talked and listened to. They received more attention from their parents than did the lower class children. Apart from parental warmth and affection, children in upper class families enjoyed better facilities and atmosphere to grow and develop.

The lower class mothers were also nurturant but, due to lack of time, could not give much time and attention to their children. They had no alternative but to leave their preschoolers in home, at the mercy of their siblings or neighbors. These children were free to do whatever they wanted; therefore, they received the privilege to explore the environment.

In the nuclear families of the two social classes, the trend was the same. The same three categories, nurturance, responsiveness, and encouraging ($t = 3.287$, 4.045, 2.80 all significant at <.01 levels respectively), were employed by upper class mothers. The lower class mothers allowed freedom to explore more often than upper class mother of nuclear families (t = 2.113, $p < .05$).

Social class and family structures did not have any influence on the development of competence in its children. Dependency in children was partially influenced by the joint family system in both socioeconomic classes. This was very much in accordance with the views, illustrated in the literature review, by different authors that the joint family system instills dependency in its children (Roland, 1988; Sinha, J.B.P., 1981).

The research findings indicated that, on the whole, the majority of children displayed a trend towards being more competent rather than dependent.

The reasons for this may be that, due to growing competitiveness in the society and having more job opportunities, the incentive towards competence is increasing. Parents have started viewing childrearing and child development as a kind of competition among themselves to create an at least above-average child. Therefore, although mothers are more loving and affectionate, the tendency to protect children (which leads to incompetence) is decreasing.

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CHAPTER 5

Transformation of Women's Social Roles in India

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> You planned to tame a swallow, to hold her,
> In the long summer of your love so that she would forget
> Not the raw season alone, and the homes left behind, but
> Also her nature, the urge to fly, and the endless
> Pathways of the sky.
>
> —Poem by Kamla Das in *The Old Play House*, as quoted by Bhasin (1972, p. 43).

This chapter is devoted to an analysis of changes that have taken place in the social roles of women in India over the past three generations. It provides a cultural-analytic background for the study of Sinha (Chapter 4, this volume), by extending the horizons of purely psychological investigation to a cultural-historic one.

The diversity among Indians on many grounds is far too great for any generalization on any issue. However, the broad categories of people include the following: (a) the rural uneducated, poor mass of men and women; (b) moderately educated, urban, middle- and high-middle-class men and women, who even have a small percentage of highly educated women as well; and (c) the urban, educated affluent class of men and women. Nevertheless, there is something common across these categories that refers to a spiritual orientation towards life and faith in religion. Interestingly, Indian women (with few exceptions), irrespective of education, affluence, and urban/rural background, have faith in some supernatural power, are extremely fatalistic, observe some kind of rituals across the year, and engage in *puja* (many would just burn an incense stick and fold their hands, mumble a few *mantras*, but nevertheless will spend some time in *puja*). Moreover, the religious embeddedness of Indian women's psychology is paralleled by their intricate linkage with their collective social network.

Typically an Indian female is not married only to her husband but also committed to serve and obey her husband's parents and close relatives. Her entry into her husband's home is not as his young wife only but also as an obedient daughter-in-law to his parents and an affectionate sister-in-law to his younger brothers and sisters.

It may be said that Indian women diverse in their socioeconomic categories, differentiated as followers of different social customs and rituals, capable of going to any extent of emancipation or remaining a conforming social being, nevertheless, share an universal fact about themselves. They accept with conviction responsibility towards their social roles but never perhaps put aside their obligations towards a nonworldly realm of religion and spiritualism. The social role of Indian women, and their religious demarcation, thus becomes a very relevant point of reference for them.

THE SOCIAL ROLES OF INDIAN WOMEN AND THEIR RELIGIOUS DEMARCATION

Hindu women by and large enjoyed a high status equal to that of men at home and in society until 300 B.C. Due to the various sociocultural and political factors that prevailed after 300 B.C. the status of women began to decline. It continued to decline until 1800 (Dube, 1963). The woman was denied all rights and was kept in a state of subjugation (Desai, 1975). Socially, legally, ideologically, and morally she was a nonentity (Das & Bardis, 1978).

However, the position of women (especially among the middle and upper classes) began to improve at the beginning of the 19th century, due to various social, cultural, political, and economic factors and movements for social reform.

Gandhian ideas advocated equality in the family and society for women and called for opening wider opportunities for the self-development of women. By the resolution passed by the Congress in 1931, it was accepted that women should have equal political and legal rights with equality in fundamental rights. According to a widespread quote in public use, Jawaharlal Nehru believed that women must be trained to participate "in every department of human activity" and play an active part in all professions and spheres, because without economic freedom, other aspects of equality would prove superficial.

A DESCRIPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL SOCIAL ROLES

By and large the Indian women's "life scripting" consisted of (and consists for majority even today) messages which say "an unmarried girl is a guest at her parents' home," "a good girl should always serve and obey her husband's parents," "an unmarried girl is like a bird sitting on the branches of the tree in her father's courtyard, ready to fly to her husband's home," and "a girl should enter her husband's home on a *doli* (palanquin) and come out on an *arthi* (a bamboo stretcher for carrying a dead body to the cremation ground)—never before that or under any circumstance."

Marriage is an all-important event in an Indian woman's life. However, it is at the same time replete with contradictory implications for her position in the family. It bestows status on her but also imposes on her a discipline which usually tends to be quite harsh (Madan, 1976). The dominating mother-in-law is a case in point. The expectation of unquestionable service and obedience from a daughter-in-law is another.

It is highly probable that middle-class Hindu women who are 60 years of age or above were married in their early teens or even earlier. In the villages the marriage age was even lower, and child marriages were common. Education for girls was not considered important at all, and girls who were married very young were either illiterates or had access to very little education at home. The child brides were of impressionable age and were socialized at their mother's place to respect and obey their mothers-in-law and the relatives of their husband. In fact, ideally a girl was supposed to be subordinate to her mother-in-law and do as she wished. A mother-in-law carried an image of a dominating woman whose affection could be won by serving her and making her happy. Since girls were married young and many times reached their adulthood at their in-laws' home, there was time for grooming them into good daughters-in-law.

The mother-in-law often developed very affectionate ties with the teenage girl who grew to adulthood under her training and supervision. Nevertheless, she always had in mind that a daughter-in-law was not a daughter and that, although she could have all the other facilities and goodies a daughter had, her freedom had to be relatively restricted in comparison to that of the daughter of the family.

She was supposed to be more responsible, obedient, mature, and sacrificing for the family, as she was its future female head. The restrictions on the daughter-in-law's movement outside home, or the discouraging attitude of the family members for her personal achievements, were strategies to confine her to the home and remind her that it was her right place. Perhaps the majority of the girls never resented all this, because they were taught to accept all this as an inevitable demand on a daughter-in-law.

Not bound by the symbiotic ties and devoid of the spontaneous affection that an Indian mother had for her daughter, believing that she would be given away in marriage, the relationship between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law was a complex one. The mother-in-law was obeyed and liked, but she was also someone superior in position, powerful and punishing.

The psychological interpretation for the love–hate relationship between the two women has to do with the fears of a mother who is afraid of losing the love and attention of her son, whom she had possessed completely before arrival of another woman in his life. Indian mothers are very possessive and overwhelming: They get status in the family after becoming mothers of sons, and an Indian mother's identity lies with her children, as has been noted by psychologists (Kakar, 1979, p. 33).

In her desperate attempts to still have control on her son, it has been reported that a woman may even meddle in the sex life of her son, restricting his access to his wife to only once a week. But since most women are eager to have grandchildren, they would like their daughters-in-law to become mothers soon (Jacobson & Wadley, 1977).

Another reason why the daughter-in-law was ruled with an iron hand lay in the collectivist orientation of the Indian system and the responsibility of the female household head to keep the family united. Unless a newcomer was taught to obey, conform, share, and co-operate with the other family members, she was likely to get attracted to her own personal needs, goals, and values, or at best to those of her husband, but not work towards fortifying the collective nature of the family.

In collectivist cultures people are embedded in a small number of predominantly premordial groups. They take the needs, goals, and values of their ingroups for their own. They share, conform, and cooperate within the ingroups, and their behavior is characterized by high conformity (Roland, 1984). By all accounts Indian culture is said to be collectivist (Bond, 1985; Hofstede, 1980; Sinha & Verma, 1987, Triandis et al., 1986). Women have had a very important role as mothers-in-law and as obeying daughters-in-law in the survival of the joint family system in India, which is now facing a transitional phase due to urbanization, modernization, and preference for materialistic and individualistic values.

There is no denying of the fact that daughters-in-law, and before them, their own mothers-in-law, were taught and groomed (many with force) to learn the collectivist values. One finds that such training helped light a light of selflessness and sacrifice and created strong emotional ties among the family members.

The daughter-in-law did not live in subordination or total powerlessness for the rest of her life. Gradually, she became more confident in her new home, and, as the years passed by, she could dominate her aged mother-in-law completely. However, in good families the family members were supposed to be cordial to each other. A family in which brothers fought, or their wives did not live in peace, was considered to be uncultured. Similarly, the relationship between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law had to be guided by certain normative expectations.

The conflicts and resentments between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law were not made explicit, and much restraint was exercised in expressions of anger and disagreement. There were few instances of answering back or quarrels, but generally there could be only "cold wars" between the two.

In general, Indian daughters-in-law were expected to remain docile and obedient to their mothers-in-law. In some north Indian states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, a daughter-in-law's services would include massaging the arms and legs of her mother-in-law and doing big and small things for her (like helping her tie her hair, stitching her blouses and petticoats, cooking for her, making arrangements for her *puja*, etc.). When untouchability was observed in many orthodox Hindu families, it was a *brahmin* (higher caste person) or the women of the family (usually the daughter-in-law) who cooked and served food to the big joint family members.

The services of an obedient and hard-working daughter-in-law were praised, and she was considered to be an indispensable member of the family, loved by the elders and respected by the youngsters. However, where a daughter-in-law refused to learn the collectivist values of the family, happened to have an unreasonably dominating mother-in-law, or had predominantly a selfish nature, the family's peace was at stake.

The quarrels and conflicts between the daughter-in-law and the mother-in-law usually had their roots in the need for power of the two women or a vulnerable ego that got hurt as soon as the expectations from the other were not met.

In sum, in an ideal joint family, despite trifles and struggles, both women were engaged in the service and welfare of the whole family. The mother-in-law wanted her supremacy over the daughter-in-law but not necessarily always by coercive means. As soon as she was convinced that she had not lost the love and attention of her son because of his bride, and had a caring daughter-in-law, she was a good and happy mother-in-law. An affectionate, caring mother-in-law could become a mother figure for the new bride, and both she and her husband had a special affection for her.

Changes Across Generations

There has been much change in the relationship between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law for the last two decades. Tikoo (1985) observes that the educated, "modernized girls refuse to submit to any sadistic approach of their in-laws": nevertheless, "the authoritative role of the traditional mother-in-law has not come to an end as yet" (p. 85). At times a woman who has had an uncordial relationship with her own mother-in-law may remember the sadism to which she had been subjected and then may adopt a more humane and sympathetic attitude towards her own daughter-in-law.

Moreover, although young people do feel they need to belong to the joint family for the security it provides, they do not want to remain in it, because of the social obligations and sacrifices it calls for (Ramanujam, 1972); consequently, to avoid humiliation and interference in their personal lives, educated women prefer nuclear families. The difficulty experienced by women in joint families has been noted by Cormack (1953), Kapadia (1959), and Ross (1961). For the middle-class educated women of today, the important things in life are a better standard of living, high social status, and money for a secure future and a comfortable present. Motivated by such needs, plus the desire for some personal achievements, they are attracted by careers and the possibilities for learning new skills. With the responsibility of her own nuclear family and a career, a modern woman neither wants, not perhaps can afford, to become an ideal daughter-in-law.

With the emergence of individualistic and materialistic values the urban middle-class woman is hardly similar to the daughters-in-law of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. However, this does not mean that the mother-in-law is less respected today and should not be obeyed, but that there has been a change in expectations from each other. The mother-in-law realizes that the power distance between her and her daughter-in-law has narrowed because of the changing socioeconomic reality.

Earlier, the daughter-in-law observed *purdah* in front of her mother-in-law as a token of respect, but now this tradition is more or less gone from the middle class and upper middle class nonorthodox families. In many liberal families the daughter-in-law has all the liberty she wants.

However, all is not so well. In families where money is valued above anything else, daughters-in-law are tortured and burned to death for dowry, most of the time with the consent and participation of the mother-in-law.

There are also still some orthodox families where daughters-in-law are treated as subhumans, perform all the household work, even observe *purdah*, and live under restricted freedom. However, this seems to be a diminishing trend and is becoming obliterated with education coming to women.

The Village Scene

As she is usually married earlier than city-dwelling educated women, the village daughter-in-law gets the responsibility of the home, hearth, and fields quite early in life. The mother-in-law here too is not very different in her expectations and psychological fears from the one in the towns and cities. However, here the clashes of ego and the power strategies to control each other are not very sophisticated or subtle. The two women may quarrel, create a scene, have bouts of depression, and complain about each other in the neighborhood, but their fights and conflicts are not taken with much shock.

The village daughter-in-law, due to the socioeconomic condition of her family, cannot expect to have physical comforts and luxuries many times available to the city girls. Undergoing hard physical labor, she works within and outside the family, looks after the cattle and children, and serves her in-laws as far as possible. Serving her mother-in-law would mean massaging her body if she is sick or otherwise, cooking, cleaning, washing, getting the water from the well or tube-wells, and even collecting fuel and fodder. If the mother-in-law is not sick and old, she may help the daughter-in-law in the domestic work and in the fields.

Village women have some pronounced real-life problems that permeate their lives all over. Primarily they have to struggle with the problem of poverty and find the basic necessities of life more than brood over a bruised ego. Not that the village daughter-in-law is insensitive or unhurt, or that the mother-in-law is less demanding; the point however, is that both are more preoccupied with the demanding problems of everyday life. They are not the ones who would necessarily like to conceal their feelings and may express themselves by fighting out and answering back to each other. Nevertheless, the daughter-in-law knows quite well that she has her duties towards her mother-in-law, and that she should serve her in time of need and old age.

Many daughters-in-law have an eye on the little personal property (some silver jewelry or a little saved money, etc.) that the mother-in-law has, and would like to get it from her, at times by pleasing the mother-in-law and many times by other demanding ways. Usually the mother-in-law would in her old age give away small valuable things to her daughter-in-law or make a verbal will that she could take them after her death.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Indian women, especially Hindu women, irrespective of their class/caste or urban or rural background, have a great fear of old age and an emotional insecurity that they might have to face if their sons and daughters-in-law leave them. Above all, there is the desire for the last ritual to be performed by the son and a wish to transfer whatever personal property one has to one's near and dear ones.

Since the Indian government does not provide social security to the old, they are almost totally dependent on their sons for their future. The daughters, although very caring and affectionate towards their parents, marry and go away to their own in-law's place: thus, for practical reasons they cannot always look after their parents in their old age. In view of these social, economic, and religious considerations, old people have a very insecure and unsafe life if they are not cared for. This is one reason why the son's wife might have an edge in the mother-in-law–daughter-in-law relationship.

The Indian system is full of examples of serving, devoted, and extremely dutiful sons and daughters-in-law, but it also has stories of parents being deserted after they transfer their property to their children. Nevertheless, the son and the daughter-in-law are expected to take care of their parents in old age. This is one duty that they will usually perform, if not out of love, then out of the fear of social criticism.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT FOR THE SOCIAL ROLES: THE PUJA

Sengupta (1974) observes that India seems to be the only nation in the world today that still boasts of an ancient religion that is still a living force. She feels that the old traditions are still tenable particularly because of the women of India, who are not only religion-oriented but both custom- and tradition-ridden. For this very reason many women are considered a "stumbling block" in the quick progress of the country. Many are still glued to the outdated dogma and rituals.

However, amidst a circle of narrow and worn-out ceremonies exist men and women with extraordinarily universal ideas, Sengupta concludes that every good Hindu woman, while worshiping her individual idol or insisting on family or caste custom, believes actually in the unity of all through *Brahamn* (the highest cosmic consciousness). And therefore, through the story of women of India we derive a universal outlook.

For many women (especially those who are old or growing old) *puja* could be a couple of hours' affair every day. Every Hindu home must have a small place for *puja*, decorated with pictures of deities where the *puja* is performed in a small or big way, depending on the time and on the faith of the family members.

Religious activities play an important part in women's daily, weekly, and annual routine. This seems paradoxical in a way, for according to orthodox Hinduism a woman should not study the sacred scripture nor perform any independent sacrifice. The priest and officials are always male. Similarly, most of the life cycle rituals, or *samskaras*, are for males (Pandey, 1969). However, now no heed is paid to unreasonable restrictions (like not studying the scriptures), and women who can and want to read and contemplate on the scriptures and religious texts do so with pride. We have women scholars and orators of repute on Hindu scriptures and philosophy.

It is, however, true that domestic rituals like daily prayer and *puja*, performing religious activities, and spending time on special festivals, *puja*, and so on, are the responsibility of the women. In South India it is the daily ritual of women to draw *kolams* before dawn (rice powder designs at the front door, so that the ants and birds can eat it later on, and the Sun God bless the people of the family and village with food and affluence). On the religious days, which come very often, prayers and *puja* are longer. Women visit temples more frequently than men do, and observe fasts, and so on, on special days like Tuesdays and Fridays. It is the duty of the woman to water the sacred plant of *tulsi* and light the earthen lamps in the evening for the gods, a practice which many women still follow in the villages and some in the towns. Special rituals are observed on a full-moon or new-moon day. The trouble of cooking for festivals is also borne by the women of the family.

Generally, women do not perform religious activities and rituals for their own good or individual benefit. They perform them on behalf of their family (Singer, 1971). Moreover, when there is some problem in the family, it is usually the wife or the mother who takes a fast as part of a vow, goes to a temple or even on a pilgrimage, and seeks the blessings of the Almighty.

The religious attitude of Indian women, and their vulnerability to "fall prey" to many influences that exploit their willingness to do anything for the well-being of their family, has links to their illiteracy (to an extent) and to their being attributed the role and moral responsibility of a "savior" for the family from all that is considered evil and unforeseen. An Indian woman often fulfills such obligations at much individual suffering, and by sacrificing her personal comforts. Women have been glorified for their unique capacity for patience, for suffering, for unselfishness, and for the ability to submerge their personality for common good of the family (Bhasin, 1972, p. 13). This is also tied to the perpetuation of their suppression and enabling the patriarchal society to retain its dominance over them. Hindu women from generation to generation have been carriers of the family's tradition and performed rituals that could be extremely demanding on their time and physical strength. Nevertheless, the Indian women dare not take the responsibility for any misfortune falling upon their family because they failed to carry out their religious duties properly.

Perhaps it is very difficult to imagine Indian women with a new radical psyche dawning on them, with education and equality that are devoid of spirituality, faith in one's religion, and religious practices. Indian women (or, for that matter, all Indians) have internalized a self-image that has dominant streaks of a contemplative, fatalistic, philosophical attitude toward life (Inkeles & Singh, 1968; Spratt, 1966), and they have never been known not to have it.

The religious observances of rural women are generally confined to offering prayers to the village goddess and family deity. On auspicious days they might travel some distance to a city or a town where some holy river (e.g., the holy Ganges) flows to take a dip. There is a tradition of offering *puja* to sacred trees and plants in India on special days, which village women do in groups. On special days the sacred cow is worshipped, and even the snake, the favorite of one of the popular deities, *Lord Shiva*, is worshiped. Married women observe fasts for the welfare of their husband and children on special days and, once or twice a year, undertake very difficult fasts (like remaining without food and water for 24 hours or more) to please the Sun God or some other deity. Interestingly there are some *vratas* (fasts) once in a month or so that help realize salvation after death, and many old women and widows observe them. Even today middle-class urban women are quite orthodox in the sense that they observe many of the abovementioned rituals and fasts of their village counterparts.

Many rituals and religious practices are more popular in cities, where women learn them from each other or adopt them in their enthusiasm to become religious. Generally, there is a wish to be blessed by the gods and goddesses, in return for these practices, with prosperity and family well-being. Even highly educated, so-called "intellectually oriented," women have their faith and anchors for peace of mind. Many read books on religion and philosophy, become followers of some *gurus* in some cases, listen to devotional songs and go to temples, and so on. They can still engage themselves in some rituals and observe fasts, and so on. In fact, education dispels superstitions to some extent, but it does not seem to interfere with the faith and religious conviction of the education women.

The colossal success of the two TV serials recently telecast by the national network, based on the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata* (the great Hindu religious epics) brings the whole nation to a standstill when they went on the air. The grapevine has it that even government functions on Sundays (day of the telecasts) were scheduled keeping that in mind.

It might be said that the change over time is evident in the manifest preferences and behavior to a certain extent, but that is more or less to suit the time and convenience and not because of some very drastic change in the basic attitude of the people: family members now simply enjoy an audiovisual depiction of their great religious-philosophical thought instead of reading it, and prefer to listen to the devotional songs *(bhajans)* on audiocassettes than singing them themselves or in groups. Even the daily *puja* for many working women has been shortened to suit her time and convenience, and often people on their deathbeds are exposed to chanting from a cassette. All the famous pilgrimages in India vibrate with recorded voices of famous singers of devotional songs and sanskrit *shlokas* (couplets).

Religion and *puja* has been the source of power for many women in the past and present who feel psychologically shattered, deserted, lonely, and destitute. Not only that, the daily *puja* and other devotional practices keep the self reminded of its spiritual mission and the role of the human body that should be used as a meditational tool to transcend the material world (Verma, 1987). Religion and *puja* have been the abode of the weak and the insecure; they have been a source of strength and power for many who find themselves helpless and weak in a world of powerful and resourceful. For many who are weak and who have none, there is *Rama* (god). A popular devotional song goes," Nirbal ke bal Ram" or "the strength of the weak is the Lord Rama."

SOCIAL MARKING OF WOMEN'S ROLE: THE PURDAH *AND ITS CHANGE*

Purdah, or veiling, Jacobson and Wadley (1977) observe, "is an aid to harmony within joint family. Since it emphasizes the subordinate relationship of woman to those in authority in the family and de-emphasize her tie to her husband" (p. 70). They further add that veiling and seclusion in her conjugal home constantly remind a woman of her position as "bahu" (the daughter-in-law), who must quietly subjugate her individual wishes to those of the group. A young wife also finds that the veil shields her somewhat from the constant scrutiny of others in a new home.

Veiling was (and is to some extent) more common in the North Indian States like Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Bihar, and Bengal. For the village Hindu women and women of high-caste orthodox families, *purdah* observance, and avoidance of her father-in-law, husband's elder brothers, and elderly relatives, was lifelong. In some families a middle-aged daughter-in-law could exchange only few words with an aged father-in-law. The new bride was also veiled from her mother-in-law and other elder female members of the family for a short period of time, and from her husband too, when others were present.

The change in the *purdah* system across generations in India has been quite notable. For women who are 70 years or more today and were married into reasonably affluent and traditional middle-class or high-middle-class families, *purdah* observance was quite common.

Purdah in the 1920s and 1930s symbolized women's confinement to the four walls of their home. *Purdah* did not mean just veiling, but some strict rules that forbade women to go outside their homes for visiting relatives and friends, for shopping or entertainment, or even for getting an education. A girl was not allowed to interact with male members of the family or outsiders except when the male was a child or a relative younger in age than she. *Purdah* meant almost total seclusion of women from the outside world, and it was a manmade rule for safeguarding women's chastity and modesty from outsiders and the "evil eyes."

Women who are in their middle age today have most likely never experienced all the hardships of *purdah* faced by their mothers and mothers-in-law. Most of the women of this age have an education. Some are highly educated and have jobs. Perhaps as new brides they were asked to observe respectful veiling for a while, but that was not to continue or become a hurdle in their development.

However, in some middle-class and low-middle-class families, especially those of low-caste Hindus where the pace of modernity has been slow and education has not made a breakthrough, *purdah* can be observed even today.

Women who have realized their importance as homemakers and professional women have nothing to do with a custom like this. Nevertheless, examples of a peculiar mix of tradition and modernity in the attitudes and behavior of even the educated modern urban women are visible, and some women from this group also observe respectful veiling in front of their father-in-law and elderly relatives.

However, it may be said that *purdah* system is no more the rule of the day and is steadily being given up by almost all sectors of urban women. Women who have migrated to cities from villages also do not observe *purdah* in the cities.

In remote villages women may still observe respectful veiling, but it does not confine them to the four walls of their homes or prevent them from working in the fields or as laborers to support their families.

It may be concluded that, today, the custom of *purdah* (whenever it still remains) is more or less a token of respectful veiling from elders. However, since males do not follow this custom, it does speak of the subordinate position of women in a way. In a subtle way it also indicates that women have to conceal themselves, because attractive *objects* need to be kept hidden and safe.

It is interesting to mention the case of Indian girls of college age who have been brought up by liberal parents in metropolitan and cosmopolitan cities. One comes across a generation now which is Westernized in its taste for dress and food, is jeans- and dress-clad, finds "sarees" cumbersome, moves around on its own, visits beauty parlors and pizza shops, goes to discos, and listens to American and European pop music. Some of these girls just love fun and a lively life style, but many among them have very high aspirations and are serious young women determined to achieve a bright career and future. These young girls will just laugh at the idea of observing *purdah*.

Since these women come usually from high socioeconomic strata of the society, they do not represent the young women of all of India. What is interesting is the fact that two girls of exactly the same age may be having drastically different socialization and opportunities. One may be illiterate and destined to observe *purdah* and engage in household chores in a remote village, cooking on a smoky hearth, while the other may be hopping around in fast-food shops, libraries, beauty parlors, and boutiques, and preparing for competitive examinations in a pair of jeans.

Finally, in most Muslim families *purdah* is observed, not from related males, but rather from strangers. A bride may be shy in the presence of her father-in-law or husband's elder brothers, but if she has married a cousin, these men are her relatives, and she may be at ease with them. Muslim *purdah*, as observed by Jacobson and Wadley (1977), serves to define the kindred group vis-á-vis outsider and thus heightens the family's sense of unity. The seclusion of marriageable women from strangers also helps to ensure that a girl will marry only a man acceptable to her family. This is particularly important for Muslims having property, since Muslim women inherit and control land and other valuables (Jacobson & Wadley, 1977, p. 70).

WOMEN AS HOME MANAGERS: CHANGES OVER GENERATIONS

Vohra and Sen (1986) observe that modern trends in demographic and social changes, for example, the rising age of marriage, smaller families, urbanization, migration, the rising costs of standard of living, and the calls for greater participation in decision making, are introducing major changes in women's roles and responsibilities.

It is quite clear that the educated Indian woman has realized that she cannot remain confined to the four walls of her home if she has to play her multiple roles. Moreover, she also realizes that, without being progressive enough, she cannot accept the new challenges or social changes overtaking the country. They conclude that the "Indian woman is moving towards an ideal balance of tradition and progressive values" (p. 136).

However, there are problems, too. With the growth of education (more so among middle-class, urban-dwelling women) the concept of "wife" and "mother" has changed, but not that of "husband" and "father." Their orthodox attitude at manifest and at subtle levels put women at a disadvantage pushing them into the world of conflicts. Moreover, despite the rise in women's social and economic position, the old fears born of the experiences of past generations still haunt, including the old ideologies which regarded job and home-management as mutually exclusive. However, children growing up today, born to educated parents and brought up in an environment that is picking up progressive values and is accepting of women's new role and responsibilities, would probably not be bothered much by the conflict of "career and family." It is also, hopefully, expected that the changing reality will change the attitudes of men and women in coming decades, and that there will be more adjustment and a life of give-and-take in the home.

Middle-class Women

Today the middle-class urban woman has to be educated. Furthermore, it is also expected that she should be qualified for a job and perform the dual role of a homemaker and economic support. There has not been much change in the women's expected home-management role in conjunction with the economic changes, but for the fact that their has been a general acceptance of, and some degree of appreciation for, women who contribute in the family's income.

In many families the husband and the children cooperate and help the housemaker complete the domestic chore and are less demanding. In some families the other family members, like the mother-in-law and the sister-in-law, help her with the household work so that the mother is able to reach her workplace in time. In exceptional cases, the woman is allowed to be a career woman exclusively. With good domestic help and cooperative family members, this is possible. However, the other side of the story is not so happy. Very few women are in such jobs that provide a very high salary and facilities that would provide her freedom from daily household activities.

Moreover, unlike their counterparts in developed countries, the working women of India do not have easy access to home appliances, for at least two reasons. First, they are expensive and not very dependable; and secondly, the provision of the electricity to make them work is unreliable. Finally, there is an extreme scarcity of domestic help who were easily available 10 to 15 years ago.

The majority of working women have to do with part-time domestic help who can be irresponsible and irregular.

Middle-class women in big cities who go to work, covering long distances from home and work mostly for economic reasons, remain "working machines" from morning until night. Many times the expectations from the working woman belonging to a joint family are unreasonable, and her mental suffering is caused by the fact that she is taken for granted and nobody seems to appreciate her for the labor she puts in on domestic and professional fronts (Verma & Pandey, 1989).

Moreover, with education she has an additional responsibility of helping her young ones with their homework and progress in school. A large number of women choose their children's educational institutions comparing the merits and demerits of the schools. Furthermore, it is the mother who primarily attends school functions and maintains relationship with the class teacher (Caplan, 1985). Earlier, these responsibilities were shared by the father, grandfather, or even uncles. It is true that, in general, an educated wife has become an asset and an economic necessity in many middle- and low-middle-class families, to her own cost.

There is another face also to the issue of apparent change, and it refers to the "double standard of morality" of our system. Very often a peculiar mix of tradition and modernity co-exists in the attitudes and behaviors of educated Indians. Consequently, there is not much change at the attitudinal and behavioral levels regarding certain issues like sex, marriage, family, and the woman's role as the housemaker. For example, very often girls are encouraged to have a higher education, because it will be helpful in getting a suitable husband for them. Similarly, it is status symbol now for many middle-class families to have a daughter-in-law or a wife who is highly educated and is in a respectable job.

Women are encouraged and attracted toward certain careers, not necessarily because they like them but because of the glamor, power, and social status they bring. A very strong preference for young women to sit for competitive examinations recruiting them into various branches of the Indian administrative service or medical profession is a case in point. These jobs can provide ample opportunity to serve the needy and become a real contributor to the progress of the country. However, the spirit with which women are opting and being encouraged for these careers is open to question. Many times the apparent change in attitude is not so real, and not the result of a genuine appreciation for economic independence of women or consequence of the realization that women are equal partners to men in the process of social change and development of their country.

The argument gets supported also by the fact that Indian society was harsh on career women only some two decades or so back, because then it was more respectable to be a nonworking good homemaker above anything else. A study of matrimonial columns of some popular dailies across the last 5 years will show clearly that now the desirable qualities for a young woman are her academic qualification and being in a profession in addition to her physical assets.

In sum, the change in women's expected home-management role is also due to the tendency for social comparison, the desire for better standards of living and status symbols. It is not necessarily because women have right to their growth, emancipation, and self-independence. And because it is obligatory on the part of each citizen, irrespective of his or her sex, to contribute in the progress of his or her country, the educated women have become engineers, architects, entrepreneurs, scientists, professors, bureaucrats, lawyers, judges, executives, and politicians besides being homemakers, but in a limited number.

The Higher Upper Class Affluent Women

The higher upper class affluent women are lucky enough to have been brought up in comfort and have had access to education in good institutions. Women belonging to this modern, progressive, and Westernized section of society enjoy considerable freedom and almost equal opportunity to education, employment, selecting a male, and combining marriage and career, or even divorce and marriage (Kapadia, 1958).

It may be mentioned briefly that a group of high-society women living in cosmopolitan cities like Bombay, wives and family members of business tycoons, film stars (and their relatives), or business women themselves, can afford to give up the role of home manager. With great lust and want for materialism, becoming the "new rich", a group of women have acquired a new role—that is, of perpetuating consumerism. Their families are socialized to adopt a new culture, the culture of "five-star hotels." The rush (perhaps the result "of money-induced boredom") is on for an exclusive identity brought by money and by running after "costume jewelry, artwear, exotic-looking fakes, wine and cheese inaugurals and clubs open to only invited members" (Tripathi, 1989, p. 126). Some high upper class women utilize their free time by doing some social service through voluntary organizations and become famous. Many do it for name and fame; some because they decide to serve the needy.

The Rural Woman

Village-residing uneducated women have always played a very important dual economic role for Indian society. Besides being producers/processors (in the fields), she has been distributor of food to families (as the housemaker) plus earner of essential cash income, which goes towards basic needs of the family. The number of households where women happen to be the head appears to be increasing. However, Srivastava (1988) observes that "such households are vulnerable to poverty because these women usually retain the primary responsibility for child care and home maintenance which must be compatible with market oriented activity" (p. 6). Apart from domestic duties women engaged in agricultural work spend some 12 hours (from dawn to dusk) in the fields and take care of the cattle at home.

The report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India, 1975, made 14 years ago, rightly pointed out that, despite the quantitative change in the education of Indian women and an increase in their job opportunities, the plight of the Indian women has remained more or less unchanged. And, while education, legal rights, and changing social attitudes have opened new vistas for participation to a minority of women in the privileged sectors, the condition of women among the vast masses has not shown similar improvement but has shown decline, at least in the economic sphere (ICSSR, 1975).

The plight of rural women, poor and illiterate, has been and still remains that of homemaker and major economic support. The most hardworking of the whole lot of Indian women, rural women constitute the major work force in the fields and in construction work as laborers. They work in factories and mines and contribute to their family income by employing themselves in petty jobs in the cities where they accompany their husbands for livelihood. It is always the woman who looks after the family if the husband goes out to earn money in big cities, or even to a foreign country (recently there has been massive movement of Indian males to the Middle East, where they become blue-collar workers and earn much more money than they can in India). Similarly, males from backward states within India (i.e., states that stand low on the social and economic indicators of development) migrate to developed states to earn their living. Most of the time in such families the wife looks after the children and the parents of her husband. She still continues to work in the fields according to the seasons and crops.

In sum, it may be concluded that rural women belonging to the low socioeconomic strata of Indian society, uneducated and poor, are the ones who work in and outside their homes for little return and at much cost. There has been hardly any change in their home-management role in conjunction with economic changes, and they keep on struggling for enough or little.

Finally, it may be mentioned that the Government of India's plans for development have shown concern especially for improving the status and condition of women belonging to this particular group. It is acknowledged that, since women contribute in a substantial way to the progress and economic development of the country, they should be encouraged to become equal participants in decision making.

The latest in this line is the 30% reservation for women in the "Panchayati Raj" Programme (1989; or decentralization of power to the village level). This is an example of some new expectations from rural women. Indian women have obtained political rights and privileges more or less similar to those of men and earlier than their counterparts in some countries. One waits hopefully for their arrival, not only on paper and in plans, but in reality.

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE: THREE GENERATIONS OF WOMEN

The description of the perspectives of three generations of women that follows is an authentic account of the life style of a *Bihari* (belonging to an eastern state of India) Indian family, given by the daughter of the family. She talks about her grandmother, mother, and herself. Such descriptive information or case histories of women can be utilized in meaningful ways. First, these cases allow one to look at the source of the inner strength of these women across generations and their coping strategies in times of crisis and stress. Similarly, one can look for the roots of their fear and loneliness, on the one hand, and satisfaction and complacence on the other. It is possible to have an insight into how, under their respective circumstances, these women lived and tried in their own way to evolve into personalities that had some distinction. Such account might help trace the women's inner journey from their daily life chores to a more meaningful existence in the realms of spiritualism, which is more or less typical of the Hindu psyche. Furthermore, the narrations can be utilized to notice the gradual change, from the relatively selfless orientation found in the earlier generation women to the somewhat more self-oriented one in the latter case. Finally, the description could be made a means to get a feel of the collectivist orientation of the then contemporary Indian society.

My Grandmother (My Father's Mother, 1875–1948)

My grandmother was an extremely fair, beautiful, long-haired woman of average height and remarkably kind and generous nature. She died when I was hardly 2 years old.

Married in her childhood, she became a wife to a man, a reasonably rich landowner, manager of a bank by profession, extremely loving and caring for the joint family he headed, a great philanthropist, freedom fighter, a man of high ideals, very honest, a person interested in staging drama, playing football, a believer in women's education who trusted almost anybody, but a dangerously impulsive man. He often invested and lost money in small businesses. Nevertheless, he was a person who was loved dearly by those who knew him. I am talking about the elder brother of a very well-known political figure and freedom fighter who himself was a great scholar of saintly temperament.

I wonder how my uneducated, *purdah*-clad grandmother felt being wife to a dynamic, busy man and the eldest daughter-in-law in the joint family of the two well-known social figures of the state of Bihar. Grandmother was never a hindrance in her husband's activities and was a selfless woman. She did social service quite naturally without ever thinking of becoming popular or powerful. She distributed grains, mangoes, and homemade pickles to the poor village folks. In season, mangoes and mango pickles were free for all, so that the poor could eat their coarse food with them. I am told that she was extremely generous in giving grains to anybody who asked for them—free from her home grainery that was not even kept locked.

Grandmother never made any distinction between her children and those of her sister-in-law. Her blouse was always stained by the oily heads of the family infants who kept on being born at regular intervals to one or the other daughters-in-law and whom she carried close to her breast. She was a woman who would not care to claim her seniority in the family and treated her younger sister-in-law as equal and even better opinion giver than herself. She loved her daughters and daughters-in-law, but there were occasions when she would get angry. Her anger, however, was short lived.

She was not receptive to the crooked ways of the world and hardly suspected malice in the intentions of other people. Grandmother was an extremely religious woman, busy in her *puja* and making her *Krishna* (the idol of Lord Krishna she had at home) comfortable. She was certainly orthodox in her ways—observed *purdah* and untouchability. I guess my grandfathers, who were social reformers in their own way, did not impose their ideals on the womenfolk of the family and allowed them to be the leaders in their domain, namely, home. There were few occasions when male members could communicate with their wives on issues other than family matters. Nevertheless, they had certain definite influence on them. Grandmother never wore anything else but hand-spun (*khadi*) cloth throughout her life as a respect to the call for discarding millmade clothes, and so did other family members.

Between husband and wife the relationship was less sensual and more one of regard, care, and concern. Grandmother would take definite pains to fulfill even the smallest wish that Grandfather made, and he too would be deeply concerned about her welfare. Perhaps she identified herself with the role of an ideal woman whose domain was her home and family, and she lived in this role with totality. The highlights were her human qualities. I really do not know whether she ever repented being a domestic woman.

Unfortunately, she had to face many crises in her life. She saw the deaths of one of her daughters, her husband, my two brothers, and never had another grandson. When grandfather died, she threw away the bunch of keys she always carried and never touched them again. She said, From now onwards, she had no interest in material concerns. Her gesture was also a kind of renunciation of power and authority she held. She spent the rest of her life like an ascetic, reading religious books, undergoing many fasts and living a very simple life. Like a grandmother, she told stories and sang verses from the religious books to her grandchildren.

Grandmother was almost panicky at the thought of not having my father, her only and very dear son, near her at the time of her death. At no cost did she want to miss her only chance of attaining *Moksha* (salvation), having already lost her husband and grandsons. It is difficult for me to conclude whether grandmother derived sustenance and power from religion in times of crisis or her religious practices were an escape from the painful experiences that haunted her. Her deep faith in Hindu religion made her bold enough to prepare herself for death like a realized person who is not afraid at the end of the body. She told my mother from her deathbed about the Hindu rites to be performed on a dying person. Perhaps Grandmother set spiritualism as the goal of her life after her widowhood and the deaths in the family. Perhaps she could see that the material world was a source of sorrow, and that permanent solace lay in prayer and God.

I view my grandmother as a typical example of traditional, ideal Indian womanhood with remarkable human qualities. She loved her family very dearly but still searched the ultimate tranquility of mind in the idol of her *Krishna*, the symbol of ultimate reality for a *bhakta* (devotee).

My Mother (1909–)

My mother became motherless at the age of 3. She grew up in a home with a reasonably affectionate stepmother and an affectionate aunt. As a child she did not feel free to cling to, relate to, or open her heart to anybody. Her father, a police officer, loved her and praised her thoroughly for the food she cooked as a child and served lovingly. She began cooking as an 8 or 9 year old, made *puja* arrangements for her 'Bari ma' (aunt), served her stepmother, who was often sick with symptoms of early pregnancy, and was a help in domestic work.

Although in want of love and security, Mother was not a serious child: She laughed a lot and was known to be jovial. Her childhood, full of responsibilities, lasted for 14 years, and then she was married. Her marriage was decided by a lottery. My father had three equally good offers (including Mother's) coming from daughters of very good friends of my grandmother. My bewildered grandfather decided to settle the matter by picking out one piece of paper out of three, with the names of the prospective brides. The draw was in favor of my mother.

As a married girl, she had the status of eldest daughter-in-law of a respectable and reasonably rich family. Her husband went to England just after marriage for 5 years (that was in 1925, to earn a diploma in metallurgy). She was loved by her parents-in-law, her husband's sisters and brothers, and given the best food to eat, and maids waited on her. However, she was allowed no freedom due to the *purdah* system. She remained almost confined to her room, with hardly anyone to talk to. She was seldom allowed to go to her father's home, as married girls were supposed to stay with their in-laws, and also because they loved her so much that they did not want to send her away. Mother waited for my father to return with great apprehension. She saw the possibilities of his getting remarried abroad or not accepting her after coming back. She kept on seriously thinking about what would she do in case my father did not approve of her. Gradually, she developed a kind of pessimism, fear, and apprehension, and her cheerfulness was gone.

My father, being the only son of his parents, was loved dearly by his uncle, sisters, and mother and found his wishes fulfilled easily. He was not spoiled but did have a short temper. From my grandfather he inherited his impulsive nature, interest in many spheres of life, and a love for sweets. His trip abroad cultivated in him love for hard work, gardening, and punctuality. From his mother he inherited a trusting nature and a simple heart.

As husband my father was loving to my mother but, I guess, a little insensitive. He made her do and learn things that interested him but not necessarily her as well. He brought a variety of hair curlers and rollers for my mother from England as a present, because he wanted her hair to be curly. My mother did not know what to do with them. She also learned to make jam, jelly, pudding, and cakes for him. She recalls that she was afraid of my father as his young wife and took care of all his personal needs religiously, which she did until recently. I see a totally different kind of relationship between them now, in old age.

My mother thoroughly regrets that she was not formally educated. Whatever little she knew she utilized in writing poetry and essays. She wanted to write books and earn money by selling them. She was the one who decided to send us to a good residential school, as father had a transferable job. My mother has a taste for philosophical and intellectual discourse. She loves to hear commentaries on the *Bhagvad Gita* and the *Ramcharitmanas* (the famous Hindu epics).

She once had a chance to go and live for some time at Gandhi's Sabarmati Ashram. This exposure gave her pleasure, and she enjoyed the daily reading, writing, and prayer activities. She recalls that, once, Gandhi praised her for good handwriting, which she had developed after persistent effort. Mother recalls that "Mahatmaji" (as Gandhi was popularly called) had said, "You can do something important in life provided you are given a chance." I wonder today whether Ma did not get that chance, or she did not make enough effort.

The greatest crisis in her life was the loss of her two sons in their childhood. Then, at times, father was jobless and left her without money. In such times she was looked after by the joint family but had no personal money. The death of her sons made her almost mad with grief. My father was also badly shaken. However, I get an impression that mother helped him bear these losses with courage. In bringing up her four daughters, she was a reasonably good mother. Although mother did her *puja* (devotional practice) daily, she was no way an orthodox person. She was not dominating, but made us see if we were wrong. She was not particularly imposing of her religious or other beliefs. She gave us freedom and tried to make us capable of not misusing our freedom. She did not tell us that girls were inferior or incapable.

However, now at 78 she is a woman rather fed up with life and highly pessimistic. She feels depressed because there are no daughters-in-law to take on the household responsibilities, and no sons to perform her last rites. Poor health adds to her miseries. However, I see a streak of light in her when she talks in favor of intercaste and even internation marriages, economic independence of Indian women, their equal rights and development. My father is no more a source to be afraid of but, on the contrary, a victim of her wrath and irritation. She tells him that she had done enough for him and everybody. She does some household work even now but makes explicit that all this is very difficult for her now.

Father at 83 is a very lonely man stuck to the television; he finds very few people to communicate with. I find him more shattered by loneliness than mother. We sisters are there, but all of us have our own households to take care of. All of us come and see them regularly, but that is not enough.

Father is a transformed man who does not make demands but does expect that he is taken care of. He tries to be considerate to Mother and does some of her household shopping. He is very particular that she takes her daily medicines and lives longer.

Mother says that nothing matters now. Even if she is excited over some issue, she regains her earlier pessimistic mood soon. She does feel bad about her behavior at times, and I see her making efforts to quiet the mind.

Myself (1946–)

I was born 15 days after my second brother died. My grief-stricken mother had wanted a son who would be bright, competent, and earn a name for himself. She tells me that, as a child, I was cute, very well behaved, and docile. I was also very sick with a liver ailment and was not expected to live. My youngest sister was born a year and a half after me, and mother had to divide her time between us.

As a kindergarten child I displayed some signs of boldness and rode a bus to a school far from home. Then for a couple of years I left my mother to stay with my younger grandfather in Delhi for my studies. In my primary school I was a good student, had many friends, and was a carefree girl. A major part of my education as done in a residential school, an institution influenced by the teachings of a saint-philosopher.

I was highly impressed by what he said. He talked about coming out of all the prior conditionings in one's life that culture, traditions, norms, 'gurus,' nationality, and ideologies put forth. According to him, all these stripped the mind of its innocence and made one incapable of observing the reality and finding the truth.

My adolescence was full of emotional upheavals emerging out of perpetual self-analysis. I wanted to define what was 'right' and 'wrong,' 'moral,' and 'immoral,' for me. Self doubts, self-criticism, and at times guilt feeling for no special reason overpowered me. I was a girl who was not confident in her behavior. There was absolutely no guidance or planning for the future. I was neither ambitious nor motivated. I guess I was looking for my identity. My family and institution were nonimposing, and I felt myself almost lost in this state of uncertainty. I was also not capable enough to decide my own goals in life.

However, I was sensitive and watched all this mental exercise with a desire to make life meaningful and give my energy a positive direction. In my student life I learned painting, a little flower decoration, dancing, wrote poetry and articles, played outdoor games, went on educational trips and acted in dramas. Loved by my teachers and friends, I think I had a typical adolescence, over which I am much nostalgic. On the whole, life in school and college gave me rich experiences (happy or sad) and a receptive perspective.

I got married before my bachelor's result was out, at the age of 18. It was an arranged marriage. It turned out to be a set of new expectations and a role in a totally new set-up, and there were occasions when I wanted to get away from this. However, I did nothing unusual and behaved like a regular daughter-in-law.

Married in a joint family to a very considerate husband and noninterfering in-laws, I had fewer problems than expected in a joint family. However, the network of expectations was always around, and I tried to fulfill them as far as possible. Gradually, with the passage of the years there has been a withdrawal from this network, and I do not find myself much involved in family relationships other than that of my own nuclear family.

I accepted the pleasure and pains of motherhood with patience and surprise and could be categorized as a highly anxious mother. When both my children joined school, I could sense a restlessness within myself. I was haunted by the thought that perhaps I was wasting my time sitting at home doing nothing in particular. I did not know what I wanted to do. For some time I read good novels: then I became rather creative and did a lot of knitting, sewing, embroidery, a little painting, and learned good cooking. I was still not complacent.

Way back once I had aspired to become a medical doctor but was not very serious about it. This was perhaps my only goal-directed thinking that met a premature end.

I am not sure with what motivation I joined college again for my master's. Perhaps to take care of my boredom; but from then onward I had a goal, to do well in whatever I committed myself to. Hard work and commitment led me to reasonable success in studies and job. Today I find myself more confident. Men have been facilitators and not a hindrance in my way. My husband, some of my teachers and colleagues, even the thinking of some philosophers, all have been a help. Nevertheless, I do have my blues and weaknesses. My problem was and has been about handling a restlessness which originates from a search for finding something which could contain my total attention, interest, and energy. People find an answer to such problems in their faith in religion, social service, devotional practices, books, *gurus*, and God. I have not. I believe, this search must stop. Perhaps there is nothing beyond what is there in the present moment and now.

A General Analysis of the Three-Generation Life Courses

The first-generation woman emerges as a person who never cared to question her existence beyond its embedded part in a very close-knit joint family. She was capable of extending herself to the larger collective of the village folks and was able to relate with them at an affective level. Her care and concern for the needy, for her husband and other family members, was in the true tradition of a household head of a cultured family in rural India. Her unconditional faith in Hindu religion and philosophy was perhaps the source from which she derived the courage to face death and crisis in the family. The grandmother was an example of Indian womanhood who lived her role of a householder alright but chose spiritualism as the ultimate goal for herself.

We see the mother turning nonconformist in attitude and somewhat revengeful towards her husband, now in old age, in lieu of the freedom she was deprived of in her youth as she kept conforming to the traditional role of a daughter-in-law and a wife. This woman had the desire for some kind of personal growth and wished for some kind of identity of her own but lacked courage and initiative at the same time. She was the kind who needed someone to give her the initial go and encouragement. Nevertheless, she did not depend on anyone for the courage she needed to face crisis in her life. Her source of power lay within herself, which helped her survive the shocks of the deaths of her two sons, kept her living with a dangerously impulsive and somewhat insensitive husband, and made her perform domestic chores that were extremely taxing at times. Against all odds, the mother looks to be a self-determined woman, and even now, with all her pessimism, sickness, old age, and loneliness, she seems capable of avoiding a breakdown. Her story is the story of many Indian women who conformed to their traditional role of a daughter-in-law, a wife, and a mother, but with some difference. Mother, unlike others could see that being a perfect role-player is not necessarily what a woman looks for.

The third-generation woman is the educated, somewhat affluent, urban woman of modern India. She was lucky to have come across influences and people who were facilitators and not hindrances in her way towards a search for a meaningful existence. Nevertheless, one can see that she took the responsibility of paving her own path to a goal she did not know quite well. It cannot be said that she did not inherit the traditional stereotype of Indian womanhood from her ancestors. One can see a very anxious mother and a regular daughter-in-law in her. She served her husband's family members in many ways. But she was also able to dissociate herself from the demands she did not want to succumb to. A woman who is able to do this is said to be in favorable circumstances rather than really courageous in India. The highlight of the daughter's personality is her sensitivity towards life in general. Her insecurity is the insecurity of an intellectually oriented individualist who does not find the answers to her problems in books, persons and relationships, or *gurus* and religious practices. Her concern for self is evident in efforts for achievement in study and job, and her individualist tendencies come in light with her major concerns getting limited to her nuclear family. Nevertheless, the daughter's emotionally charged personality and a readiness to relate with people are the qualities of a collectivist. Her realization that her search for something beyond what is already in the present must stop is the most welcome sign which could become her source of personal psychological strength.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

It may be concluded that the transformation in women's social role in India has been gradual but is surely taking place at a number of manifest levels. However, the pace of transformation has been relatively "fast" or "slow" for different categories of women, depending on their socioeconomic status, education, and place of habitation.

Indian women are a peculiar lot for the following reasons: First, they are believers in an externally controlled fate and function under the dominant influence of religion and rituals. Furthermore, the religious embeddedness of their psychology is paralleled by their intricate linkage with their collective social network.

Secondly, very often the Indian women represent a peculiar mix of tradition and modernity that co-exists in the attitudes and behaviors of even educated Indians. The transformation in women's social role in India has to be examined in the light of the above observations.

In the present chapter an attempt has been made to examine these changes broadly in the spheres of religious practices and Indian women's social role in the family. Finally, her homemaker's role has been examined in conjunction with the economic changes taking place in the Indian system. As far as religious practices and following of rituals are concerned, it is still there. Nevertheless, the transformation is to be traced in the extent to which these practices are made convenient and then adopted for the women who cannot stick to them due to a demanding life style or leave them alone because they feel responsible as "saviors" for the family.

The transformation in the Indian women's social role in family has been traced through the illustrations from the mother-in-law–daughter-in-law relationship and the social marking of the women's role in the context of the *purdah* system and its changes.

For this part the conclusions indicate the following:

1. There has been change in the mother-in-law and daughter-in-law relationship. Although the daughter-in-law realizes her duties and obligations towards her husband's family members and his mother, the power distance between the two women has lessened.

2. The *purdah* system is surely being disregarded by more or less all classes of women, with the exception of women belonging to very orthodox families and classes.

Finally, there has been an appreciable acceptance of women's role as economic support, but not in disjunction from her role as a homemaker. It may be added that the transformation in women's social roles, in conjunction with the economic changes, has to be accepted and respected at a deeper attitudinal level by the society at large, and not at a superficial level, that is, by succumbing to the "double standard of morality" of the Indian system.

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CHAPTER 6

A Co-Constructivist Perspective of Life-Course Changes among Havik Brahmins in a South India Village*

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INTRODUCTION

The interplay between individuals and the principles of their culture results in change. At any given point in time there are specific principles governing ideal behavior as well as acceptable deviations from ideal behavior. *Co-construction* refers to the change in these principles as members of a culture negotiate and accommodate to new situations. In some cases, the changes occur so gradually that the negotiation goes unnoticed. In other cases, a direct challenge results in a conscious reevaluation of principles. As a result, there may be active negotiation and reinterpretation of appropriate behavior or an affirmation of traditional behavior.

In cultural transmission a child learns from its peers as well as members of older generations. The older generations may provide the initiative for the younger generation to transcend ambivalently held beliefs. Co-construction is most likely to occur unnoticed in the areas of ambivalence. I observed an example of this with regard to a 3-year-old Havik Brahmin girl. Ideally, women

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were submissive, showed no initiative, and did not attract attention. Yet this girl was treated as especially intelligent, quick-witted, and regarded as special because of these qualities. Her exploits at age 3 were the talk of the village—in a supportive fashion. Her father's friends teased her, grandmother figures criticized her when they thought she was too dependent, and her mother talked frequently of the importance of education. The girl's reasoning got her what she wanted at age 3. While all talked of the ideal submissiveness of women, from childhood she benefited from being assertive. She learned how to transcend passivity from members of her society who had no cognizance of their socialization of her for an assertive role in later life. When this girl later attended college, I asked her father about this. He responded to my questions with surprise, stating, "She has performed academically better than my sons. How could I not send her to college when I sent them to college?" The father and the other villagers did not note this change, because the entire society regarded her behavior as appropriate and had in fact negotiated the change. The changes in the options of this woman's opportunities were unnoticed, because the negotiations of co-construction had been occurring from her infancy and had parallels among other women her age. At no time did she transcend the culturally accepted in her assertiveness. Hence, her negotiations met with parental and societal approval, support, and encouragement.

The direct challenge to cultural beliefs and patterns resulting in active co-construction may force parents to choose between their principles and their children. Often the challenge comes as youth interpret cultural principles in a manner consistent with the actions of elders. In the vignette the 3-year-old was unaware that her negotiating enhanced female assertiveness. Her requests made sense and were congruent with other changes in Havik Brahmin society. Neither she nor her parents were aware of the cultural evolution which their co-construction negotiated. Just as this resulted in a generalization of principles to a new realm, such as college education for women, so co-construction may result in a generalization of principles to unpredictable realms. With direct challenge, the circumstances are known to other members of the society whose direct or indirect intervention serves as a barometer for the negotiators. Active negotiation involves considering the issues and deciding appropriate action. The negotiation determines the accommodation for change. In extreme cases this may result in a rupture in family and societal relationships. If respected members of the society agree that a rupture is appropriate, the traditional has been reaffirmed and a limit has been placed on extending cultural principles in that direction. With every rupture the boundaries are clarified. When a rupture ends in reconciliation supporting the innovative behavior, the boundaries are formally redrawn.

> The "culture" . . . has to be viewed as undergoing constant change itself. . . . The co-constructivist perspective has to include *culture change* as one of the by-products of adults' and children's joint construction of *novel* psychological and social phenomena. (Valsiner, 1988, p. 287)

The co-constructivist perspective results in a loop, so that parents alter their own cultural principles in accord with the challenges their children present. Neither parents nor children realize that there is cultural evolution. In societies with a highly structured ritual, the ritual provides an umbrella over the interpersonal variability of forms of social interaction. There is little questioning about individual practices when the ritual is a given, as the assumption is that all follow the appropriate ritual.

Valsiner (1988, p. 284) has commented on the variability both in transmission and cognitive processes. The perceived cultural sharing marked by acceptance into an ethnic group, in this case Havik Brahmins, creates a psychological bonding. Currently, the Havik Brahmin umbrella extends over much variant behavior. This is possible because of the assumption that a person who knows the cultural rules will follow them. It is with wonder that some members of the society comment on how in the past Havik Brahmin society excluded members for deviant behavior, which has now become accepted behavior. At times the members of the culture are cognizant of the change in the children's generation, but occasionally the changes are appreciated in retrospect, after an accumulation of changes portray a clear cultural pattern rather than an idiosyncratic instance. The co-constructivist perspective includes, not only the concept that children transcend the culture of their parents and that this results in the parents' changing to adapt to their children, but also that each individual partakes both of a *collective culture* and an idiosyncratically generated *personal culture* (Valsiner, 1988, p. 290). The personal culture emerges in interaction with the collective culture by way of being mediated by other persons' personal cultures. The collective culture is an abstraction derived from interactions with the personal cultures of others (J. Valsiner, personal communication, August 14, 1989). Occasionally, novel situations develop for which everybody must negotiate. An example of a new arena for co-construction among Haviks is the stage of adolescence which has developed with increased age at marriage and with education.

Higher education, including high school and college education, involves a longer period of dependency of the child on its parents. At the same time the child is exposed to influences outside the home. These influences prepare the child for greater independence. In Havik Brahmin society, with education has come a period of adolescence and increased independence. Before education was available, women were married before puberty; men commonly married in their late teens or twenties. At no time were either truly independent. Women went from a family of orientation, where parents indulged every whim, to a husband's family where they were expected to be adults, wives, mothers. Men remained dependent upon the older men in the family.

Education provided the arena for many changes. To pursue an education, an individual must have time to attend school and to study. This diminishes the person's availability to help with chores and agriculture. In addition, other life events such as marriage and raising a family are delayed until education is completed. Marriage may cause a person to stop education. Considerations turn to the self and to one's own needs. Education provides an environment for the development of individualism and assertiveness.

Havik Brahmins[1] in South India traditionally endorsed, and still endorse, the wishes and assertive behavior of young children. The assumption was, and still is, that children below the age of 5 do not know the cultural rules and are too young to comprehend appropriate behavior. Hence adults, wherever possible, indulge every wish of a child below 5, and misbehavior is explained as "The child does not understand." The belief is that, as children mature, they will internalize the passivity expected in behavior toward elders. At a time when there was little opportunity for adult independence, the transformation to passivity occurred. However, with the introduction of education, increased marriage age, and choice of marriage partner, childhood assertive behavior changed from a time of freedom before assuming adult behavior in dependency relationships to a time of preparation for independence. I propose in this chapter to examine co-construction as a mechanism involved in educational changes. My hypothesis is that, as Havik Brahmin society changed so that assertive behavior in the adult became functional, negotiated change occurred in which elders supported increased assertion rather than passivity. The apparently voluntary relinquishing of power by elders is in reality their means of preserving familial relationships. I will illustrate this hypothesis with case studies representing change for the society.

THE SETTING

The study was conducted in a multicaste village in Karnataka State, South India. Nestled in the hills and valleys on the slopes of the Western Ghats, the village, Totagadde[2] by pseudonym, is located seven miles from the nearest town, 45 miles from the district town, and approximately 250 miles northwest of the Karnataka state capital, Bangalore. In 1964, before there was public transportation, Totagadde appeared isolated. People went to town by bicycle, foot, or ox cart. A visitor to the state capitol was a source of wonder. By 1987, there was ready access to urban areas. Shoppers, students, and workers commuted by bus or motorcycle to the nearby town. Not only had the nearest town become more accessible, but so had the state capitol, Bangalore, and even all parts of India. Some Totagadde residents have studied and now work in the national capitol, New Delhi.

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[1] Related anthropological work on Havik Brahmins includes Harper (1964) and Ullrich (1975a, b, 1977, 1980, 1987a, b).

[2] Totagadde refers to the major crops in this village. "Tota" represents areca nut (betel nut) land; "gadde," rice paddy.

Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Totogadde

Caste Name[a]	Number of Houses	Percentage[b] of the total Number of Houses	Caste Population	Percentage[b] of the total Population
Havik Brahmins	33	25	181	23
Lingayat	1	1	5	1
Vokkaliga	9	7	53	7
Potter	7	5	50	6
Divaru	41	31	263	34
Barber	1	1	5	1
Hosluru	12	9	68	9
Holeru	11	8	54	7
Migrants	16	12	100	13
Midwife (Christian)	1	1	3	1
Total	132	101	782	101

[a] Castes are ranked in order, with the highest caste at the top of the chart. Although the migrants are lumped into one category, they comprise several castes of markedly different ritual rank. Christians theoretically rank lower than untouchables.

[b] Due to rounding, the percentages total more than 100%.

The nine hamlets belonging to Totagadde are located at some distance from each other. An aerial view would reveal that the hamlets form a perimeter to the 186 acres of cultivated land. The initiated recognize village boundary markers in the form of deities, residing in stones or trees, which provide sociogeographical integrity to the village. The houses in each hamlet face the cultivated area—the rice lands, the sugar cane land, the areca nut plantations—which forms the nucleus of the village. The original houses were built close to one another—indeed within whispering distance. This is in contrast to other areas in Karnataka, where the houses are on the plantation itself with neighbors at a distance.

This multicaste Karnataka community had a population of approximately 500 in 1964 and approximately 800 in 1987.[1] In 1987 the 391 males and 410 females resided in 132 houses. All but one household, that of the government appointed midwife, are Hindu. The midwife is Christian (Table 1). The residential pattern is such that there are three Havik Brahmin hamlets, a hamlet containing members of the Vokkaliga, Lingayat, Potter, and Divaru castes (the Vokkaligas are a high-ranking agricultural group; the Divarus are a low-ranking agricultural group), a Divaru hamlet, a Hosluru hamlet (Hoslurus are members of a low-ranking former tribal group who primarily work for others), a Harijan hamlet (Harijans are also known as untouchables), and two hamlets populated by former migrant workers who have permanently settled in this village.

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[1] The total male and female population in 1987 was 801. However, due to visiting patterns and children raised by relatives, the resident population at that time was 782.

Village social organization. In Totagadde, each of the castes has a distinct ritual ranking in the village hierarchy (Table 1). Commensality and endogamy are primary features of the ritual ranking. Caste etiquette dictates that one should not eat cooked food, drink coffee, or even accept water touched by a member of a lower caste. Although against caste rules, some now accept tea or coffee from members of lower castes. The exact ranking of each caste is common knowledge.

Caste residence reflects the social organization of the village. Of the castes residing in Totagadde there are three major divisions with three major hamlet areas. The location of the three Brahmin hamlets in the center of the village reflects their political, ritual, and economic dominance. The three Sudra hamlets are located in the northern area of Totagadde, reflecting a higher rank than the untouchables, who reside in the southern part of the village. (North is more auspicious than South.) Sudras, as well as untouchables, may have steady employment with a Brahmin family or may work for Brahmins at times of specific labor needs, such as during planting or harvesting. Members of a hamlet generally interact socially with people in the same or corresponding caste hamlets. In 1964, Brahmin women restricted their visiting to Brahmin hamlets and were not consciously aware that other castes had religious beliefs and ritual practices independent of Brahmin ritual.

The Havik Brahmins are the dominant caste politically, ritually, and economically. They comprise approximately one-fourth of the total village population. Their primary source of income is areca nut (betel nut) cultivation. Although the Haviks of Totagadde are dominant economically, few are wealthy. Areca landholdings range from one-half to four and one-half acres. Some of the more enterprising Haviks supplement their areca earnings with other cash crops, including cardamom, cocoa, cinnamon, nutmeg, and peppercorns. In 1964, they also owned rice land, which was cultivated by non-Brahmins. Since 1964, this rice land has been awarded to the tenant farmers. Consequently, few Havik Brahmin households now own rice land. Education has provided a resource for knowledge about additional crops and alternative careers. Increased knowledge of innovative agricultural techniques has resulted in additional cash crops. With these increased options both with regard to farming and alternative careers, younger people have more to contribute to the household. This has led to a change in the locus of power from the eldest man in a household to younger men in the household.

Havik Brahmin men are at the top of the village hierarchy. They advise non-Brahmins on economic matters, settle non-Brahmin disputes, and answer questions on ritual for members of other castes. Any adult Havik male may be called upon to perform intravillage, intercaste ritual functions. A non-Brahmin generally borrows money from his or her Havik Brahmin employer in times of need. The Haviks have chosen to retain their dominant status by encouraging members of other castes to obtain education, modernize, and use birth control.

The primary agricultural occupations in Totagadde are associated with areca (betel) nut and rice cultivation. Havik Brahmins traditionally owned areca nut land; indeed, few members of other castes owned any land at all. When the government awarded non-Brahmin tenant farmers land ownership, Brahmins predicted that non-Brahmins would be unable to manage land successfully. However, the non-Brahmin landowners proved themselves capable of land management. Land ownership, which in the past was primarily a prerogative of the Brahmin, no longer correlates with caste.

Social distance is reflected by perceived dialectal differences and is positively correlated with residential distance. The social dialects reflect density of communication in that members of those social groups that have the greatest interaction have the greatest similarity in lexicon and grammar. Linguistic distinctions serve as markers of solidarity and social distance. Dialects are socially ranked, so that speech patterns reveal caste identity. Code switching occurs when a member of one social group speaks with a member of a different social group. This is most marked among the Havik Brahmins, who restrict their dialect to members of the same caste.

Linguistic deference in terms of address to Haviks by non-Haviks indicates the special position Havik Brahmins occupy in this area. As recently as 1974, a member of a higher caste could address those of lower castes as (*huDuga*[4]) or "girl" (*huDugi*) (Ullrich, 1975b). Brahmins of any age may address all of lower caste rank as "boy" (*huDuga*) or "girl" (*huDugi*), while Brahmins are addressed with terms of respect. A dialect restricted to Haviks serves to differentiate Haviks from all other castes and to signify caste solidarity. Pronominal usage in which males and gods are in one category and females and inanimate objects are in a second category correlates with Havik Brahmin male cultural superiority. The other caste dialects of Totagadde have separate categories for males, females, and inanimate objects, which is congruent with a relatively higher female status. Haviks speak down to non-Brahmins by using the village non-Brahmin dialect with them.

Associated with ritual ranking are ascribed professional roles. For example, no matter what ritually neutral educational level or profession a member of the potter caste attains, the making of pottery is his or her birthright. Inherent in professional employment, however, is increased status for members of the family, as well as members of the caste. This achieved status bears no relationship to ritual status. Economic and educational opportunities beyond Totagadde provide increased interaction with members of other castes. These interactions transcend ritual status. Indeed, the society in Totagadde now acknowledges achieved status and outside of the village may even give it priority over ritual status.

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[4] Kannada words are transcribed with the following conventions: capitals represent retroflex phonemes; a colon, vowel length; *sh*, a palatal sibilant.

The Havik Brahmin belief system defines three ritual states: ritual purity (*maDi*), ritual neutrality (*mailige*), and ritual pollution (*muTTuceTTu*), a tripartite division that reflects the ritual status of caste groups. Brahmins, the only ones in the village capable of achieving ritual purity (*maDi*), serve the community by directly worshipping the gods. Non-Brahmins assume pollution so that the Brahmins can maintain sufficient purity for the benefit of the community (Harper, 1964, p. 152). Untouchables are always in a ritually polluted state (*muTTuceTTu*), and members of other castes are generally in a ritually neutral state (*mailige*). In 1964, this stratification applied also to those visiting Brahmin houses. Only Brahmins entered; high-ranking non-Brahmins could approach the Brahmin veranda; low-ranking Sudras and untouchables sat at the edge or remained standing in front of the veranda. If the latter had come closer to the house, they would have ritually polluted it.

The idealized role of Havik women is to support their husbands. Traditionally Havik women made no economic decisions and did not appear in decision-making positions. Only one woman has participated in the Havik Brahmin caste council, and only two Totagadde Havik women have ever taken charge of land management; the elder is the only Brahmin woman who has entered into any activity that might be construed as competitive with her husband. This is in sharp contrast to women of other castes (Ullrich, 1977), who work beside their husbands in their rice fields and may even have charge of family finances. These women speak out and represent the family in disputes if they are the better debaters. Havik women have less autonomy in the management of their own households than women of other castes. In 1964, Havik Brahmin women were not likely to be seen or heard. Etiquette dictated they remain silent in the presence of those whom they respected. When visitors arrived, the Havik Brahmin women either stood silently in the doorway or retired to the inner part of their homes. Men had total responsibility for dealing with the world outside of the family. In contrast, other caste women are conspicuous in activities within their own homes, vociferously welcome visitors, and at times assume responsibility for business with other castes in Totagadde and in the nearby town.

Women are ritually inferior to men, an inferiority accentuated among Havik Brahmins, where men perform the primary religious services for their own households and the community. The role of married Brahmin women, which is regarded as essential for important worship ceremonies, is restricted to touching their husbands' arm at crucial times during the ceremony and to bringing the food offering. Traditionally only those Havik Brahmin women who have made a special vow for their husbands' long life perform religious services. In 1987, I observed two postmenopausal women performing the daily worship (*pu:ja*) for their families. Theoretically women are prohibited from learning the sacred mantras (Vedic prayers) necessary for performing *pu:ja*. In both of these cases the women used mantras, and their *pu:ja* served as the required daily worship before the noon meal.

Havik Brahmins. There are 33 Havik Brahmin households, comprising a population of 181, or 23% of the total village population. The traditional occupation of Havik Brahmins is the priesthood. They were invited by the Karnataka rulers in power from about 250 A.D. to 540 A.D. *(Census of India, 1961)* to come from northern India to serve as priests. According to tradition, there was no caste in Karnataka at that time who performed their specific religious function. Although they have continued their traditional occupation of the priesthood, now areca cultivation is their primary means of livelihood.

Havik Brahmins have a patrilineal, patrilocal, and patriarchal society in which the joint family was the ideal. A household consists of a patrilineal group, which may be a joint family, an extended family with one parent or married brothers and their wives and children, or a nuclear family. The oldest male in the household theoretically has all the authority. This had begun to change in 1964, and now authority for managing the household is shared by adult males residing in a household. In 1964, the ideal was the joint family; in 1984, the nuclear family (Table 2). Although the verbalized ideal family form has changed from joint family to nuclear family, the evidence does not support the verbiage. In 1964, there were 14 nuclear families, 6 joint families, and 7 that were a combination either of married brothers residing together, brothers and a widowed mother, or a widowed mother with her son's family. In 1987, there were 13 nuclear families and 10 joint families. The remaining 10 households are of the combined form. Hence Havik Brahmin household structure does not reflect the stated change in ideal from joint to nuclear family. However, with daughters now insisting that their fathers find husbands who reside in nuclear families, future family forms may more closely approximate the current ideal.

The eldest man of the household (*yejma:nru*) was in charge of the household. In 1964, in all but two households, the oldest male retained all authority. In 1987, the son in six of the eight joint families was in charge of the household. In all of the extended households the oldest brother retains power. The power that was invested in the eldest male, usually the father, may now be invested in an adult son.

In 1964, the patrilineal interest in marital decisions was protected by the father of the groom and the groom's relatives. Now even orthodox fathers place

Table 2. Family Composition among Havik Brahmins

Family Type	1964	1984
Nuclear	14	13
Extended	7	10
Joint	6	10

the responsibility for choice of marital partner on the groom, saying, "The decision is yours, as you are the one who will live with your bride." The trend is toward later age at marriage, decreased age difference between spouses, and fewer children. According to women, the ideal age for a woman to marry is from 18 to 25.[5]

Women associate the increased age at marriage with their realization that their opinions are important. All of the women gave this as the advantage of marriage after a high school or college education. They regard education and age as providing a woman with the courage to express her opinions and to be undaunted by criticisms of mother-in-law and husband. This may be another way of expressing the value of individuation occurring during adolescence. Havik Brahmin women believe increased life experience provides the internal security and identity to face criticism with self-assurance. Some women over 50 years of age have internal security manifested by informal power; others chafe at their submission but view themselves as extensions of their husbands. Several older women said they had no need for independent financial resources because their husband provided everything, but others expressed embarrassment that a son or a husband took their earnings. Identity separate from the family is associated with independence and the option of having financial resources. Embarrassment reflects the perceived lack of formal differentiation. These older women freely discuss their frustration over their cultural inferiority and the lack of value given their individuality.

Men are still hesitant to take brides from families which have the reputation of containing strong-minded women, believing that a dominant mother will have a dominant daughter. In 1964, a dominant woman was a deviant woman. The two extremes—the overtly dominant and the overtly passive woman—are both regarded negatively. In 1964 and 1975 the passive woman was the ideal. Havik Brahmin women were perceived as forever childlike; now they ideally should be capable of managing when their husbands are absent. In this sense a wife has become more of a partner than in the past.

From the start of a marriage the couple now makes its own decisions, which includes family size. The current generation attempts to complete childbearing before the wife reaches age 30. With the expectation that children who are born alive and healthy will survive, poorer Haviks now consider one child, regardless of sex, an appropriate family size; wealthier Haviks may limit their family size to one son, two children regardless of sex, or three children (providing neither of the first two is male). With the average number of living children per Havik woman decreasing in one generation from 5.6 to 1.4 (Ullrich, 1987b, p. 623) a woman's childbearing role is less significant. Younger married women criticize parents-in-law and village elders when they indicate a woman's function is to provide a son—illustrating that views have changed about the need for a son. Some couples have decided that two daughters are sufficient, and some elders state that a daughter is as good as a son. In 1987, some elders with two granddaughters stated that daughters are fine and ignored questions about the ritual significance of a son. The ritual need for a son to perform an annual commemoration ceremony after the parents' death is now quietly ignored—even by elders. This clearly is an area of cultural change.

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[5] Measures of central tendency show a change in mean, mode, and median for the marriage age of women from 11, 13, and 12 years to 21, 21, and 21 years for women in the age categories over 50 years and less than 40 years, respectively. Age differences with spouse among women over 50 years of age show a mean, median, and mode of 12, 10, and 10 years, while those in the under-40 category show a mean, median, and mode of 5, 6, and 6 years.

Havik Brahmin education and profession. In 1964, few Brahmins had received a formal education. At that time three men were in college. These men were the first Totagadde villagers with a college education. By 1974, a high school education was a minimum requirement for both men and women. (See Tables 3 and 4 for educational level among different age groups.) By 1987, both men and women who performed well in school generally attended college. Women might study at home by correspondence courses instead of going away to college. In the 1980s one Brahmin family relocated to a distant college town so that the mother could care for her three daughters and one son while they attended college; the father still continues to manage the areca nut land in Totagadde and commutes from Totagadde.

The difference in education among Havik Brahmin women over 40 and men over 50 compared with those less than 40 is striking. Those women over 40 have at the most a middle school (seventh grade) education. Except for the one man over 50 who had more than a high school education, none of the men over 50 attended high school. Twenty years ago men who wished a bride with a high school education had to find a wife from a more educationally progressive area of Karnataka. This provided incentive for female education around Totagadde.

With the exception of three women and eight men, all Totagadde Havik Brahmins under 40 have a high school degree. In general, men have more education than women. For younger men the high school degree is rarely an educational terminal point. Although there is now emphasis for both males and females to obtain professional qualifications, women generally yield to family

Table 3. Educational Level of Havik Brahmin Men Interviewed (N = 79)

Level of Education	>50	between 40 and 50	Men <40
Higher	1	6	24
High School	—	3	14
Middle School	3	2	7
Primary School	9	---	---
Religious School	8	---	1
No Education	1	---	---
Total	22	11	46

Table 4. Educational level of women interviewed (N = 45)

Level of education	Women >50	Age Women between 40 and 50	Women <40
Higher	---	---	7
High school	---	---	13
Middle school	---	3	1
Primary	4	6	---
No education	9	1	---
Total	13	10	22

Source: "A Study of Change and Depression among Havik Brahmin Women in a South India Village," by H.E. Ullrich, *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry, 11*, Table 1, p. 269. Reprinted by permission.

pressure to terminate education for marriage. However, there is increasing sentiment that women should become professionally qualified. Marriage is seen as an option for a woman as soon as she experiences difficulty in college, in finding employment, or when a suitable groom is found. As professional men often seek professional women as brides, employment enhances a woman's marital opportunities. A man's education has priority over his marriage. Hence a bride is not sought until after he has completed his education and is earning his livelihood—whether it be managing land or professional employment.

Members of the first generation to wish education met opposition from their parental generation. Children negotiated for more education; in turn, when they became parents they taught their children the value of education. Mothers helped their daughters to negotiate for greater independence. Many women, as well as men, have assumed the right to express their views. Individualism and assertiveness have become increasingly valued among both men and women. In two generations there has been a change from the importance of considering the family unit first to considering what the individual wants. In the past there was a risk of depression at the time that a person changed from being an assertive child to a prepubertal married woman. Women recall how abandoned they felt at the time of marriage. Many felt unable to fill their new responsibilities and were afraid to ask for instructions. They showed weight loss, decreased appetite, inability to sleep, frequent crying spells, hopelessness. These periods of dysphoria were precipitated by marriage and limited to women. Now that teenagers are more assertive, there is less teenage depression associated with marriage. Concern now focuses on reactions to academic failure. Examination time is a period of considerable stress for both men and women. Low examination scores may mean the loss of opportunity to pursue a desired career. Poor examination scores have resulted in feelings of worthlessness, decreased sleep, decreased appetite, decreased interest in activities which were previously pleasurable, dysphoria, and irritability. Parents fear their children may attempt

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suicide, but at this point no Totagadde Havik Brahmin college student has attempted suicide upon receiving disappointing examination results. Parents, however, report many anecdotes of children who have committed suicide as a result of poor examination results. Memories and the fears of such depressions have entered into the equation of co-construction so that parents are more inclined to negotiate with their children in arenas such as career and marital choice. These are the areas in which adults wished they had been given more autonomy. As women were expected to adapt to others in the past, they are now more attuned to the desires of their children. As a result, the mother is more likely to act as a broker in co-construction by providing the adolescent with emotional support for pursuing his or her goals.

Changes in the assertiveness of Havik Brahmin women stem in part from the educational opportunities that have made economic independence for women a possibility. Should there be difficulty in locating a groom acceptable to a woman, she now has an option to remain single (Ullrich, 1987b, pp. 633–635). Older women view education and professional skills as insurance in case of spinsterhood or widowhood. Within the last 20 years Havik Brahmin men have started requesting dowries. Although a dowry is not an essential part of the marriage arrangements, it is an increasingly frequent part of the negotiations. In instances where poorer Haviks do not have the financial resources for a dowry, the growing acceptance of the single professional woman relieves pressure on the family to arrange a marriage.

In fact, marriage still takes precedence over education; education beyond the bachelor's degree is usually at a woman's insistence and in the absence of an appropriate groom. The view that a woman may be too highly educated for finding a husband is balanced by her desire for higher education and by the fear that she will be unable to find a husband. In Totagadde there are examples of Havik Brahmin women with various levels of education—high school, college, or professional training—for whom grooms have not been found. As a result, the arranging of marriages is a source of considerable anxiety for parents. Higher education is one way a woman occupies her time while her father and kinsmen search for her groom. Moreover, higher education exposes women to men and increases the possibility that she will find her own mate.

In general, women prefer to marry professional men who reside in urban areas. With increased pressure for the land, the pattern has arisen that men study until they achieve a professional position or until they fail in school. Whereas a generation ago the only people to leave the village were the failures at land management, this is now reversed, and the son who fails in school or college is the one designated to manage the land. In 1987, 17 Havik Brahmin men from 13 families worked outside Totagadde as college lecturers, bankers, shopkeepers, physicians, and truck drivers. Only one Havik household had all of its sons in a Totagadde joint family managing the land.

Of 12 single Havik Brahmin women, 6 are employed. Three of the unemployed women are trying to find jobs; the other three are waiting for their marriages to be arranged. Without education such options for employment would not be feasible. Three married women discontinued employment after starting a family. There are currently two married women who have continued employment after marriage. Mothers who had no opportunity for education urge their daughters to become qualified and to seek employment, believing that economic independence provides emotional satisfaction (Ullrich, 1987b). Fathers express the view that the only security for their daughters is in marriage. However, even fathers state that a good job will provide less urgency in arranging a marriage and an alternative should the marriage be unsatisfactory or end in widowhood.

Reasons for Change. Caste solidarity is an underlying factor in many of the social and economic changes. Modernization among the Havik Brahmins serves to provide prestige within the caste and to maintain a dominant leadership position among those of other castes. Accompanying modernization is an endorsement of achieved status. By 1964, Brahmin competition for modernization was an established pattern (Ullrich, 1975a). By 1985, Havik Brahmins regarded caste as irrelevant to professional competence.

In 1964, for Havik Brahmins trips to the nearby town were ritually polluting. Now this ritual pollution is disregarded. Comments to the effect that "our children are more important than caste rules" suggest a conscious decision to receive non-Brahmin visitors, to travel widely, and even to accept caste intermarriages (Ullrich, 1987b). The interpretation that decreased ritual observance is essential to economic viability provides a rationale for change. With increased occupational diversity the Havik community retains its solidarity through caste organizations that are open to all Haviks and their spouses—whether they are Havik or not. Economic viability now takes precedence over rigid ritual observance.

The numerous changes in Totagadde Havik society since 1964 may be interpreted as an effort to retain power in a society which is changing from ascribed status to achieved status. By endorsing changes that may be inevitable, the Haviks have maintained their position. Encouraging education, taking advantage of economic opportunities, and suggesting intercaste cooperation all serve to keep the Havik dominant and respected in Totagadde. These changes which have occurred without overt conflict on the family level, the caste level, and the village level have been at the initiative or support of the elders. Parents have perceived their own interests to be in encouraging their sons and daughters rather than in opposing them. In the cases where fathers have tried to oppose sons, the village supported the sons. In turn, sons and daughters have not directly conflicted with the elder generation, but have followed co-constructivist principles. Negotiating with respect has facilitated changes.

In 1964, no Havik woman had visited the non-Brahmin hamlets of Totagadde. Now there is less separation of castes. Havik Brahmins attend the weddings and other functions of their non-Brahmin employees. Members of all castes attend the local school and may travel by bus to town. In 1964, when there was no bus, religious restrictions required Havik Brahmins to purify themselves ritually after a return from town, but in 1987, Havik Brahmins disregarded the pollution incurred from sitting next to non-Brahmins in a bus. Brahmin youth, as well as artisan and peasant youth, use the bus as transportation to attend college. Now no one observes purification rituals on return from town, although members of all castes travel by bus.

Since my first field trip in 1964–66, there has been much cultural change. The changes in ritual and in belief have occurred gradually, so that at times my inquiries have caused people to realize that they have forgotten some of the ritual and to wonder at the change in their beliefs since 1964. The opportunities for women have changed dramatically. In 1964, a woman neither had the opportunity for a high school education nor any say in whom she would marry. A married woman who stated an opinion impinged on her husband's respect. Now a woman may choose whom she will marry, whether she will attend college, or whether she will work after marriage, or even decide on a career instead of marriage. With these changes, as well as an increase in the marriage age, a wife who is not assertive is the object of comment.

In this chapter I will focus on education as an arena for co-construction. Through case studies over time I will show how cultural change has been negotiated. By illustrating direct confrontation and accommodation as well as the unrealized goals of the parental generation, the process of co-construction will be clear.

METHODOLOGY

From my first research visit to Totagadde and through the four other visits I have used the participant-observation approach, in-depth interviewing, and an occasional formal questionnaire. My living arrangements with a family were especially conducive to observation. Moreover, I was treated as a member of the family—to such an extent that the villagers expected me to follow their cultural rules and to employ appropriate exceptions to the rules. In addition, I informally visited each of the households (25 in 1964, 33 in 1985). The village perception was that I visited each household daily.

For purposes of this chapter adolescence will be arbitrarily defined as the teenage years. Among Havik Brahmins, women were traditionally married before puberty and men generally obeyed their fathers and uncles in agricultural work. One might argue that women went from childhood in their parents' household, where they had no responsibilities, to adulthood, where, as wives, they had responsibilities towards their husbands, in-laws, and children. Men also had no adolescence, as they were subject to their father's commands. Ritually a man assumed adulthood at marriage. By 1964, however, women and men both had a period in their development that included formal schooling. The delay of marriage marks the start of psychological adolescence. Adolescence was a new phenomenon that necessitated co-construction. Before this period, villagers report that marriage arrangements were made entirely by the elders. Neither bride nor groom saw each other before the marriage. Then the groom obtained a say and had an opportunity to view his prospective prepubertal bride. Men could reject a prospective bride without providing a reason. In some cases the bride objected strongly to her proposed marriage, but her elders paid no heed. This was often the first instance of her father's ignoring her wishes. The anger and frustration these women harbored provided impetus to encourage change among their children, especially their daughters' insistence on increased education and marital choice. Adolescence is regarded as providing a growth opportunity for all youth and a positive cultural change involving a period of "becoming-an-adult" and equipping the individual with cognitive skills not developed before this time. For adolescence both parents and children developed cultural patterns through co-construction.

In my field work among Havik Brahmins in a South India village, I noted that they assumed all members of the society shared the same culture. When I visited the various households, I noted that behavior varied. Totagadde Havik Brahmins either were unaware of these discrepancies, chose not to acknowledge them, or regarded the variations as insignificant. In all probability, they applied all three of these means of dealing with discrepancies. Although Havik Brahmins occasionally showed curiosity about other households, I treated my data as confidential information and would not discuss villagers with each other. This approach was respected. I obtained a dual role—as a researcher and as a resident of the village. To my surprise, after I had mastered the cultural rules of formal appropriate behavior, Havik Brahmins also expected me to deviate in a culturally appropriate manner. This illustrates their assumption that, once a person knows the cultural rules, that person will follow the rules.

CASE STUDIES

Case studies illustrate the role of co-construction in change. Because the cultural roles for men and women are so separate, I will present longitudinal case studies for co-construction in education patterns among women and men. These cases focus on a person of change and the current response to that change.

MEN AND EDUCATION

Case 1

In the 1950s, M.L. wanted an education. His father was opposed to this, as he believed education would result in his son's leaving the traditional agricultural occupation for an urban occupation. M.L. defied his father's orders to stop school. By running away to relatives so that he could attend high school, he enlisted the assistance of these relatives. M.L.'s father then allowed him to attend high school. In continuing defiance of his father, M.L. pursued college training via correspondence courses.

M.L., now in his 50s, recalls this period as one of the most painful in his life. However, as he matured into a village leader who taught other members of his caste and provided opportunities for agricultural innovation, his father took pride in M.L.'s achievements. By remaining in the village, M.L. showed that education did not mean that a person would be lost to the traditional occupation. He provided a statewide and national network for access to agricultural research.

M.L.'s formal study involved the North Indian language, Hindi, which he taught to the residents of Totagadde. When M.L. realized the pursuit of Hindi was not pertinent to his role as a landowner, he changed his focus to agriculture. While M.L. introduced the value of education to the village, he accommodated his father's fears that M.L. would leave the village. In 1964, M.L. was working on an advanced degree in Hindi literature. At that time he arranged to study in Totagadde with periodic visits to the university for tutoring and examinations and regular correspondence about studies. This was an accommodation to his father's disapproval of M.L.'s educational goals.

In 1987, M.L. talked of providing his son with the option of a career outside of Totagadde and how he wished he had had the same opportunity. In this sense M.L. stayed in Totagadde, perhaps to prove to his father that education could be of value to all. Initially, he used his education to teach other villagers. Then his language skills provided a bridge beyond the village to other areas of India.

As an adolescent, he felt that his goals were worthwhile. By arguing for his goals and how they would benefit all, he achieved his goals. At the same time, he showed respect for his family's fears that education would take him away from the village. M.L. talks of his determination and belief in education and how his father expected education would pull M.L. away from his heritage. He remembers the first stage of his education, when he persuaded his father to provide a bicycle so that M.L. could attend the closest school, a school in the town six miles away. M.L. reasoned that, if he obtained an education, he would use the skills in Totagadde to show his father that education would benefit all, and that the fact of an education did not mean disrespect for tradition. M.L. has become a political leader respected for his wisdom. He openly listed the advantage of education before his father in his old age. The terms of the education then meant for M.L. a necessity to remain in Totagadde. He describes the pain and despair he experienced in the negotiations and attributes his contributions, his state and national agricultural network, and his agricultural diversification to the benefits of education.

M.L., the first Totagadde resident to obtain an education, provided a role model for the Havik Brahmins in the entire village. Even if other villagers had not realized that an educated son who chose to remain in the village was an asset, M.L. pointed this out by holding classes for others and including others in his networks. He frequently talks of the period before education was readily available. The local schools were built later. Since 1964, when there were primary and middle schools in the village and a high school three miles away, education has become increasingly valued and available for both men and women. Not only was the woman who was sent for a convent high school education in 1964 the first Totagadde woman to marry a professional man, but her father found an appropriate groom easily. By 1975, there was a college in the town six miles away. M.L. obtained his education before there were convenient facilities. In 1975, Havik Brahmin villagers were aware that the lack of education of women of this area put them at a disadvantage in marriage arrangements. Education did not alienate children from parents. Now a child who is successful in school brings honor to his or her parents and his or her extended family. Whereas in the past leaving the village to follow another profession might have been a threat to the social system, many parents express the view that requiring children to remain in the village would deprive their children of the opportunity to use their skills. Now the belief is that the son to remain in the village is the less intelligent and the unsuccessful one in school.

Case 2

H.B. was an honors student. In 1987, he attended college in a distant city. His excellence in college resulted in a fellowship to study computers, which includes a research position in the military after obtaining his degree.

H.B. is focused on his family. As a result, he visits home at every opportunity. When he comes home, he frequently brings classmates. His family encourages his academic achievement and reinforces the importance of his potential contribution. Although he does not have a brother to manage the land when his father becomes too old to work, his parents tell H.B. not to consider this and emphasize the importance of H.B.'s career and the honor accorded the family. Where M.L. was restricted to Totagadde, H.B., out of deference to his family, will pursue a profession outside of Totagadde. Aware that H.B. enjoys his family ties, his parents and siblings keep in close touch by mail. His frequent visits to his family, and their welcoming of his friends belonging to all castes, reassures him of his role in the family while providing a secure source of emotional support. H.B. relates how important his sisters are to him. He enjoys his role as uncle to their children and arranges to be present for all family events. He hopes for an assignment in close proximity to his family. Consultations with his family provide impetus and praise for his academic and professional achievements. Their encouragement increases his independence.

Case 3

H.L., in 1987, had only one interest, English. His parents were against his career choice, because they felt he would have a difficult time securing an academic position. H.L. refused to listen to his parents. They expressed their concern but finally gave their support when his college scores showed him to have achieved the top rank in the state. In this, H.L.'s parents tried to negotiate with him. He refused to consider any alternatives. The family conflict dissipated when his examination results showed his promise in his chosen field. In other matters he is an obedient son, but he refused to listen in this one matter. His parents, and many other parents, stated that sons, in 1987, no longer believed they needed to follow paternal instructions—in this way, parents rationalize their sons' disobedience and praise obedient sons such as H.B. as exceptions.

These three cases show the evolution of assertion with regard to education. In 1964, the father believed he had the right to decide what and to which level his sons would study. Sons had opinions about what course they wished to pursue; however, they expressed to me the perspective that such assertion would damage their fathers' respect. M.L., by opposing his father publicly and by seeking support from his maternal uncle, provided opportunities for others. He negotiated with his father for an education; his father negotiated to have him remain in the village. This occurred at a time when the father theoretically had total control over a son. When he had difficulty with his father, he enlisted the support of his maternal uncle, the kinsman who traditionally has a close relationship with his nephews and nieces. Grandparents also at times provide a supportive role. Although a father need not listen to his in-laws, he loses respect when he refuses to hear their viewpoint.

In 1987, fathers expressed their opinions, but the cultural expectation no longer gave the father the power to choose his son's educational options nor his choice of career. Hence some sons consult their fathers and heed their fathers' wishes, while other sons openly disregard their fathers' wishes. Although H.B. grew up at a time when sons were expected to have some say about their career, he negotiated with his father about higher education. In this instance his parents encouraged him to pursue a career in which he would be employed outside of the village. The co-construction in this case involved the parents' (and especially the father's) indicating that his son's obligation to the patrilineage was to use his skills and not to follow in his father's footsteps. This change in goals which is characteristic of Havik Brahmin society today allows for the parents to retain some control or semblance of control. Even in the third case, where H.L. broke with tradition and openly defied his father, H.L. is pursuing a prestigious profession which will enhance familial respect. The co-construction in this case shows the father's support of a disobedient son, because the son proved he had the skills to succeed.

In all likelihood, M.L. would have been censured by the society if his self-assertion had led to his permanently leaving the village. Even if he had been successful, villagers would have probably expressed sympathy for a respected man with such a disobedient son. The principle that a son should obey his father was unchallenged at that time. However, there may have been village support for a reconciliation if M.L. had been successful. There are precedents where village sentiment supported the innovative child rather than the challenged father. By 1987, parents no longer demanded such obedience from their children. Sons are especially privileged to express their independence. The adolescent in 1964 kept his criticisms from his elders. M.L. was unusual in his defiance. By 1987, not only did adolescents openly defy their elders, but parents felt they could do little to control their sons. Mothers, in particular, tried to appease their sons, as they felt their sons might leave home permanently (as one non-Brahmin son has done). At this time fathers do not lose face if their sons are disobedient. The overt cultural values have changed from expected submission to allowed assertion. This change is associated with increased opportunities and the opportunity for individual development provided by education away from home.

WOMEN AND EDUCATION

Case 4

J.A., an 18-year-old girl in 1964, wanted more education. Studying English especially appealed to her. However, she thought her brother should have the opportunity for a high school education and believed there were not sufficient family resources for both. Hence, she did not ask to be sent to high school but studied from her brother's books. Arising at 4:30 a.m. to study, she drew attention covertly to her intellectual needs. Her failure to engage in verbal co-construction may have been a factor in her parents' ignoring J.A.'s needs. In contrast, her younger sisters received a college education. J.A. may have provided impetus for her younger sisters to state their needs openly, since her younger sisters observed J.A.'s covert co-construction was ineffective.

When the village women's group started a nursery school, J.A. was offered a salaried teaching position. Her mother thought J.A. should work for free. J.A. appealed to her father to be allowed to accept a salary. Her father supported her in this, so J.A. was the first Havik Brahmin woman of Totagadde to receive pay for services. Although J.A. never expressed her desire for an education, she negotiated with her parents for the opportunity to accept a salary. In her verbal co-constructivism she was successful. At that time a salary provided a person with economic resources to spend as desired. Women had traditionally been dependent on men for every cent, just as sons and younger brothers were dependent on fathers and older brothers. In addition to financial discretion, a salary was proof that the services rendered were regarded as valuable. At the time that J.A. became a nursery school teacher, she was the only person in Totagadde to receive a salary—all the men depended on the sale of crops to support their families.

J.A. opened the way for other women to pursue careers. After J.A.'s marriage, nursery school teaching became an option for women awaiting marriage. As long as Havik Brahmin women taught nursery school in Totagadde, the position was reserved for unmarried women. However, there are now Havik Brahmin women employed elsewhere as nursery school teachers who have decided against marriage.

After J.A., a high school education became the minimum educational level for both men and women. Her younger sisters have at least a high school degree, and two have college degrees. The family has been supportive of one who chose to continue a civil service job after marriage. J.A.'s youngest sister wishes to pursue a profession rather than marriage. The family is concerned, because her salary is insufficient for her to be economically independent. They are exerting pressure for her either to become better qualified professionally or to allow them to arrange her marriage.

Case 5

H.V., a 19-year-old girl, decided on a profession as a college teacher. Her parents regard marriage as a woman's financial security and believe that they retain responsibility for their daughter until she marries. Hence she will be a psychological burden until she marries—even if she is gainfully employed. Although H.V. did not want to consider marriage before completing her education, her father actively searched for an appropriate groom. When he located a potential groom, H.V. considered the prospect of marriage and agreed to marry him. After the potential groom visited her, he decided against marrying her. According to village gossip, somebody from the village sabotaged the marriage arrangements by stating that her mother was too assertive and that H.V.'s beauty was marred by a big nose. She was bitterly disappointed but coped by continuing with her studies.

To meet her goals, she needed certain grades. She did well but did not get the high first class she wanted or which others thought she merited. (Other villagers attributed the unexpected low first class to her depressed mood after the unexpected rejection by her suitor.) Disappointed, she decided to retake her examinations. In studying to retake her examinations, she decided there were too many distractions in Totagadde and arranged to stay in a hostel in town. This action initially did not have the approval of her parents. But she insisted and did not listen to their arguments. She chose a recognized hostel where the chaperonage for women is acknowledged as good. Her parents reasoned that she had followed their wishes in considering marriage and had been devastated by the man's negative decision. Hence, her actions showed parental respect as well as wisdom in preparing for her future should no groom be found.

This example of H.V. shows a dedicated woman who has her own professional goals; however, she was prepared to relinquish them in deference to her parents' preference. When that did not materialize, she proceeded with her first choice. By so accommodating her parents, she earned herself the reputation of a dutiful daughter. As such, when she did decide to stay in town while studying for her examinations, her parents permitted her to do so after they had expressed their disapproval.

Case 6

H.M., a 15-year-old woman, graduated from high school in 1987. Her mother wished her to attend college in a distant city. This college is known for excellent training in computers. H.M.'s mother reasoned that this would prepare her daughter for a profitable profession. H.M.'s mother is still bitter at having her own education interrupted for marriage. Unsuccessful in persuading her parents to delay her marriage, she wishes her daughter to have the opportunities she missed. But H.M. felt she needed more training in English before attending a program in the English medium. She insisted on attending the college in the nearby town for 1 year. In this way, H.M. negotiated for family support to deal with expected academic difficulties during her first year of college. All the Totagadde Havik Brahmins who have attended English medium colleges have remarked on their difficulties with English. H.M., a timid woman, lacks confidence in her skills. When she performed well on her high school examinations, other villagers commented with surprise. Her mother, however, has confidence in H.M.'s abilities. Her expectations of H.M. are realistic and congruent with H.M.'s accomplishments. But H.M. has lower aspirations than her age-mates. Her negotiating to transfer after 1 year of college allowed her another year of remaining in a supportive environment where she can remain passive. She negotiated to reside with her grandparents in a nearby town during this year. In this way she would become accustomed to residing away from her parents. The co-construction in this instance was between a passive daughter and an assertive mother. Although the mother expressed her disappointment, the daughter followed her chosen course.

Among many older women, there is bitterness that their education was interrupted for a prepubertal marriage; among younger women, that their education was interrupted for marriage after high school; among new brides, some complain that they should have finished college before marriage. Fathers take the responsibility for their daughters' marriages seriously and are not comfortable until all of their daughters are married. Some women vacillate on the issue of marriage versus an education for their daughters. Some women support their husbands, others express frustrated wishes for more education, and some encourage their daughters and nieces to obtain economic independence. None of the women support marriage immediately after graduation from high school. Ambivalence is expressed by encouraging grammar school girls to do their best in school. Unbridled assertion in grade school is tolerated by mothers who state, "All too soon our daughters will be tamed." By regarding education as the key to a daughter's education, these women are providing encouragement for an assertiveness which may be tamed by tact, but not by submissiveness. Through co-construction the ideal of the submissive woman is disappearing. Young women who are submissive are now the object of pity by older women; 20 years ago, a woman submissive to her elders was a positive example. Older women who were raised to be submissive accommodated to etiquette. Their support for their daughters' quest for education and their daughters' negotiating with fathers represents co-constructivist principles which older women unsuccessfully applied but remembered and used to guide younger women towards greater assertion.

The case studies illustrate co-construction in cultural change from 1964 to 1987. I have chosen education as an arena of change. In the area of education there has been general agreement about the value for both men and women. Village sentiment is that the changes have been for the benefit of the society.

CONCLUSION

The changes which have occurred among the Havik Brahmins in this South India village illustrate tension between a communally shared belief system of appropriate behavior and individual behavior. This tension and cognitive dissonance between infant and early childhood indulgence and expected adolescent passivity led to discontent, which made possible the increased assumption of authority. The relatively greater opportunity for male assertion created less dissatisfaction among men who already had assertive skills. In contrast, women who were expected to be more passive felt helpless in asserting their independence. At the same time women showed more resentment toward their expected role. Consequently, wives acted as brokers with their husbands and provided emotional support for daughters who wished greater economic independence. Indeed, women supported the younger generation of women in greater assertiveness.

The case studies of co-construction as a mechanism of cultural change in the arena of education shows the convergence of behavior and socialization for men and women. The principles for men and women differ. Men felt entitled to education; women initially did not. As a result, mothers encouraged daughters to achieve higher education. The additional support of older women implies the degree of co-constructivism is positively correlated with the divergence from the original cultural values. Co-construction has been an important mechanism in the cultural change from discouraging education to the current situation, in which academic excellence provides prestige to all the members of a joint family.

The co-construction illustrated among Havik Brahmins has broader implications for evolving cultural changes. Where members of the different generations express their ideas, dreams, and dissatisfaction with the status quo, co-construction can facilitate rapid cultural change. When there is a lack of communication, frustration increases and the status quo changes more slowly. As communication increases, the rate of change increases. Related to perceived increased communication is increased opportunity. The family relationships are closer. There is appreciation of the achievements of the younger generation as they experience increased options. The transition from primarily a society of ascribed status to one of achieved status has been a function of the accommodation of members of the culture to each other. In the past, when the society was dominated by religious principles, individuality had less value. Now the elders of the society are pleased with their decision to accommodate to their children. In turn, the children value the accommodation which elders have shown. Interactions among family members have become more spontaneous, as co-construction has been acknowledged.

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PART III

Co-Construction of Self in Adolescence

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

The co-constructionist perspective in developmental psychology is applicable to different facets of phenomena at different stages of human development. While in case of early childhood we could trace the external co-construction of novel conduct of interaction partners (see Part I of the present volume), if we then take a closer look at the developmental issues of adolescence we can find those mostly in the domain of intrapsychological construction of the self under pervasive canalization by the collective culture surrounding the person. The collective-cultural guidance of self development is encoded into the culturally organized environment that the child and adolescent encounters, and that leads to his or her subjective experiencing of these environments.

The particular life courses of persons through their childhoods can bring them into contact with more than one collective culture. The family of the child may live in different collective-cultural environments because of the parents' work assignments, or the multicultural perspective can be present constantly in the child's home environment if the parents come from different collective-cultural backgrounds. Chapter 7 (by Yasuko Minoura) is devoted to the analysis of the ways in which adolescents who are linked with multiple collective cultures utilize their experiences in constructing their personal selves. Contrary to the habitual emphasis on the need for single-cultural "personal identification," Minoura's research materials give evidence for creative combination of aspects of different background cultures in the adolescents' selves. This process of building one's personal culture at the crossroads of different collective cultures is not necessarily an easy and problem-free process for the young person. Indeed, it can bring the person anguish of "not belonging to any culture" that can lead to the creation of the notion of loneliness (or "rootlessness") as the meaningful organizer of one's self. However, that direction of personal self-construction is not mandatory in cases of adolescents of multicultural backgrounds. Equally possible are productive constructions of selves that integrate aspects of the collective-cultural backgrounds in the construction of personal culture. The young person can make use of both cultures in one's background, and to synthesize his or her own in a way that transcends both. Such a person becomes capable of feeling and thinking in different parallel ways and is hence ready to adapt to a wider variety of culturally organized life environments.

In Chapter 8, Rolf Oerter reports his first results from a comparative-cultural study of "implicit anthropology" (adolescents' and young adults' understanding of human nature) in three countries—Germany, the United States, and Indonesia. His main interest is in the emergence of dialectic understanding of the relationships between person and society. He demonstrates that some individual persons in each of the samples studied come to use the dialectical reasoning about human nature, even if the collective-cultural backgrounds of the samples differ substantially. It is only rarely that psychologists have tried to make sense of the dialectical reasoning processes of their subjects (e.g., Basseches, 1984, 1989; Buss, 1979; Riegel, 1973, 1975, 1979), although some of the presently famous classic authors of the past were adamant about the need to build developmental psychology around the concept of dialectical synthesis (Lev Vygotsky—see Van der Veer & Valsiner, 1991). The dialectical perspective is no mystical framework—it merely transcends the limitations of the classical logic and opens the door for careful investigation of the systemic nature of dynamic developmental processes. However, it is quite clear that any serious use of the dialectical perspective in developmental psychology requires a fundamental reorientation of its methodological traditions. Both Oerter's and Minoura's narrative data presentations constitute a starting point for that endeavor.

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CHAPTER 7

Culture and Self-concept Among Adolescents with Bicultural Parentage: A Social Constructionist Approach*

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Developmental psychology is now entering a postpositivist and possibly post-Piagetian stage. There has been a growing recognition that the contents of a culture that have been inculcated into the individual through socialization processes are deeply related to his or her cognitive, affective, and interpersonal functioning. The most important activity of socialization is the construction of meaning systems in the individual's mind. This study explores how adolescents, especially those of bicultural parentage, construct their psychological interior by incorporating various cultural meanings prevailing in their environment.

There are the three major socialization settings in which cultural meanings are transmitted to children: (a) the school setting, including its curriculum as well as relationships with peers and teachers; (b) the family; and (c) the society surrounding both the family and the school, such as mass media or the local atmosphere. Most studies on adolescence have been done in a setting where these three are within an identical cultural milieu, such that an adolescent whose parents are both Japanese attends a school where all instructions are given in Japanese by Japanese teachers; their peers are also Japanese. In such a setting cultural forces operating in the socialization process are difficult to discern, because they are of relatively the same tone; thus an influence from one source does not stand out for examination.

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In addition, most developmental researchers are concerned with children who grow up in a monocultural setting. In this setting researchers tend to fail to recognize the functions of a culture and its relations to self-concept. The cultural background of subjects has seldom been part of the research focus. Therefore, in order to study how adolescents construct meaning systems in their minds and what kind of cultural milieu affects such processes, it is strategically better to have, as a subject population, people who have been raised in two cultures. Adolescents with bicultural parentage, who have attended an international school, seem especially appropriate, since this context has potential relevance for a number of dimensions of social identity, including language, cultural affiliation by birth, and peers' and school's influences. This type of sample enables a researcher to examine how various cultural forces surrounding an adolescent are integrated into his or her psychological interior.

A THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

D'Andrade's conception of cultural meaning systems was employed to explicate the processes by which one constructs one's world of meanings. According to D'Andrade,

> Meanings in general, and cultural meaning systems in particular, do at least four different things. Meanings represent the world, create cultural entities, direct one to do certain things, and evoke certain feelings. These four functions of meaning—the *representational*, the *constructive*, the *directive*, and the *evocative*—are differentially elaborated in particular cultural meaning systems but are always present to some degree in any system. (1984, p. 96)

D'Andrade's four functions are the potentialities of a meaning system, which are to manifest themselves, under certain circumstances, as psychological functionings such as cognition, affect, motivation, or behavior. Many factors appear to influence the internalization processes that incorporate cultural meaning systems into the individual's psychobehavioral system. The representational, directive, and evocative functions correspond to different levels of experience the individual undergoes upon exposure to a particular cultural meaning system, while the constructive function refers to creation of cultural entities by the social agreement among more than two persons; it corresponds to the representational function at the individual level. This study attempts to understand the functions of a culture at the individual level using the cases of adolescents with bicultural parentage. As such, focuses are on how the representational, directive, and evocative functions of a meaning system are differentially manifested in the individual's psychological state.

The representational function D'Andrade postulates appears to be similar to Wallace's (1961) mazeway conception of a culture and to Goodenough's (1963) subjective culture. It refers to knowledge about what is out there and what can be done with it, such as how to use a public transportation system, or when and how much we can give a tip to a waiter at a restaurant. Such knowledge helps us to adapt to a certain cultural environment, since we can depend upon a cultural prescription without pondering on it. Thus, we can save psychological energy. However, cultural meanings in the interpersonal sphere have more than the representational function. How do the directive, and evocative functions emerge when it comes to dealing with interpersonal relations? In order to assess how a cultural meaning, once incorporated, operates, I examined (a) the cultural grammar of interpersonal relations which each subject subscribes to, and (b) the cultural identity one subjectively prefers to have as one's own. Friendship networks were considered to be related to behavioral manifestations of the directive and the evocative function.

In examining the processes in which my subjects construct their view of their own selves, Gergen's criticisms on traditional research on self-conception were taken into consideration. This study shares with Gergen and Gergen (1983) two guiding orientations: (a) the individual has capacity to shape actively the configuration of self-conception, and (b) the individual is seen as a historically emerging being.

METHODOLOGY

Subjects included 16 12th graders, 2 11th graders, and 1 graduate of the same international school. All were enrolled in this international school in Japan and, except for one, had one Japanese parent and one non-Japanese parent. The one exception has a German father and Thai mother. This case was included in order to obtain some insight into the construction processes of cultural identity in an environment where little cultural support was available for membership he aspired.

Semistructured interviewing was employed, with flexible changes in questions depending upon what a subject said, in order to explore the content of their self-concept and its relationship with language competence, friendship networks, and cognizance of one's own social position such as citizenship, minority status in a host society, and future plans (see Appendix for an interview schedule). My role as an interviewer was to lead a subject to the examination of his or her inner states of mind. After collecting data I made systematic inferences about the psychological interior from what the subject said. Although the main corpus of data came from 40 minutes of individual interviews, it is supplemented by observation in naturalistic settings such as classrooms and the cafeteria. Special care was given to examine where they felt most comfortable and with whom they tended to make friends. Subjects' descriptive characteristics are shown in Table 1. Data were collected from the 12th and 11th graders who have been in Japan for more than 1 year, regardless of cultural backgrounds of their parents, but this essay focuses only on those cases with bicultural parentage.

The school which the subjects of this study attend is called an "international school," but in terms of curriculum, teachers' educational background, and the number of students who go to university in the United States after graduation, its character is North American. However, cultural influence imposed upon the subjects varied, depending upon the cultural background of the non-Japanese parent. Therefore, it is hypothesized that, if a student's non-Japanese parent is American, the incorporation of an American meaning system will be facilitated as much as that of the Japanese meaning system, since the combined influence of an American parent and an American-style school is counterbalanced by the Japanese parent's influence, along with that of the host Japanese society. If a student's parent holds citizenship other than that of the United States, Japanese culture will be incorporated more in his or her self-concept, since the influence of the Japanese parent is reinforced by the host Japanese society, while non-

Table 1. Descriptive characteristics of subjects

ID	citizen-ship	sex	school	culture		oriental appear.	taught J.C.	proficiency in Japanese
				Fa	Mo			
Flora	US	f	US	US	J	yes	yes	Δ
Haruko	US,J	f	BA only	J	US	yes	no	O
Jane	US	f	US	US	J	no	no	O
Gregory	US	m	BA only	US	J	no	yes	O
S5	US,J	f	J	J	US	yes	yes	O
S6	US,J	f	J + US	US	J	no	yes	O
S7	US	m	Int'l + US	G	J	no	no	O
Maggie	J	f	BA only	Is	J	no	no	O
Christy	triple	f	BA only	Du	J	no	no	O
Tina	Italian	f	Int'l	Ita	J	yes	no	O
Yoko	Korean	f	Int'l	K	J	yes	no	O
Nancy	German	f	Int'l	G	J	no	no	O
S13	Swede	f	Int'l	Sw	J	no	no	O
S14	J	f	Aust.	Ca	J	yes	no	O
S15	J	m	UK	Ind	J	Indian	no	O
S16	Taiwan	f	Taiwan	Ch	J	yes	yes	Δ
S17	K	m	BA only	Br	J	yes	no	O
Jean	J	f	BA only	Br	J	yes	no	O
Ken	US,Ger	m	Int'l	G	Thai	no	no	×

J:Japan K:Korean Br:British G:German Du:Dutch Is:Israel Sw:Swedish Ca:Canadian
O:good Δ:fair ×:poor Fa:Father Mo:Mother
taught J.C.: being taught Japanese language and/or Japanese culture
School: School attended prior BA Int'l School, where this study was done; Int'l means they attended international schools other than BA before transfer to BA International School.

Japanese parent's influence is left alone, without any support from the environment.

RESULTS

Adolescents with American-Japanese Parentage

"Japanese" is the culture of the host society, while "American" is the culture of the school. What kind of cultural meanings has a child incorporated in this setting? Two illustrative cases follow on the representational and the directive function.

Haruko, whose father is Japanese and mother is Japanese-American, was born in Osaka and continued to live in Japan except every summer, which was spent in Hawaii with the mother's grandmother. She said, "A lot of my feelings are Japanese-like. I feel like that you can't tell, 'be honest,' *honne*. What is shown to other people is your *tatemae*. In that sense I'm really Japanese. My mom is just like an American. She says what she wants. *Honne, tatemae, awaseru* are a part of me, a part of my life. I never get rid of it."

Jane's psychocultural world is a little different from Haruko's. Jane was born in Japan and entered a nursery attached to an international school without knowing how to speak English. At the age of 9 her father decided to move to Florida in order to get children acquainted with American culture. While in Florida for 7 years she used to be taken as an Italian or Spanish person, occasionally as a Hawaiian. She forgot almost everything about Japan. She enrolled again in the 11th grade of the international school when her family returned to Japan. At this point her parents got a divorce. Her brother went back to Florida with her father, who was not so happy with life in Japan, while Jane stayed with her mother, who ran what Jane calls "an esthetic salon" (beauty parlor). The interview with her was carried out in English, though I was not aware of the fact that she is half-Japanese until being told so.

"Most friends that I have are Japanese or Americans who have lived in Japan for a long while, like Gregory. Sometimes they can't understand what I said, even though they can speak English." Such a communication gap, which Jane felt between her and those who have attended this international school from the first grade and who have never been abroad, was widely shared by Americans who happened to be a student of this international school. For example, Lily, an American, who came to Japan at the beginning of the 11th grade as a consequence of her father's job transfer, said, "I don't know so much difference in their way of behavior as communication. I think it's hard to go out and talk with someone who doesn't know slang. It's really a communication gap. I can really never discuss a hard issue. My friend, Sophia, is half American and half Japanese, but she is totally American. She can understand what I'm talking." Judging from these comments, there exists an invisible dividing line between long-timers and new arrivals from the States, which is not accounted for by language competence. To understand English does not necessarily mean to understand meanings it intends to convey, when people do not share the same system of cultural meanings.

When asked how Japanese are different from Americans, Jane said, "American characteristics are, even if you hurt the other person, you do it because you want to be honest. Japanese keep it inside. Japanese people say what others want to hear." In reply to a question whether she said something that was not true to avoid hurting another's feelings, she said, "I do sometimes, but being honest is better. However, it depends upon whom you are talking to."

These two cases illustrate psychological processes corresponding with the directive and the representational function of a cultural meaning. The cultural meaning both refer to is the twofold structure of Japanese consciousness which was explicated by Doi (1971): an external face which is to be shown to others (*tatemae*), and the true feelings that are generally concealed (*honne*). Haruko's case indicates that the cultural meaning system particular to Japanese interpersonal relationships was incorporated into her mind to the degree that directed her to behave in a Japanese way even when no Japanese was present.

Compared to Haruko, Jane's induction of Japanese meaning systems is somewhat ambivalent. She is well aware of the twofold structure of Japanese consciousness and can interpret her friends' behavior accordingly, i.e., Japanese meaning systems in Jane's mind operate through the representational function. However, when it comes to acting like a Japanese, she can't help having some reservations, saying, "Well, it's better to be honest." Her classmate's comment about her as more American in terms of her frank expression of herself confirms this. She has learned about and understands the Japanese meaning system and believes it to be good. This means that, for her, the Japanese meaning system has functioned at the representational level, but not fully at the directive level.

Social identity preferred. Both Haruko and Jane chose to go to an American university. When asked, "What will you miss most when you leave Japan for the United States after graduation?" Haruko said, "Kobe is my home. I don't consider the States my home, but it's not a foreign country. This time I have to leave home for good, leaving my life behind. I might not come back here any more; so different a feeling." The mother's influence is strong enough to make her feel that the United States is not a foreign country. Although acknowledgment of this appears to act on her cognition about the United States, despite her double citizenship, in terms of the actual behavioral environment she is most comfortable in one filled with Japanese cultural meaning. Gregory, who describes his Japanese mother as a *kyouiku mama* (mother who has intense concern with her child's school performance) and his America father as a workaholic, is very similar to Haruko in his cultural identity. Gregory is taken as "some sort of Japanese" by one of his classmates newly arrived from the States, because of his strong association with Japanese students. There is a possibility that American elements may loom large in Haruko's and Gregory's self-concept, while they are in an American university.

Jane exhibited a different type of self-definition. Being asked "Do you identify yourself more with American or more Japanese?" she answered:

> I like to think of neither. Here I am. I have one parent Japanese, one parent American. I don't have to be either this or that one. I do have my pride in both, though English is my language. It doesn't matter which one I belong. I'm very individual, independent person. In that way, I'm American. That's also because of me. I have a lot of respect for my family. I have that part of Japanese culture. I really really appreciate a Japanese sense of family. That makes me so secure. The word "half" doesn't sound very nice. I just consider myself me. I don't mean to say which part of me is Japanese, which part of me is America.

Another case, Flora, illustrates the psychological outcomes of the evocative function of Japanese cultural meaning system. Before coming to Japan, Flora lived in Los Angeles for her whole life (13 years). Her father's job brought her to Japan despite her unwillingness. Her father, a Japanese-America, graduated from a Catholic international school in Japan, married a Japanese woman he met in Hawaii, and tried to get a job in Japan for a long while. Flora said, "My father's dream was to have his daughter being raised in Japan to know what Japanese culture is like. In addition to a Japanese language school, my parents had me take lessons such as *soroban*, Japanese dance, *nagauta* (Japanese classic song), and tea ceremony, while in California."

For the first 2 months in Japan, Flora refused to speak the Japanese language, because, she felt, she was American and resented that people outside looked at her as Japanese because she looked Japanese. In a year or so, she came to realize that she had to learn the language if she lived in Japan. As she interacted more with her mother's relatives, gradually she became able to accept Japanese ways, partially because she had to, partially because she wanted to. She made conscious efforts to find out something positive about Japan and to become accustomed to Japanese ways. At first the Japanese way of gift giving was very peculiar to her, in that people said, "Here is something trivial, please accept," no matter how much it cost. When asked, "Does the Japanese style of communication naturally come to you?" She said, "It's natural now, but sometimes I wonder why I'm doing this, why I'm saying that."

Under strong parental pressure, Flora has been transforming herself from American to Japanese. After 3 years in Japan, she has been able to acquire a good cognitive map of Japanese ways and to behave accordingly, but sometimes her feelings do not go along with her behavior. This is in marked contrast with Haruko, who has never experienced such a detached feeling towards her own behavior directed by Japanese cultural norms. Haruko, who has lived in Japan for all her life, incorporated Japanese meaning systems both at the behavioral and at the affective level on the extent and depth which become inseparable from her self-concept, while Flora, who came to Japan at the age of 13 (as she was becoming an American), could incorporate the Japanese way only on the cognitive and behavioral level, but not on the affective level. It has not yet struck its root in her self-concept. In other words, for Flora Japanese cultural meaning system has not yet fully acquired the evocative function.

Adolescents with Bicultural Parentage Other than American-Japanese

Eleven cases in this category have Japanese mothers, while the father's nationality is German, Italian, Swedish, Israeli, Australian, Indian, Korean, or Taiwanese. The fathers, with two exceptions, are fluent Japanese speakers and run businesses in Japan. Four of these students have attended schools outside Japan. Seven had all their education in international schools in Japan, in a school culture which is different from that of both of their parents. Three cases will be presented first, and then analyzed in terms of the psychological consequences of the parental culture.

Maggie has an Israeli father and a Japanese mother. She has never lived outside Japan. She has not yet visited her father's land. Although her father's native tongue is Arabic, he has always used Japanese with his wife and English with his son, who is 6 years older than Maggie. Her mother, who cannot speak English, cooks always in the Japanese style and creates a Japanese atmosphere in her family.

Despite her bilingual home and school environments, Maggie is much more comfortable with Japanese when it comes to expressing her feelings. However, she has difficulties in reading Japanese newspapers, because she cannot read *kanji* (Chinese characters). As to writing and reading, English is her dominant language, though she suffers from a feeling of insufficiency with it. Most of her friends, both at school and outside, are Japanese who have never lived in foreign countries. She plans to go to study music in the States, but wants to come back to Japan to live.

She said,

> I don't look like a Japanese and I take it granted to be called foreigner, but what I have in my head is all Japanese, the way I think or behave. I am more comfortable with my boyfriend taking a lead; I tend to retreat a step back in order to *tateru* (make him look good and manly by letting him take an initiative), just like many Japanese girls. I also consider I, as a female, I have *nigemichi* (an alternative or excuse for not trying hard) like getting married. I switched my citizenship from Israeli to Japanese when Japanese law was amended to allow me to adopt mother's citizenship. I did this from my own will, since I wanted to visit China in future. As far as I hold a Israeli citizenship, I am not allowed to enter China. But this does not mean to negate my father's cultural heritage. I really hate to be called "half." Instead I prefer being considered "double." I don't know much about Israel, but I can't forget the half of me which is related to Israel.

Maggie lives in a world constituted by the Japanese meaning system, which she acknowledges. In this sense, Japanese culture functions at all four levels of D'Andrade's definition. The American meaning systems prevailing among her teachers and her classmates from the States appears not to affect her much. The host culture in general, along with the influence from her mother, appear to have had more impact upon her than the school's North American culture.

Christy was born in Melbourne to a Dutch father and a Japanese mother. She thus holds triple citizenship: Australian, Dutch, and Japanese. Her family came back to Japan when she was still a baby. She has never visited her father's land and cannot speak any Dutch. Her parents sent her to an international school in order to maintain close communication with her father, who couldn't speak Japanese well, and to avoid being bullied at a Japanese school because of being mixed-blooded.

Christy feels good about her nonoriental looks, which prevent her from being treated as Japanese. She prefers being treated as a "foreigner." Though she is interested in finding out what is good about Japan, she has never wanted to become a full-fledged Japanese. She said, "'being a half' or 'being a foreigner' allows me to have *nigemichi* (an excuse) for not acting like Japanese; even if I cannot write Japanese well, I am excused if I said I'm a half." According to her teachers' evaluation, her level of English is miserably low despite having attended an English-medium school for 12 years. Although she has lived most of her life in Japan and her mother is Japanese, she acknowledged that she doesn't know much about things in Japan. She has difficulties in understanding Japanese TV news, for example. She appears to be really "half" in her attainment both in Japanese and English.

Tina, with an Italian father and a Japanese mother, has never been to Italy (despite her Italian citizenship) and has an identity similar to Christy's. Tina, though, resents being treated as Japanese because of her oriental appearance. She added, "I'm a half, but when I am in a foreign country, I would like to be proud of being Japanese. While in Japan, I wanted to be looked at as a non-Japanese, because everybody regards a half positively here."

Yoko was born in Kobe, to a Japanese-born Korean father and a Japanese mother. Her parents sent their three older daughters to an international school in order to avoid discrimination against Koreans in a Japanese school. Although Yoko had her all education in two international schools from kindergarten on, she is more comfortable with expressing her feelings in Japanese than in English. However, her reading and writing ability in Japanese is not as good as her English. In terms of her manner of behavior she is quite Americanized. Her best friend is Nancy, who has a Japanese mother and a German father. They have been classmates since kindergarten. Her boyfriend is a newly arrived American. She does not like to belong to either the "Japanese" or the "American" clique.

After she went to Korea for a basketball tournament of international schools in Asia, she became conscious of having Korean citizenship. Being asked questions in Korean by an immigration officer, she suddenly realized that, despite her passport, she could not speak any Korean and did not know much about her Korean tradition. Before this incident, her Korean passport did not mean anything to her, but now she is conscious of it and has become proud of it. She decided to wear *chogori* (traditional Korean dress) for her graduation ceremony. Under the amended Japanese citizenship law she can adopt her mother's Japanese nationality if she wishes, but she has no intention of doing so.

Mediating or passing? Confronting two cultural forces, one from the father's and the other from the mother's, Maggie has strived to be "double" by making conscious efforts to integrate the cultures of both parents into her self-concept. Christy, on the other hand, has tried to magnify her foreignness by negating a part of her Japanese background and passing as a foreigner. However, her foreignness does not have much cultural basis, except the fact that she attends the international school. Yoko does not have any physical sign of foreignness like Christy. Being marginal to both Japanese and Korean traditions, therefore, she appears to seek the basis of her identity in being a student of an international school, which probably has facilitated her Americanization. In a sense, Yoko could pass as a "foreigner" in Japan by virtue of being a fluent English speaker. Maggie's way of handling her double cultural heritage is close to the concepts of "mediating," while Christy's and Yoko's way is close to "passing." Both concepts are discussed by Bochner and Furnham (1986). Yoko's recent realization of her Korean heritage may be affected by the consciousness-raising movement among Japanese-born Koreans in the 1980s and may enable her to integrate her double heritage as Maggie did.

What will happen to these people after high school? One possible path was indicated by Jean, a 24-year-old graduate of the same school. Jean, with a three-fourths British father and a Japanese mother, who looked back upon her days at school and upon university life in the States, saying,

> When I was here, I wanted to become so much a part of the American way or European way, and resented my Japanese appearance, thinking that they are lucky. However, I changed myself while I was in the States, where there is so much interest in Japan now. I became able to appreciate my being bilingual and bicultural. Now, though I have a British surname, I'm Japanese, as my passport indicates.

For Yoko, being addressed in Korean was a fortunate trigger for her to review seriously the neglected half of herself. She may be able to reorganize her self-definition as successfully as Jean did.

A Case of Boy with German Father and Thai Mother

So far we have discussed cases in which at least one of parents' cultural background is congruent with the host Japanese society. In this section I would like to turn my attention to a rather rare case, a mixed-blooded boy whose parental cultural backgrounds are congruent with neither school culture nor the host society. This case illustrates how a boy constructs his cultural identity in a series of environments through his formative years where little social support is available for cultural identity he aspired to.

By being born in New York, Ken acquired U.S. citizenship, while his father holds German and mother holds Thai citizenship. Both parents were working in New York and communicated with each other in English at the time of his birth. Because of his father's job transfer, Ken's family moved to Bahama when he was 3 years old and stayed there until he was 10. His parents chose to educate Ken in English and to raise him as an American, so they sent him to the best private school, which had adopted the British system. The student body of this school consists of many nationalities; thus, Ken had relatively little exposure to the so-called "American way." His parents did not try to teach him either German or Thai.

Another job transfer of his father brought Ken to New Delhi, and then, in 1984, to Kobe in Japan. While in India, Ken attended for 5 years American Embassy School, which consisted of about 50 nationalities, with Americans being dominant. He made two brief visits to the United States, although neither relatives nor friends were there. He said, "While in India, I had a sort of identity crisis; some years I did not feel like American, didn't feel a part of any nationality, didn't have any standard. English is only language I can speak fluently, but I felt like homeless." By coming to Japan and entering the international school where this study was carried out, he became able again to feel American. Asked about the source of his American identity, he paused for a while and then said,

> America is one of a few countries in which any one can feel like American, if he has American citizenship. I don't look German, don't look Thai, but in the United States it doesn't matter. While in India, I was occasionally taken for Chinese by Chinese people. Culturally speaking, I'm American, but it is not so important. It's just one part of me. It doesn't identify me; it doesn't mean I'm patriotic toward America. I feel patriotic towards countries where I live.

To the question of which side he supported in an international basketball game between Japan and the United States, he said, "Maybe the U.S.," but continued that he does not prefer one over the other. When asked where he would feel most comfortable, he said, "That's the most interesting question. I feel at home in Japan as well as in the U.S. I am going to an American university, because I plan to live there, but not for the rest of my life. I like more living in the third world, because I like to be a foreigner."

DISCUSSION

The individual's identification with a special group is central to the process of self-definition. Tajfel (1981, p. 255) defines *social identity* as "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership." Social identity is, therefore, as Hogan and Cheek (1983) point out, a function of having a particular status in one's group. Cultural identity is a part of social identity, and it is derived from the awareness of belonging to a certain cultural group by birth, upbringing, or choice.

The cases so far discussed indicate that there are dual processes underlying the development of cultural identity: (a) identity derived from the psychobehavioral system one has internalized as a guiding pattern for behavior in the process of socialization; and (b) identity derived from one's conscious choice of a cultural group in which one aspires to membership. The latter aspect of identity fluctuates as the social or life situation changes. For example, Jean, as a high school student, wished to identify herself with American way, then a dominant culture of her school, but after she had learned about America's interest in Japan while she was in an American university, she became able to take a pride in her Japanese passport. Christy and Tina have tried to emphasize their foreignness when constructing their self-image, because they perceive that Japanese people regard Caucasian looks highly. Moreover, Tina confessed that she wanted to be Japanese when abroad, while in Japan she preferred belonging to a category of foreigner. Adolescents with bicultural parentage have an alternative to choose either of their parental cultures as their preferred one, if they are not in pursuit of integration of both sides. These cases indicate that the construction process of cultural identity is limited by, as well as fitted to, the sociohistorical moment in which an individual lives.

Ken's case is also illustrative in terms of conscious construction of cultural identity. He chooses to be "American," which is related to neither of his parents' cultural backgrounds. His German father and Thai mother choose to raise their son as American and consistently send him to schools where English is a medium of instruction, instead of teaching him German or Thai. Thanks to this parental choice, Ken is able to actively construct an American configuration of self-conception, even if he has grown up outside the United States since age 3. Taking into consideration the fact that Ken has been outside the States for most of his life and that he is 16 years old (he skipped his grade two times), it is difficult for me to discern whether he should be regarded as fully American in terms of D'Andrade's directive and evocative functions. Judging from what he said, there is a good possibility that inner feelings about his being an American may not be established, and that he may remain as a foreigner even after he graduates from an American university. This leads us to the following discussions on a part of cultural identity derived from the psychobehavioral system.

Prior to the conscious construction of one's cultural identity, there is the internalization process of meaning systems prevailing in socialization environments. Different from the conscious construction, this internalization process takes place without conscious effort within the limits set by sequences of human development (Minoura, 1979), and, once internalized, meaning systems govern daily life. This is another powerful source of cultural identity. In the case of those who are raised in a monocultural setting, D'Andrade's three functions of cultural meanings work in an integrated manner. However, those who move to a different culture in the middle of their formative years tend to experience discrepancies either between the directive and the evocative or between the representational and the directive, as illustrated by Jean's and Flora's cases. Jane and Flora, who transferred themselves from the United States to Japan during their high school days, have not yet acquired proficiency in spoken Japanese and have ambivalence towards Japanese system of cultural meanings. That is, for them Japanese cultural meaning has not yet been inculcated enough to exert the directive and evocative functions fully, but it has a partial, but significant, influence on their lives. The process and chronology by which children acquire culture-specific meaning systems at the interface of two cultures have been studied. It was found that the period from age 9 to 14 or 15 was sensitive for the incorporation of cultural meaning systems (Minoura, 1979, 1988).

In the cases of individuals who are raised in monocultural setting, the two processes mentioned above are almost identical and go hand in hand. Therefore, the dual processes of identity formation have remained unnoticed. The cases of adolescents with bicultural parentage offer an invaluable opportunity to lay open each of the two processes in bold relief for close examination. In an effort to disentangle the complicated, sometimes incongruent, processes of identity formation among adolescents with bicultural parentage, it helps to know when and how the individual comes to hold the authentic beliefs about himself or herself in relation to a culture. One's cultural identity acquires authenticity through reorganization processes during adolescence, when conscious commitment to certain cultural groups is made. The development of cultural identity depends upon the two-step processes: the first step is related to the incorporation of cultural meanings into one's psychobehavioral system and the second step is the conscious construction of one's self-image.

In order to understand these processes of cultural identity formation, Ebuchi's (1984) study on ethnicity of third generation Japanese-Americans is helpful, although, unlike his subjects, my subjects were exposed to more than two different cultures simultaneously (two at home, and more than one at school). As he proposes, there are two kinds of Japanese culture among Japanese-Americans: one is an "expressive culture" represented by such things as arts, rituals, citizenship, and other symbolic elements; the other is an "instrumental culture," which governs daily life. Self-definition as a *sansei* (third generation Japanese-Americans) is based on the former, but Japanese culture in the latter sense is at a minimum and does not constitute a psychobehavioral system. For this *sansei* depend on America (Ebuchi, 1981). *Sansei* adopted the American way as their psychobehavioral system; they are culturally American in all four functions of D'Andrade definition.

Now let us examine the impact of differing parental cultures upon a person's cultural identity. It was revealed that, despite the American influence of one parent, frequent visits to the States, and an American-oriented school curriculum, the host Japanese culture that is shared by the other parent is incorporated more into children's minds as a psychobehavioral system if young people spent most of their formative years in Japan. This is even more true in the cases of those neither of whose parents are American. As seen in the cases of Maggie, Christy, and Yoko, their father's culture does not provide them with a meaning system they can live by. It does not function as an effective psychobehavioral system at all. It exists in the imagination and remains as a symbol, something which explains why they are different from other Japanese. The symbols, however, once incorporated into one's self, motivate one to act for them.

In the cases of Maggie, Christy, and Yoko, their father's cultures, which are neither American nor Japanese, appear not to function as the instrumental culture. Nevertheless, children disclosed their interest in the cultural heritage of their father in one way or another. The culture that does not constitute the individual's psychobehavioral system can be termed more aptly the "symbolic" rather than the "expressive" culture.

Christy's and Yoko's cases reveal that knowledge of one's citizenship is not necessarily accompanied by emotional significance. The gap between the cognitive and the affective content of one's cultural identity has not been noticed by psychologists who have studied adolescents raised in a monocultural setting, since cognition is always present together with affect. It is at the time of reorganization during adolescence that knowledge of one's membership of a particular cultural group acquires significance. During high school days, the weaker side of parental culture appears to loom larger and to start affecting the reorganization processes of one's cultural identity. Before that stage, cultural identity appears to have not yet been consolidated, since it is based only on one's "instrumental culture." In the case of children who have one parent's culture congruent with that of the school's, that parent's culture tends to be incorporated into the psychobehavioral system as a part of instrumental culture. However, when one parent is either Japanese or American and the other is neither Japanese nor American, this fact becomes a salient element in the process of self-definition as the children reach adolescence. In the case of Yoko, her daily behavior is dictated by instrumental culture provided by the school setting, while her symbolic culture (such as Korean citizenship), which she perceived as possessing a somewhat negative connotation in the context of the host Japanese society until her recent realization of her cultural root, exists as something outside her psychobehavioral system.

It is also found that an oral proficiency in Japanese bears a decisive role in the acquisition of cultural meanings governing interpersonal behavior, since these are transmitted through interactions with people who adhere to them. Another reason why children with one Japanese parent and the other not have incorporated Japanese meanings more than American ones probably lies in their friendship network with Japanese-speaking "intensive students" (students who are admitted to a special program after graduating from a Japanese junior high school, enrolling in the 9th grade of the international school after 6 month's intensive English learning). It is recognized that there are two types of network among students: a Japanese speakers' network surrounding intensive students, and an English speakers' network consisting of those who had their schooling exclusively in the States before coming to this school. The subjects of this chapter tended to flock together with Japanese speakers and seldom intermingle with "Americans," even though they were fluent speakers of English. This helps adolescents with bicultural parentage to adopt a Japanese psychobehavioral system as their instrumental culture. Ken was not included in Japanese speakers' network, and attached himself more or less to English speakers; this exposure to the American way may help him to identify himself as an American.

In the school my subjects attend, there is no normative self-structure reflecting the values and goals of one specific culture (at least not in the traditional sense of culture as homogeneous, e.g., "the Japanese" or "the American" culture). No matter how American oriented it is, an international school outside the States tends to develop a culture different from that of American schools. An international school with a student population of diverse cultural backgrounds thus offers a unique socialization environment in which cultural forces operate that are sometimes incongruent or contradict those of the family as well as those of the host society. Those with bicultural parentage thus cope more easily with schooling in such a setting than they would in Japanese school in which the definite normative self-structure exists. Acceptance of diversity in value orientations characterizes the culture of this school (Willis, 1986). This, in turn, helps all students broaden their points of view and have a better way of thinking and an open mind toward how other people think. However, the impact of living in a foreign country during adolescence upon cultural identity calls for further study.

CONCLUSIONS

Intensive studies of cases critical to help our understanding of relationships between the functions of culture and an individual's psychology revealed the following:

1. There are the two types of culture which may affect adolescents' cultural identity: instrumental culture, which provides the individual with cultural

prescriptions for behavior and for effect; and symbolic culture, which provides symbols related to a social group. When a culture exerts all three functions—the representational, the directive, and the evocative—it will become the instrumental culture of that individual. Japanese culture derived from one parent, together with the influence of the host society in general, constitutes the major basis for the instrumental culture of children with bicultural parentage, except for those who spent their formative years in a culture other than Japan.

2. The self-concept may be regarded as consisting of a personal self and of a social self. The latter is the basis of one's cultural identity. This study reveals two distinctive sources of cultural identity that may alter the nature of the individual's identification with social groups: the instrumental culture, for which most subjects in this study depend on Japan; and the symbolic culture, activation of which may depend upon situational factors during adolescence—e.g., the father's culture sometimes plays the role of a symbolic culture. The former constitutes one's psychobehavioral system. These two cultures are identical for adolescents raised in a monocultural setting, so no dissociation is observed. However, in the cases of adolescents with bicultural parentage, integration of the two cultures becomes an important developmental task during adolescence.
3. Awareness during adolescence of citizenship or minority status in a host society starts to affect one's cultural identity and one's prospects for future life. The aspects of a host culture one has incorporated before adolescence into one's self-concept appear to be seriously reviewed and reorganized from a new perspective. This reorganization during adolescence stabilizes the self-concept, at least for those adolescents who try to mediate their double cultural heritage. A multicultural setting, like this international school, appears to facilitate this processes.

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APPENDIX: AN INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

(Life History and Cultural Background)

1. Where were you born?
2. When did you come to Japan? What brought you to Japan?
3. How did you feel when you've learned that your family was moving to Japan?
4. What passport do you have? Do you have more than one passport?
5. Where have you lived? Would you list places and length of stay for each place?
6. Where do you feel most at home? Why?
7. How many languages can you speak?
8. Which language do you speak with your father, mother, sibling, respectively?
9. Have you studied any Japanese before coming to Japan?
10. Have you ever attended a Japanese kindergarten or elementary school?
11. Which language is most comfortable when it comes to express your feelings?

(Acculturation in Life Style)

1. What kind of food do you eat often?
2. What food do you like? Do you like *anko*, or *konnyaku*?
3. Do you wear shoes inside your home? Or slippers?
4. In your home, do you have a Japanese-style room?
5. Does your father or mother read Japanese newspaper?
6. Have you ever stayed with a Japanese family?
7. Do you watch Japanese TV?
   What kinds of program do you watch most?
8. Do you read any newspaper? In English or in Japanese?
9. Do you read comic books? In English or in Japanese?
10. What VTR programs (in English or Japanese) do you watch most?
11. Have any Japanese guests visited your home?

(Social Network outside the School and Self-Concept)

1. Have you ever done part-time work? Could you explain about it?
2. How do you spend your weekends?
3. Have you ever join any kind of clubs outside the school?
4. Do you have Japanese friends outside BA?
   When and how did you get to be friends?
5. What do you do together? What language do you use?
6. Could you tell me differences you feel between Japanese friends and your BA friends (your friends in BA or your friends at your hometown)?
7. Whom you are most comfortable with?
8. Have you experienced discrimination in Japan?

9. Could you talk about things that you find most satisfying in Japan?
10. What do you do after graduating from this high school?
11. What will you miss most when you leave Japan?
12. What is your plan after completing university education?
13. Could you tell me the most pleasant experience you had since you came to Japan?
14. Could you tell me the most disgusting experience you had since you came to Japan?

(For Sojourners)

1. What has been the most significant problem in your adjustment to life in Japan?
2. What sort of frustrations have you had so far in Japan?

(For Long-term Residents)

1. What are the most significant problems in your adjustment to life in your country of citizenship?
2. What sort of frustrations will you have when you go back to your country?

(For Those with Bicultural Parentage)

1. Do you identify yourself more with American or Japanese (Change depending upon parent's cultural background)
2. Is Japan your home?

CHAPTER 8

Persons' Conception of Human Nature: A Cross-Cultural Comparison*

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INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of the study to be presented here is to attain a broader and more systematic approach to the conception of human nature. Both developmental and cross-cultural perspectives are interlinked in order to reach an integration of hitherto unconnected research fields that seem to belong together (Valsiner, 1987).

In his article about the self system, Bandura (1978) emphasizes the role of conceptions of human nature underlying psychological theories. He states that the interest in those conceptions

> stems in part from growing recognition of how such conceptions delimit research to selected processes and are in turn shaped by findings of paradigms embodying the particular view. As psychological knowledge is converted to behavioral technologies, the models of human behavior on which research is premised have important social as well as theoretical implications (p. 344).

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Baumeister (1986) describes the historical development of identity through an integrative analysis of the work of historians, sociologists, and literary critics. He demonstrates how the individual identity is determined by the historical situation of society and culture, and vice versa, how society is changed by the changing conception of identity. Attempts to order different views about the conceptions of human nature were undertaken by Wrightsman (1974), Coan (1979), Epstein (1973), and Hjelle and Ziegler (1976).

Within the framework of psychological theories the concept of human being can be related to approaches of social cognition. Single competences like moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969), perspective taking (Selman, 1980) and conceptualization of friendship are determined by the frame of an implicit anthropology, which in turn develops to a higher complexity and a hierarchical level through the combination of partial competences of social cognition. This mutual influence between anthropology and social-cognitive competences leads to a structure in which every element is related to a general understanding/construction of human being.

There exist already a remarkable number of studies about naive conceptions of self and identity. Damon and Hart (1982) described the development of self-understanding from infancy through adolescence. Keller, Ford, and Meacham (1978) found several dimensions of self-concept in preschool children. Livesley and Bromley (1973) and Montemayor and Eisen (1977) presented profound studies of person perception and self-conceptions in childhood and adolescence. A recent study about the conception of human nature was conducted by Eder (1989).

The study of the concept of human being within different cultures raises the question of how to measure characteristics and/or structural aspects of this construct. Two aspects have to be taken into consideration. The first one concerns the theoretical status of the construct; the second one deals with the cultural appropriateness of the method.

Let us now deal with the first aspect. The concept of human being can be conceived as a holistic structure which consists of many components. Such a structure will contain essential features of the cultural knowledge about human beings and of the cultural norms of human behavior. The structure also contains idiosyncratic elements forming it into a unique unexchangeable entity. The latter characteristic stems from the personal experience of the individual as well as from the influence of individual temperament (Thomas, 1928). Since the whole structure is a result of the constructive activity of the individual, it is also determined by the cognitive competence of the individual.

The comparison with Piaget's (1977) and Kohlberg's (1969) approach shows both similarities and differences. There is congruence with these approaches with regard to the assumption of formalism. A structure must be described by formal logical characteristics. This implies that the same formal structure may exist across a great variety of contents, for example, values, orientations, knowledge. The formal characteristics of the structure allow for the comparison of different individuals, subgroups, and cultural groups, since they serve as *tertium comparationis*.

On the basis of structural equality, differences in values, behavior, and psychological traits can be better described. There is still another advantage of the structural approach which is well known through Piaget's work. Developmental differences with regard to the concept of human being (implicit anthropology) can be conceived as structural differences. Development as structural change means that there are qualitative changes, not only quantitative ones.

The main difference from Piaget's and Kohlberg's approach lies in the assumption that the structural stages are a combination between knowledge structure and formal logical structure. At every stage elements of knowledge are necessary in order to construct the stage. The higher the stage, the more fields of knowledge are included in the construction of the stage.

In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that different structural levels of conceptualization of human being can be discerned which show the integration of knowledge into the logical structure of the conception.

Methodological Considerations

The choice of a structural approach has a substantial impact on the selection of methods of measurement. Thus, it is difficult, if not impossible, to use a questionnaire with prefixed items. Instead, methods have to be chosen which stimulate the individual to use his or her conception of human being. Two main possibilities were chosen in order to reach this aim. The first possibility is to conduct an interview about the nature of human being in which the subject can describe his or her view of humans (a more detailed description see below). A second method consists in confronting the subject with a problem-solving task. Such a task can be a social or psychological dilemma similar to those used by Kohlberg. In both cases the individual is stimulated to elaborate on his or her knowledge and its formal logical order, and to apply the developed structure to the given task.

Of course, cross-cultural comparison also has an impact on methods of measurement. Within Western cultures, one may assume that the same methods can be used unless the translation problem cannot be solved sufficiently (see Triandis & Brislin, 1984). The use of dilemmas, however, needs a more careful examination. A story containing a dilemma is maybe perceived differently within two cultures that might seem rather similar, like Germany and the United States. Therefore, one has to check how subjects understand the presented dilemma before it is used for the main study. If we move to a remarkably different culture, like Indonesia, we first must insure that the individuals are familiar with the method we want to apply. Familiarity means that subjects have an opportunity to use procedures in everyday life equal or similar to those of the method of measurement. If, for example, people in Indonesia are not confronted with dilemmas presented in a narrative way, this method would be inappropriate. The use of the same method does not per se guarantee the equivalence of measurement even if the issues of meaning (e.g., same concept, different meaning) and translation are treated very carefully.

METHOD

Three procedures were used for measuring of the concept of human being (i.e., implicit anthropology): a focused interview about adulthood, dilemma stories followed by a focused interview (Merton & Kendall, 1946), and statements which had to be evaluated by the subject according to several aspects.

1. Interview about adulthood. The semistructured interview is divided into four main parts. In the first part, general questions about adulthood are asked; for example, what should an adult look like, what is appropriate for adulthood. The second part deals with the three main roles of adulthood: the family, occupational, and political. The third part draws the attention to the past of the interviewee, asking for developmental changes during the previous 2 or 3 years. The last part of the interview deals with the near future of the interviewee, asking for his or her goals in life and his or her further development. The interview does not follow a sequence of fixed questions but takes into account the answers of the subject with regard to the stage of conceptualization of human beings. Therefore, the interview technique must be trained beforehand.

This interview was first conducted with different age groups in Germany ranging from 6 to 20 years. From the results five main stages of construction of human being were obtained, which served as the theoretical basis for further studies (Dreher & Oerter, 1986). The revised interview provided questions for higher levels of construction of implicit anthropology and an improved procedure for gaining more elaborated answers.

2. Dilemma stories. The subject is presented with dilemmas in which a contradiction is embedded. Thus far, two stories were used. One story tells the dilemma of an actor whose company shuts down and moves to another city. The actor can either commute, thus losing time for his or her family, or stay and lose the job, thus risking unemployment. Furthermore, the actor has bought a house and must pay a high mortgage. The subject is asked to describe the situation and to find a solution. The interviewer is asking questions and tries to reach the highest possible level the subject can achieve. Again, the interviewer must be trained in understanding and assessing the actual level of the individual in order to ask questions at the level proximal to the individual's point of view. The second story deals with two old school buddies, who meet after a long time, telling each other about their ways of life. One of them has become a banker, working hard all day and dedicating even his or her free time to career. The other one has taken over the dog-breeding business of his or her parents and is happy and satisfied with what he or she is doing. Both defend their own life style but soon question whether their life style is the best.

In Indonesia only the second dilemma was used and adapted to Javanese culture. The dog breeder became a teacher who lives in a village with his or her parents, helping them with farming and participating in community life. The role of the banker remained unchanged.

*3. **Procedure using preformulated items.*** In previous research, statements representing the different stages of the understanding of human being were constructed. The subjects had to choose the one closest to their own position. Then they evaluated each statement separately. Finally, they ranked the statements according to a developmental sequence that—in their opinion—people possibly pass through.

SUBJECTS AND DESIGN

Subjects from the following three cultures were included in the study: United States, West Germany, and Indonesia (Java). Table 1 presents an overview of the samples, which are controlled for educational level, gender, age, and region. The samples differ with regard to these variables, but there is an overlapping number of subjects showing the same conditions, such as the same age, educational level, procedure, and an equal distribution over gender. In the following, we focus on subjects stemming from different cultures, but having the same sex, age, and educational level.

A further description of the samples seems necessary. The American sample was drawn from five universities: Rutgers (New Brunswick, NJ), Chapel Hill (North Carolina), Knoxville (Tennessee), Provo (Utah), and Berkeley (California). All subjects were freshmen or sophomores. The universities were chosen

Table 1. Cultural Samples and Their Characteristics

	Culture		
	U.S.	**West Germany**	**Indonesia (Java)**
n	108	122	110
education	high	high low	high low
age	18–27	16–28	18–24
area	urban rural	urban rural	urban rural
gender	54 males 54 females	61 males 61 females	55 males 55 females

with regard to the dimensions: rural vs. urban areas (North–South) and more conservative vs. more liberal areas according to the contemporary folk understanding in the United States.

The German subjects were selected from a higher educational level (gymnasium, university) and lower educational level (apprentices, workers, employees) whose living area was either Munich or a rural area of Southern Bavaria.

The Indonesian sample was collected from the area around Bandung, Java. Half of the subjects were university students, and half were working people (employees, workers). Half of the group with lower education lived in Bandung, and half lived as workers in a tea plantation in the highlands near Bandung.

Since the actual verbal production of the individual is the main data source of the study, all interviews were taped and carefully transcribed. Thus, every single word from each subject is fixed and available for analysis.

Equivalence with regard to produced structure as well as differences between the three cultures will be demonstrated by the verbal data of the interview. The content analysis of the verbal material follows the theoretical assumption of the existence of universal stages of the concept of human being and at the same time the systematic search for relations between the individual structure and characteristics of the specific culture. This will be shown in more detail below.

The three procedures described above could not be conducted with all three cultural samples. In Indonesia the interview about adulthood was combined with one dilemma and the questionnaire method, while in the remaining cultural samples two dilemmas (family job and career) and the questionnaire method were administered. The reasons for this proceeding are twofold. First, there was time enough either for two dilemmas, or a combination of adulthood interview and dilemma, during one session. For the Western samples the contradictions of both dilemmas seem to be characteristic. Thus, more information could be expected about both forms of dilemmas. However, in Indonesia the efficiency of the dilemma procedure was unclear even after a pilot study carried out before the main study was started. On the other hand, the interview about adulthood turned out to be a fruitful instrument, because this way of talking about things is more appropriate for Javanese culture. Furthermore, *dewasa* in Indonesian means "adult" and "mature" at the same time, thus offering a concept which is particularly useful for talking about humans and human nature.

FIVE STRUCTURAL STAGES OF IMPLICIT ANTHROPOLOGY AND THEIR THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

For the categorization and evaluation of the huge bulk of verbal descriptions and arguments of the tested subjects, a theoretical framework is necessary to order the data and make them comparable. As already mentioned, a structural approach was chosen for the description and explanation of subjects' implicit anthropology. Each stage can be described by the general issue or theme, the personality theory, the social/environmental theory, the action theory and the thinking operations of the individual. Table 2 presents an overview of the characteristics of each stage, arranged according to the four dimensions of the concept of human being.

Although the separation into four dimensions is somewhat arbitrary, they follow an inherent logic. The *personality theory* describes human beings as distinct from their environment and attributes characteristics to them which are attached closely to the person. First, those characteristics may consist of overt visible variables like size, weight, body shape, and sex (see, for example, Livesley & Bromley, 1973). Gradually, internal or "inner" psychological traits are added and may displace surface traits. The *social/environmental theory* focuses on the role of environment for humans and their relations to it. Social partners, as well as material and immaterial objects, belong to the environment but also belong to the human being himself or herself, since he or she cannot exist without the environment. Therefore, any anthropology has to take into consideration both the personality itself and its environment.

The action theory can be regarded as the relation between personality and environment. Each action links the actor and the environment. In the following, we concentrate on only one aspect of action theory, which deals with the rationale of goal setting/goal reaching.

Thinking operations are the conditions for the emergence of a new stage of implicit anthropology. In accordance with Piaget's (1977) view, thinking operations accomplish a specific level of equilibrium which can be reached when the person is at a given stage. Each stage gains a new and higher kind of equilibration which in turn is accomplished by new modes of thinking operations.

Stage I: Actor

The issue of stage I is action. Humans are described by actions they are performing in everyday life. Human beings thus become actors who are related to the environment through actions. Since every action is object related (Leont'ev, 1978), it constitutes a relation between subject and object (environment). *The personality theory* at stage I conceives the individual as a carrier of actions whose purpose is to perform actions like learning, working, cooking, sawing, reading, driving a car, and so on. The *social theory* of the individual describes the person as an owner of possessions, especially of other persons. Thus, a human being has a husband or wife, owns a house and a car, and so on. The second type of relations toward the environment is therefore the belonging of parts of the environment.

The *action theory* of the subject at stage I does not yet distinguish clearly

Table 2. Stages of Implicit Anthopology (Description by Four Dimensions)

Stage	Label	Personality Theory	Social theory	Action theory	Thinking style
I	humans as actors	naming and description of overt actions	possession of persons and objects	action as an entity, no further differentiations: A (G,M,E,C)*	pre-operational, concrete-operational
II	humans as owners of psychological traits	conception of psychological traits, abilities, skills, and competencies	instrumentality of other persons	differentiation of action into: G - M - E	concrete logical and formal logical operations
IIIa	autonomous identity	self-control, self realization, identity as organizing entity of traits and actions	others are equal with regard to structure and different with regard to content	further differentiation of action into: G - M - E - C	relativistic thinking
IIIb	mutual identity	reflection of internal contradictions with regard to incompatible life styles, values, goals	identities are defined through each other and the relations between them. The envolved persons are not exchangeable	consequences of an action for others are considered: G - M - E - C ego alter	subjective dialectic thinking
IV	societal (cultural) identity	contradiction between individual and society; incompatibility of societal demands	humans as exchangeable elements of a system which determines the individual (macro-system)	actions as elements of big systems the functioning of which is not predictable through individual actions	objective dialectic thinking

*A: Action; G: Goal; M: Mean; E: End; C: Consequences.

between goal setting, means, and end, but understands action as a whole in which the actor and the environment are integrated.

Thinking operations at stage I are mainly preoperational; that is, the subject does not need concrete logical operations in the sense of Piaget to construct this level of conception of human being. Thinking deals with concretely visible entities and does not need to infer from overt appearance to covert causes.

Stage II: Owner of Psychological Traits

At stage II, the new view of human beings characterizes humans as owners of psychological traits. The subject constructs the understanding of traits, competences, skills and abilities and uses these terms in his or her *personality theory.* The personality is described as a bunch of distinct psychological traits. This personality conception is similar to previous conceptions in psychology, e.g., that of Eysenck (1953), Guilford (1967), and Cattell (1965). Moreover, it was similarly described by Livesley and Bromley (1973), who found it in a cross-sectional study with children of age 7 to 15.

The *social/environmental* theory at stage II accentuates the other person's instrumentality for reaching goals. However, the instrumentality is reciprocal, since one's own instrumentality for others is included in this view. It is noteworthy that this stage corresponds to stage II of moral judgment (Kohlberg, 1969) and to stage II of self-conception (Noam, 1985).

The *action theory* of the subject clearly differentiates between goal, means, and end of action. Human action is seen as a process where a goal is set by the actor and pursued to an outcome by using certain names. The development of human being, for instance, is often described as pursuing certain goals (e.g., striving for an occupation) in the course of which effort and diligence are necessary. The means–end relation is also part of the instrumentality of others, since the other person is being used as a means for reaching a certain goal.

Thinking operations at stage II are either concrete logical or already formal logical. If we have, for example, a more formalized system of psychological concepts, then formal logical reasoning is necessary. At this level the personality theories of psychologists would be an illustrative example. From this point of view, they can be regarded as formalizations and systematizations of naive theories.

Stage IIIa: Autonomous identity

Stage IIIa of implicit anthropology becomes important for our study, since most of the subjects at least produce it at the beginning of the interview. The main issue of this stage is the autonomous identity. *The personality theory* constructs an understanding of human being which goes beyond single psychological entities as explanatory concepts for human action. The new conception forms a core concept that integrates single traits and competences. This core concept can be circumscribed as *identity*, even though for the most part subjects do not explicitly use this term. The person pursues a main goal on which many single activities and competences are concentrated. The person is described as reflexive, thinking much about himself or herself and claiming to know himself or herself. Furthermore, he or she knows what he or she wants, what his or her goals in life are. This view is completed by the attribution of internal control and the belief in self-efficacy. The autonomous identity masters his or her fate and is—or has to be—the producer of his or her own development. It can be easily recognized that this conception is to be found in many psychological theories, especially in those of humanistic psychologists like Maslow (1954), Rogers (1959), Lerner and Busch-Rossnagel (1981), and others.

The *social/environmental theory* at stage IIIa is determined by this understanding of human being. Since every person is an identity (in the sense described above), the problem has to be tackled that persons are different even though they are equal with regard to the structure of identity. Thus, tolerance and acceptance of different life styles and different value systems are introduced into the conception of social theory. On the other hand, everybody has to accomplish his or her task himself or herself. Therefore, meddling with the business of others is not desirable. "Live and let live" is the motto of the social theory at stage IIIa. The acceptance of equality of humans and of plurality forms the basis of democracy in the modern meaning. The *action theory* now includes the consequences of action completing the chain: goal–means–end–consequence. The focus of action theory is the consideration of the consequences of one's own action for one's own sake. Within the domain of morality, the concept of responsibility is understood as the necessity to bear the consequences of one's decision. In the family-job dilemma the actor is responsible for his decision to have a family and to purchase a house with a high mortgage. In the career dilemma, the actors are responsible for the life style they have chosen; therefore they should keep their way of life.

Thinking operations change gradually toward formally logical thinking, which becomes indispensable if the equality of identity structure and at the same time its content variation are conceived. However, a new type of operations becomes important that is known as *relativistic thinking* (Kramer & Woodruff, 1986; Leadbeater, 1986; Sinnot, 1984). This kind of thinking is necessary, since different value systems and life styles are logically incompatible. Relativistic thinking leads to the assumption of the existence of different kinds of truth. Relativistic thinking as a higher level of epistemological thinking was ascertained, among others, by Perry (1970) and Broughton (1978), with young adults.

Stage IIIb: Social (mutual) identity

At stage IIIb, human beings are characterized as social/mutual identities. While identity at stage IIIa was comprehended as demarcation from others, the relations between different identities become constitutive for the understanding of human being. The identity no longer is only an internal structure but needs, for its development and realizations, the exchange with other identities. Thus, the individual at stage IIIb defines identity by the mutual relationship between two or more persons who play an essential role in the life of the person under consideration.

Personality theory—the conception of the "inner" aspect of a person—recognizes contradictions and incompatible action tendencies. One reason for the emergence of dialectical experiences is the perception of the differences between identities which are significantly related to each other. The existence of different life styles and value systems allows for the possibility to have those differences within one and the same person. This is a consequence of mutual identity, since the extension of the boundaries of one's identity toward other persons means that different ways of living and different values become part of one's own identity. Therefore, contradictions and incompatibilities of action possibilities are essential characteristics of human beings. Another cause of contradicting tendencies within the identity is the experience of inner needs and external demands. The generalized knowledge about this conflicting influences also leads to the conception of a personality for whom conflicting tendencies are constituents of the identity. In psychology, this kind of personality theory was, for example, conceived by Fromm (1964, 1965).

The *social/environmental theory* at stage IIIb conceives a new type of relations, mutual and transactional relations. The former knowledge that the environment is part of the person in one or the other way is restructured to the knowledge that there is a flow back and forth between the person and his or her environment. This is essentially true for social interactions. They become a defining criterion of human beings. In contrast to lower conceptual stages, reciprocity has attained a higher flexibility and therefore a new type of equilibration. The new understanding of mutuality allows for taking the position of any person involved in the interaction and analyzing the interaction from his or her point of view. This competence enables the constructor of the new stage to leave his or her cage of self-centered perspectives, a process which began much earlier and now has led to a new level of flexibility. A motto of social theory could be: "Others are part of me, and I am part of others."

The *action theory* at stage IIIb takes into consideration, not only the consequences of one's own decision and action for oneself, but also the consequences for other persons. Vice versa, the decisions and actions of other persons are evaluated with regard to their impact on one's own person and the person under consideration, respectively. Responsibility now includes the impact of an action on others, especially on significant others. This means that every action basically concerns other people; therefore, it has to be planned with regard to the consequences for other persons. There is really no action which has an impact only on the actor himself or herself. Responsibility is also a reciprocal concept, since responsibility is mutually required for all persons. Another aspect of action theory at stage IIIb is the beginning understanding of the functioning of systems. Those systems are small entities of which the individual is a part. Thus, family, a school class, a company, or a small association are seen as systems in which the change of one element may cause a change of the whole and in which the whole influences each element, for instance, persons as elements of the system. As soon as the system (and related concepts) is brought into play, the understanding of action as a chain of steps is not sufficient any more. Social interaction and transaction are not only single paths forth and back but form a system of relations in which each element is mutually linked with all other elements.

Which *thinking operations* are needed for the construction of stage IIIb? Dealing with contradictions and incompatibilities makes a new kind of thinking necessary: dialectical reasoning. Since different views, value systems, and life styles do exist, not only between different persons, but also within one person, relativistic thinking is not sufficient any longer. Contradictions have not only to be accepted but also to be related to each other and to be resolved. Dialectical thinking serves this task. It enables the subject to become aware of the existence of contradictions within the person and to provide solutions which are not simply logical in nature, but integrate the contradicting elements. Kramer and Woodruff (1986) call this process "integration into a dialectical whole." The dialectical operations deal with subjective contradictions, those that are located within the subject. Those contradictions are perceived as genuinely human and as characteristics of human beings. Therefore, the term *subjective dialectical thinking* is chosen for this type of thinking (see Table 2).

Stage IIIb corresponds to stage III of Kohlberg's (1969) levels of moral judgment and to stage III of Noam's (1985) levels of self-concept. The numbering follows that of these authors. It is interesting to note that stage IIIa does not appear in the system of Kohlberg and Noam. This will be commented on later.

Stage IV: Societal identity

At stage IV, human beings become societal identities who are mutually related, not only to single persons, but also to society and culture as a whole. The individual is perceived within the polarity of culture/society, on the one hand, and the subject on the other hand. Thus, the subject is confronted with the contradiction of ego identity and role identity (Habermas, 1976) and with conflicting demands of the surrounding culture. The *personality theory* at stage IV links person and society. The influence of society on the individual is twofold. First, there is a dialectical relationship between individual and society, which means that the individual always faces the conflict between personal needs and societal demands. Second, societal demands do not only exist outside the individual, but become internalized. Thus, the individual experiences the conflict between internalized social norms and role prescriptions on the one hand

and private needs, above all the need for self-realization, on the other hand. This conflict was already described by the distinction of ego identity and role identity (Habermas, 1976). Baumeister (1986) distinguishes between inner self and outer context. While at earlier stages personality theory is only described by the inner self, the constructor of stage IV tries to integrate both the inner self and the outer context into his or her view of personality.

The *social/environmental theory* conceives humans as exchangeable elements of the big system society. Individuals have to accomplish certain roles and to fulfill certain tasks. In this function, their skills and competences are needed, but individuals are exchangeable as long as they are able to fulfill the demands of society. This conception adds a new facet to the previous picture of human beings. The persons related to the identity at stage IIIb are more or less significant others, they are not exchangeable, while they gain "abstract valence" (Oerter, 1983) at stage IV. Abstract valence of a person means that he or she has value ("valence" in the sense of Lewin, 1954) apart from his or her unique traits, goals, and orientations. Level IV is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the conceptualization of justice and equality. In Western cultures, level IV is in most cases linked with the understanding of the principle of justice. In substantially different cultures, justice and equality are not necessarily connected with the conception of level IV, which will be demonstrated with the Javanese culture.

The *action theory* at stage IV of implicit anthropology must leave the chain model of action behind. Humans as parts of big systems are involved in the maintenance and/or development of the system. Their action may or may not influence the system, their impact is not predictable. The huge number of variables do not allow an unequivocal description of causes and effects. Thus, the naive understanding of big systems meets the scientific definition of *systems* (Ashby, 1952; Laszlo, 1972; Luhmann, 1985; Maturana & Varela, 1975; Sameroff, 1983) even if it might be less differentiated and logical than scientific conceptions.

Furthermore, *thinking operations* undergo a change at stage IV. The contradictions are no longer only subjective, they also exist outside the individual in the culture and society. Thinking has to treat them as objective, i.e., as existing independently from single individuals. Typical examples of contradictions expressed in the family-job dilemma and in the career dilemma are: the present–future contradiction, which undergoes different transformations in different cultures; the polarity between individual and society; the contradiction between family and occupation within Western cultures; and the dilemma of decision making in the face of competing opportunities offered by the culture. This kind of understanding also changes the concept of responsibility and guilt. Guilt cannot be attributed only to single persons, since negative effects are an outcome of the system as a whole. Responsibility, on the other hand, does not remain restricted to significant others but is assigned to society as a whole, or even to mankind. Both parts, individual and society, are intertwined in such a way that individual needs and goals are connected with the welfare of society and the conservation or development of the respective culture.

Being aware of cultural and societal constraints is often painful for the individual and may lead the person into an identity crisis. In our first study, we found in some cases a negative evaluation of the relation between individual and society (Dreher & Oerter, 1986). A few subjects expressed the view that they did not see a chance for self-realization in their society. The negation of culture and society made them retreat or even escape from their environment. The negation of society and culture is also being described by Baumeister (1986).

Components of Dialectical Thought

It seems necessary to define dialectical thought more precisely and to describe characteristics for subjective and objective dialectical thinking. We distinguish between three different components which are at the same time phases of dialectical thought: perception of contradiction, information processing of dialectics, and dialectical solution.

Perception of contradictions. Dialectical reasoning can only start when contradictions are perceived as being dialectical. This means that a contradiction is recognized, not primarily as a logical one, but as the incompatibility of the realization of both opposing parts at the same time. The dialectical thinker is aware of the fact that both opposing parts are more or less equally important and that the decision for one part would be followed by the loss of the other part. In the case of subjective dialectical thinking, the person perceives the problem as an intrapersonal contradiction between different life styles, opportunities, and affordances (e.g., in the career dilemma) or as an interpersonal conflict consisting of the fact that each decision is followed by negative consequences for the partner(s) (e.g., in the family-job dilemma). In the case of objective dialectical thinking, contradictions are perceived as societally produced (e.g., the family-job dilemma) or shaped (e.g., the present–future dilemma). Contradictions are viewed as existing independently from single subjects within a given culture/society. On the whole, perception of dialectical contradictions is expected to occur first in development, since it is (a) the precondition of further dialectical reasoning, and (b) the component of dialectical thought that is easiest to achieve.

Information processing. This component describes how the person deals with a given recognized contradiction. Usually the subject avoids one-sided arguments and refuses to develop a clear-cut, logically unambiguous solution. On the contrary, both parts of the contradiction are thoroughly examined, and positive as well as negative aspects of both parts are elaborated. On the whole, the contradiction is aggravated rather than smoothed during the process of reasoning. Following aspects that cannot be described in detail are included in the analysis of information processing: the subject's treatment of valences of alternatives, of consequences of alternatives, of previous decisions, and of interdependencies between incompatible goals. Reasoning at the subjective dialectical level uses psychological knowledge of everyday life and personal experiences. Objective dialectical reasoning in addition needs knowledge about culture and society and generalizes previous experiences as typical for them.

Dialectical solution. The solution is either a synthesis of the contradicting parts or at least consists of steps toward a synthesis. Subjective dialectical solutions focus on changes of the individuals involved in the problem, while objective dialectical solutions propose changes of the whole system (of society and culture) or at least of parts of the system.

With regard to the quality, the solutions form a hierarchy beginning with one-sided solutions as expedients and ending with the transformation of the whole problem. To begin with low-level solutions, here the preference for one alternative is chosen. However, even in this simple case, the solution is not being constructed as a formal logical solution or from the background of relativistic thinking rather than conceived as an expedient or as preliminary, since no better way out is available.

A second type of dialectical solution is the compromise, be it the sequential realization of contradicting alternatives (in the career dilemma, for example, first career then present orientation) or be it the suggestion for a common means for the incompatible alternatives (e.g., moving in the family-job dilemma). However, those solutions are only labeled as dialectical if they are conceived as expedients which do not eliminate further problems arising from the dilemma.

The highest level of solution is labeled as transformation, which redefines the whole problem or elements of it. A solution of the transformation type at the level of subjective dialectical reasoning is the conception of a new life-style in the career dilemma which removes the contradiction between alternative life-styles and a new type of occupation in the family-job dilemma (e.g., establishing an own business where the separation of family and work as well as the dependency from the company is overcome). However, the assessment of the solution depends on the dialectical arguments given by the subject. Thus, mentioning of an own business could also be a predialectical solution that is linked to the personality type of stage IIIa (autonomous identity).

The introduction of the concept of basic wage as a solution for the family-job dilemma is an example of transformation at the level of objective dialectical reasoning, because the contradiction between family and occupation disappears, which, of course, does not mean that all problems are over. Dialectical reasoning emphasizes in many cases that new contradictions arise after the solution is realized.

THE STAGES OF UNDERSTANDING HUMAN NATURE IN THREE CULTURES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

In the following part, case examples from each of three cultures are presented in order to demonstrate how a certain stage is constructed by subjects from different cultures. We restrict ourselves to stages IIIa, IIIb, and IV, since most of the subjects at least produced the stage of autonomous identity. The description also includes essential cultural differences, although some major issues have to be discussed later in a separate section, where the relations between individual and culture are to be discussed.

Autonomous Identity

United States

> 1. Career dilemma: Well, I don't think either one would have the better argument. I mean, if they are both satisfied with their life, you can't say who's life is better. They both think that's what is more important. Both of them seem to be excited about what they are doing. (Do you think there are people who have both wishes . . . ?) I think you are going to have to give up a lot of things and I don't think you are going to succeed in both things. . . . Either way you are losing stuff on both ends, but it comes out even in the end. (What to do?) You get what's important and decide along the way what you want to do. Decide beforehand what is important and what your goal is going to be, and then go for that goal. Maybe with a little leeway. (Chapel Hill, female, 21 years)

This example is a nice illustration of the personality theory at stage IIIa. Any way of life is acceptable, if the person is happy with it. Identity is expressed by the goal that is best for the person and for which the individual has to search. Thinking tries to solve contradictions in human life logically and by means of a relativistic attitude. You have to "decide beforehand what is important." After the decision is made, you should stay with it. Here, action theory at stage IIIa is expressed, because one is responsible for the outcome of one's decision.

Germany

> 2. Career dilemma. I wouldn't ask who has the better arguments; it's not correct to ask this way. It seems that Otto finds fulfillment with his dog-breeding business and likes his work, but Karl likes his work, too, and is investing everything into his career. I mean, there are some workaholics who feel great about it. (College, male, 18 years)

Both life styles are accepted. Again, happiness/fulfillment is the criterion for the acceptance of different ways of life. The social theory at stage IIIa is expressed by the tolerance of differences between persons and the right for searching for one's own way.

> 3. Family-job dilemma. I tell you that's a career person. He wants to climb up the ladder in his job, but I think that does not go together with (the family). . . . I think he does not realize that you either have a vocational career and the family takes second place, or you care about the family and the job is not that important. (Is there a perfect solution?) There is no perfect solution. You can only say how you would do it yourself. But I cannot transfer it to other people. (University, male, 20 years)

Personality theory and social theory of this subject deal with personality types (career person). People are different because of their personality structure, which was developed in the past. Social theory expresses that there is no general recipe for all persons. One's own decision cannot be transferred to other persons; therefore, meddling in other persons' affairs is rejected. Despite claiming that there is no perfect solution, the subject argues predialectically, because this statement is related to the differences between persons. Therefore, the subject is arguing at this point using relativistic thinking.

Indonesia

> 4. Adulthood interview. An adult must know/understand himself and his environment. He can compare between good things and bad things. He must be consequent and more capable to establish social relations than immature people (dewasa = adult, mature). (Bandung, university, male, 21 years)
>
> (Does an adult need a job/a family?) It depends on the person, because one person needs a job, the other one doesn't. It depends on his principle. The same goes for the family (Bandung, university, female, 20 years)

In this example, the focus of the autonomous identity is on self-knowledge and a mature value system that distinguishes between good and bad. Action theory at stage IIIa is described by the demand of being consequent, which means that goals that are set by the person should be pursued.

> 5. Career dilemma (N = teacher living with his parents in a village; K = banking business).
>
> In my opinion both are good. The good thing with K is that she wants to improve her career. N is already satisfied with what he has reached. Everybody has his or her own fortune . . . They have different attitudes and behavior. (Do they envy each other?) I don't think so, because they are satisfied with what they have. (Bandung, university, female, 21 years)

This pattern of arguments is similar to those of Western subjects. The justification for different life-styles is the satisfaction of the actors. Thinking is relativistic, since both are right in their way of life.

Social (mutual) identity

United States

> 6. Family-job dilemma. To build a house is not very common here, and so it seems to be a very special place if you build it yourself. And that it might be very difficult to move. But at the same time maybe that would be an option. Also it has to be taken into consideration the husband's job and what kind of income he is producing, how flexible his job is . . . also what kind of neighborhood and town and the type of things they want to live in. . . . But either way there are negative things about it, there are still going to be things you have to deal with; either she'll not take the job and work at something that is less challenging, and she would be unhappy with the job, or he will take the job and she will have a 15-hour day and never see her family. It doesn't sound like, either one, the problem would be over. (New Brunswick, female, 21 years)

In this passage the social (environmental) theory of stage IIIb is described. People have their environment, and their identity is partially defined by the environment. Mutuality is articulated by including the husband's job and income. At the end, the personality theory of stage IIIb is stressed in that the subject describes the person as living with contradictory demands and wishes. This state of affairs is not only an actual one, but will stay forever, which can be seen from the last sentence of the subject. Her reasoning indicates subjective dialectical perception and information processing as described above.

Germany

> 7. Family-job dilemma. In any case, a satisfying solution cannot be found . . . There is no way out. First, I thought that he could look for a job in his city, but it says that it is very difficult to get a job. . . . The most important thing is that he consults the family, that they sit together and talk it over. . . . If the wife says, o.k. it is possible, I could stand it . . . but she would probably say what about the children. That's the next problem. Maybe she says that's no problem for me, but think of the children. But if he stays in the city, he soon might become dissatisfied, less money, less job satisfaction, and his family will soon feel his sullenness. He comes home saying, only because of you will it take 10 years longer to pay the mortgage. . . . He will take it out on his family. (College, male, 19 years)

The subject's information processing is dialectical in the sense defined earlier: No clear solution is possible. Both poles of the contradiction are evaluated and the consequences of each decision are examined. It turns out that each solution has negative consequences, not only for himself, but also for the whole family.

The social theory of the subject is also a construction at IIIb. The problem has to be discussed with his wife, and it depends on her opinion as well as on her contribution to the family life which solution should be chosen. However, each decision, though accomplished by a common effort, is followed by negative consequences.

> 8. Career dilemma. My dream is, on the one hand, to have a super job in which I invest efforts because I like it and, on the other hand, to ride on horseback and to race across the prairie feeling great.... I think it's contradictory, if not, I would feel much better in this situation.... I have the feeling that this contradiction arises again and again... I think it remains. (University, female, 24 years)

In this case, personal involvement and experience lead to the dialectical perception and information processing of the contradiction which is elaborated and aggravated. The personality conception is that of stage IIIb (the person is conceived as a human being with contradictory tendencies within himself or herself).

Indonesia

Interview about adulthood. The subject answers the question about political duties as follows.

> 9. Yes, we have to think of others, because we don't live alone. We need a social life. Someone who has become mature (=adult) should be mutually related to other persons. We help them and we need their help. (Bandung, university, male, 20 years)

This statement fits the social theory of stage IIIb pretty well. People are mutually related to each other. They are "animal sociale," as the subject explicitly states.

> 10. Career dilemma. (The problem) comes from within oneself. Yes, it is a general human problem. (Does it come from the environment/society?) For certain persons maybe. They follow the progress of the world, the problem comes from the person himself. Because there is some feeling of dissatisfaction, so people always want to improve their position. (Bandung, university, male, 21 years)

This view, though quite different from Western thinking, shows in its formal structure dialectical thinking and stage IIIb construction of human nature. Certain persons suffer from the "dissatisfaction" between the present state of their personality and the wish to participate in the (economical) "progress of the *world.*" But this statement only shows dialectical perception, that is, the lowest performance of dialectical reasoning.

A last example may illustrate the connection between dialectical thinking and personality theory. During the discussion of contradictory tendencies within a person, the subject states:

> 11. There are problems, for instance, somebody is a farmer but yet wants to be rich. He could work harder. He should three times multiply the production and also his time and his money. Because he needs more time, problems arise concerning the community. . . . The problem comes from the person himself. He is the one who creates something from which we shall get the consequences. . . . Moreover, actual everyday problems come from the person himself. Let us assume we have settled down; then we create problems by wanting to reach higher things for our own progress (and advantage). This means that we decrease our attention for the society (community). Society (community) will not let it happen, there the problem arises. . . . We should also be prepared for future problems beyond the here and now. Future problems might be caused by the way we solve present problems. (Bandung, university, male, 20 years)

This passage demonstrates how structural equivalence and contentual difference can be found together. Action theory stresses the more distal consequences of action. One-sided activity will neglect social duties and therefore raise problems. The statement that future problems are "caused by the way we solve present problems" also shows action theory at stage IIIb. The contradictions are described here as those between the present state and the future situation. The (dialectical) problem is located within the person. He or she is the producer and the core of conflicts. To be sure, this is not a state of the personality to be wished for. Indonesian (i.e., Javanese) culture emphasizes harmony as the most desirable regulation principle for social interaction as well as for the personality itself. One main contradiction mentioned above is that between personal interests and societal tasks or demands. Dialectical reasoning shows the dialectical perception of the problem (contradiction between time spent for personal goals and time demanded by communal/societal tasks). Dialectical information processing elaborates the conflict, but no dialectical solution is presented. Rather, the renunciation of personal interests is suggested.

Societal Identity (Stage IV)

In the following, case examples are selected which clearly show both the level of mutual identity and of societal identity. The condition for assigning level IV is that the lower levels are established. Therefore, it is necessary to quote also phrases from level IIIb in order to show how the higher stage should be understood as a cumulative stage containing the lower levels as unrenouncable elements.

United States

> 12. Career dilemma. The subject first describes the contradiction of two different life styles as a conflict within one person, using the phrase "The grass is always greener at the other side." At a later part of the discussion the interviewer asks: So you think it's a societal problem?
>
> Oh yeah, definitely! (Societies where this conflict is not as big as in the United States?) Yes, I would think in communal sort of communities like a kibbutz.... Americans have a phobia about any kind of communistic style of society; they label it, stereotype it, as being communism, where there are many benefits of it. But anyone who tries to start something like that, it stays very small because no one wants it getting any larger...
>
> I wouldn't say "leave it as it is"... ideally it would be very nice if we could have—without a status—without a salary, if you had food for the day, a place to stay you were taken care of and you were doing something during the day to occupy your time... it wouldn't really be work, but in other people's eyes it would be work that would be getting accomplished.... But then there is different levels of education and it should also be that everybody should be able to have an equal amount (of education), pursue as much as they want, because, although I said it would be nice to get rid of status, the more education you have the more knowledge which gives you a higher edge or more status, I would think. So to get rid of that it seems like you'd have to have equal education. (Knoxville, male, 22 years)

In the case presented above, the subject discovers the societal roots of contradicting life styles and suggests a society in which differences of status and education are reduced and work is transformed into an activity which allows self-realization but which is at the same time work "in other people's eyes." The divergence of work and inclination disappears. Again one should keep in mind that it is not the criterion of whether the claim is correct or realistic that characterizes level IV, but the structure of description and arguments. If somebody recognizes how individual development and motivation are determined by societal and cultural influences, he or she must think of societal restructuring in order to reduce the contradiction. Individual efforts are not sufficient. The dialectical solution presented by the subject is—in our terms—a transformation of the problem. *Work* is redefined as nonalienated activity, which has the same function as work but has changed its character for the individual.

> 13. Family-job dilemma. The interviewer asks: Where does the problem come from?
>
> Well, I'd say it's definitely society, a society-created thing, where women have been designated by the more male-dominated society, and you're supposed to stay in the home and deal with the children, and some people relate it to the industrial revolution and things like that occurred... I'd say that it became a more economic necessity for women to be working as well. That, for women, it became a kind of self-esteem, or psychologically it became a necessity. My mom, when I was growing up, she went to college... and then, looking back right now, it seemed to

> be a necessity for herself to maintain sanity...and if she hadn't done that she would really would have gone to some kind of almost loony, just sitting in her home dealing with the kids and be with the kids all the time...I guess that's where I get it from. (Berkeley, female, 22 years)

In this passage the subject tries to explain the psychological motive or need for work as an instrument of getting self-esteem and self-realization. First, she mentions how middle class women became part of the labor force (the relation to lower class women is also being described but skipped here). Then she explains how the need for work becomes a psychological necessity, using her mother as an example. An originally economic motive becomes a psychological motive, which is so strong that a person becomes disturbed ("loony") if it is not satisfied. This explanation—independent of its truth—is one of the most mature conceptions of stage IV we found.

The same subject also develops a solution at the level of objective dialectics, namely, the contradiction of family and work, both of which demand more time and involvement than the person can afford:

> 14. There should be some sort of balance. I mean there is no need to have people working 70 hours a week; some lawyers work 70 hours a week. There is a need to be at work maybe 30 hours instead of putting in let's say 40 hours. So you can spend more time with your family, then you have everybody working maybe 30 hours a week and everybody having 40 hours a week for the family. Then everybody could have both.... If everybody was allowed to work 30 hours a week and have a living wage, everybody could be employed and they could be with their families, too. Who knows, maybe we could have jobs that could be interesting to everyone rather than just having the task-oriented work that they create in menial labor.

The solution of psychological contradictions demands a change of societal conditions. Thus, reduction of working time and its consequences for the removal of unemployment as well as the increase of options of labor activities may produce a psychological change of work attitude toward interest and fulfillment in work. These suggestions can be labeled as a transformation solution: The problem is redefined, and the contradiction disappears.

Germany

> 15. Family-job dilemma. It's of course a personal problem, for example, it's a problem for me. But I view it as a consequence of our society and of my education. I was educated toward achievement and success. (If you had the power, would you change things or leave it as it is?) Yes, I would change education, the school system, then the whole economic system has to be changed, not any more only toward profit and that only the strongest survive, but it should be tuned to the emotional, for instance, that you can choose according to your interests and not

> according to success. If you understand a little what they are doing with you, then still the conflict between job and private life exists, but maybe you avoid stress for your children. I mean, there is some hope, also a change in our society, which might help a bit, but on the other hand again this pressure toward success and toward progress. But I believe that something happens in small steps, however, only within certain groups. (University, female, 24 years)

The contradiction of job and family (private life) is seen as an objective one. It can be solved by a change of the system, where education is seen as the crucial force of change. The subject also recognizes that the problem is being experienced as an intrapersonal problem, although it is an objective societal contradiction. The suggested solution is objective-dialectical, since it attempts to remove the contradiction between family and occupation through the change of the system. This change is being seen as long lasting and occurring only (if at all) in small steps.

Another subject relates the objective structure of industrial society to the subjective structure of the individual in the following way:

> 16. It's a matter of attitude toward consumption and toward what you develop out of yourself. I try to elicit abilities within me, what I can do, actively do and not only consume. There are a lot of activities without any consumption.... If many people recognize this, then it means first that there is no need to produce that much, which also means that people need not work that much. Then the (family-job) problem would be mastered. (Postgraduate, male, 27 years)

Although the personality theory is only roughly indicated, the subject seems to have some understanding of the mutual determination of personality structure and societal structure. The priority of goods production in an industrial society and its complementary behavior of consumption is seen as one-sided and distorting human nature. As a counterbalance, an active personality is suggested that does not need consumption any more.

Indonesia

The picture of stage IV with Indonesians shows features different from members of Western societies. On the one hand, there is much more reflection and consciousness about community and society, which means that this domain is an essential part of life for each Indonesian. On the other hand, the knowledge about culture and society is different. So belonging to society means security and safety. An individual is balanced if he or she is well integrated into societal life and societal duties. Society as a whole (as well as the community) should be governed by harmony (Magnis-Suseno, 1981).

Another remark is necessary. *Masyarakat* means community and society. It can only be inferred from the context which meaning is appropriate in a certain sentence.

> 17. Interview about adulthood. The interviewer asks: "Should an adult take responsibility for the society/community?"
>
> Yes...in order to be united/unified (bersatu)...people should be united/unified. Everything will be done very quickly if we work on it together....It is necessary to have an adult know the circumstances in which the principle of harmony (*rukun*) is realized that peace of mind can be reached. (For whom?) For the society/community, of course. (Is it necessary for an adult to participate in national election?) It is because this is an obligation given by the government (Why did the government impose this obligation?) So we know that we are Indonesians....An adult should fight for humanity in order to unify the society/community and to help each other (tolong menolong). (An adult) should be active to build a well established society...this means to reach a better system of society. (Bandung, university, male, 22 years)

This description of political duties is remarkably different from what a member of Western societies would say (in a study prior to this one, the same interview was conducted with German adolescents and young adults; therefore, data exist which prove this statement). However, the formal structure shows some aspects of the beginning construction of stage IV. The subject shows an understanding of society as the unification of its members. This means, not only a kind of association or alliance, but also harmony, shared meaning and feeling. At the end of this passage the subject names a better system of society as one of the aims of social/societal activity. The community/society is seen as an integrated whole and, at least marginally, understood as a system. However, there is no evidence that the subject really distinguishes between community and society. In a way, the model of community (construction at stage IIIb) is transferred to the big system of society. Contrary to descriptions of Western subjects, society (or community) is being conceived as a harmonious whole in which the individual should feel secure and safe and in harmony with other members of the system. This view is taken by many subjects of our Indonesian sample. Thus, there is much evidence that the majority of the investigated subjects do not perceive or construct the system of society/culture by objective dialectical thinking. The reason is that Indonesian (Javanese) culture emphasizes harmony—the so-called *rukun* principle—as a major control mechanism of social life (see, for example, Draine & Hall, 1986; Magnis-Suseno, 1981). Nevertheless, society as a functioning system seems to be well understood by many Indonesians of our sample. For example, one subject describes the individuals as parts of a body that only stays alive if all its parts function appropriately.

> 18. Career dilemma. The life of every individual has a specific problem, especially with regard to the environment. Sometimes a way of life does not fit society or is even in contrast to the will of society which means that society is ignored by the individual....It is a typical human problem because every individual has his or her own desires, it brings up conflicts with others....(Does

> the problem come from society?) Yes, it does, because sometimes what the individual wants does not fit what is requested by society. (Can you imagine a society without those conflicts?) It is not possible, because everybody has his or her own desires. (If you could change things, what would you do?) I would try to unite (unify) society, for example, arrange community meetings. I would guide those individuals who have their own will in such a way that they could get what they want without causing conflicts with societal rules. (Bandung, university, male, 24 years)

Here, the contradiction is seen between individual and society. It is conceived as a general objective dialectical relationship between individual needs and societal rules. However, the origin of the conflict is attributed to society (which is more an exception in the Indonesian sample). The suggestions of the subject about how the conflict can be settled are of special interest. He aims at a solution where the individual can fulfill his or her wishes or goals without violating societal order. The means for this end consist in accomplishing a consensus and unification of the community/society by general discussion. This procedure reflects a typical feature of Javanese culture. The main issue is the unity (consensus, a balanced state of affairs, a state of harmony) of the community, a situation which is transferred to society. To put it another way, the subject suggests—using the knowledge of his culture—the method of power-free discourse in the sense of Habermas (1983). To summarize, objective dialectical thought is present with regard to all components: perception, information processing, and solution. The solution does not provide a contentually fixed goal but consists in the discourse itself. The final solution is unknown; participants have to create it during the process of discourse.

One would expect university students to articulate more often the conflict between traditional Indonesian culture and Western culture that penetrates Indonesian economic and social systems. But there were only a few cases who attempted to relate this problem to the career dilemma and the adulthood interview, respectively. Here is one example of the career dilemma:

> 19. People could learn from each other how to live integrated (like N) and how to strive for success (like K). (Does everybody experience problems in connection with his or her way of life?) People in big cities do. . . . Nowadays, as the standard of living is increasing, many people want a higher standard of living. Some of them fail, become frustrated and then withdraw. . . . It is a typical human problem. At least for people whose standard of living rose in the big cities, especially for people from a moderate economic level. It began with the increase of differences between rich and poor people. This situation stimulated lower class people to reach a higher economic level. Progress in technology and the influence of Western civilization also motivated Third World countries to gain the same prosperity and way of life. This situation indirectly pushes people to keep on striving for more wealth. (Bandung, university, male, 22 years)

In this example, the Western influence as well as the more general influence of differences in socioeconomic level are regarded as a source of contradiction. Perception and information processing show characteristics of objective dialectical reasoning, while no solution is performed.

On the whole, the existence of level IV can be taken for sure in Indonesia, at least for the sample of university students. Subjects from the tea plantation described elements of level IV in the adulthood interview and used concepts which described society as a well-functioning whole in which the individual is securely embedded.

If we summarize this section, we can postulate the existence of roots of the theoretically assumed stages of conceptualization of human nature. Despite the broad variety of contents and the remarkably large cultural differences, basic structural features remain the same across groups and cultures.

DISCUSSION AND THEORETICAL EXTENSION: THE RELATION BETWEEN CULTURE AND INDIVIDUAL

The previous part provides evidence for both universal structures and cultural differences with regard to the conception of human nature. In order to understand the interconnection between both, one should be aware that the individual represents essential structural features of the culture in which he or she lives. From this perspective, universality means that certain structures (at least of the lower stages) of the conception of human nature develop in all cultures because (a) they all are human, and (b) the logic of increasing and hierarchical complexity determines the sequence of stages. Diversity, on the other hand, mirrors the specific historical development the culture undergoes. In the following section an attempt is made to interpret some of the differences in our material by culture-specific influences. For reasons of space limit we concentrate on the Indonesian culture. First, some relevant aspects of Javanese culture are described. Then, some results are discussed.

Aspects of anthropology in Javanese culture

Javanese subjects in general describe themselves regularly as members of four groups and settings, respectively:

- the family
- the environment (*lingkungan*)
- the community (sometimes identical with *lingkungan*)
- the society (Negara Indonesia: the Indonesian State)

It can be claimed that their identity is defined much more than that of Western subjects by groups that seem to lie like shells around the individual. Besides informal tasks which are regulated by unwritten laws, strong obligations exist. "Everyone is enrolled in the Rukun Tetangga, neighborhood organizations, and expected to respond to their call for physical assistance to clean the roadside, or any other of the neighborhood projects. Each household must donate money for a variety of community celebrations" (Draine & Hall, 1986, p. 121). All civil servants and employees of the government are members of the Korps Pegawai Negri (Civil Servant Association). The corresponding organization of the wives of the civil servants is the Dharma Wanita. Membership in these groups and others is compulsory and hierarchical.

Group membership starts early, with school attendance. Every pupil becomes a member of one or more groups, for example, of the Pramuka (the Indonesian Boy and Girl Scouts), a sport team, or a religious group. Throughout the whole country social groups exist, the so-called *arisan*. They can comprise members of an extended family, neighbors, or employees of a company. During their meetings they collect money into the "pot." Every month another member becomes the winner. The *arisan* is active until each member has "won." This form of cooperation and "winning" is typical for Java, whereas forms of competition are introduced by the administration according to the Western model. One of the widespread competitions is between villages or *kampung* concerning the cleanest and nicest environment.

At the level of the government, *Pancasila*, the five principles, regulates societal life. Every child has to know about these principles and regards himself or herself as a member of the Indonesian country.

Thus, the individual is embedded in systems of growing size and complexity and views the social duties in all these systems as an essential part of his or her life and simultaneously as part of his or her identity, as is described in examples above (see No. 11,17). Maybe the most illustrative description subjects use is the term *kentuhan*. This means "perfection" or "improvement on the way to perfection." It is used as a goal for the person himself or herself and for all reference groups of the individual. The improvement of social systems toward perfection is seen as a crucial task by the majority of the subjects (see, e.g., example 17). Individual competences and social identity are connected in a way that the higher the individual's abilities, the more efficient his or her commitment to social systems.

A second concept often used (see also examples above) is *dedikan* (dedication). The person is being described as dedicating himself or herself to family, neighborhood, and community. Thus, there is always an action tendency away from the individual toward the social environment.

According to Indonesian ethics, all social interaction should obey the *rukun* principle (Geertz, 1961; Magnis-Suseno, 1981). *Rukun* means harmony and avoidance of conflicts. Social partners have to step empathically into each other's shoes and to anticipate whether a verbal statement may embarrass or bother the partner. Social interaction should always proceed in a way that harmony is not disturbed. The *rukun* principle does not mean that everybody is happy and that there are no specific desires and needs. But the mutual negotiation of personal wishes has to obey the rule of maintaining harmony. This means that, indeed, very often, personal needs have to be neglected.

Identity

Triandis (1989), Baumeister (1986), and Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) propose three components of the self: the private, the public, and the collective. The *private* self includes knowledge about personal traits and behaviors. The *public* self consists of "cognitions concerning the generalized other's view of the self" (Triandis, 1989, p. 507). The *collective* self is defined by relations to the group to which the person belongs. From the cultural background described above, it can be assumed that Javanese identity is more determined by the public and collective self than Western subjects.

If one puts together subjects with a lower and with a higher education, the following picture can be given. Both samples describe aspects of the private (autonomous) identity and of the public as well as of the collective identity. Collective and public identity are more frequently and broadly described by subjects with a lower education (e.g., workers from the tea plantation), while subjects with a higher education present more descriptions of private identity.

It is suggested that, instead of the terms private, public, and collective identity, more concrete definitions should be used, and that they should be related to the stages of conceptualization of human nature. Indonesians accentuate *independence*, *self-control*, and *knowledge* about oneself as the crucial characteristics of private identity. They emphasize *relations* to other persons and groups ("environment," community, nation). The personality traits are often those of *socially desirable* (or rejected) behavior. *Social* and *religious norms* are much more absolute than in Western culture and determine morality (what is good and bad).

A last aspect of the conception of identity concerns emotional control, which is a general characteristic of Javanese culture (Magnis-Suseno, 1981). It means that neither negative nor positive emotions should escalate. Thus, "deep" emotions are not desirable. This is even true for music performance, where a less extreme or expressive interpretation is preferred to a kind of performance which would be more highly appreciated in Western cultures. Of course, the influence of rock music and pop music is going to change the taste of Indonesian youth. Here is an example for emotional control as a mature trait of personality:

> 20. Adulthood interview: Adulthood is connected with the balance of emotions. That means that he or she can control his or her emotions, or is mature with regard to his or her emotions. . . . A child's behavior is characterized by directness and by

> being uncontrolled. For example, happiness, it's excessive. So adult behavior means controlled behavior. (Bandung, university, female, 21 years)

The reward for controlling one's own emotions is an internal state of high value in Indonesia: *rasa tenderam* = the feeling of calmness and peace, having a peaceful mind. This emotional state cannot be gained without balanced social relations. Most subjects express in one or the other way that happiness is related to social activities of help and assistance.

Contradiction and Harmony

Reaching and maintaining harmony is—as it was already described—an important social value in Indonesia. The question arises whether striving for harmony is compatible with dialectical solutions. In very general terms, *harmony* and *synthesis* are synonyms. Hence, the principle of harmony may lead to dialectical solutions, provided that the components of dialectical perception and information processing are given. As it was shown, Indonesian subjects present dialectical solutions governed by the principle of harmony (see example 18). However, many solutions are nondialectical, even though dialectical reasoning exists with regard to the components of perception and information processing. One alternative is suppressed in favor of the other one. In most cases, for example, the contradiction between personal wishes and social/societal demands is solved by renunciation of the personal wishes, which are classified as "egoistic." In the career dilemma, many subjects view both life styles as incompatible and insist that one should avoid a combination or compromise between them. The fight between competing alternatives is often avoided. Furthermore, we find much more often the social theory being at stage IIIb than the personality theory, which in turn is more often to be found at stage IIIa.

On the whole, dialectical thinking seems to proceed more "smoothly" than with Western subjects. Thus, dialectical thinking seems to occur in another variant than in Western cultures.

Décalages vs. Structural Difference

A structural approach allows the existence of domain-specific differences with regard to the achieved stage. The cross-cultural comparison between American and Indonesian subjects reveals décalages which show the opposite tendencies for the two groups. American subjects who use dialectical thinking in the career dilemma often argue at level IIIa with regard to their social theory. This means that, within the domain of personality theory, level IIIb (see Table 2) is reached, whereas the social theory is at level IIIa (abbreviated as PIIIb-SIIIa structure). For Indonesian subjects the shift is reversed. Many subjects construct their social theory at level IIIb, while they have difficulties in using dialectical thinking because their personality theory is at level IIIa (abbreviated as PIIIa-SIIIb structure).

An explanation for this difference can be found if one considers the typical social relations in both cultures. For Americans, only family relations remain stable over a long period of time, while social contacts with other persons are only superficial in many cases and change rather often. In the career dilemma, social relations outside the family become important, for example, the mutual influences of both actors. Hence, American subjects often perform SIIIa. In Indonesia, besides the family bonds, social relations outside the family are important and stable, as was described earlier. Thus, the subjects are able to take into consideration the mutual relationship among members of a group or between two partners, as is the case in the career dilemma. Therefore, they more often produce SIIIb. Dialectical thinking, on the other hand, is more difficult to achieve, since the cultural pressure toward adaptation to social/religious norms suggests nondialectical reasoning. In this case, PIIIa is produced. Nevertheless, a substantial number of subjects perform dialectical reasoning, as was described earlier (see examples 11, 18, 19).

From a developmental point of view, the concept of décalage predicts that the difference between levels in personality and social theory will disappear with further development of the individual. It is not easy to prove this assumption, because development toward a higher stage does not necessarily occur. Even if the majority of a longitudinal sample showed no change after several years, the existence of a décalage would not be disproved, since one may assume that cognitive development stopped at this point. The inspection of our material reveals that a sufficient number of individuals reached synchrony of stages in the four domains listed in Table 2. Therefore the assumption of the existence of décalages seems meaningful. On the other hand, it is also meaningful to consider the described differences between domains as structures per se. Since a sufficient number of subjects in America show the PIIIb-SIIIa structure and many subjects in Indonesian produce a PIIIa-SIIIb structure, these structures can be regarded as typical for the cultures under consideration. The structures seem to represent specific characteristics of the culture in which they developed.

Both approaches seem to be useful but explain different aspects. The décalage concept is necessary if we search for universals in cross-cultural comparison, whereas the description of domain-specific differences as a structure per se better describes the relationship between individual and culture.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In this contribution, an approach of universal stages of conceptualization of human nature was used. However, it should be noted that the conception of *stage* is preliminary and serves as a heuristic principle. The conception of *universal stages* allows us to allocate and define more precisely cultural differences. The stages served as *tertium comparationis* in our study and can be taken as "etic" categories as against to "emic" categories, which are culture-specific (Pike, 1966; see also Triandis & Brislin, 1984). Emic categories turned out to be necessary, too. Typical culture-specific concepts for Indonesian description of human nature are: *rukun* (harmony), *sopan santun* (the right and nice behavior), *rasa tenderam* (the feeling of calmness and peace), and *gotong royong* (mutual help). For Western cultures, we tentatively propose the concept of control and its circumscriptions, respectively, as a possible emic category. On the whole, one may conclude that the approach was helpful to elaborate similarities and differences between cultures. Further research in other cultures may show whether the approach of universal structures of understanding of human nature holds its ground.

A last remark seems necessary with regard to the term *stage*. The author emphasizes a developmental perspective which should be combined with cultural psychology (see, e.g., Valsiner, 1987). If we postulate universal stages of the conception of human being, we accept the existence of general developmental laws that make humans equal all over the world, beyond the dramatic differences caused by the culture in which the individual happens to live. Thus the notion that all humans are brothers (and sisters) receives new stimulation.

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PART IV

Cultural Organization of "Intellectual Competence"

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

The term *intelligence* (and its more sophisticated relative—*competence*) belong to those concepts where our collective culturally guided common sense and scientific terminology have had an indeterminate overlap. As a result, psychologists' empiricistic efforts in their areas of research on intelligence or cognitive competence have been corroborated by relatively vague uses of the terms in their indeterminate meanings. On the one hand, the issues of the concepts of intelligence and competence lead us to address the issue of the role of common-sense concepts in psychological terminology (see Siegfried, 1993). On the other hand, however, it becomes a topic of interest for the co-constructionist perspective in developmental psychology to look carefully at the linkage of the use of psychological terms and the human action contexts within which these terms are used by the laypersons.

Chapter 9 (by Marta Kohl de Oliveira) takes the reader to the intricately complex context of a "shantytown" *(favela)* in São Paulo, Brazil. The author helps the naive Euro-American reader to overcome a number of preconceived stereotypes about other cultures. What from a distance looks very poor and crime-ridden context, where social outcasts of the society terrorize people, becomes understood as a poor rural community that is recreated in the middle of the affluent urban world. The community is organized socially by a set of specific (albeit conditionally applicable) social rules. The contexts in which persons' capabilities for adaptation to an alien world of bureaucracy and power is constantly being tested, set up conditions for the meaning of intelligence that are clearly differentiated from the notion of schooling. The home territory of the *favela* becomes a miniworld for its inhabitants, where collective support for one another is a relevant adaptation strategy. The social structure of the local community allows for the particular special skills of selected persons to be used as "foci of competence," rending it less necessary to develop these specific skills in other persons' repertoires. The psychologists' habitual meaning of intelligence (and its traditional measurement devices) would fit poorly into the world of people in the *favela*, where life needs to go on despite the poverty and uncertainty of life conditions.

Finally, in Chapter 10, Daphne Keats provides us with a cross-cultural analysis of the meanings of intelligence. Keats's work stems from the traditions of cross-cultural psychology; therefore her contribution does not include a detailed description of her subjects' social world comparable in detail to that in the previous chapter. Still, the basic aspects of cross-cultural differences that Keats discovered parallel Oliveira's cultural-ecological analysis. The collective culture in all cases sets up some guidance for what the individual persons acting within their environments begin to consider as relevant aspects of intellectual competence.

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CHAPTER 9

The Meaning of Intellectual Competence: Views from a *Favela*[*]

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People learn how to perform cognitively in the specific environments where they live, and in these environments they repeatedly carry out meaningful tasks that involve cognitive abilities. It is within a certain home and community setting that human beings, equipped with a biological potential for cognitive performance, actually become capable of operating cognitively, in response to the particular demands of that setting and according to the specific training there obtained. Cognitive functioning occurs in particular situations and only makes sense in reference to these situations. Abilities are used for specific ends, and both the ends and the abilities are integrated in a context that makes sense as a whole. Different tasks may have different meaning across cultures, across different groups within the same culture, and even across individuals.

Individuals, growing up in their cultural settings, develop their own conceptions about intellectual competence, acquisition and use of cognitive abilities, and organization of these abilities within different situations. These individual conceptions are neither independent from the cultural conditions nor completely determined by them. There is intense interchange between social processes and internal psychological mechanisms, as is thoroughly discussed by Benigni and Valsiner (this volume). To interpret the meaning of intellectual competence in a certain cultural environment, then, it is important to understand the context in which people operate and their own views about cognitive processes.

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[*] I would like to thank Jaan Valsiner for his incentive and extremely careful comments on my chapter.

The present chapter is based on a study developed in a *favela* in the city of São Paulo in 1980–1981 (Oliveira, 1982). *Favela* is a kind of squatter settlement existing in large Brazilian cities. Since there is no English term that refers precisely to the same kind of settlement, the original Portuguese word will be used throughout this work. The selection of a low-socioeconomic-status (SES) community for this study was aimed at contributing to the understanding of cognitive processes as they occur in real life situations of a significant segment of the Brazilian urban population. In the domain of cognition, low-SES groups are often defined as disadvantaged, incompetent, and unable to cope with the demands of modern life. Their own mode of cognitive functioning, however, is usually not studied. The numerous studies on "cultural deprivation" refer to the people's characteristics and patterns of behavior that are different from those of the middle class, and point to their "inappropriateness." Research in this area is usually directed to finding the cause of these "handicaps" in the early patterns of socialization and in the home environment of the people. Little research is done on the cognitive skills that *are* displayed in low-SES environments, as responses to the specific situational demands of these environments.

It is important to mention that life in the Brazilian *favelas* remained very similar throughout these years, which makes the study still adequate as a general description nowadays. Besides, a longitudinal case study of a specific environment has always more value in itself than as an instance of a larger class of phenomena that should be understood inductively.

The researcher worked during 18 months in the *favela*, as a teacher of a government-run adult education course, designed as a literacy program followed by an equivalent to 2nd, 3rd, and 4th grades of elementary school. Her role as a teacher was the starting point for her immersion in the community life and for the development of an ethnographic study of the community dwellers. The ethnographic data-gathering process was designed to collect information about the situational demands for cognitive abilities faced by the people studied, and about their performance in the different tasks they have to cope with in their daily life environment. The investigation was focused mainly on home and community settings, but, given the location of the *favela* and its relationships with the encompassing urban environment, characteristics of the large city were also observed as important elements in the delineation of the people's daily life environment. The adult night school setting was also intensively observed. Work settings were not directly observed; some information about them was obtained through verbal reports given by the subjects. In an interview done with some members of the community, a set of questions about the concept of intelligence and its relationships to schooling were included. These questions were asked to provide some systematic information on people's conceptions about intellectual competence.

Relying on a subset of data from the original study, the present chapter will present, in a first part, an ethnographic description of aspects of the context of the *favela* that relate more directly to the understanding of intellectual competence by an outsider. In a second part, the interpretations of "intelligence" by the *favela* people provide something closer to an "insider's view" of the question of the meaning of intellectual competence.

THE ETHNOGRAPHIC DESCRIPTION OF THE CONTEXT

The Social Economic Background of the Favela

Almost all of the persons contacted in the *favela* are recent migrants from rural underdeveloped areas of the country (mainly from the northeastern states), born and raised on farms or in very small villages. São Paulo is the biggest and the richest city in the country (located in the Southeast, the most developed region of the country) and, consequently, one of the most attractive poles for rural migrants. The northeast region is constituted by some of the poorest states in Brazil and is, traditionally, the region that loses the largest masses of migrants to the southeastern region. This origin is very powerful in their definition of themselves, as well as in others' perception of them. The dichotomies big city × rural areas, São Paulo × northeastern states, and high SES × low SES define central attributes in the construction of their own and of others' perception about "who they are." The identity of the "poor migrant from rural northeastern areas" has, then, two complementary aspects: on the one hand, it means being a part of a social category recognized by outsiders, and on the other hand, it constitutes a basic existential dimension for the persons who carry this identity with them.

Their characterization, by others, as a defined social group involves both a complex system of recognition of features related to social and regional origin (accent, physical appearance, material and cultural goods consumed, etc.), and a depreciative stereotype which is reflected in fictional images like jokes and TV types that picture the "typical" member of this group and in various terms used to refer to them.

With regard to the identity of the "poor migrant from rural northeastern areas" as a basic existential dimension for the persons who have this identity, the three dichotomies above (big city × rural areas, São Paulo × northeastern states, high SES × low SES) constitute the main dimensions along with the *favela* dwellers locate themselves and others. Every time a definition of self or of others is at play, the contrasts between "we from the country" and "they from the city," "we from the northeast" and "they from São Paulo," or "we the poor" and "they the rich" is made explicit.

To have the identity "poor migrant from rural northeastern areas" has the implication, at the symbolic level, of wearing a label recognized by members and nonmembers of a social group. To be a member of this specific social group, on the other hand, has concrete implications for the organization of everyday life. To leave a small northeastern village and come to São Paulo is certainly a very significant event in someone's life, an event which proves to occupy a central place in people's social relations, present life organization, and life projects.

Social Relationships in the Migrant Community

Regarding social relationships, there is intense interaction among people who come from the same place and are presently in the same situation. People in "Paraisópolis" (the name of the *favela)* come from various municipal districts of many states of the country (39 different ones for the 73 subjects studied), but there is a marked concentration of their places of origin in some quite restricted areas of the country. Of course, it is not by chance that people end up in the same *favela* in São Paulo, but precisely because there are kinship and friendship ties that define the destination of new migrants within the city. There are many ways by which people can get from their places of origin to the place where their friends and relatives live in São Paulo. People already living in São Paulo sometimes go home especially to bring a close relative to the city, according to a plan made in advance. When there is no special trip organized, any relative, friend, or acquaintance who goes home and returns to São Paulo for any reason can serve as a companion and a "guide" to someone who wants to go to São Paulo. Another alternative is to make plans by mail and have someone waiting for the new migrant at the bus terminal on a certain day and time. When the person goes to São Paulo, not knowing anyone in the city or where to look for relatives or acquaintances who are already there (which occurs almost only in the case of young males), he could start out by himself and still end up finding a neighborhood that concentrates people from his region of origin, through a chain of networks or poor migrants in the city into which he could enter through work mates or informal conversations initiated in public places like the bus terminal, parks, and bars.

The community brings together, then, many overlapping networks of relatives and acquaintances, which are the basis of a strong solidarity among the community members and which help to maintain the bonds of the persons with their places of origin and with the people who stayed behind. These bonds are kept through the exchange of letters and oral news (taken back and forth by the persons who go home for a visit), the bringing of relatives to São Paulo either to live or to stay temporarily, visits to the birth place, regular or sporadic help to relatives and friends (through money or goods), and acquisition of land or houses in the place of origin. The very maintenance of these bonds reinforces the solidarity networks that operate in São Paulo, for people need each other there in order to activate these mechanisms of interaction with the places of origin (bringing of relatives, money, or letters; money lending for traveling, etc.).

These bonds are very important, for people always have present the alternatives of "staying in São Paulo" or "going back home." It seems that to have left their birthplace and to have come to São Paulo created, for these people, a permanent awareness of the existence of a life option for them. This option is not a real option most of the time, for powerful concrete life conditions limit the possibilities of accomplishing the plans they have. But the fact is that their presence in São Paulo is perceived as nondefinitive, while the incontestability of their pertinence to their place of origin was broken by migration.

São Paulo is seen as a good place to work and earn money, but not as a particularly good place to live. Relatives, friends, and very often a small property in the Northeast are things that remind people that they do have a place of their own somewhere else. "Good" and "bad" features of the two places are brought up all the time, and the specific plan individuals have in mind at each moment usually includes both places in a temporal sequence. Or, at least, one of the places is included in an alternative project if the one given priority does not work out.

To belong to this specific social group is, as described above, crucial to the building of the social and the self-identity of the group members, as well as to the concrete organization of their lives. It is also intimately related to the characteristics discussed below: the importance of the social component in the organization of life and the instability in the living and work arrangements.

Social orientation in the organization of life. Life in the *favela* is basically a collective pursuit. Most of the solutions to everyday problems involve other people, and there is a permanent exchange of goods and services among individuals and families. The intense social interaction, and the social obligations related to it, are very strong among family members and also among friends, neighbors, and community members in general. This is closely related to the people's common origin and similar situation in the big city currently, as discussed before. The social exchanges include both the organization of "regular" life (child care, food preparation, doing laundry, etc.) and crisis situations (illnesses, death, unemployment). Many men who live alone pay some women in the neighborhood to do their laundry and/or prepare their meals. The few *favela* dwellers who have a car take people back and forth frequently, especially when there are urgent problems to be solved, like taking someone to the hospital or going for someone arriving at the bus terminal. Many women take care of neighbors' children, regularly or sporadically. People are often asked to do specific tasks for others, like helping to build something, watching their house while they are out, lending money, and so on. It is rather common to have a young unmarried girl (usually a sister or a niece of one of the members of the household head couple) living in the house in order to help with child care and other domestic tasks.

Although most of the households in Paraisópolis are declared to be nuclear family homes, they often include members of the extended family. These relatives are frequently not acknowledged as members of the household, for their presence is usually defined as temporary and as not changing the basic composition of the household. That is, they are perceived as "extra" people in a house—by definition, a nuclear family home. In practice, however, at any given moment, many of the family households do include some other people besides the parents and the children. There is, also, a constant presence of many people in the various environments and in the different situations. There are always "witnesses" to every event, and outsiders in all situations. This fact creates a very efficient system for spreading information and also a constant availability of potential helpers for needs that happen to arise.

Regarding the spreading of information, there is a constant exchange of news about the community members' regular lives. People always discuss what happens to others and are ready to answer questions about themselves and others. There is also very rapid dissemination of news about extraordinary events like a fight in the street, an accident, a party, the arrival of a stranger, etc. The numerous children who are always in the streets and around absolutely all happenings are very important vehicles in the process of information transmission. Other important centers of information getting and spreading are small commercial establishments that sell liquor, soft drinks, snacks, and usually some groceries, called *bars*, in Brazil. They are typically male places (sometimes they have billiard tables, too) and exist in large number in any neighborhood, particularly those of the lower SES.

Social relationships and the use of space. The intensity of social relations reflects and is reflected in the spatial organization of people in the *favela*. The typical *favela* construction is called a *barraco*. It is a kind of hut (the word that will be used throughout this chapter to refer to it), usually a rectangular building of about 4 × 5 meters, made out of irregular pieces of wood patched together. They usually have from one to four rooms, which are a result of precarious internal subdivision of a larger space.

There is no direct relationship between the size of the house and the number of people living in it—all kinds of arrangements can be seen, from single males living in four-room houses to seven-person families living in single rooms. The precariousness of most of the arrangements is due to the instability of people in this environment: While a single man lives in too large a hut because he is planning to bring his mother and maybe other relatives to live with him later on, a large family may live in crowded conditions because its members are there just temporarily, planning to build a larger hut or leave the *favela* soon. The situation of the *favela* as such also invites nondefinitive solutions. Lately, however, some people have been building brick houses—cheaper than well-built wood houses—hoping that this more solid settlement could be favorable to them in an eventual dispute for the ownership of the land. The occurrence of different individual solutions regarding type of housing is, also, closely related to the governmental policy towards *favelas* at each specific moment: Brick houses are built when the policy is less repressive and the government is willing to accept more definitive arrangements in the *favelas*.

In general there is a separation between the social and the private section of the house, although the private part can be used socially when there is a need for it. In fact, most of the houses are extremely small, with superposition of different functions in a single place, with many people sleeping in the same room and, very frequently, in the same bed. Probably because of the limitations of the available space, things within the houses tend to be extremely well organized. It is very common to see different kinds of devices hanging from the walls, used to accommodate specific objects: a nail for a bottle opener, a set of little ropes for the potlids, a fabric envelope with one little case for each toothbrush, a plastic bag for records, etc. This kind of careful internal organization, together with an explicit concern about order and the nice appearance of the house (pictures on the walls, adornment objects on pieces of furniture, flowers, etc.), was observed in most of the houses.

The outside space by the house is intensively used, be it fenced as a private back yard or shared as a common external area. In this area there is a little house for the water closet, clotheslines, some extra space for kitchen-related activities, and sometimes a well. These commodities may be used by the members of just one household, but they are usually collectively utilized, even when the yard is fenced. In fact, since the huts are concentrated in small areas and people tend to keep doors and windows open, the common use of space may be extended to the internal part of the houses. The social section is very often entered by people from other households, mainly women and children.

The *favela* as a whole has a quite orderly appearance, with wide streets and rather clear cut blocks, probably because it was built on land already divided in lots and planned to be urbanized. Most of the streets have names, and most houses are lined up and have a number. There is one large street that cuts across the *favela* from one end to the other and is the main access route to all of its sections, being known and used by all of the dwellers. From the main streets towards the internal part of the blocks, however, the houses start to be placed in a disordered manner, forming many small and irregular alleys. These alleys have no name, and the houses, usually, no number.

People who live on streets with no name, in blind alleys, and/or in houses with no number, usually give an approximate indication of location as their official address. They give the name of the closest main street and the number of their own house, for example, or the name of the main street of the block and the number of the closest house that fronts this main street. Of course this formal address is not very useful for actually finding someone's house, although, given the social networks and information spreading system, when one gets to the given address, it is not difficult to get to the person wanted. When actually indicating to someone how to get to their house, people will use other resources than that of giving their formal address. They will usually indicate a route to be followed through known points of reference and give a description of the physical appearance of their house and of other places along the way.

Important elements in the organization of the space are the bars and little grocery stores. There are many of them scattered about the community, and they are the main reference points for spatial orientation within the *favela*. People invariably indicate where they live or where to find some site by mentioning at least one bar as a place to start the unknown part of the way, a corner at which to turn or a place from which to see something else. After the bars and grocery stores, the most commonly used reference points are events. People mention "the street where there was a fight the other day," "the corner where we met John," and so on, as indicators of specific places. The big street that cuts across the *favela* is also a central landmark, and some key places along it are often mentioned: a creek that crosses it, a paved street it crosses, and the community center building. The so-called "community center" is a large brick building and an important institution within the *favela*, where many activities take place: it contains a day care center, classrooms for school children, and a Catholic youth group, and provides Catholic mass, medical assistance, and the adult night classes.

With regard to the use of the city space, most of the people have their lives almost entirely organized within the *favela* and its immediate surroundings. Of course, within a huge city like São Paulo, the inhabitants usually restrict their lives to a rather small area, sometimes not even knowing other sections of the city. But for the people studied, this spatial restriction is still more remarkable. The *favela* is located in a neighborhood far away from central areas of the city and, despite its proximity to the rich mansions and to large avenues, it is spatially isolated from highly urbanized sections of the city. It also lacks good transportation—there are very few bus stops within walking distance. This spatial circumscription, combined with the similarity of origin of the migrants and with the intensity of their social interchanges, characterizes the *favela* as much more of an enclosed community within the big city than most other neighborhoods. There is a clear division between the inside and outside space, and most of each person's life happens in the internal space of the *favela*. Within the *favela*, the people have many relatives and friends, as well as their church, school, grocery shops, and small stores. Many people also work within walking distance of home and virtually never go beyond the *favela* boundaries. This is true especially for older women, who are completely dependent on their husbands, children, or other relatives to do anything besides accomplishing the daily domestic routine.

Regarding life outside the limits of the *favela*, each person gets to know new sections of the city according to his or her own needs. These needs are usually related to the location of work places or of the house of a relative or friend, or to some specific event like the use of a medical or legal service, obtaining documents from certain government agencies, etc. The usual ways of learning how to get to a certain place is to go with someone the first time and then become able to go alone, to ask other people the way to the destination, or else to go to a known place (usually downtown) and then find the appropriate sequence of buses to be taken by asking other people at each step of the way.

Although most of the people do not known much of the city, there are a few places that are known by many and frequently used as reference points when any sort of spatial indication is made. Except for some more global points of reference (three nearby neighborhoods and some locations downtown), these places are quite specific spots, very close to the *favela*. They are: the state government house and a soccer stadium, two enormous buildings rather close to the *favela*; two large private schools, also very near; a supermarket; a National Social Security Program hospital; a street market, a factory, an amusement park, and a dancing place, all nearby places used by the dwellers when they do go out of the *favela* for the specific purposes these places serve; and some houses in the rich neighborhood around the *favela*, where TV stars or famous singers live or used to live.

While the *favela* is a unity within the space of the city, it is not taken as a totality by the community members in their everyday use of the internal space. First, there is a split of the *favela* in two vaguely defined sections, known as the "lower *favela*" and the "upper *favela*," in reference to the topography of the land. This division is based on a disagreement between groups that live in each of the two sections, which was stronger in the past and now persists as a latent rivalry usually brought out in critical situations like street fights, robberies, and so on. Apart from this conflictive split, most of the people do restrict their lives to one single area of the *favela*, sometimes not even knowing other sections of it.

Personal lives in the favela environment and the "foci of competence." The organization of each person's everyday life seems to be, then, intimately related to the dynamics of the community as a whole. Life seems to function essentially as a group phenomenon. This has a very important implication for the structuring of people's responses to everyday life demands and to the development and use of different abilities. One could say that the necessary competencies are necessary within the group and not within each individual. The ability to solve a specific problem needs only to exist somewhere in the community, for this is enough for the problem to be solved. More than to the division of tasks (like "women cook, men build the house," for example), this refers to the concentration of capacities in some members of the group who centralize, in each problem situation, the strategies for its solution. On a small trip with the students, for example, only two persons in the group knew which buses should be taken, where they could be caught, and the time it would take to go from the *favela* to the destination of the group. They naturally lead the group, and the ignorance of all others (including the teacher's) was not a problem at all and not even mentioned. One of the subjects, to mention another example, is the one in his house who "knows the city." Anything that involves going somewhere outside the family's small circle of everyday locomotion must be done by him or with his assistance.

There is another very important aspect of this "socialization of the problem solving strategies." It seems that there are some key persons in the community who are "foci of competence"; that is, they concentrate in themselves most of the necessary abilities to solve the problems faced by the community members in general. Three persons could be identified as "foci of competence" throughout the field work period. One of these foci is a young woman who is a teacher in the *favela* night school. She works during the day in the community center and teaches at night, in order to support her mother and five siblings. She possesses much general "useful information" (like where to look for a lawyer or a doctor, where the closest hospital is, how to proceed to adopt a child), knows the city very well, and has mastered the rules of the bureaucratic system. She also has an important network of acquaintances in high-SES groups, particularly through the social workers and the religious persons who work in the community center. Her family members and closest friends do not do anything without her support and help, and she is asked to perform numerous tasks for other people, too. She is a strong authority figure for the children who attend the community center, and the center itself relies very much on her for its daily functioning and for its extraordinary activities.

Another "focus of competence" is one of the students of the second-to-fourth-grade group, whose performance as such could be observed in the school life. He was an excellent student and led the group in most of the classroom activities. He also played the guitar, coordinated party games, wrote theater plays, composed songs, and created shows for the students to perform. The other students counted on him for everything, not organizing anything or taking any steps without his initiative or support. He also knows the city very well and has mastered the rules of the bureaucratic system.

The third person identified as a "focus of competence" is a young man not related to the school or the community center at all, but who became known because of the aforementioned information network and because he is a central "character" in the community. He knows how to drive, has a car of his own, and works as the personal driver of the most popular singer in Brazil. His occupation gives him, not only great prestige among his peers, but also an objective set of privileges because of being in constant interaction with "famous people" and higher social class groups. People in the *favela* count on him when they need transportation (particularly in emergency situations) and when they need to obtain various types of information and help.

There are certainly many other "foci of competence" in the community, but since the interaction of the investigator in the *favela* was based on her involvement with the school, most of her relationships were with members of only some of the subgroups inside the *favela*. Her identification of people as "foci of competence" was, then, restricted to the display of certain kinds of abilities and not others. The kinds of abilities that were observed have two marked characteristics: they are *modern* (that is, they are related to urban, bureaucratic, complex society), and they are *positive* (that is, they refer to socially desirable attributes). Given the limitations of the investigator's contacts in the community, people who are "foci of competence" in other spheres of life could not be identified. However, it is rather likely that there are people who concentrate more "traditional" kinds of abilities (like midwives, specialists in medicinal herbs, craftspeople, etc.), as well as people who are extremely skillful in areas not considered positive (like robbers, drug dealers, etc.).

Violence in the favela and its social framing. With regard to the strength of the social component in the organization of life in the *favela*, it is important to discuss an aspect that, in a certain sense, remains hidden when the analysis is focused on questions like solidarity, mutual help, and social exchange. This aspect is the violence that is present in many spheres of community life and acts at various levels.

There is a general aspect of violence that is not particular to the situation of the *favela* dwellers and is not discussed in detail in this work, for it is beyond its scope. This aspect refers to violence in modern society, particularly in urban areas, and to the oppression to which members of the lower SES classes are submitted daily in their very relationships with society as a whole. Closely related to this generalized violence are the rivalries among different subgroups within the *favela*. There rivalries are the "hidden side" of solidarity. The strong solidarity within subgroups inside the *favela* brings about a behavior of protection and loyalty towards one's peers, even when this implies actively taking negative attitudes towards outsiders (through gossip and verbal or physical aggression).

Also related to the violence and conflicts of modern society is an internal process of exploitation in the community. An example of this process is the real estate business. The huts where people live, all built on illegally occupied land, are subject to commercial transactions (buying, selling, and renting). Since there is no legal protection for these transactions (for they are illegal), there are a large number of people who seriously exploit others. There are some who rent many huts in the *favela*, earning enough to live, themselves, in a house in a better place outside of the *favela*. The small grocery stores within the *favela* are another example of the internal exploitation processes. Since people are usually not able to go for groceries outside the *favela* (because supermarkets and other grocery stores are very far away, and there is no convenient public transportation), they must buy in the little stores within it. Besides the convenience of their location, these stores sell things on credit, which is, for most of the people, essential for survival. Having their clients practically obliged to buy from them, the grocers ask very high prices, sometimes twice what could be gotten in other places. This is not to say that the grocers (or the house dealers) are "villains" in the *favela*, taking advantage of poor people for their own benefit. Their own situation, in fact, is not much different from that of the other community members. The point is that the solidarity observed in the *favela* does not create a harmonious world, isolated from the rules of the encompassing social system: here, too, nonreciprocal social exchanges are based on individual struggle for a better place in the system.

Besides this more general aspect of violence present in the *favela*, there are characteristics of people's attitudes and behavior that can generate violent events in everyday life, and that tend to create a climate of tension in many situations. One of these characteristics is the morality adopted by people. It seems that there is a very radical judgment about moral questions, which separates very clearly the "good" from the bad," the "normal" from the "abnormal," stigmatizing, in the discourse, persons who are at the "condemnable" pole of the dichotomies. This kind of judgment does not admit intermediary types: the single girl is either a virgin or she is depraved; the individual is either honest or a thief, etc. In practice, however, all kinds of people live in the *favela* (exactly because a *favela* within a metropolitan area tends to concentrate a higher proposition of "socially undesirable" types like homosexuals, prostitutes, thieves, drug addicts, and so on, than other kinds of neighborhoods), and they are integrated in the community life with no restrictions. Also, the behavior of "normal" people may include some stealing, lying or cheating, with no blame from their fellow *favela* dwellers and no personal guilt. It seems that moral values are viewed relative to the specific circumstances in which the behavior occurs. So, principles like "stealing is wrong," "physical aggression is bad," and even "killing is condemnable" are applicable or not, depending on the situation. Reputation and personal dignity have a great weight in the definition of what to do in each situation. If you hit someone because he offended your mother, your behavior is not only defensible but also honorable. To kill the murderer of your father is almost an obligation.

There is a close relationship between the importance of the networks of social exchanges and the fact of violence in everyday life, mainly for two reasons. First, both of these features are intrinsically related to the precariousness of life conditions; differently from other social groups, the intensity of social exchanges in the *favela* community is essential for individual survival. Second, the "ambiguous" morality and the resulting violence tend to strengthen group ties, and the group ties generate loyalty and protective behavior that may imply aggressive attitudes toward outsiders. This is true both for the community as a whole towards nonmembers, and for the subgroups within the *favela* towards each other.

Instability in Living and Work Arrangements

Closely related both to the situation of the people as rural migrants in the big city and to the strength of the social component in the organization of their lives, a third characteristic runs through the many spheres of life observed: the instability in the living and work arrangements that operate at each moment. The solutions given for each situation seem to be always temporary, subject to radical changes at any time. From the perspective of the middle class notions about having a stable life and integrating its main components (like housing, work and school) into a whole that should have continuity, the *favela* dwellers' arrangements appear to be "irrational," based on a very peculiar scale of priorities.

People move, change jobs, travel, enter and leave school extremely often. One student, for example, dropped out of school because his sister-in-law moved away from his house and his wife did not want to stay alone at night; another missed a day of school because it was payday and he was afraid of burglary in the streets (which really is more frequent on the tenth of the month, the usual payday for workers); still another student missed more than a month and a half of classes because his sister had a baby and he had to go to her house to keep her company and help with the house and the older children; a student abandoned his job as a domestic worker because he was hired to do the gardening and the boss asked him to clean the windows; another gave up work in order to go traveling with her family; numerous subjects declared having left their jobs because they had had them for too long a period.

At first this instability may seem to be the result of a certain general "style," possibly related to a lack of some basic abilities necessary to the management of life in a more stable way. The intense interaction of the researcher in the environment, however, led to the perception that this frequent change in arrangements is a result of the precarious conditions in which these people live. Instability is a constant in their situation independently of their own wants or acts: They may lose their jobs at anytime, the school courses available may be suddenly closed, they may be thrown out of their houses or even have the whole *favela* torn down by governmental authorities. Given this uncertainty in their lives, it is probably sensible, most of the time, to provoke changes in the concrete arrangements at work. In principle there is nothing to be lost, and so the willingness to risk to perhaps obtain an amelioration is very functional. Why would people fight to maintain an unfavorable situation? Also, given the importance of the group for the individual life, the activities related to the social relationships have priority over others. So, to do things like missing a day of work in order to take a neighbor to the hospital is probably very wise, for they ensure a certain position within the social network that may be crucial to one's own survival at a later time. There is still another aspect of this provoked side of instability: It gives people a sense of control over their own lives.

Thinking of jobs. The frequent change of jobs is one of the most marked differences between the unstable behavior of the *favela* dwellers and the behavior considered desirable within the standards of modern urban life. In other social groups a person's job is almost a part of his or her identity: It is a rather stable point of reference in everyday life, and it is probably a step in a lifelong occupational career. For the community members being studied, it is not. Working is just a necessary part of life, essentially related to survival. There is a clear consciousness of the fact that, given the present social structure, the situation of poverty is inherent to their lives. The perspectives of amelioration are always kept within the bounds of low-SES models. The criteria for defining *what a good job is represents, basically, a concern with making the unquestionable* obligation of daily work for survival less difficult. The criteria include the income, the nonmonetary advantages (like closeness to home—meaning less money and time spent in commuting—food supplied by the boss, etc.), the "lightness" of the work (usually referring to the distinction between manual and nonmanual work), the relationships with the boss, and the degree of personal autonomy within the job. This last criterion is related primarily to the dream of "working by oneself," with no boss, but also refers to the absence of close supervision and usually to work done outdoors, with change of places and no restriction to a single enclosed space; this is also closely related to the characteristics of rural work on small properties, which, although very heavy and demanding, does not have the oppressive routine of urban jobs. These criteria refer to the expectations of people regarding what a good job would be, and they guide them in choosing among the available positions at each moment but are usually not fulfilled by the jobs actually obtained.

The willingness to change jobs is very much related to the types of jobs available to these people. Since they are at a very low level of qualification and instruction, they are competing for low-level jobs, all more or less equivalent regarding wages, promotion opportunities, and types of tasks involved. Any small amelioration with respect to the basic criteria discussed above represents a profit for the person, and any annoyance may be the reason for quitting the job, for another equivalent one is certainly available somewhere else. That is, these workers are in a market made up of basically equivalent hard jobs, where they move constantly in search for small advantages like a little increase in earnings, a place within walking distance, a nice workmate to go with from home to work. It seems also that people perceive negative consequences in staying for a long time in a single job, particularly in the civil construction occupations. The employee who stays for a long time ends up having to act as an "ally" of the boss, being an object of requests for fidelity and extra responsibilities while, at the same time, not getting an equivalent raise in wages and work stability. So it is wiser to be a new worker all the time, free from the pressures and abuses which accompany a deeper relationship with the boss.

Life plans under uncertainty. The fact that the instability in arrangements is a *result* of the general precariousness of life and not one of its causes can be observed with regard to each person's life project. Immersed in their everyday struggle, people do have a very well-defined life project in reference to which they organize their present lives. These projects are not structured as "impossible dreams" (like going to the university, having a big house, or managing an industry), but as quite reasonable plans to be executed within a short period of time. People make decisions and organize their present lives with some future plan in mind. Virtually all are able to express a structured life project that guides their present life organization. In this sense, the many unstable arrangements can be understood as even more sensible solutions, for they are steps taken towards defined objectives. Of course these steps are usually quite risky, and the objectives may not be attained even though they do exist. This is the central point regarding the observed instability in the arrangements that operate at each moment: People do have short- and long-term projects around which they organize their lives; they find temporary solutions for their everyday situations with regard to these projects. The problem is that the resulting life organization and temporary solutions end up being the permanent situation, for people's projects are usually not accomplished, given the weight of the concrete problems faced. An interaction is created, then, between the precariousness of everyday life, with its inherent insecurity, and the instability provoked by the way people deal with the situations. A vicious cycle is triggered, where instability generates instability. A certain "fatalism" must become a part of daily functioning, for it is practically impossible to plan things in advance with a high probability that they will actually occur. It seems that things go more or less fortuitously, with no control, and in the end they work out, somehow. There is no real detailed planning in advance for events that might occur, and the arrangements are all unarticulated.

The role of leaders in this situation is essential. In the specific case of school, the presence of the teacher and of the student mentioned as a "focus of competence" was crucial for the accomplishment of projects like the presentation of a theater play, the organization of a musical show, or the preparation of a school party. The leaders must make a great effort in order to accomplish a project, and they must struggle with constant challenges—confusion during parties, rehearsals disturbed by nonmembers of the group, members who may abandon the project because of travelling or other personal problems, lack of serious commitment from outside institutions and persons, lack of resources to deal with unexpected failures in the process. It is important to emphasize again that this situation is not a result of a lack of competence on the part of these people, but of the general precariousness of life in the *favela*, including the action of forces that are out of people's control. That is, even when people's behavior is totally oriented to the accomplishment of a certain project, the instability of their own lives, the influence of disruptive behavior from other *favela* dwellers, and the inefficiency of outside institutions may work against the success of the project.

Management of monetary and nonmonetary income. The basic source of money for the people studied is, obviously, the wages received in exchange for daily work. But these wages are very low, sometimes not even enough to supply their basic regular needs, and certainly not enough for saving or for covering extra expenses resulting from any kind of exceptional event. People use, then, many mechanisms for increasing the availability of money, goods, and services.

The most common practice for increasing family resources is to have many of its members working, in or outside the home, in exchange for money. The women who do not work outside the home usually do some kind of at-home task like taking care of children while their mothers go to work, washing other persons' clothes, doing some needlework, selling clothes or other objects, preparing meals for other households, and so on. Single males who live alone or with friends are the most common customers of neighbor women for all kinds of domestic services.

Children are also put to work very early. It is virtually the rule for children from 12 years old on to do some kind of job to contribute to the family income (one can see children as young as 8 working in exchange for money). Given the proximity to the rich neighborhood and the type of interaction between the rich and the poor population, the children very often find jobs as "junior maids." They are usually paid very low salaries (something like a third or a fourth of the minimum wage), and may even not be paid at all, getting a meal a day or some used pieces of clothing once in a while. They are hired to wash cars, clean the garden, and possibly help the other maids with some small tasks inside the house. This type of job may be part time, allowing the child to go to school during the day. When not sent to work, children are supposed to do a lot at home, helping the mother with housework and child care or even substituting for her when she has to go to work.

The intense social interactions discussed before also constitute a regular way of increasing people's resources. The social networks and the permanent exchange of goods and services among individuals and families represent both a means of saving money (while a child is cared for by his or her godmother, for example, his or her parents do not have to pay someone else to do it) and a way of having alternative sources to resort to in case of need, which is crucial for survival in this environment. Besides the social networks that operate within the *favela*, the individuals and their families have important relationships with the high-SES families of their employers. Especially in the case of domestic workers, the bosses are usually regular contributors of food, used clothes, and other objects, as well as sporadic money lenders and helpers in many situations like unemployment of other family members, illnesses, need for doctors or lawyers, etc.

Still another system used by virtually all of the *favela* dwellers to balance their budget is purchasing by credit. The products needed for daily consumption are usually bought in the small grocery stores within the *favela*, and the expenses are paid at the end of the month or at the beginning of the next month, according to the payday of the debtor. Since the grocers are community members and the buying system is very much based on mutual trust, the payment of the debt may be delayed in case of need, functioning as a money-lending system. In practice this convenient buying system results in a form of imprisonment of the people to their present situation, for they are permanently in debt. When they pay what is due, there is no money left and they have to buy on credit again.

Since the material situation is always precarious, and regular sources of income are subject to frequent interruptions, any kind of extra entry of cash or of goods contributes a considerable profit for the person, even when there is no immediate special need to be satisfied. There are many ways of obtaining this extra income, deliberately put to work at any time the opportunity should arise. A mechanism very frequently used is the exchange and sale of used goods like TV sets, bicycles, and watches. Some people do this sporadically, in case of need (selling a radio set, for example, to obtain money to travel); others do it constantly, as a way of gaining small amounts of money or a more valuable item in each transaction. A person could exchange a used TV set for a used bicycle and 30 dollars, then give the bicycle and 20 dollars for a wrist watch, then get 70 dollars for the watch and immediately buy a newer and better bicycle, and so on. This person probably does not need or particularly want a TV set, a bicycle or a watch, but each transaction represents a gain that is actually a kind of savings with interest. The new bicycle could always be sold in case of need, and it would probably be more valuable than the TV set owned when the first transaction was made. Of course there is a component of "business spirit" in this type of activity, and some people have more advantages than others, in the long run. But in the ambit of each single transaction, the result is probably favorable to both parties, within their individual situation at that specific moment.

This system of selling and exchanging personal objects is a part of a set of mechanisms that occasionally includes some exploitation of others and socially condemnable acts like occasional stealing. It seems that there is a constant willingness, not only to increase the available amount of money and goods, but also to simply make the situation easier or more comfortable. This willingness, originating from real needs produced by the concrete situation faced, is combined with the previously discussed flexibility of the moral standards adopted and produces the aforementioned kind of behavior, like commerce of huts and land within the *favela*, selling of products for extremely high prices, and attempts to gain advantages over other people, even when they are one's own equals. On a trip made with a group of students and other community members, various examples of this type of behavior were observed. First, the student who organized the trip (that is, he was the intermediary between the bus agency and the travelers) asked for each bus ticket just its original price. After the trip was over, many students said he should have asked a higher price so that he could have made a profit on the trip. To make money from organizing the trip, even considering that it was a group enterprise of schoolmates and friends, was considered completely acceptable behavior. In fact, the trip organizer was judged as a little foolish for not having made the most of the opportunity. Also, during the trip, many people picked up small objects in stores and did not pay for them. They commented about this later on, referring to themselves as smart people, able to cheat the tradesmen who make easy money from the buyers, anyway. One specific fact was also meaningful during this trip: A man entered the bus to sell very cheap neck chains, and each person bought many; one student who tried them on managed to keep one without paying for it; later on another young woman got the chain from the student without him noticing it. She kept the chain, saying, "The thief who steals from a thief has a hundred years of indulgence" (this is a Brazilian proverb).

These mechanisms also include *all kinds of clever behavior towards the social* institutions, through the use of the facilities offered by the very functioning of the institutions. Some subjects, for example, used to go to doctors of the National Social Security Program with a fake complaint, just to get a certificate of medical care and so be able to miss a day of work with no reduction in their wages. One subject, to give another example, having neglected to pay some installments of a purchase on credit in a big store, was put on a list of consumers (of the municipal district of São Paulo) with no right to buy on credit anymore; the next time he wanted to buy on credit, he did it in a store formally located in another municipal district, although rather close to his house. Of course these kinds of "personal tricks" used by the community members to make the most of their opportunities are not specific to them as a group. But it is interesting to observe that they are informed about the functioning of the wide social system to the point of being able to take advantage of it to their own benefit.

This mode of managing the budget seems irrational when evaluated according to standards usually accepted as reasonable within a society where social rising is an aim for every citizen and a rational plan towards this objective must include accumulation of money and constant consumption of valuable goods. As previously discussed with regard to the instability in the life arrangements, the *favela* dwellers' different scale of priorities, apparently related to a lack of some basic abilities necessary to the management of life in the appropriate way, proved to be rather functional within their life conditions. To a person who lives under everyday pressures for survival, who has to resort to all kinds of mechanisms to keep a balanced budget, and who has to constantly rely on the help of relatives and friends, not going on a school trip in order to save 20 dollars, for example, would be completely meaningless. Events like a school trip do not happen frequently, to have 20 dollars (about a fifth of their wages) on hand is not usual, and saving this money would neither mean being in a better situation at the present time nor contribute to a constant saving process that would result in an amelioration of the situation in the long run. So, since the possible economy in the organization of leisure does not solve the problem of scarcity in daily life, it is wiser to make good use of the surplus while it is available. Members of a higher social class would probably never spend a fifth of their wages in one single Sunday of leisure, because this amount would be large enough to be more "rationally" employed and also because they probably have permanently available modes of recreation and relaxation to which portions of a regular and plentiful income were already consigned. In the case of the *favela* dwellers, anything besides shelter, food, and transportation must be obtained through mechanisms outside the scope of the basic income.

CONCEPTIONS ABOUT INTELLIGENCE AND SCHOOLING AMONG THE FAVELA PEOPLE

As briefly mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a long recorded interview was done with some members of the community in order to collect deeper individual data that could help to guide the ethnographic observations. This interview included a set of questions about the concept of intelligence and its relationships to schooling. It was answered by 14 subjects, all members of the second- to fourth-grade classroom taught by the researcher.

Although the group of subjects who answered these questions is small and not representative of the various subgroups existent within the *favela*, their answers provide relevant data on the question of intellectual competence. Their conceptions about the cognitive domain, together with the ethnographic observations, give a more realistic picture of the meaning of intellectual competence in the *favela*, combining the views of the researcher with views of members of the studied environment.

To Be Intelligent

The subjects tended to characterize intelligent people as those who are able, basically, to "make things," to create concrete products with their own hands: build house, do woodwork, do mechanical work, paint, make objects in straw, ceramics, and so on ("to make a clay pan, a straw hat, a sieve, whatever becomes a saleable piece is intelligence"; "I've known a man, for example, who built a car by himself and it was not moved with gasoline. This man was intelligent"; "Intelligent is the person whose head is good for anything, for building a house with nobody teaching him, for making any kind of improvement"). Intelligent people are also seen as interested in learning and able to learn easily and quickly; they can learn by themselves, by observing other people, or from an explanation given by someone. ("The intelligent person, when someone shows how to do something, he catches the idea and does it"; "An intelligent person is one who is interested—has interest. He sees something and is able to make it.") The ability to learn and to "make things" proved to be related to another aspect of intelligence also mentioned by many subjects—the intelligent person was usually described as having some kind of general ability: "wisdom," "geniality," "inspiration," "capacity of adaptation," "imagination," "capacity of producing good ideas," and so on. ("Intelligent is the person who makes his own plans; intelligent people are the very genius of past and present times"; "Intelligence makes the person able to adapt himself to different situations"; "An intelligent person is a sage—he knows how to do things, to think, he knows more.")

Intelligence and Schooling

Virtually all of the subjects made a clear distinction between intelligence and school acquired abilities: A person may be intelligent without having gone through school; what school gives to a person refers to a sphere of life that is different from the sphere of intelligence. Schooling was mainly seen as a process that enables people to deal with the demands of modern complex life, through the transmission of the basic literate capacities (reading, writing, and arithmetic) and through the formal qualification of individuals for occupying better places in society. People who have had school training are more able to find better jobs (both because they are formally qualified and because they know things such as how to take a test, how to fill out a form, how to use a time clock), to deal with all kinds of documents, to move about within the big city. Schooling was said to be more necessary in the city than in the country, while intelligence is useful anywhere, being an advantage even in the school situation itself. ("The person who did not go to school may be intelligent, may have a good mind. He may not know how to read but be able to build pieces of furniture, things for the house, drawings, houses"; "The one who did not go to school may have a knowledge of himself. For example, if he sees a mechanical object he tries to make one like it and it works; he may do it without having gone to school"; "Intelligence is different from schooling, here in the city it is. Here, a person who did not study does not find a good job. A person can be intelligent without having gone to school"; "School knowledge may help much, especially in the city. A person may know how to do something very well back in the Northeast, but if he did not go to school he may come to São Paulo and not get a good job because he is not able to take a test and he is shy.")

It seems, then, that the subjects make a distinction between two kinds of ability when defining intelligence and school-acquired skills: On the one hand, there is a sort of "wisdom" and the ability to make life flow with regard to basic needs, more directly related to survival, which seems to, somehow, come with the person; on the other hand, there is the capacity of dealing with some more "modern" kinds of problems, which is a result of specific training, obtainable in school.

Despite the opposition between the two kinds of ability, the subjects of this investigation seem to see them as interacting and likely to serve, alternatively, the same purposes. While a nonschooled intelligent person may be able to find a new address from a given explanation, for example, another person who did go to school but is not very intelligent may also find the new address by reading bus and street signs. In the words of a subject, "There is not much difference between a person that went to school and one that is intelligent: the intelligent person has magnificent ideas that are worth learning, while the person that went to school knows how to do things the correct way, which is interesting."

Meaning and usefulness of school. For the subjects studied, who came from rural underdeveloped areas where most of the people (including themselves and their closest relatives) are illiterate or have a very low educational level, and who migrated to São Paulo looking for a better life in the metropolis, school has a very strong symbolic meaning. Schooling, seen as a process that enables people to deal with the demands of modern complex life, is perceived as conferring status on the person who passes through it. School seems to have a value in itself, independently of the eventual benefits it may give to the students in terms of knowledge acquisition and of formal qualification.

The value given to school as such as expressed in the importance attributed to the accomplishment of the school ritual. This ritual corresponded to a rather stereotyped view of what school is: a world with its own rules, where the teacher has the maximum authority and the students should do whatever she requests, working hard under rigid discipline. In the accomplishment of this ritual a great importance was given to *the way* things should happen, as if to pass through school meant to have sat in a classroom, taken dictations, colored maps, gone to the blackboard, taken monthly tests, and so on, as necessary steps to actually getting to the substance of schooling.

The discussion of the question of the symbolic value given by subjects to school might lead to the idea that the subjects are deceived by the importance of the rituals, not taking into consideration the real meaning of school. In fact, however, there are two concrete aspects of school truly related to the accomplishment of the rituals. First of all, school does function based on specific rules and with a particular language that must be known by those involved in it. Second, the process of accomplishing the school rituals does lead to more substantial benefits than the simple repetition of pieces of routine.

Regarding the specificity of the school language and rules, it was observed that the development of school activities is based on symbols and rules that are not part of everyone's knowledge. That is, the manner of doing things in school is specific to school itself and is learned within it. The most obvious of these rules, which configure the "school frame," constitutes a stereotype rather generalized in our literate society, even among people who have never been to school (and even when this stereotype does not exactly correspond to the actual schools in operation): Virtually everyone knows that, in school, there is a teacher who teaches and dictates the rules to a group of students who should learn and obey; there is a blackboard and some desks, and people work with notebooks, pencils, and erasers. At a finer level, however, to master the mechanics of school and to manipulate its language are abilities learned inside school, and at the same time, crucial for the performance on the various school tasks. Many times the school language was more of an obstacle to learning than the content itself. People who had never been in school had extreme difficulty in dealing with the school language, while the students who had a certain amount of school training demonstrated mastery of the general mechanics of school and ability to see the various types of activity as acceptable within the school "game," even when unknown as specific activities. However, even though these trained students knew a lot about the kinds of activities likely to occur in the classroom, the formal presentation of school tasks was still an obstacle to their good performance. Comprehension of instructions, particularly written ones, was also still a big part of the problem to be solved. So, "to accomplish the school rituals" proved to be, not a misleading rule adopted by the students, but a very meaningful behavior within the logic of school.

With reference to the substantial benefits obtainable from the process of schooling, besides the main ones mentioned by the subjects interviewed (transmission of the basic literate capacities and formal qualification of students), the set of different school activities proved to lead to a very important outcome: the organization of people's knowledge. There are many pieces of knowledge usually taken for granted among members of the modern urban culture that are, in fact, gradually acquired in school. There one gets a general mapping of the basic foci of interest of our culture, absorbing, step by step, a set of facts and modes of reasoning that are incorporated, as "truths," to the common-sense universe. This basic skeleton of knowledge is the foundation for our world view and may be easily complemented by information obtained from other sources, even when it is presented in an unconnected manner.

The subjects studied, recent migrants from underdeveloped rural areas, with a short and nonsystematic passage through school, proved to have a fragmented universe of knowledge, made out of odd pieces that are not integrated. It seems that going from having the information necessary in their everyday rural life to the mastery of the information necessary and/or valued in the modern urban culture, these persons missed some essential links. This situation seems to be a result of the impact of the information system prevailing in the big city (where television plays a crucial role) on the set of information previously mastered in the rural life. These individuals have been submitted to a process of acquisition of information universalized by the urban mass culture, but, in the speed of the process, some gaps remain that disorganize their universe of knowledge. They know, for example, that there is an artificial satellite that sends the international soccer games images to their TV set, but they do not know that the earth is round or that it goes around the sun all the time. They are able to sing some American songs, repeating their English words, but think that there are two languages in the world: Portuguese and "foreign." Talking about the division of time in years and centuries, one student said we are in the year 15. He was referring to the fifteenth anniversary of the biggest Brazilian television network, which was being intensively advertised as "The year 15." These few examples show the difference between the structure of knowledge of these people and that of individuals who passed through a gradual process of socialization within the universe of knowledge of our literate and urban culture. The role of school in this process is incontestable: it is the agency addressed to the transmission of the knowledge accumulated by society, in a gradual and organized manner. The school ritual—including discipline, persistence, repetition, and accomplishment of routine kinds of tasks—is essential to the attainment of this outcome of the process of schooling. Again, then, "to accomplish the school rituals" proved to be, not a misleading rule adopted by the students, but a functional behavior towards the attainment of the objectives of school itself.

Schooling and the everyday life. For the subjects studied, who are below completion of primary school, work in nonqualified occupations, and live in an environment that, although within a large metropolis, is "unsophisticated" in terms of modern urban standards, the uses of skills developed in school refer, basically, to the reading and writing skills. The mastery of these abilities provides for a concrete distinction between the literate and the illiterate person, with clearly observable things that one can do and the other cannot. The most basic step to be mastered is that of writing one's own name. This skill is very much valued, for its absence is a symbol of the most complete illiteracy level, which has a strong negative connotation. In fact, however, just being able to write one's own name is of no practical use, for even in the formal situations in which the literate status is required, people must prove they can read and write. So, although this ability might make things easier for the individuals in the few situations in which they have just to write down their own names (signing a petition, a receipt, etc.), its value is basically symbolic, giving them a higher status than that of an illiterate.

The mastery of reading and writing skills proved to have two different kinds of applications in people's lives. First, it provides people with tools for dealing with specific demands of the modern urban system, enabling them to move about within the big city, to cope with documents and bureaucratic institutions, to work in jobs within complex types of enterprises, since they can read bus and street signs, take admission tests, deal with time clocks, and so on. The ability to cope with specific kinds of tasks means more than being able to solve specific problems—it means the possibility of dealing with the normal stimuli of the literate world, making the individuals at ease within the prevailing codes of this world. The illiterate individuals have much less autonomy, having to depend on others for facing the challenges of the literate system.

The second kind of application of reading and writing skills is the possibility for individuals to actually read and write anything they should want, that is, to really exercise the literate potential they possess, to personally enjoy this acquired tool. The most widespread concrete object of this use of literate skills is the reading and writing of letters. This is a constant and important activity for these people who live far away from their places of origin and who left relatives and friends behind. Illiterate persons must ask someone else to do this for them.

Besides letters, the literate subjects used to write various things for themselves or for others: short notes or messages, song lyrics, theater plays, single phrases, or small texts expressing someone else's or their own ideas. These pieces of writing were either handed to the teacher or to their classmates, or simply kept in their notebooks. Most of this written production had the objective of communication with others, of a simple record of personal ideas or feelings, or else of mere accomplishment of the act of writing (frequently by the simple copying of written texts from some source). The mastery of reading and writing skills proved to be meaningful as the mastery of a symbolic system, to be used by each individual as a means of communication or of personal expression.

It is interesting to observe that there was no frequent use of the written word as a helpful tool in regular everyday events outside the ambit of specific literate activities. That is, while the subjects used the written language to cope with the specific demands of the literate society on the one hand, and to manifest their thoughts and feelings on the other hand, they did not do things like writing down appointments, using paper and pencil to organize group activities, looking for jobs in the classified ads, and using the phone book. It seems that nonliterate ways of dealing with these kinds of problems did not change with the introduction of the literate skills.

FINAL REMARKS

This chapter has consisted, basically, of a detailed description of one specific environment—a Brazilian *favela*—in which the investigator was looking for the processes of construction of cognitive competence. As mentioned in the introduction, it relies on a study developed in 1980–1981, and the text is kept within the limits of this study. Its main objective was to understand how cognitive competencies are demanded from members of the studied community in everyday life situations, and how they deal with these demands. Their own conceptions about intellectual competencies were also obtained in interviews, providing the researcher with an insider's view of the question of cognition.

In these final remarks, by way of conclusion and to open other paths for reflection and research, two ideas relevant to the question of intellectual competence will be briefly discussed. These ideas emerge from the study reported, and may be related to the chapter in this volume by Keats, and also to some facts discussed in the psychological literature.

The first idea is that *intellectual competence*, be it called *intelligence* or not, is not a clear-cut and definitive concept, but a flexible domain made out of dynamic elements that seem to be ordered and reordered within each culture. The longitudinal study here reported shows how the *favela* dwellers deal with problems in ways that are sometimes similar and sometimes very different from the style considered adequate in middle class environments, how different tasks require different kinds of abilities, how some persons in the community can concentrate many competencies necessary for solving problems faced by the community members, and how people define intelligence as some kind of "general wisdom," as an ability to make things with one's own hands, and as an ability to learn easily and quickly. In her chapter, Keats discusses how traditional societies submitted to great social changes show either shifts in people's expectations for intelligent behavior or some kind of combination of "traditional" and "modern" competencies. Keats's Chinese and Australian subjects, when asked about the characteristics of intelligent behavior, gave answers that could be classified, afterwards, as "general abilities," "thinking abilities," and "personality characteristics," covering a wide range of human traits.

It is interesting to note that this multifaceted approach to cognitive abilities, evident in different sets of qualitative empirical data, is also found in psychological theories about human intellectual processes. The most fertile conceptions of the organization of human abilities used in the psychometric type of research also take it to be some sort of hierarchy of different abilities that are mobilized in different combinations according to the cognitive task to be accomplished (Cronbach & Snow, 1977; Snow, 1980).

The second idea relevant to the question of intellectual competence refers to the great importance of school, both in the conceptions of people about cognitive abilities and in the processes that take place within literate cultural groups. Keats points out that school is the main agent of "cognitive socialization," and that the introduction of schooling policies in developing countries changes people's views about intelligent behavior. In the present chapter it was shown how the *favela* dwellers clearly distinguish between intelligence and school-acquired abilities. It is interesting to observe that these two kinds of ability roughly correspond to the psychometric definitions of fluid and crystallized abilities. Fluid (or analytical) ability is a general ability that appears at the top of the many hierarchical models of cognitive abilities. It refers to abstract, nonverbal reasoning or, to use Cattell and Cattell's (1960) term, to "relation eduction capacity." Crystallized ability includes scholastic and verbal abilities, referring to achievement that depends directly on training (Cronbach & Snow, 1977; Snow, 1980). Sternberg and his colleagues (Sternberg, 1982; Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981), in an extensive study of people's conceptions of intelligence, found out that their subjects (both experts in the field of psychology of intelligence and laypersons) distinguished verbal ability from problem-solving ability when asked about the characteristics of intelligent behavior. These researchers also pointed out the correspondence between these informal conceptions of intelligence and the scientific theories that distinguish fluid from crystallized abilities.

In the same line there is the study by Wober, mentioned by Keats, about the concept of intelligence in Uganda. This author also found a distinction made between two types of intelligence: one slow and considered (associated with traditional rural values), and the other quick and sharp (associated with school educated urban dwellers).

In works that relate culture and cognition (e.g., Cole & Scribner, 1974; Luria, 1976) formal schooling and the literacy process seem to be fundamental factors in the production of qualitative changes in modes of cognitive functioning.

School is the social agency in charge of systematically transmitting the knowledge and the modes of intellectual functioning that are dominant in the literate society, besides being determined to initiate individuals in the understanding and use of the writing system. Writing itself, as a symbolic system, creates new intellectual possibilities for the previously oral human being. The study of cognitive development within culturally structured environments in literate societies must take the school as a privileged setting where shaping of the intellectual individual takes place.

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CHAPTER 10

Cultural and Environmental Influences in the Acquisition of Concepts of Intellectual Competence

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When children first go to school, they embark on a process of cognitive socialization which will continue through the school years and beyond. The school is a powerful environment in any culture: It shapes the child's developing self-concept by giving feedback on school performance, on social skills involving relationships with both peers and adults, and on peripheral skills such as sporting, aesthetic, and religious activities that may be fostered in their culture. In each of these the child has to come to understand what is regarded as good performance.

Education systems are the principal agents of cognitive socialization. It is confidently believed in developing and developed countries alike that education is the key to national progress. However, cultures may differ in the emphasis that is placed on the different components of the educational process, depending on what outcomes are valued as most highly desirable and what are considered to be the most appropriate ways to achieve those outcomes.

To foster excellence in any field, there has to be some underlying concept of what constitutes competent performance in that field. Cultural contexts differ in the degree to which individual differences are played down or emphasized. In the former case, attributions of outcome are likely to be either to the group, the view of collectivist cultures, or to social conditioning, the Russian view, rather than to innate personal qualities. In the latter case, interpersonal comparisons will play an important role. In the former it is still possible to evaluate performance, but in the latter performance may be treated as an attribute of the individual. Thus, even in social systems where individual differences are played down, intellectual competence can still be positively valued and rewarded. The effort put into study by Chinese schoolchildren clearly shows that, in the school environment, the reward in the form of acceptance in the next higher level of education is a very salient motivation. Yet popular notions of what actually constitutes intelligent behavior may be vague, and it is probable that consensus is not to be found even among those groups of people most intimately involved in situations in which intelligent behavior is stressed. Such groups include teachers, students, and the children themselves.

In this chapter we will examine the role of cultural expectations in the acquisition of concepts about intellectual competence. Some cross-cultural research is reviewed, including a study in which the perspectives of Chinese and Australian children and adults are compared.

CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF EDUCATION AND THE EXPECTATIONS FOR COMPETENCE

The educational environment is both a product of and a part of the society's cultural environment. Schools, and universities too, prepare young people within a cultural context and on the foundations of a cultural history for a future seen from that culture's distinctive perspective. As cultures differ, can there then be any universal concept of what constitutes intelligent behavior? In posing this question, we avoid the problem of trying to define intelligence. It is not the same question as "What is intelligence?". In many unschooled traditional societies puberty rites have in the past provided a symbolic means of recognizing the transition from child competencies to adult competencies. For example, elaborate training rituals introduced Aboriginal boys to the desirable adult behavior. In the past these behaviors were the skills of hunting, tracking, and the use of weapons, but they also included traditional stories that contained the sacred knowledge and ethnohistory of the tribe. Many such knowledges and skills, valued highly in earlier times, are now either threatened with extinction or devalued, and there is a loss of respect for what formerly was regarded as intelligent. For many Aboriginal youth the conflict between the cultural expectations of the tribal traditions and of modern Westernized society has not been resolved.

A similar situation is found in most developing countries, where great social changes have occurred in the space of only one or two generations. One of the most significant changes is the introduction of national schooling policies. The change from an unschooled to a schooled population shifts the source and expression of expectations for intelligent behavior from the personal authority of family and tribal elders to the external authority of books and teachers. The problems of this transition are exacerbated when the teachers come from a different cultural environment, as they frequently do. For example, in the campaigns to increase literacy in China, many children from the ethnic minorities are being taught by teachers who use Modern Standard Chinese rather than the local languages (Zuo & Wei, 1988). Some of these minority languages have no written form, and previously the people had no village schools. The holding power of the schools in these circumstances has to compete with both the language problem and the demand for labor in the fields, and it would not be surprising if the competencies valued in the home were incompatible with those encouraged in the schools. When the children respond to the cultural expectations of the school and go on to higher levels of study, they frequently have to leave their homes to study in larger centers, and in some cases go abroad. The result is often alienation; many do not return. We can ask, therefore, whether the teachers, who are mainly responsible for the positive reinforcement of certain kinds of intellectual performance, reflect the expectations of an esoteric scholastic environment or the popular expectations of the general community.

A related issue is the way in which the expectations of the adult society are passed on to the children. If these are not clearly modeled or articulated, the children may not understand what is expected of them, and their failure to comply may be interpreted as rejection of adult values, deliberate misbehavior, evidence of a generation gap, or unwillingness to be taught. In the case of social competencies there is even more likelihood of cultural variations in what is regarded as desirable.

Both age and sex differences in childrearing practices may affect the expectations of adults for children. Sex-based differential socialization treatments may produce different interpretations of competence for boys and girls. As they are rewarded differentially for similar behavior, the children's concepts of competence will develop in the culturally desirable direction. Age differences in such concepts show themselves in the implicit conceptualizations that parents work with in their dealings with children, for example, when they set tasks for children to do, or when they try to obtain an older child's forgiveness for a younger child's transgression on the grounds of the younger child being too young to understand. Schools design curricula with explicit notions of what children of each age group are capable of, and the child's own developing cognitive ability makes possible an expanding appreciation of the complexity and variety of adult expectations.

Home and school also vary across and within cultures in the degree to which they assume responsibility for children's social development as well as intellectual development. In Australia it is acknowledged, and set down in the curriculum statements of the state education departments, that the role of the school includes responsibility for social and physical as well as intellectual development. For example, courses in personal development are offered, all primary school programs give time to instruction in health and hygiene, and physical development is encouraged in physical education and active sports. Counseling services are available in all states to assist students with personal and social development problems. Many such problems arise because of the mismatch between the expectations of parents and the demands of the school. In some cases parents from ethnic minorities appear to have extremely ambitious expectations for their children, in the hope that the children will achieve higher levels of success than their parents. These demands can cause high levels of stress for the children as they strive to meet the parents' demands and at the same time to be accepted by their peer group. Some cut themselves off from the Australian peer group to concentrate on studying—the response of a number of adolescents of Asian background—while others behave as if they lived two separate lives at home and at school—the response of some Aboriginal students who leave their outback home environments for hostel life in urban centers, and of some adolescents of Greek and Lebanese ethnic background.

In Asian countries the influence of the family in the development of social competence is generally recognized as being very great (see, for example, Suvannathat, Bhanthumnavin, Bhuapirom, & Keats, 1985). This influence extends to expectations for good performance in school. Parent–child relationships within the traditional Chinese family have always been strong and they remain so in the modern Chinese family, whether in modern South-East Asian cities such as Hong Kong and Singapore, or in China itself, although the political structures may differ. In both China and Japan there is also a long tradition of respect for scholastic performance. The modernization process has introduced a new perspective to this tradition, reflected in both countries in a great deal of pressure being exerted by parents upon children to show good performance in school. Stresses of examinations for selection for entry to the next level of education exert a heavy toll but produce high performance levels compared with American children, especially in mathematics and reading in the early school years (Fang, Tong, & Liu, 1988).

Yet another important influence in the development of competence in some Asian countries is the religious school. In the Wat schools of Thailand, Buddhist teachings stress humility and respect for elders and authority. In the Koran schools of Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia, Islamic teachings are interpreted by the religious leaders. Both Buddhist and Islamic schools use repetition and modeling extensively.

Finally, there is the influence of the national ideologies, which permeate the life styles of adults and children. Capitalist or socialist, collectivist or individualistic, society pours out the messages of competence in words and pictures every day through newspapers, television, radio, and the content of advertising. These messages may not always coincide with the official pronouncements to children by school principals and teachers.

STUDIES ON THE MEANING OF COMPETENCE

Many examples from cross-cultural studies show that categorizations of competence must be regarded as being influenced by a combination of cultural, societal, and group values.

Class and caste differences in South-East Asian countries have been shown to affect parental expectations for children's competencies. Thai studies (Bhanthumnavin, 1985; Meekhun, 1981; Vanindananda, 1985) have shown strong class differences, not only in school performance, but also in achievement motivation and moral development, in each case favoring the higher socioeconomic classes. These findings suggest that concepts of competence may also vary within cultures depending on perceptions of the attainability of the competence: What one group takes for granted as available to its children may be inaccessible to others.

Wober's (1974) study of the concept of intelligence in Uganda distinguished between two kinds of intelligence, the one slow and considered, the other quick and sharp. The former was associated with traditional rural values, the latter with more modern values of the younger, school-educated urban dwellers.

The importance of the cultural context of competence is also shown in studies with Australian Aborigines. There often appears to be a lack of commitment to the tasks set by whites, suggesting the presence of quite profound value differences as to the nature of good performance. For example, Kearins (1988) asked two questions, "What sort of things would make you think that an Aboriginal child was really clever, out of school?" and "What might an Aboriginal child do, at home, that would make you think he was *not* clever?" The respondents were 178 Aboriginal adults in scattered locations in Western Australia. The second question was answered with extreme reluctance. Many would not reply or vehemently insisted that no child was unintelligent; of those who did not reply, most said that laziness was not clever. Intelligence was most often seen as independence and helpfulness. Less frequent were having bush skills, that is, the ability to track and find one's way in the bush, and sporting ability. Cognitive characteristics mentioned included talking, self-expression, reliability, responsibility, curiosity, observation, concentration, memory, imagination, being sensible, being a tryer, and staying out of trouble, but together these were not as frequently mentioned as bush skills or sporting ability. Lower in frequency were school-related skills, especially reading skills and specific skills such as drawing, painting, singing, and use of tools. Asking questions is considered neither intelligent nor desirable. From the results of their studies of learning styles of traditionally oriented Aboriginal children, Harris and Harris (1988) consider that perhaps the most important aspect of Aboriginal expectations about learning is their ritualistic view of school learning: They tend to see school as a place where learning is bestowed on them by all the masters of ceremonies (the teachers) rather than by their individual effort. Harris and Harris see this as a carry-over from the tribal traditions in which knowledge is held by the elders. A younger person would deny knowledge rather than usurp the elder's prerogative to explain or give knowledge. In Western terms these attitudes produce a paradox in a test situation. Aboriginal children are trained in independence rather than obedience, but they are also taught to be cooperative.

> A test adds up to someone demanding something of someone else, and independence training enables Aboriginal children to resist this pressure in passive and well-mannered ways. From the Aboriginal students' point of view they are doing tests only because they were told to by an adult. Therefore, from their viewpoint it is acceptable if they go about this task with a degree of casualness and indifference—or in short, don't work too fast and don't try too hard. (Harris & Harris, 1988, p. 73)

Whereas, in many earlier studies, cross-cultural data tended to show differences which favored the Western samples, more recent data from Asia have been obtained in which the differences occur but the direction is reversed: the Asian children do better than the Western children. To explain such findings, we may consider the possibility that the Asian child is simply more intelligent, a view that has been advanced not infrequently. On the other hand it could be that their performance reflects a higher level of motivation, more task-related teaching styles, a higher social value on intellectual tasks, or the effects of pressure on children to work hard at any school-related tasks.

An example of this type of finding may be seen in a series of studies by Stevenson and colleagues (see, for example, Stevenson, Stigler, Lee, Lucker, Kitamura, & Hsu, 1986), which compared children in the cities of Minneapolis, U.S.A.; Sendai, Japan; and Taipeh, Taiwan on tests of mathematics, reading, and general cognitive abilities. Two age groups, kindergarten and fifth grade, were included and the test data were supplemented by interviews with teachers and mothers and observations of behavior in the classroom. Substantial differences were found on the mathematics test in favor of the Japanese and Chinese children in both age groups. A similar result occurred on the reading test, although the disparity was not as great. However, on the general cognitive abilities tests there were no substantial differences, and the small disparities found tended to favor the American children at the kindergarten level. These tests included performance tasks such as perceptual speed, coding, and spatial abilities, and verbal tasks, including vocabulary, verbal memory, and information.

Attitudes to school differed markedly. The Japanese and Chinese children were much more favorable in their attitudes to school and spent longer hours in practice and on homework. Extra workbooks were often provided in the Japanese and Chinese homes, but this did not occur in the American homes. The schools spent more time on teaching mathematics in Sendai and Taipeh than they did in Minneapolis, and even in kindergarten the Japanese and Chinese children spent much more school time on academic work than the American children. When the mothers were asked whether they attributed success in their children to effort, natural ability, level of task difficulty, and luck, the American mothers were more likely than the Japanese or Chinese to attribute a greater role to natural abilities.

This study illustrates well the influence of cultural values as to what is desirable as good performance rather than on providing evidence of any native differences in ability. One possible interpretation is that, for the Japanese and Chinese children, the effects of the intense competitiveness of access to tertiary schooling are already being felt in the earliest years of schooling; but other, more positive values are also present. These values appear to be consistent with traditional values of respect for learning and the authority of teachers, values which characterize, not only Japanese and Chinese cultures but many other Asian cultures. The press to achieve good performance in mathematics reveals the need for competence in commerce and technology in these modernizing industrial societies where access to tertiary education is highly competitive and the key to advancement.

Social components of competence are highly valued in many cultures. In the Thai culture the quality of respect is uniquely valued. Children are encouraged to learn *krengjai*. Academic achievement without *krengjai* is not regarded as worthy. *Krengjai* incorporates a somewhat more cognitively complex concept than is usually understood in Western notions of "respect." *Krenjai* is at the heart of the elegant system of Thai interpersonal relationships; it also reinforces hierarchical distinctions. According to Vanindananda (1985, p. 185), *krengjai* is a trait which is best described as the feeling and attitude of self-effacement and humbleness, involving the desire to avoid intruding upon or embarrassing others, or causing others to extend or trouble themselves." Studies in Thailand of various aspects of child development reported by Suvannathat, et al. (1985), when taken together, suggest that this value underlies concepts of what is considered intelligent behavior, especially in the acquisition of social skills. It clearly was seen to facilitate the learning of social perspective taking, cooperativeness, and altruism, but may not be conducive to the encouragement of achievement motivation or problem solving. For the Thai, desirable intellectual performance includes effective social performance as an essential component. However, because respect of seniority and authority are stressed in socializing the child, opportunities to exchange viewpoints and attitudes with parents or adults are seldom presented (Vanindananda, 1985), and, except in some higher socioeconomic status families, there are few opportunities to develop problem-solving skills or independent critical thinking (Prachonpachanuk, 1985).

Social components also appear to play a large part in Malay concepts of competence. In Gill's study of Malay and Australian university students (Gill & Keats, 1980), three competence areas were distinguished, namely, mental abilities, arousal, and skills. In the mental capabilities group, which included understanding, thinking, learning, solving, and remembering, the only differences in rank order were on learning and solving, the other items being in the same order as above. On the skills, however, the socially related items were ranked more favorably by the Malay students. For the Australian students the order was reading, speaking, writing, symbolic skills, social and practical skills, and, last, artistic skills; but for the Malay students the order was, first, speaking skills, then social and symbolic skills, followed by practical skills, writing, reading, and, last, artistic skills: The correlation between the Malay and Australian ranking was nonsignificant.

The importance of social skills in Japanese concepts of intelligent behavior is illustrated well in the study by Azuma and Kashiwagi (Azuma, 1985) using female university students and their mothers. The first stage of the study was to obtain a list of descriptors of an ideal intelligent person, using an open-ended method of questioning. Respondents were then asked to indicate which of these descriptors applied to an actual person whom they regarded as prototypical of an intelligent male and an intelligent female. The characteristics most favored overall were "quick thinking" and "grasps the gist of a story," which were checked by over 90% of all groups of respondents. Also high on the list were "knowledge" and "good memory." However, a factor analysis produced five factors of which the first, described as social competence, accounted for 38% of all variance, and the second factor, characterized as social flexibility and modest docility, accounted for 25% of the variance. The third factor was a scholastic factor, loading on items such as planfulness, school achievement, and studies hard, accounting for 15% of the variance. The fourth was a sharpness factor, stressing speedy decision making and quick judgment, and account for 11% of the variance, and the fifth was a knowledge factor, with items including knowledge, good reader, and vocabulary accounting for the remainder of the variance. Sex differences were found, especially in the mother's responses. The characteristics associated with intelligent females more than with males were psychosocial insight, good at writing, stays in good humor, dressed nicely, sociable, smartly helpful, writes neatly, financially clever, likes to write letters, dextrous, and artistically oriented. Characteristics associated more with males were good at games, good at mathematical thinking, confident behavior, less expressive of emotions, can look things from different angles, logically coherent, calm, good at getting to consensus, and a good reader. Possibly the use of all female respondents accounts for producing such a strong emphasis on the social aspects of competence; also it could be that it was at least in part an artifact of the task demand that tended to accent and hence polarize sex-based differences. Even so, the role of cultural expectations is clearly affecting these conceptualizations.

A CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF CHINESE AND AUSTRALIAN CONCEPTS OF INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOR

The approach of first obtaining responses in open-ended questions and then using these responses to create a more formally structured questionnaire was used in a study with Chinese respondents from Beijing, China, and Newcastle, Australia (Keats & Fang, 1987). The respondents were children, teachers, university students, and other adults who were neither students nor teachers.

Interest centered on both cross-cultural and generational differences. The question was first posed in open-ended form, "In your opinion what are the characteristics of intelligent behavior in (a) a child and (b) an adult?" For their answers for a child the respondents were asked to think of a child of about 11 years of age, the age of the child respondents. (Other questions asking for synonyms and the opposite, unintelligent behavior, did not prove fruitful.) From more than 200 different responses obtained, three groups of characteristics were identified, namely general abilities, thinking abilities, and personality characteristics. The next phase of the study was to select from the responses those that discriminated between children and adults, between Chinese and Australians, or were frequent in all groups. A questionnaire was then prepared using these statements as items. Thirty-one such items were obtained and were set out in three groups comprising general abilities, thinking abilities, and personality characteristics. The items are set out in Table 1.

These items were then rated for their importance on a 4-point scale and ranked within each set. Some minor changes in the wording were made for the Australian children as a result of pilot testing, and linguistic equivalence of the Chinese and Australian versions was carefully checked. Wording variations for the Australian children are shown in brackets. These questionnaires were then given to groups of children, teachers, students, and adults, as before, with samples ranging from 110 to 250 in each group.

The rank orders obtained are shown in Table 2. Analysis with Kendall's W showed a high degree of internal consistency in all groups. Overall, the mean ratings of importance were high in all groups, indicating that the items were regarded as relevant. The lowest rating occurred in the Australian adults' rating of the personality items, where the mean rating on the 4-point scale (with 4 as the most important, and 1 as not important at all) was 2.68 (SD .685) for children and 2.81 (SD .543) for adults. The lowest mean rating received on any individual item was 2.397 (SD .647), for the Australian adults' rating for children of the personality item, "Can keep calm when difficulties arise." The rankings of all groups of subjects were correlated with each other for each of the three groups of items, and for children and adults, using Spearman rho rank order corrrelation. These results showed considerable agreement on the general abilities items. For an intelligent adult, out of the 28 correlations only three failed to reach the .05 level of significance (Australian children vs. Chinese children = .445) Australian adults vs. Chinese children = .264, Australian adults vs. Chinese students = .418). For an intelligent child 7 failed to reach the .05 level of significance, and all of these were between the Australian children and the other groups of respondents. On the personality items, there was a remarkable consensus. For an intelligent adult all correlations were positive and significant, and of the 28 correlations, 26 were above the level for $p < .01$ and 2 above $p < .05$. For an intelligent child only 2 failed to reach the $p < .05$ level (marginally), and these were between Chinese children and Australian adults (Rho = .552)

Table 1. The Items

General Abilities Group
"What can an intelligent child/adult do?"

1. Is good at thinking
2. Has excellent communication and language skills (Is good at talking to people and telling others about his or her ideas)
3. Is active and alert
4. Wants to know the answers to many sorts of questions
5. Is creative and original (Has many original ideas) .
6. Has good learning abilities (Is good at learning)
7. Is very observant (Watches carefully how other people are doing things)
8. Is good at imitating (Is good at copying correctly)
9. Can concentrate
10. Is good at remembering
11. Has a knowledge of many things (Knows many things)

Thinking Abilities Group
"What can an intelligent child/adult do?"

1. Is good at solving problems
2. Shows understanding (Can understand) when asked to do something
3. Works and thinks quickly (Works quickly)
4. Is critical, asks lots of searching questions (When thinking about a problem asks lots of questions)
5. Acts wisely and sensibly
6. Can think in abstract terms (Can understand and use difficult ideas)
7. Can reason logically (Can reason things out)
8. Can see what are the most important points of an idea and use them in different situations (Can see which ideas are the most important and use them in other situations)
9. Thinks and acts carefully and correctly (Always works carefully and correctly)
10. Has sharp clear thoughts (Can think clearly and to the point)

Personality Group
What sort of person is an intelligent child/adult?

1. Likes to try something different
2. Is an independent thinker and worker (Able to think and work alone without help from others)
3. Is confident (Self-confident)
4. Is a happy person who gets on well with others
5. Works in a cooperative spirit (Works well in a group)
6. Is modest and sensitive to other people's feelings (Is not bossy, thinks about other people's feelings)
7. Is successful (Is a successful person)
8. Is determined and perseveres when things become difficult (Keeps trying, even when things become difficult)
9. Is unpredictable (An unpredictable person—You cannot tell what he or she will do next)
10. Can keep calm when difficulties arise (Can keep calm when there are difficulties)

Note. Variations in wording for Australian children shown in brackets.

Table 2.1. Rankings for an Intelligent Adult

Item	Aust Chld	Aust Tch	Aust Stud	Aust Adlt	Chin Chld	Chin Tch	Chin Stud	Chin Adlt
a. General Abilities								
Good at thinking	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1
Language skills	8	6	6	7	4	8	6	8
Active and alert	7	10	10	6	11	9	10	10
Wants answers	4	5	7	8	5	7	5	6
Creative and original	9	9	4	10	2	2	1	2
Learning ability	2	3	2	3	3	3	4	4
Observant	3	4	3	2	6	4	3	3
Can imitate	11	11	11	11	10	11	11	11
Can concentrate	5	2	5	4	9	6	7	7
Good at remembering	6	7	9	5	8	5	8	5
Has knowledge	10	8	8	9	7	10	9	9
b. Thinking Abilities								
Solves Problems	1	2	2	2	1	2.5	1	1
Understands	5	6	6	4	8	7	7	7
Thinks quickly	7	9	9	7	10	8	9	6
Critical questioning	3	5	5	8	2	4	2	3
Acts sensibly	10	10	10	10	9	10	10	10
Thinks abstractly	8	4	4	9	7	9	8	9
Reasons locigally	2	1	1	1	3	5	6	8
Uses Ideas	4	3	3	3	4	1	4	4
Thinks carefully and correctly	9	8	7	6	5	6	5	5
Sharp, clear thoughts	6	7	8	5	6	2.5	3	2
c. Personality								
Likes to try different things	2	2	2	3	2	6	3	2
Independent	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Confident	3	4	4	2	9	4	2	3
Happy person	6	8	9	9	7.5	9	8	7
Co-operative	7	6	6	6	5	7	9	9
Sensitive	9	9	8	8	7.5	8	7	8
Successful	5	5	7	7	6	5	6	5
Perseveres	4	3	3	4	3	2	4	4
Unpredictable	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Keeps calm	8	7	5	5	4	3	5	6

and Chinese children and Chinese adults (Rho = .479). On the thinking abilities items, however, there was much less agreement. For an intelligent adult 8 of the 28 correlations failed to reach the $p < .05$ level. Of these, 3 were only marginally below the cutoff point. All correlations were positive. For an intelligent child, however, nonsignificant and negative correlations appeared. The Australian children's rankings showed zero and negative correlations with

Table 2.2. Rankings for an Intelligent Child

Item	Aust Chld	Aust Tch	Aust Stud	Aust Adlt	Chin Chld	Chin Tch	Chin Stud	Chin Adlt
a. General Abilities								
Good at thinking	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Language skills	8	7	7	9	5	10	10	11
Active and alert	4	10	9	7	6	8	7	5
Wants answers	11	3	3	4	4	6	2	3
Creative and original	6	8	5	8	2.5	4	6	7
Learning ability	2	2	2	2	2.5	2	4	2
Observant	10	4	4	3	7	3	3	6
Can imitate	9	11	11	11	10	9	8	9
Can concentrate	3	5	6	5	9	7	9	8
Good at remembering	7	6	8	6	8	5	5	4
Has knowledge	5	9	10	10	11	11	11	10
b. Thinking Abilities								
Solves problems	1	2	2	1	3	5	6	5
Understands	4	6	5	5	10	4	4	4
Thinks quickly	6	7	8	7	6	6	3	3
Critical questioning	10	4	3	3	1	1	2	1
Thinks abstractly	7	3	6	8	9	9	7	10
Reasons locigally	9	1	1	2	7	8	10	9
Uses Ideas	8	5	4	4	2	3	5	7
Thinks carefully and correctly	5	9	9	9	5	7	9	6
Sharp, clear thoughts	3	8	7	6	4	2	1	2
c. Personality								
Likes to try different things	2	2	2	2	1	2	1	2
Independent	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1
Confident	3	4	4	3	9	3	3	3
Happy person	5	9	8	7	8	7	5	5
Co-operative	9	6	5	6	7	9	9	8
Sensitive	8	10	7	9	5	8	6	9
Perseveres	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	6
Unpredictable	10	8	10	10	10	10	10	10
Keeps calm	7	7	6	8	4	5	7	7

the rankings of all other groups, the Australian teachers' rankings correlated positively and significantly with the rankings by Australian students and Australian adults, and the Australian adults' rankings correlated positively but not significantly with those of Chinese groups. In this set of 28 correlations only 7 were positive and significant at a level above $p < .05$. This group of items was in effect a subset of the most frequently occurring item, "Is good at thinking."

which was placed in the general abilities group. However, when the top priorities were extracted, it became clear that the source of most of the differences was in the items that were rejected rather than those that were ranked highly.

The top priorities present a set of opinions about intelligent behavior in Chinese children that is very similar to the opinions held about intelligent behavior in Australian children. The order of items varies a little, but there is much support for the notion of a constellation of characteristics shared in common about children in these two contrasting cultures. The only group to disagree was the Australian children's group on the thinking abilities items. Unlike the adult groups, they did not include critical thinking in their top priorities, but it is possible that the result is an artifact of the change in wording. The original form of the item, "Is critical asks lots of searching questions," had been changed to "When thinking about a problem asks lots of questions," as the term *critical* had not been well understood in the pilot runs. On the other hand, as can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, there were as many cases of the Australian children differing from the other Australian samples when no verbal changes had been made.

Overall, there appeared to be far less discrepancy between the children's and adults' rankings in the Chinese than in the Australian respondents. Adult societies communicate their values and expectations to children in many ways, both explicit and implicit. In Chinese schools, there is much more didactic teaching and clear role modeling provided in school texts than there is in Australian schools. Perhaps, also, there is more congruence between these formal explicit channels and the less formal implicit channels of socialization in China than there is in Australia . It is also possible that Australian children misinterpret adult expectations for them. Whatever the explanation, there does appear to be a generation gap in these concepts. The concept of intelligent behavior, as expressed by the Australian children, seems to be linked to notions of good behavior in school, behavior of a child who is relatively uncreative, who is uncritical and conforming but careful and correct, who shows understanding when asked to do something, who can solve problems, who thinks clearly and who acts sensibly.

There were also some unexpected results in the Chinese responses, as can be seen in Table 2. Although derived from the Chinese responses and not the Australian in the first phase, the item "Works in a cooperative spirit" was not among the top Chinese priorities and occurred only in the Australian students group in fifth rank for children. Independence, on the other hand, was a top priority for all groups for both children and adults. Another example was the item "Is good at imitating [copying a model]," also derived from Chinese responses only in the first phase. This item was placed last by all groups, both Chinese and Australian, despite the prevalence of this teaching style in Chinese schools.

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

The findings of these studies can be used to examine some theoretical issues as to the universality versus the contextual specificity of people's concepts of what constitutes intelligent behavior. Several themes emerge.

In all these studies there is a positive value placed on concepts of intelligent behavior, no matter what culture the respondents come from. The term *intelligent* is seldom if ever used in a derogatory way. In the rare cases where a characteristic is not favorable, it is when it is given as a personality trait rather than an ability or quality of thinking. Examples are "unpredictable," "moody," "swollen with pride," and "feels superior," which were found in the Australian first phase responses.

Respondents do not distinguish between personality characteristics and mental abilities. To some extent this must be attributed to the way in which these questions are posed. However, to many people in the Asian samples from Japan and Malaysia and in evidence from Thailand, social characteristics are an integral component of intelligent behavior. Learning to behave intelligently in these cultural contexts therefore places a demand upon children to acquire the appropriate social skills.

School learning may not be associated with the acquisition of social intelligence; consequently, it is not incongruent to find a strong emphasis on social components in the Japanese student and mothers groups and emphasis on the skills of mathematics in the classrooms of the young.

While there is a remarkable degree of similarity between the Chinese and Australian views, the difference between these and the Japanese views presented in the Asuma and Kashiwagi study is equally striking. The difference is clearly traceable to the sex differences in the responses. The Japanese responses for males are much closer to the Chinese and Australian.

Generation differences appear to be more typical of the Australian than the Chinese. Whether this trend would be supported in other Asian cultures would need to be tested.

In sum, the studies bring out the role of the interaction of environmental factors with cultural values in the expectations of adults for children and in setting priorities for developmental goals. They also show that it is possible for at least two cultures that are in great contrast to each other to share many ideas in common as to what is desirable as intelligent for their children. It is surely significant that the differences came from the characteristics judged of lesser importance. The studies show clearly that differences in culture do not necessarily mean difference in conceptualization about the nature of intelligent behavior.

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EPILOGUE

Comparative-cultural Co-Constructionism and its Discontents

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The contributions to the present volume remain a heterogeneous collection of efforts to make sense of manifold ways in which a developing person enters into the co-constructivist role in the course of development. The comparative-cultural perspective that was made the focus of this volume was shown to transcend the limitation of cross-cultural psychology. *Culture* was made into a virtue (rather than a nuisance) by assuming that human development is intricately embedded in the process of co-construction of meanings and conduct patterns. Irrespective of whether we encountered a Brazlilian infant in the middle of some chaotic-looking behavior (from which the mother selected and highlighted some segments, giving them meaning), or adolescents and young adults in Germany, the United States, and Indonesia trying to think through their understanding of human conduct, we could observe a certain underlying general thread that links these clearly very different phenomena: *human development takes place through the young person's constant construction of personal-cultural forms of conduct* (involving both action and mental/affective counterparts) on the basis of (but not "shaped" or "molded" by) the collective-cultural organization of the person's social world. In other terms—child development is the focus of bidirectional cultural transmission process (see Valsiner, 1989, chap. 3) where all persons involved are active co-constructors of the psychological processes in the child.

There are many reasons why this co-constructivist perspective has remained in the role of an occasionally rediscovered Cinderella in the ballroom of conceptual self-presentations of psychologists. First, it is a perspective that emphasizes the notion of *construction of novelty*—in contrast with the prevailing views in psychology that have looked for natural-science type "laws" (or lawlike "rules") that the psychological functions of persons are supposed to "follow."

Given that contrast, it is no surprise that the emphases of James Mark Baldwin (on "persistent imitation"—see Baldwin, 1892) and Josiah Royce (on "restless eagerness"—see Royce, 1903) at the turn of the century, as well as a similar focus on synthesis of novelty in the work of Soviet psychologists in the 1920s (Lev Vygotsky's and Mikhail Basov's work—see Valsiner, 1988) has been largely forgotten.

Secondly, the *systemic nature* of the co-constructivist perspective requires the definition of new units of analysis for psychology (see an analysis by Horley, 1988). These units have to retain the process dynamics of the relationship between the developing person, his or her structured context of development, and (if present) the active goal-directed actions of other persons who participate in organization of that relationship. This three-part unity is usually beyond the capabilities encoded into psychologists' traditional language use, which is geared towards classification of elementary (nonsystemic) constituents of complex phenomena. Again, the need for systemic units of analysis was episodically recognized by the predecessors of the co-constructivist perspective—Gestalt psychology's emphasis on analyzing phenomena without losing their nature as wholes (or, in Vygotsky's terminology, analysis into "minimal gestalts"—see Valsiner, 1988, pp. 173–179) coincided with the need reflected here.

Finally, the co-constructivist perspective requires the development of *new methodology* that would fit the phenomena of development. This need has been emphasized by Lamb and Wozniak (1990) in their review of the first two volumes in the present series. In conjunction with the focus of the co-constructionist perspective, that novel methodology is expected to cover a rather large territory:

> Given a co-constructive metatheoretical theme, one might expect to find research characterized by (a) dynamic analyses of the flow of events over time; (b) interactional analyses in which dyads, triads or even higher order social organizations serve as the unit of focus; (c) pattern analyses in which the overall structure of the set of relationships that exist among variables is more central than the values taken on by any one particular variable; (d) transactional analyses in which outcomes are studied as a joint function of variation in person variables and in the characteristics of specific environments; (e) multicultural and historical analyses of variations in the cultural meanings of particular patterns of interaction; and (f) a willingness to explore the relatively messy transactions that occur in everyday as opposed to laboratory environments. (Lamb & Wozniak, 1990, p. 854)

The contributions to the present volume continue the tendencies in the first two volumes of our series to cover rather episodically some of the methodological foci outlined by Lamb and Wozniak. Surely the focus on multicultural and intergenerational comparisons is added by this volume to its predecessors. In balance, it should become obvious that the co-constructionist perspective still remains in a methodological disarray—the traditional methodological canons clearly do not fit the phenomena or the theoretical underpinnings of the perspective, but at the same time the contributors' individual efforts to transcend these traditions are only partly succeeding and constantly reverting back to the traditional discourse. A major methodological overhaul of developmental psychology's methodology is in order, if this domain of our discontents is to be overcome.

ONCE MORE ABOUT CROSS-CULTURAL COMPARISONS: DISCREPANCY OF THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

As is evident from the present volume, adding the cross-cultural focus to traditional psychology does not solve the latter's problems. Rather, these problems start haunting psychologists on a worldwide scale. For them to work beyond the safe base of their own cultural habitats poses remarkable difficulties. As was pointed out in the introduction, cross-cultural psychology has been taken hostage by the notion of "culture" and has attempted to get rid of that concept in multiple ways. On its empirical side, cross-cultural psychology is known to pose its practitioners a number of problems (e.g., see Cole, Gray, Glick & Sharp, 1971; Draguns, 1982). The problems of the applications of particular methods "in the field" are merely a tip of an epistemological iceberg that entails a fundamental discrepancy between the theoretical and methodological foci of psychology at large.

It appears from the analyses of cross-cultural psychology and cultural anthropology that the reasons why cross-cultural comparisons are desired in these disciplines roughly belong to two main metatheoretical domains. First, cross-cultural comparisons are undertaken in order to *find universality* between the cultures involved. In psychology, that often has entailed the treatment of inductively demonstrated *lack of difference* between samples of subjects from "different cultures" as *proof* of such universality. In this way, cross-cultural universality is achieved through empirical "proof" of similarity of the group-aggregated data (see also criticism by Jahoda, 1981, pp. 43–44). Of course, this change in investigator's argumentation to proving the null hypothesis constitutes an inferential fallacy which remains consensually unnoticed.

The ease of entering an inferential fallacy tells us a story about a metatheoretical orientation. As was pointed out in the introduction, much of the interest in cross-cultural psychology stems from the aim of proving that what psychologists know already within their unicultural research has generality to *homo sapiens* as a whole. Psychology's generalizing ethos as an occidental-centered discipline begins thus to come close to trying to show that, although people in other cultures seem very different from us, their psychological bases for these differences do not differ qualitatively from ours. The following explanation illustrates that:

> Even when intensive work has been carried out, the difficulty of *measuring variables accurately and the lack of experimental control* in the field setting have raised questions of *validity.* Because of these problems, *a single piece of negative cross-cultural evidence should not be enough to overturn or bring seriously into question a Western relationship that has been based on careful research that has been based on careful research and numerous replications*. Further, an anomalous cross-cultural finding that fails to make sense in terms of what is already established from Western research would not usually present sufficient reason to reinterpret all previous work in that area. More generally, *the evidence stemming from cross-cultural work cannot form a foundation for the study of human development; for this basic undertaking, the cumulative findings of Western research over a period of decades are more adequate*. But the cross-cultural evidence can yield valuable modifications and *checks on the validity* of our presumptive knowledge. (Munroe & Munroe, 1975, p. 2; emphases added)

The parts of this quote that I have italicized reflect the nature of cross-cultural psychology as an extension of traditional unicultural psychology (with all of its methodological conceptualizations: validity, experimental control, measurement of variables, etc.) from the European or North-American laboratory traditions of experimental psychology to the "field" conditions of other "cultures." It is important to note that this extension is nothing new for psychology—a similar extension has occurred in the history of psychology across the boundaries of different species. The proliferation of the behavioristic orientation in American psychology led to the deductive positing of the adequacy of testing general psychological questions on selected animal species the representatives of which were available in confined laboratory environments, with a subsequent generalization of findings to psychological knowledge in general, including that about human beings. From the perspective of a laboratory-bound psychologist experimenting with hungry rats, the study of one's human conspecifics outside of the controlled conditions of the laboratory could have been viewed as inconclusive in terms similar to the declared limited role of cross-cultural evidence in the extension of psychological investigation from the Western cultures to the "others." Last (but not least), the belief in the summative accumulation of knowledge through empirical evidence from one's own culture leads a psychologist to view "anomalous" findings from other cultures as requiring *specific* explanation, rather than general reorganization of one's psychological theory.

However, what happens in the case of cross-cultural transfer of methods and their implicit theoretical bases from the context of occidental cultures to others is that the forms of organization of psychological functions in the latter cannot lead to productive development of psychology's theoretical base. The quote from Munroe and Munroe (1975) given above represents a story about the *impasse* of empiricist-accumulative notion of scientific progress (see also Toulmin & Leary, 1985). By way of predeclared limitations of the cross-cultural field conditions for "accurate research" any learning of fundamentally novel aspects about human psyche is closed to the investigator. What we might need to do in psychology at large might be exactly the opposite—to question the generality of the context-freed and methods-determined psychological data that dominate the empirical research tradition (see Manicas, 1986; Margolis, 1986; Secord, 1990a; Shames, 1990, and others). Of course, the pastime of questioning psychology's focus as science is no novelty either. Psychologists at different times have returned to that tantalizing subject matter—with much criticism and very few solutions.

PSYCHOLOGY'S BOOMING AND BUZZING CONFUSION: RECURRENCY OF "CRISES"

Psychologists' viewing of their own discipline has often led to the realization that the whole discipline is in a state of theoretical and methodological "crisis" (Bühler, 1927; Vygotsky, 1927/1982). It might be the case that psychology's "crisis" started at the time of its separation from philosophy over a century ago (see also Piaget, 1971) and continues under the constant efforts by the social institutions that maintain it to appropriate the discipline for its needs (under the nice labels of "applied value" and "practical applicability"). In the 1970s and 1980s, the discipline at large is facing another shared feeling of a "crisis."

The contemporary "crisis" situation emerged from the web of social psychology and entailed the painful recognition of the historical nature of most of the phenomena that traditional social psychology attempted to force into its physicalistic schemata (see Gergen, 1973, 1978). This recognition is linked with the whole "social constructionism" tradition that has been productive in shattering the dogmas of traditional psychology over the recent decade (Gergen, 1989; Harré, 1979, 1986; Hurrelmann, 1988; Sampson, 1977, 1981; Shotter, 1984, 1990). First and foremost, the notions of the guaranteed "objectivity" of the methods of traditional psychology's "scientific method" have been under attack and scrutiny (Bourdieu, 1973; Graumann, 1988; Gadlin & Ingle, 1975). Careful analyses of the history of psychology's methodology indicate that our contemporary dogmas of the "scientific method" in our discipline are of rather recent making (Danziger, 1985a, 1987a; Danziger & Shermer, 1993). Furthermore, the historical (and highly irrational) nature of the proliferation of statistical methods in psychology has been made explicit (Danziger, 1985b, 1987b; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Gigerenzer et al., 1989). What was sarcastically called "quantophrenia and numerology" by Pitirim Sorokin some decades ago (see Sorokin, 1956) has become the core of contemporary psychology's methodology (and a major obstacle in the advancement of the discipline—see Kvale, 1983).

In parallel discordance with the methodological numerology in contemporary psychology, one can encounter an increasing recognition of the qualitative difference of the psychological phenomena from their physical counterpart.

Psychological phenomena can exist only in the case of living systems that are open to exchange relations with their environments in irreversible time (Kenny & Gardner, 1988; Maturana & Varela, 1980; Mishara, 1988). These systems are capable of preadaptative construction of strategies to face the future life events (Anokhin, 1962; Ayala, 1970; Varela, 1971; Vygotsky, 1927/1982). Hence the scientific methodology that could adequately handle these phenomena needs to be built on the foundations of a developmental approach—an understanding that did not fail to reach the physicists of the turn of the century (see Wise, 1983).

A consistently developmental orientation to psychological phenomena needs to recognize the multilinearity of development (see Toulmin, 1981; Valsiner, 1989) that is being co-constructed in social interaction "online" (see Chapman, 1988; Clark, 1978; Harré, 1981; Miller, 1987). In that process, the subjects who participate in the research encounter are active, goal-setting and goal-attaining agents (see Secord, 1990b), rather than mere passive objects who—by an illustrative jargon expression of psychologists—are "run." All this reorientation is tantamount to a major change in methodology—a change that is currently not very clearly formulated either in practice or in the ideal wishes of social scientists.

SOME STEPS TOWARD CO-CONSTRUCTIVIST METHODOLOGY

It is not at all easy to chart out the methodological program for co-constructivist perspective that Lamb and Wozniak (1990) briefly suggested. A very major lack of differentiation of two concepts—"methodology" and "method"—in our metascientific reasoning of recent decades constitutes an obstacle on the way. In present-day psychological discourse one can find both terms used interchangeably. In contrast, it could be possible to return to the older (European) tradition of differentiating these two concepts—"methodology" then becomes the general art of constructing methods on the basis of the theoretical framework within which the given investigative effort is set up. Thus, on the one hand, the methods are based on the theory of the investigator (aided by methodology), and on the other—on the nature of phenomena to which they are applied (again a concern of methodology). Methodology thus brings together the theory and phenomena in the process of data derivation from the latter in accordance with the explicit assumptions of the former.

This suggestion is in direct opposition to the prevailing practice in empirical psychology that has been well summarized by Danziger:

> Traditional research practice in psychology proceeded as though theories and methods were, in some fundamental sense, independent of one another. Methods were assumed to be theory neutral, so that, in principle, any method could be used to confirm a theory. The choice of methods was supposed to be determined by

> considerations that were seen as purely technical in nature, considerations like precision and reliability, for example. What was not addressed was the question of the adequacy of the methods in terms of doing justice to the theories to be tested. Within this ideology of research practice theories did not enjoy the same high status as methods. Theories were seen as the personal products of individual theorists and therefore subject to accidental and irrational influences. Methods, on the other hand, were treated as though they were purely rational constructions. In fact, the rationality of the whole enterprise was guaranteed by the nature of its methodology and not by any quality of its theoretical constructions. (Danziger, 1988, p. 87)

The ascription of the status of rational inquiry to methods separated from their theoretical contexts has led to a paradoxical state of affairs in psychology where any vague combination of thoughts can be attributed the status of "theory" if some valid and reliable standard method can be claimed to constitute a test for it. Methods in this way become objects of consumeristic use for the projection of the psychologist's intuitive folk models upon the phenomena, rather than constructed tools that map the elaborated world of theory upon the structured richness of the phenomena. However, it is the latter orientation that needs to be attempted. Three basic assumptions are suggested here as a foundation for the co-constructivist methodology.

Let us first look at the focus of methodology—which is on the developing system and its interdependence with the environment. The first assumption narrows down the field of perspectives for construction of methodology. If development is the main aspect of our interest, we would need to create methodology that allows us to study it as a process. For that purpose, the individual developing child's relationships with the world are the focus of our methodological interests. This focus is contrasted with the across-contexts and across-persons accumulation of data in most of psychology (see criticism in Danziger, 1985b), with a subsequent generalization to "populations" (see Shvyrkov, 1987). Instead, each individual developing case is analyzed in the process of its development, and questions about general principles of development are asked and answered within the case history approach (see Valsiner, 1986). Subsequently, it can be possible to discover a multiplicity of developmental courses when different case histories are compared, which would lead to the appreciation of multilinearity of development (see Toulmin, 1981). Furthermore, the within-care systemic analysis of development needs to retain the temporal order that exists in the phenomena. Thus the microgenetic orientation (Draguns, 1984) on the one hand, and emphasis on the transformation from one qualitative form to another (Basov, 1929) may be of relevance. The refusal to aggregate derived data over time guarantees the possibility for detecting the moments in development where novelty comes into existence. It is for that reason that the empirical examples of Chapter 2 in the present volume or other similar examples (Tajima, 1987) are of methodological interest.

Secondly, openness to "surprises" and the detection of novelty plays an important role in co-constructivist methodology. It follows directly from the notion of co-construction that the developing person at times reaches a point at which novel forms of conduct emerge. The methodology of the co-constructive perspective needs to be capable of recognition of these moments (and of the emerging new forms). Since human development operates in parallel in the domains of conduct (external actions linked with intrapsychological mental/affective processes) and intrapsychological psychological reflection of the world, these novel forms can be found in both domains. Much of the novelty in psychological development takes place in the semiotic sphere (see D'Andrade, 1986); hence, developmental psychology cannot be based on the separation of "behavior" from its emerging meaningful context. The semiotic construction may well take place within the confines of a particular kind (of the adequate narrative structures, or as guided by language use—see Gergen & Gergen, 1988; Siegfried, 1993), but it still remains a developmentally emerging phenomenon that becomes functional as a means to the further development.

Finally, the investigator is never an independent agent who only "has effects upon" the subjects who are studied. Instead, the researcher is necessarily an active participant in the social encounters that lead to the derivation of data. Not surprisingly, scientists have been found to develop very strong affective expectations as well as ambivalent relationships with the targets of their investigation (Devereux, 1967; Mitroff, 1974). Furthermore, subtle contextual "metacontracts" that guide children's development (Elbers, 1987) set up the stage for the researcher's data derivation. Hence the co-constructionist methodology needs to define clearly the limits for its own empirical evidence. This all should remind us about the simple idea that the road to better understanding of complex developmental phenomena in their culturally organized contexts is always limited in access, and investigators need to construct new ways of thinking and means of empirical investigation to continue on the long road towards better understanding of human development.

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